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ABSTRACT 
 
After the First World War (1914-1918) – the first “total war” in modern history, where whole 
populations, not just military forces, became participants in the war effort, the potential 
power of propaganda was realised, through the exploitation of mass communication media to 
manipulate public opinion. Alongside politico-diplomatic, economic and military 
manoeuvres, governments needed to mobilise the minds of their population to secure support, 
to mobilise them behind the war policy and to avoid discontent and dissension. This was 
particularly crucial to South Africa during the Second World War (1939-1945), especially as 
the country was threatened by deeply ingrained political tensions and internal divisions. The 
wartime Union, under General Jan Smuts, experienced an escalation of political extremism 
and militancy from radical sections of white Afrikaner nationalists who opposed the 
government’s war policy. Furthermore, some elements within even the Union Defence Force 
(UDF) displayed disloyal tendencies which threatened the morale of the armed forces. Thus, 
in response, the government waged a massive propaganda campaign during the war aimed at 
stimulating recruitment, at preserving national morale, at combating anti-war resistance and 
at minimising disruptions to the implementation of its war policy. 
 
To this end, the authorities exploited information avenues such as radio broadcasts, the press, 
films, mobile recruiting tours and military demonstrations for publicity and propaganda 
purposes. As propaganda delivery channels, radio, the press and films were potentially 
powerful. However, the strategy pursued by the authorities failed to maximise their full 
impact. The government also did not enjoy a media monopoly for the conduct of its war 
propaganda. The SABC continued operating independently and its airtime was not handed 
over to the authorities. Similarly, while the government relied on the support of sympathetic 
newspaper editors for its propaganda campaign, newspapers themselves sometimes ignored 
censorship regulations and published material which was unhelpful to the national war effort. 
Meanwhile, the opposition press also contested the propaganda terrain by waging anti-war 
campaigns. Films were the weakest link due to limited government control, production 
obstacles and an English language dominance which alienated the majority of white 
Afrikaans speakers. Another problem was persistent rivalry among various official and semi-
official propaganda agencies and a lack of clarity over a common propaganda policy. 
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When it came to recruitment, government propaganda achieved particularly limited success. 
Despite patriotic appeals for volunteer enlistment, the shortage of manpower remained a 
persistent problem throughout the war. Alongside this, social and economic problems such as 
food and housing shortages also had a negative impact on public morale. The positive reach 
of propaganda efforts within the military, especially education, information and social 
welfare services, was also limited in that they were unable to dispel dissatisfaction resulting 
from poor service conditions, military policies, and the growing influence of war weariness. 
Towards the end of hostilities, there was a perceptible decline in troop discipline and morale.  
 
In general, therefore, the Union government’s overall war publicity and propaganda effort 
failed to produce a solid sense of national war cohesion or war unity. Although the country 
remained stable and was able to sustain war participation, it could not be said that South 
Africa’s leadership was able to persuade inhabitants – whether white or black - to participate 
in the Second World War as a war to be embraced as a people’s war.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die Eerste Wêreldoorlog (1914-1918), die eerste “totale oorlog” in kontemporêre geskiedenis 
waartydens nie net militêre magte nie, maar hele gemeenskappe by die oorlogspoging betrek 
is, het die potensiaal van propaganda om die openbare mening met behulp van die 
massamedia te manipuleer, tuisgebring. Naas polities-diplomatiese, ekonomiese en militêre 
maneuvrering, moes regerings ook die gesindheid van die bevolking beïnvloed om hulle agter 
die oorlogspoging te skaar en twis en tweedrag te vermy. Gesindheidsbeïnvloeding was vir 
die Unieregering van kardinale belang gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog (1939-1945), 
aangesien Suid-Afrika onder diepgaande politieke verdeeldheid en interne spanning oor die 
oorlogskwessie gebuk gegaan het. Die Smuts-bewind het hewige politieke druk en militante 
weerstand ervaar van Afrikanernasionaliste wat teen die regering se oorlogsbeleid gekant 
was. Ontevrede elemente in die Unieverdedigingsmag (UVM) het insgelyks dislojale 
neigings openbaar, wat die moraal van die gewapende magte ondermyn het. Die regering het 
gevolglik gedurende die oorlog ’n omvattende propagandaveldtog van stapel gestuur om 
weerstand teen sy oorlogspoging te beveg, ontwrigting in die implementering van die 
oorlogsbeleid tot ’n minimum te beperk, die werwing van soldate te bevorder en die 
nasionale moraal hoog te hou. 
 
Die Smuts-regering het ’n verskeidenheid van instrumente, waaronder radio-uitsendings, die 
gedrukte media, rolprente, mobiele werwingsveldtogte en miltêre demonstrasies, vir hul 
reklame- en propagandaveldtogte ingespan. Die regering se propagandastrategieë het egter 
nie dié kragtige instrumente optimaal uitgebuit om maksimum trefkrag te verseker nie. 
Daarby het die regering ook nie ’n monopolie oor alle mediaplatvorms vir geniet om hul 
propagandaveldtogte te bedryf nie. Die SAUK het onafhanklik gefunksioneer en min lugtyd 
aan die regering afgestaan om radio-uitsendings vir publisiteit en propagande te benut. Die 
regering het voorts sterk op koerantredakteurs gesteun om hul propagandaveldtog te 
bevorder, maar redakteurs het soms sensuurregulasies geïgnoreer en artikels geplaas wat 
regeringsbeleid ondermyn het. Die opposisiepers het uiteraard ook die regeringspropaganda 
met anti-oorlogpropaganda beveg. Rolprente was die swakste skakel in die regering se 
reklame- en propagandastelsels vanweë hul swak beheer daaroor, ’n gebrek aan tegniese 
vaardigheid, die hoë koste van rolprentproduksies, asook die oorheersing van die bedryf deur 
die Engelse taal, wat die meerderheid Afrikaanssprekendes die harnas ingejaag het. ’n 
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Verdere probleem was die voortdurende wedywering tussen die verskillende amptelike en 
halfamptelike propaganda-agentskappe. Dit was veral die gebrek aan ’n duidelike 
propaganda-beleid wat tot oorvleueling en mededinging gelei het. 
 
Wat werwingspropaganda betref, het die regering beperkte sukses behaal. Naas ’n beroep op 
pligsbesef, eer en glorie, het die regering oor geen hefkrag beskik om werwing te bevorder 
nie. ’n Gebrek aan mannekrag het derhalwe die UVM dwarsdeur die oorlog gekortwiek in 
weerwil van die regering se omvattende reklame- en propagandaprogramme. Teen 1945 het 
slegs sowat 330 000 uit die Unie se bevolking van nagenoeg tien miljoen vir vrywillige 
krygsdiens aangemeld. Sosio-ekonomiese uitdagings soos ’n gebrek aan voedselvoorrade en 
behuising het ook negatief op die openbare en burgerlike moraal ingewerk. Interne 
propaganda in die UVM, veral deur middel van die opvoedings-, informasie- en 
welsynsdienste, het ook beperkte sukses behaal as gevolg van ontevredenheid met militêre 
beleid, swak diensvoorwaardes en oorlogsmoegheid. Dié ontevredenheid het moraal en 
dissipline ondermyn en teen die einde van die oorlog tot uitdagende gedrag en oproer onder 
die troepe gelei. 
 
Oor die algemeen genome, was die Unie-regering se totale reklame- en propagandapoging 
dus oneffektief. Alhoewel die hele die stelsel nie in duie gestort het nie en Unie se 
oorlogspoging sonder groot ontwrigting voortgegaan het, het oorlogsmoegheid, oneffektiewe 
beleide en die invloed van sosio-ekonomiese probleme uiteindelik tot openbare en militêre 
ontnugtering gelei. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Second World War (1939-1945) was one of the most colossal events in the history of the 
twentieth century. It was the deadliest and the most absorbing in terms of the human and 
material resources. After the First World War (1914-1918) – the first “total war” in modern 
history, whereby whole communities, not just military forces, became participants in the war 
effort, the potential power of propaganda was realised, through the exploitation of mass 
communication media to manipulate public opinion.1 Propaganda was a social force which 
aided national governments in mobilising public opinion to secure national solidarity, 
cooperation and consent behind the war policy. Hence scholars, particularly in the twentieth 
century, immersed themselves in the research and production of works dedicated to 
examining the phenomenon of propaganda as an instrument for mobilising public opinion and 
shaping attitudes, primarily in the context of the Second World War.2 However, the 
conceptualisation of propaganda has been vague and, at times, it is used interchangeably with 
publicity or advertisement and also with the so-called psychological operations.3 
                                                 
1  G.S. Jowett and V. O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 4th edition, (Thousand Oaks, London and 
New Dehli, 2006), pp. 205-206; H.D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (Peter Smith, 
New York, 1938), pp. 9-10, 219-222; T.H. Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare (Random 
House, New York, 1962), p. 6; S. Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War (Geoffrey Bless, London, 
1938), p. 1. 
2 See H.D. Lasswell, ‘The Theory of Political Propaganda’, American Political Sciences Review, vol. 21, 
no. 3, August 1927, pp. 627-631; H.D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (Peter 
Smith, New York, 1938); S. Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War (Geoffrey Bless, London, 1938); 
T.H. Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare (Random House, New York, 1962); A. Rhodes, 
Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion: World War II (Angus and Robertson, London and Sidney, 1976); 
J.M. Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 
(Manchester University Press, Britain, 1984); H.D. Lasswell, D. Lerner and H. Speier (eds.), 
Propaganda and Communication in World History, vol. 1, The Symbolic Instrument in Early Times 
(Hawaii University Press, East-West Centre, Honolulu, 1979); M. Balfour, Propaganda in War: 1939-
1945: Organisation, Politics and Publics in Britain and Germany (Routledge, London, 1979); J. Wilke 
(ed.), Propaganda in the 20th Century: Contributions to its History (Hampton Press Inc, New Jersey, 
1998); Y.R. Kamalipour and N. Snow (eds.), War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective 
(Rownan and Littlefield, Lanham, New York and Oxford, 2004); G.S. Jowett and V. O’Donnell, 
Propaganda and Persuasion, 4th edition, (Thousand Oaks, London and New Dehli, 2006). 
3  See S. Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War (Geoffrey Bless, London, 1938); H.D. Lasswell, 
Propaganda Technique in the World War (Peter Smith, New York, 1938); T.H. Qualter, Propaganda 
and Psychological Warfare (Random House, New York, 1962); M. Balfour, Propaganda in War: 
1939-1945: Organisation, Politics and Publics in Britain and Germany (Routledge, London, 1979); 
H.D. Lasswell, D. Lerner and H. Speier (eds.), Propaganda and Communication in World History, vol. 
1, The Symbolic Instrument in Early Times (Hawaii University Press, East-West Centre, Honolulu, 
1979); R.D. McLaurin (ed.), Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations (Praeger 
Special Studies, New York, 1982); Y.R. Kamalipour and N. Snow (eds.), War, Media and 
Propaganda: A Global Perspective (Rownan and Littlefield, Lanham, New York and Oxford, 2004). 
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In 1927, Harold Lasswell, an American sociologist, defined propaganda as ‘the management 
of collective attitude by the manipulation of significant symbols’.4 His emphasis was on the 
impact of the appropriate symbols - written or spoken words, pictures or musical sounds, on 
the alteration of an attitude, which he defined as ‘valuational disposition or tendency to act 
according to certain patterns of valuation’.5 Accordingly, propaganda’s purpose is to foster a 
favourable or negative attitude towards or against a particular object or cause, and to 
eliminate those suggestions that would produce unfavourable responses. This definition was 
expanded in 1938, in his book, Propaganda Technique in the World War, wherein 
propaganda is defined as ‘the management of opinions and attitudes by direct manipulation of 
social suggestion rather than by altering other conditions in the environment or its 
organisation’.6 In the context of war, Lasswell emphasises that propaganda is one of the three 
chief instruments in operations: military power as coercive power on land, sea or air; 
economic pressure in terms of controlling access to resources; and propaganda as the direct 
use of suggestion to ‘mobilise the animosity of the community against the enemy, to maintain 
friendly relations with neutrals or arouse them against the enemy and to promote national 
unity’.7 In his view, Lasswell indicated that his work intended to generate an understanding 
of the propaganda phenomenon which had ‘created utopianism that fed the masses’, by 
analysing its techniques and role in that regard.8  
 
Writing in 1962, Terence Qualter argued that propaganda must also explain what the 
propagandists do. Thus, he defined it as ‘the deliberate attempt by some individual or group 
to form, control, or to alter the attitudes of other groups by the use of the instruments of 
communication, with the intention that in any given situation the reaction of those so 
influenced will be that desired by the propagandist’.9 For effectiveness, Qualter emphasised 
the need for propaganda to adapt to the needs of the situation and the audience in order for it 
to ‘be seen, remembered and acted upon’.10 Other scholars defined propaganda in the context 
of their own fields such as psychology, political science, history and also as a type of 
                                                 
4  H.D. Lasswell, ‘The Theory of Political Propaganda’, The American Political Science Review, vol. 21, 
no. 3, August 1927, p. 627. 
5  Ibid., pp. 627-631. 
6  Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War, p. 9. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Ibid., p. 2. 
9  T.H. Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare (Random House, New York, 1962), p. 27 
10  Ibid., p. xii. 
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communication.11 Still today, there is no consolidated thought on the conceptual definition of 
propaganda. 
 
Leonard William Doop indicated in 1989 that it was not possible to have a clear-cut 
definition of propaganda because of its complex nature involving societal behaviour in 
different times and cultural contexts.12 However, Jowett and O’Donnell disagree. They 
believe that, although the definition is itself complex, it is necessary to identify its 
characteristics in order to be able to analyse it.13 To that end, they offered their own 
definition: ‘propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate 
cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the 
propagandist’.14 In analysing the basic features of propaganda, Jowett and O’Donnell state 
that it is a form of communication, with emphasis on the deliberate intent (wilful and 
premeditated), systematic (meaning methodical and in organised regularity, not random) and 
the goal is to ‘attempt’ or try to ‘create a certain state or states in a certain audience’, for 
example, ‘perceptual, cognitive, behavioural’ or all of them.15 The desired end-state should 
be determined as an objective beforehand. This definition does not significantly deviate from 
the previous definitions. Other scholars appropriated Jowett and O’Donnell’s definition in 
their analysis of propaganda, because it is more encompassing and incorporates most of the 
basic elements, such as intentionality, systematic “attempt” and the manipulation of thought, 
attitude and action to benefit the propagandist.16 
 
The definition by Jowett and O’Donnell is more relevant to this study because it provides a 
broad framework for an account of the role of propaganda in warfare throughout the history 
of the twentieth century, particularly the way it was applied during the First and Second 
World Wars.17 It also incorporates some of the key thoughts about propaganda that featured 
in the pre-war works of the influential authorities on the subject, Harold Lasswell (pioneer of 
                                                 
11  See Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, pp. 1-14; J.M. Mackenzie, Propaganda and 
Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester University Press, 
Britain, 1984), p. 3; J. Wilke (ed.), Propaganda in the 20th Century: Contributions to its History 
(Hampton Press Inc, New Jersey, 1998), p. x; H.D. Lasswell, D. Lerner and H. Speier (eds.), 
Propaganda and Communication in World History, vol. 1, The Symbolic Instrument in Early Times 
(Hawaii University Press, East-West Centre, Honolulu, 1979), pp. xii-xiii, 5-6. 
12  As Quoted in Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 4. 
13  Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 4. 
14 Ibid., p. 7. 
15 Ibid., pp. 7-9. 
16  J. Wilke (ed.), Propaganda in the 20th Century, p. x. 
17  See Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, chapter 5 (Propaganda and Psychological 
Warfare). 
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propaganda studies), Leonard Doop (foremost author on the psychology of propaganda and 
served as director of foreign intelligence in the office of war information (USA) during the 
Second World War), as well as Sidney Rogerson, (publicity and public relations specialist 
and former British military officer).18 These works, focusing on war propaganda, were 
published in the 1930s. 
 
In South Africa, the conception of propaganda was broad and flexible. It was conceptualised 
by specialists in various fields such as H. Sonnabend, S. Biesheuvel, R.F.A. Hoernlé and L. 
Fouché, as well as the leading educationist and wartime director of military intelligence, E.G. 
Malherbe.19 These specialists conceptualised the basic principles of propaganda in terms of 
the philosophical foundations, historical development and psychology, for special 
instructions in the various institutional agencies which carried out propaganda activities. 
Basically, the conception of propaganda included elements such as information or 
“education”, a form of publicity or advertisement as well as a form of psychological and 
political persuasion, all aimed at manipulating perceptions and influencing behaviour towards 
the interests of the government.20 Broadly speaking, the aims were to create awareness and to 
arouse public interest in the war, to influence the public to reject Nazism and Fascism as well 
as the narrow ethnic-based nationalism, and to embrace the liberal democratic values and a 
common “white South Africanism” pursued by the ruling United Party under General J.C. 
Smuts.21 Towards blacks, propaganda was aimed at combating agitations and to influence 
them to remain acquiescent and non-challenging to the established socio-political order. 
 
Thus, the basic thrust of Jowett and O’Donnell’s definition and its inherent characteristics, 
mainly drawn from the historical examples including the two world wars, is more of a 
refinement of the previous broad notions about propaganda; hence its relevance and 
usefulness in the South African context during the Second World War. 
                                                 
18  Lasswell, The Theory of Political Propaganda (1927); Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World 
War (1938); Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War (1938); L.W. Doop, Propaganda: Its Psychology 
and Technique (Henry Holt, New York, 1935). 
19  E.G. Malherbe’s wife, Janie Malherbe also served as an intelligence officer in the Union Defence Force 
during the Second World War. To eliminate confusion in references to the Malherbes in this study, the 
director of intelligence (E.G) will be identified as Dr Malherbe and the wife through her relevant 
military rank. 
20  Propaganda instruction was carried out by a semi-official pro-government propaganda agency called 
the Union Unity Truth Service (UUTS), which established a School for Propaganda and Political 
Instruction in Johannesburg during the war. 
21  See J. Lambert, ‘An Identity Threatened: White English-speaking South Africans, Britishness and 
Dominion South Africanism’, 1934-1939, Kleio, vol. 37, no. 1, 2005, pp. 50-70. 
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As indicated above, the potential power of propaganda was acknowledged at the end of the 
First World War. It was realised that warfare had transformed and, as Jowett and O’Donnell 
put it, ‘no longer did single battles decide wars … whole nations were pitted against other 
nations, requiring the cooperation of entire populations, both militarily and 
psychologically’.22 Michael Howard, a British military historian, held a similar view that, 
‘war had become a matter, not simply for military specialists, but for society as a whole’.23 
The British had led the way during the First World War by organising propaganda agencies, 
such as the War Aims Committee, the War Propaganda Bureau and the Neutral Countries 
Sub-committee, to wage a massive mobilisation effort to preserve national morale and to 
conduct psychological warfare against the enemy.24 At that time, the British propaganda 
efforts were undertaken by Alfred Charles Harmsworth or Lord Northcliffe, the press man of 
Britain who owned a chain of newspapers, including The Times and The Daily Mail.25 He 
was approached by the prime minister, Lloyd George, to become the director of propaganda 
in 1916, because of his huge influence in the print media. But, John Buchan, another 
influential military correspondent who served under John Charteries in the British 
intelligence section on the Western Front, was appointed to that position in early 1917.26 On 
30 May 1917, Lord Northcliffe was appointed as head of War Mission to the United States of 
America (USA) to ‘control British operations’ there, including publicity.27 
 
Due to the exaggeration of the ‘atrocity stories’ featuring massacres, mutilations or tortures of 
civilians or prisoners of war, mainly in the anti-German campaigns, to draw sympathies from 
the neutral countries or to persuade the Americans to enter the war, propaganda was 
discredited after the war, particularly in Britain and in USA.28 The USA’s Committee of 
                                                 
22  Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 207. 
23  M. Howard, ‘Total War in the 20th Century: Participation and Consensus in the Second World War’, in 
B. Bond and I. Roy (eds.), War and Society: A Yearbook of Military History (Holmes and Meier, New 
York, 1975), p. 216. 
24  Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 208; A. Rhodes, Propaganda: The Art of 
Persuasion: World War II (Angus and Robertson, London and Sidney, 1976), pp. 107-108; Rogerson, 
Propaganda in the Next War, pp. 1-11, 20-23. 
25  See Biography by J.L. Thompson, Northcliffe: Press Baron in Politics, 1865-1922 (John Murray 
Publishers, London, 2000); Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 107; Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and 
Persuasion, pp. 208. 
26  Thompson, Northcliffe, pp. 267-268; J. Buchan, The South African Forces in France (Imperial War 
Museum and Battery Press, Nashville, 1920), pp. 1-5; Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 107; Jowett and 
O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, pp. 208. 
27  Thompson, Northcliffe, p. 275. 
28  Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 107; Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 208-217; Qualter, 
Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, p. 66. 
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Public Information (CPI), headed by the journalist, George Creel, suffered the same fate as in 
Britain because the post-war realities proved to be inconsistent with the wartime propaganda 
messages.29 But, there were concerns from some propaganda enthusiasts who believed that 
the British government should have ‘an organised information service as necessary as any 
line of defence in the future war’.30 Conversely, unlike in the First World War, it should be 
driven by the truth, not ‘false news’ which would be contradicted by evidence later on.31 The 
Germans, under Adolf Hitler, had realised the impact of propaganda on the defeat of 
Germany in 1918, and thus took over where the British and the Americans had left off, to 
orchestrate a wave of propaganda in Germany and across the world during the inter-war 
years.32 A special government ministry for propaganda headed by Joseph Goebbels (ministry 
of public enlightenment and propaganda) was established in Germany, and the world was 
subjected to an intensive propaganda campaign to promote Hitler’s ideology of National 
Socialism (Nazism). 
 
Many avenues were exploited by Nazi Germany for propaganda purposes, especially the new 
innovation of radio, which broadcast messages in a variety of languages to thousands of 
audiences in foreign countries. Nazi agents penetrated the social, political and economic 
structures of societies in foreign states through “expert missions”, including South Africa, in 
order to facilitate the advancement of the ideals of Nazism.33 By the outbreak of the war in 
September 1939, Nazi propaganda had created confusion in the targeted countries, and some 
in Europe, notably Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Scandinavians, quickly 
succumbed to the German military power. Also, France and Britain reacted too late, both 
militarily and through propaganda, in some cases, due to the influence of the pre-war pro-
German lobbies such as the Cliveden Set in Britain.34 It was only when the war had already 
begun, that national governments began to build-up the psychological resistance to Nazi 
propaganda, through the establishment of special information and propaganda agencies as 
part of the overall wartime strategy. It is therefore no surprise that during and after the war, 
                                                 
29  Jowett and O’Donnel, Propaganda and Persuasion, pp. 208-217; Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 131. 
30  Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 108; Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War, p. 156. 
31  Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 119; Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War, p. 156. 
32  J. Wilke (ed.), Propaganda in the 20th Century, Introduction, pp. 1-2; Qualter, Propaganda and 
Psychological Warfare, pp. 112-114; Balfour, Propaganda in War, pp. 422-425; Howard, Total War in 
the 20th Century, p. 218; Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 212. 
33  See O.v. Strahl, Seven Years as a Nazi Consul (Ridout and Co, Cape Town, 1942); Qualter, 
Propaganda and Psychological Warfare; Rhodes, Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion: World War II; 
Balfour, Propaganda in War: 1939-1945: Organisation, Politics and Publics in Britain and Germany. 
34  See N. Rose, The Cliveden Set: Portrait of an Exclusive Fraternity (Pimlico Random House, London, 
2001). 
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volumes of works dedicated to the examination of propaganda during the Second World War 
were produced. However, the focus was more on Europe, Asia and USA.35 Africa, which was 
also subjected to propaganda from all sides – the colonial masters seeking black cooperation 
and support during the war or the opposing powers attempting to disrupt the war effort by 
creating internal dissensions - featured less in that historiography about wartime propaganda. 
Only recently, some works have attempted to fill this void.36 
 
In South Africa, the history of Second World War propaganda is a theme that attracted little 
attention. The most informative publications on South Africa’s role in the Second World War 
have appeared as official histories, but are more concerned with the campaign, battle or 
regimental histories of the traditional “drum and trumpet” type, with a strong focus on 
strategy, organisation and the operational aspects of the war.37 Very few38 have crossed into 
the so-called “New Military History”, for example, those that reflect on the experiences of 
                                                 
35 Studies of propaganda in the Second World War have been undertaken in various countries especially 
in Germany, former U.S.S.R, USA, France, Italy, Japan and Britain, as it gained recognition as an 
essential tool in furthering the aims of nation states in peace and war. See Lasswell, Propaganda 
Technique in the World War; Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War; Qualter, Propaganda and 
Psychological Warfare; Rhodes, Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion: World War II; Mackenzie, 
Propaganda and Empir; Lasswell, Lerner and Speier (eds.), Propaganda and Communication in World 
History; Balfour, Propaganda in War: 1939-1945; Wilke (ed.), Propaganda in the 20th Century; Y.R. 
Kamalipour and N. Snow (eds.), War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective (Rownan and 
Littlefield, Lanham, New York and Oxford, 2004); Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and 
Persuasion. 
36  See for example B. Ibhawoh, ‘Second World War Propaganda, Imperial Idealism and Anti-Colonial 
Nationalism in British West Africa’, Nordic Journal of African Studies, 16(2), 2007, pp. 221-243; R. 
Smyth, ‘War Propaganda during the Second World War in Northern Rhodesia’, African Affairs, vol. 
83, no. 332, July 1984, pp. 345-358. 
37 See an analysis of the Second World War official histories by I.J. van der Waag, ‘Contested Histories: 
Official History and the South African Military in the Twentieth Century’, in J. Grey (ed.), The Last 
Word? Essays on Official History in the United States and British Commonwealth (Praeger, Westport, 
Connecticut and London, 2003), pp. 27-52. See also the role of the Union Defence Force (UDF)’s 
Union War Histories Committee (1940-61), which produced official history trilogy by J.A.I Agar-
Hamilton and his associates (Crisis in the Desert May-July 1942, published in 1952; The Sidi Rezeg 
Battles 1941, published in 1957; War in the Southern Oceans 1939-45, published in 1961). These were 
followed by the South African Forces in World War II Series publications by an Historical Advice 
Committee led by the journalist, N. Orpen and the novelist, J. Ambrose Brown, as well as the works 
produced by former servicemen who wanted the world to remember South Africa’s contribution in the 
Second World War. Such publications concentrated on the operational aspects of the war (land, air, 
role of the navy) as well as individual campaigns and regimental histories. The South African Forces in 
World War II, vol. 7: Military and Industrial Organisation, penned by Orpen and Lt Gen H.J. Martin, 
and appearing in 1979, moved slightly away from the military operations to the organisational 
dimension of the war. 
38 See for instance L.W.F. Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of the South African Blacks in the Second 
World War’ (Unpublished D. Litt et Phil Thesis, RAU, Johannesburg, 1986); I. Gleeson, The Unknown 
Force. Black, Indian, Coloured Soldiers Through the Two Wars (Ashanti Publishing, Rivonia, 1994); 
and M. Roth, ‘If you give us rights we will fight: Black involvement in the Second World War’, South 
Africa Historical Journal, No. 15, November 1983, pp. 85-104; S. Chetty, ‘Gender under Fire: 
Interrogating War in South Africa, 1939-1945’ (Unpublished MA Thesis, Historical Studies, 
University of Kwazulu-Natal, Durban, December 2001). 
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troops in the frontlines, endurance, deprivations on the home front, prisoners of war, plight of 
foreign nationals, military-society links, circumstances of non-whites, information 
management and propaganda.39 The rationale leans more towards the traditional world-wide 
predominance of the sensational aspects of war, i.e. campaign analysis, battlefield accounts, 
strategy and tactics or the professional activities of armed forces such as doctrine, 
organisational structure, weapons development, as well as the procurement and training of 
manpower.40 In his doctoral dissertation awarded by the Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit (now 
University of Johannesburg) in 1986, Louis Grundlingh noted this neglect and stated that, 
‘considerable studies on the Second World War have lately been done on aspects other than 
military or strategic. The same cannot be said about South Africa. In the available literature, 
military themes dominate. No social questions were asked’.41 In addition, given the diversity 
of the South African society in terms of race, class, gender and culture, social themes in the 
context of the Second World War experience by different groups still remain under-
researched. This is the main weakness that Grundlingh attempted to correct, by at least 
addressing the experiences of the one neglected section of the South African population, 
blacks, and analysing their participation in the Second World War. His contribution has 
enriched the South African historiography in that regard, especially as this section of the 
society was hitherto scantily mentioned in mainstream histories. Grundlingh’s work is one 
example of attempts to broaden the frames of enquiry regarding South Africa’s experiences 
of the Second World War by the diverse sections of the population, from a social and 
political perspective, that is, other than the military aspects. 
 
Furthermore, the efforts of Grundlingh have since been supplemented by related studies such 
as Ian Gleeson’s book, The Unknown Force: Black, Indian, Coloured Soldiers through the 
                                                 
39 The so-called “New Military History” is one of the contested aspects of histories dealing with wars and 
conflicts, which emphasize that war should be considered more broadly, beyond the operational 
strategies and tactics, to reflect its (war) impact on the society and culture. See A. Marwick, War and 
Social Change in the Twentieth Century: A Comparative Study of Britain, France, Germany, Russia 
and the United States (MacMillan, London, 1974); B. Bond and I. Roy (eds.), War and Society: A 
Yearbook of Military History (Holmes and Meier, New York, 1975); B. Vandervort, Wars of Imperial 
Conquest: 1830-1914 (Routledge, London and New York, 1998); D. Ashkenazy (ed.), The Military in 
the Service of Society and Democracy: The Challenge of the Dual-Role Military (Greenwood, Wesport, 
Connecticut and London, 1994); P. Karsten (ed.), The Military and Society: The Military-State-Society 
Symbiosis, vol. 5 (Garland Inc, New York and London, 1998), and J. Black, Rethinking Military 
History, (Routledge, London and New York, 2004). 
40  See van der Waag, Contested Histories, pp. 27-29. 
41  L.W.F. Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of the South African Blacks in the Second World War’ 
(Unpublished D. Litt et Phil Thesis, RAU, Johannesburg, 1986), p. 3. 
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Two World Wars, which appeared in 1994.42 As the title suggests, Gleeson provides an 
overview of the role played by blacks, Indians-Malays and so-called coloureds, collectively 
referred to as “Non-Europeans”, as the neglected sections of the society in South Africa 
during the two world wars. It is however too short to cover the entire spectrum of two world 
wars and how each of the sections played their part and their experiences thereof. Non-
Europeans were also not homogenous socially, culturally or politically. Although all (Non-
Europeans) were subjected to South Africa’s discriminatory policies, each group was further 
sub-categorised and subjected to the differentiated military service conditions. Thus, the 
experiences of Non-Europeans were different. 
 
Since then, a few more useful studies focussing on the broader issues relating to South Africa 
during the Second World War have appeared. Specifically, they cover the various war-related 
aspects such as the Union’s politico-strategic environment43, international relations44, the 
impact of the Ossewa-Brandwag’s anti-war activism45, the Nazi penetration and influence in 
South Africa46, social history of white servicemen47, the anti-Semitism in South Africa48 as 
                                                 
42  I. Gleeson, The Unknown Force. Black, Indian, Coloured Soldiers Through the Two Wars (Ashanti 
Publishing, Rivonia, 1994). 
43  A. Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War (Continuum, London, 
2008); R. Hyam and P. Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer 
War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003); P.J. Furlong, ‘Allies at War? Britain and the 
“Southern African Front” in the Second World War’, South African Historical Journal, vol. 54, no. 1, 
pp. 16-29. 
44  Hyam and Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003); Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the 
Second World War (Continuum, London, 2008). 
45  P.J. Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika. The Impact of the Radical Right on the Afrikaner 
Nationalist Movement in the Fascist Era (Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 1991); G.C. Visser, 
OB: Traitors or Patriots? (Macmillian, Johannesburg, 1976); A.M. Fokkens, ‘The Role and 
Application of the Union Defence Force in the Suppression of Internal Unrest, 1912-1945’ 
(Unpublished Master of Military Science Thesis, Stellenbosch University, December 2006); C. Marx, 
Oxwagon Sentinel: Radical Afrikaner Nationalism and the History of the Ossewabrandwag (University 
of South Africa Press, Pretoria, 2009). 
46  R. Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa in the Nazi Period (Greenwood Press, New York, 
1991); C. Marx, ‘“Dear Listeners in South Africa”: German Propaganda Broadcasts to South Africa’, 
South African Historical Journal, no. 27, November 1992, pp. 148-172. 
47  N. Roos, Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961 
(Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot and Burlington, 2005); M. Cardo, ‘“Fighting a Worst Imperialism”: 
White South African Loyalism and the Army Education Services (AES) during the Second World 
War’, South African Historical Journal, vol. 46, No.1, May 2002, pp. 141-174. See also M.J. Cardo’s 
doctoral thesis, ‘Culture, Citizenship and White South Africanism, c. 1924-1948’ (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 2003). 
48  P.J. Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika. The Impact of the Radical Right on the Afrikaner 
Nationalist Movement in the Fascist Era (Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 1991); D. Scher, ‘Louis 
T. Weichardt and the South African Greyshirt Movement’, Kleio, vol. 18, 1986, pp. 56-70; J. Hellig, 
‘German Jewish Immigration to South Africa during the 1930s: Revisiting the Charter of SS Stuttgart’, 
Jewish Culture and History, vol. 11, issue 1-2, 2009, pp. 124-138; S. Gilbert, ‘Jews and the Radical 
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well as the wartime elections.49 In the context of the social dimensions within the military 
forces, three works are notable: Ian van der Waag’s History of the South African Defence 
Force Institute, (SADFI, then known as the Union Defence Force Institute (UDFI)) (1991)50, 
covers the social welfare services (canteen system) for the UDF troops; Henrius Bantjés’s 
Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep (The Entertainment Unit) (1990)51, which covers the 
entertainment services organised for the military forces; and Michael Cardo’s Army 
Education Services (AES) (2002)52, which deals with the information and political education 
system within the UDF. 
 
However, as far as wartime propaganda in South Africa is concerned, there is no single and 
detailed study longer than a journal article. Some of those that emerged most recently, for 
instance, the articles of K. Fedorowich and E.D.R. Harrison, focus on the espionage, 
subversive operations, intelligence and counter-intelligence activities involving Germany and 
Britain in southern Africa.53 A very recent publication by S. Chetty, has attempted to provide 
a glimpse of the propaganda effort in South Africa. However, it has a narrow source base and 
focus as it describes mainly the visual propaganda dimension based on the analysis of a pro-
war publication, Libertas and the two post-Tobruk documentaries, Fall In and With our Men 
in the North, produced for military recruitment.54 The article is also slanted towards women 
and, to a limited extent, the representations of blacks in those visual propaganda materials. 
Therefore, there is no detailed and in-depth study of wartime propaganda in South Africa. 
This historiographical limitation needs to be addressed because of the various socio-political 
                                                                                                                                                        
State: Legacies of the Holocaust in Apartheid South Africa, 1945-60’, Jewish Social Studies: History, 
Culture, Society, vol. 16, no. 3, 2010, pp. 32-64. 
49  F.D. Tothill, ‘The 1943 General Election’ (Unpublished Master of Arts thesis, University of South 
Africa, 1987). 
50  I.J. van der Waag, A History of the South African Defence Force Institute (SADFI), 1914-1990 (1 
Military Printing Unit, SADF, Pretoria, 1991). 
51  H. Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep van die Unie-Verdedigingsmag Gedurende die Tweede 
Wereldoorlog: n Historiese Ontleding’ (Unpublished master’s (MA) Thesis, University of Pretoria, 
Pretoria, 1990). 
52  M. Cardo, ‘“Fighting a Worst Imperialism”: White South African Loyalism and the Army Education 
Services (AES) during the Second World War’, South African Historical Journal, vol. 46, No.1, May 
2002, pp. 141-174. 
53 See K. Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence in South Africa and 
Mozambique, 1939-1944’, The Historical Journal, vol. 48, 2005, pp. 209-230; P.J. Furlong, ‘Allies at 
War? Britain and the “Southern African Front” in the Second World War’, South African Historical 
Journal, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 16-29; E.D.R. Harrison, ‘British Subversion in French East Africa: SOE’s 
Todd Mission’, English Historical Review, vol. 114, 1999, pp. 339-369; E.D.R. Harrison, ‘On Secret 
Service for the Duce: Umberto Campini in Portuguese East Africa’, English Historical Review, vol. 
122, 2007, pp. 1318-1349. 
54  S. Chetty, ‘Imagining National Unity: South African Propaganda Efforts during the Second World 
War’, Kronos, vol. 38, no. 1, 2012, pp. 106-130. 
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challenges and the competing ideological paradigms (fascism, black and white nationalisms, 
liberal politics as well as communism) which were accelerated in the country during that war. 
 
As E.G. Malherbe put it, during the Second World War, South Africa was the only country to 
engage in what was regarded as a ‘two front war’: the first front being outside, i.e. in the 
theatre where battles were fought, and the second front being inside, i.e. the homefront, 
against the subversive activities and sabotage operations waged by some anti-war factions.55 
Interestingly, in 1920, John Buchan said exactly the same thing of South Africa in the First 
World War. He indicated that, ‘South Africa, of all the British Commonwealth nations, had 
the most intricate task … [she] had foes within and without her gates … she had to contend 
with internal revolution and the enemy across her own border’.56 This had huge implications 
for internal security, stability and public order as well as presented a threat to the country’s 
war effort. Thus propaganda, almost everywhere, assumed strategic significance as an 
instrument of state policy during war and crisis. In South Africa, particularly, since the 
government adopted a volunteer military system and having to construct a military force 
basically from scratch, because the previous administration under General J.B.M. Hertzog 
pursued a thrifty and passive defence policy, propaganda was more vital. At the time, the 
UDF was severely ill-prepared for the war, with no equipment, trained manpower and 
training facilities in September 1939. To compound matters, there were elements within the 
UDF who were opposed to the war policy and also refused to serve beyond the borders of the 
Union. Some of them even displayed disloyal tendencies and thus threatened the cohesion 
and morale within the armed forces. 
 
Another challenge for South Africa was the reaction of the population to the war. Some white 
Afrikaans-speaking sections of the society were violently opposed to the country’s support of 
Britain and subsequently waged various anti-war campaigns to maintain putative neutrality. 
Hence the views stated above, that the Union faced a two-front war because, after the 
mobilisation of the UDF for deployment in the war theatres, about half of the troops remained 
in the country to counter the anti-war resistance and safeguard internal security. Sections of 
the white Afrikaans speakers were also heavily influenced by Nazi propaganda, particularly 
through the Zeesen Radio broadcast service, which encouraged Afrikaner dissension and the 
                                                 
55 E.G. Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment (Howard Timmins Publishers, Cape Town, 1981), p. 215. 
56  J. Buchan, The South African Forces in France (Imperial War Museum and Battery Press, Nashville, 
1920), p. 13. 
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overthrow of General J.C. Smuts’s government. With regard to blacks, the racial policies 
prevented them from whole-heartedly supporting the war policy, particularly since they were 
requested to serve without arms (guns). There was also contradiction between what the war 
was fought for: the values of democracy and freedom, against the undemocratic doctrines of 
fascism and Nazism, and on the other hand, the segregation policies which denied those 
democratic values to blacks. Hence their limited support for the Union’s war policy. In a 
nutshell, the Union was not united when war broke out. The government of Smuts, which led 
the country into the war, was severely constrained and had to navigate a number of problems 
in order to give effect to its war policy. It is on this basis that propaganda became critical to 
create an imperative for intervention in the war and to mobilise public support. 
 
Hence the need arose to undertake this study in order to examine the role and significance of 
propaganda in South Africa’s effort to effect its war policy, while on the other hand having to 
contend with a multifaceted internal anti-war activism. To fill this neglected gap of South 
Africa’s wartime experience, this study seeks to explore the propaganda efforts in the 
country, by attempting to address a few questions: What kind of challenges did the authorities 
encounter? What were the internal security conditions and threat perception that necessitated 
the mobilisation of propaganda? What were the goals of that propaganda? What kind of 
policy measures and response strategies were employed? How did the authorities cater for the 
different population and gender groups? Which kinds of programmes were implemented? 
Which kinds of platforms were exploited and for what purpose? In which areas were those 
programmes and platforms applied? What was the content or the main themes of the 
propaganda messages? Given the diversity of the population and their interests, how did the 
targeted audience react to propaganda? And lastly, how effective were those propaganda 
platforms and programmes, i.e. success and failures of those efforts? 
 
As Marwick states, ‘war is a great auditor of institutions … a supreme test of a country’s 
military, social, political and economic institutions … if they are inadequate they will 
collapse.’57 South Africa was severely tested during the Second World War. This study 
examines the above questions, from a socio-political perspective, and attempts to give 
account of how the Union government exploited propaganda in an effort to give effect to the 
war policy and to sustain the country’s institutions. Therefore, the Union government and its 
                                                 
57  A. Marwick, War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century: A Comparative Study of Britain, 
France, Germany, Russia and the United States (MacMillan, London, 1974), pp. 6, 12. 
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actions are at the centre of the study. The population, on whom propaganda from the 
government, the opposition movements and from the enemy was applied, is also central to the 
analysis, especially in terms of the reactions. This study is confined to the South African 
context, but references to other areas will be made where this is relevant or could assist in the 
illumination of the analysis. 
 
As highlighted, the study also takes into account the structural and socio-political diversity of 
the South African society (even in the military), which therefore implies an examination of 
the propaganda strategies and objectives as applied to the different population groups and 
their responses. The study is undertaken within the context of “war and society”, because it 
investigates a social phenomenon – propaganda – and its usage in the manipulation of the 
society’s thoughts, attitudes and behaviour during the war situation. There is a clear link 
between the war and its impact on the South African society. 
 
The study itself is based on extensive research in South Africa’s archival repositories. The 
records in the South African National Defence Forces Archives (Military Archives) in 
Pretoria, form the main basis of the study. The most significant archival groups are the 
Archives of the Chief of the General Staff, Archives of the Adjutant General, Archives of the 
Secretary for Defence, Archives of the Directorate for Non-European Services and the Native 
Military Corps, and the Press and Propaganda Archives. Other critical records on the subject 
of this study were obtained from the National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria. Most 
importantly, the Smuts papers were particularly useful. They were supplemented with the 
Archives of the Secretary for Native Affairs. Other critical papers used are the Harry (H.G.) 
Lawrence collections (University of Cape Town), E.G. Malherbe collections (University of 
Kwazulu-Natal, Durban) and T.C. collections (Wits University, Johannesburg). The National 
Museum of Military History, Johannesburg, was also useful in their collections of the posters, 
war art and photographic pictures of the DNEAS members.  
 
Furthermore, the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s Archives in Johannesburg have 
been very valuable in providing the annual reports from 1937-1949, and also the audio clips 
that were recorded during the war. In addition to these, the South African Film, Video and 
Sound Archives in Pretoria have enriched the study by making available the actual wartime 
films and newsreels (African Mirror) produced for propaganda purposes. Therefore, this 
study attempts to cover a wide-spectrum of the propaganda efforts. However, there is a 
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limitation. There are few records on propaganda conducted by the opposition, except a few 
newspaper clippings. But, that shortcoming is offset by the collections on the opposition 
movements which are located in the Military Archives and in the collections of H.G. 
Lawrence and E.G. Malherbe. There are a few secondary sources that have also been used to 
supplement the archival records and to fill the gaps on the opposition movements. There are 
still many other records that have not been listed above, but have been significant in the 
development of the study. Details of these may be found in the source references throughout 
this study. It was a challenging exercise to sift through many volumes of archival documents 
to extract the most appropriate data relevant to the study and the most rewarding in the 
amount of knowledge that has been acquired in the process. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS AND THREAT PERCEPTION 
 
 
German propaganda is more dangerous, subtle and insidious than any attack by armies. 
Night by night, the soul of the people of South Africa is being sapped and their convictions 
undermined by the broadcast from Zeesen.58 
 
The Union of South Africa’s participation in what became the Second World War (1939-
1945), was riddled with controversies. Like most countries during the inter-war years, it was 
affected by the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartie (NSDAP) (National Socialist 
German Workers’ Party) (in short, Nazi Party), whose agents actively penetrated foreign 
states to propagate Nazi ideas, to generate support for Nazi Germany and to establish 
linkages with potential Nazi sympathisers.59 Those Nazi agents also established espionage 
networks, collected intelligence and sought to exploit tensions within societies to create 
instability and fragmentation for purposes of reducing national resistance to the advancement 
of the Nazism.60 
 
As such, the Union, as well as Germany’s former colony in southern Africa, South West 
Africa (SWA) (currently Namibia), became targets for Nazi activities.61 Both countries had 
                                                 
58 National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria (NASAP), J.C. Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 303/1, Excerpt from 
General J.C. Smuts’ Speech to United Party members in Bloemfontein, 3 November 1939. See chapter 
2 for full quotation; See also J.C. Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts, (Biography) (Heinemann and Cassel SA, 
Cape Town, 1952), p. 377. 
59  University of Cape Town (hereafter UCT) Jagger Library, Archives and Manuscripts, H.G. (Harry) 
Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 47, G.C. Visser, Strictly Confidential Report on the Affidavit of Dr 
Luitpold Werz, (see attached German Intelligence Service report), South African Police Special 
Investigator, Union War Prosecutions, 25 November 1946; UCT, Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, 
Official (South African) White Book on Nazi and Nazi Propaganda in South Africa from 1933 to the 
Outbreak of the War in September 1939, vol. 3, pp. 247-433; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 
17; Strahl, Seven Years as a Nazi Consul, p. 69. 
60  UCT, Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Activities and Nazi Propaganda 
in the Union of South Africa from the Year 1933 to the Outbreak of War in September 1939, vol. 3, p. 
253; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.262, Otto von Strahl, ‘Protect your Home Country’, 18 July 
1941, pp. 1-19; See also Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, pp. 112-113; Fedorowich, 
‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence in South Africa and Mozambique, 1939-1944’, 
The Historical Journal, 48, 1, 2005, pp. 209-230; P.J. Furlong, ‘Allies at War? Britain and the 
“Southern African Front” in the Second World War’, South African Historical Journal, vol. 54, no. 1, 
pp. 16-29. 
61  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official (South African) White Book on Nazi and Nazi Propaganda 
in South Africa from 1933 to the Outbreak of the War in September 1939, vol. 3, pp. 247-253; Furlong, 
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German nationals and those of German extraction. After her First World War defeat, 
Germany was stripped of her colonies and one of them, SWA, was given to the Union to 
administer as a mandated territory on behalf of the League of Nations. SWA became a source 
of political tension between the Union government and Nazi Germany. Many Germans in that 
country became enthusiastic about Hitler’s National Socialism and had begun to agitate for 
the German takeover.62 The Union was also targeted due to the genealogical connection of 
some Afrikaners with Germany, for example, the pre-war Minister of Defence, Oswald 
Pirow, and due to her (historical) relationship with the British Empire, Germany’s perceived 
arch-rival for European hegemony. The chief aim was to deprive Britain of the potential 
support in the event of war, by cultivating the Union’s neutrality and disrupting the imperial 
war capacity.63 This was highlighted in September 1939 through the country’s virulently 
contested parliamentary decision to participate in the war against Germany and the resultant 
political turbulence that followed during the war. 
 
This chapter, therefore, intends to illustrate the nature and extent of Nazi Germany’s 
manoeuvrings in the Union during the 1930s to facilitate Nazi influence and its impact on 
domestic politics. It explicitly examines three broad issues: the establishment of a branch of 
the Nazi Party in the Union during the 1930s and the various mechanisms exploited to 
orchestrate penetration and expansion; the development of Nazi-inspired, ultra-nationalistic 
movements in the country; and the growth of internal anti-war and anti-government activism. 
Broadly speaking, the analysis of the above themes serves to highlight the sources of 
controversies regarding the Union’s entry into the war, particularly the neutrality question, 
and the determinant factors which shaped government actions to facilitate the realisation of 
the objectives of the war policy. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 16-17; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-
Intelligence in South Africa and Mozambique’, pp. 209-230; Furlong, ‘Allies at War?’, pp. 16-29. 
62  R. Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa in the Nazi Period (Greenwood Press, New York, 
1991), pp. 6-10, 196-198; A. Hagemann, ‘Very Special Relations: The “Third Reich” and the Union of 
South Africa, 1933-1939’, South African Historical Journal, vol. 27, November 1992, pp. 137-138; 
P.J. Brits, ‘The Last Years of South African Party Rule’, in B.J. Liebenberg and S.B. Spies, eds., South 
Africa in the 20th Century (J.L. van Schaik, Pretoria, 1993), pp. 204-205. 
63  A. Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (Hambledon Continuum, London and New 
York, 2006), preface (p. ix), pp. 11, 173; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-
Intelligence in South Africa and Mozambique’, p. 211; Furlong, ‘Allies at War?’ pp. 16-29; A. Stewart, 
‘The British Government and the South African Neutrality Crisis, 1938-39’, English Historical Review, 
vol. 123, no. 503, July 2008, pp. 947-972. 
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THE NEUTRALITY PREDICAMENT 
 
When war erupted in September 1939, the debate about the Union’s neutrality became the 
primary focus. Leading personalities with conflicting views about this decisive political 
question were General J.B.M. Hertzog, the Union Prime Minister, and General J.C. Smuts, 
his deputy since the inception of the Fusion government in 1934. According to Hertzog, the 
Union could adopt a neutrality policy and not support Britain if the latter was involved in 
war.64 Such neutrality would strengthen the principle of sovereignty that he (Hertzog) had 
politically been fighting for. From its inception, the Hertzog-led National Party existed for 
the purpose of ensuring that the Union was completely emancipated from British dominance 
and that Afrikaner interests were secured.65 
 
On the other hand, Smuts believed that the neutrality policy was not an option for the Union, 
constitutionally, morally and practically.66 He believed that European events also had 
implications for South Africa and the country could ill-afford to remain isolated from 
international affairs.67 Smuts questioned the wisdom of extreme elements within the society 
about crying for neutrality ‘in all circumstances and in all cases’, without due consideration 
to the unfolding international events at the time.68 German territorial expansionism and 
intolerance presented evidence of a ‘fever of war in a nation’ and Smuts anticipated that 
Hitler would continue because he was striving for world domination.69 His views were 
expressed in a letter to his British friends, M.C and A.B. Gillett, that he did not believe Hitler 
would retreat. He was also concerned about the unchecked growth of Nazism in the Union, 
particularly the spread of ‘propaganda, falsehood, delusion and fomenting of strive carried on 
by foreign agents.’70 These developments regarding the Union’s domestic politics also 
affected British authorities. Reports indicated that some Afrikaner people were infuriated by 
                                                 
64  Union of South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 36, 2-5 September 1939, col. 18-21; J. 
Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century. A political History-In Search of a Nation State 
(Blackwell, Oxford and Massachusetts, 1999), p 117. 
65  H. Deegan, The Politics of the New South Africa: Apartheid and After (Longman, England, 2001), 
p.13. 
66  Union of South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 36, 2-5 September 1939, col. 24-30; 
Stewart, ‘The British Government and the South African Neutrality Crisis’, pp. 947-972. 
67  Union of South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 36, 2-5 September 1939, col. 24-30; 
Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century, p. 117. 
68  Stewart, ‘The British Government and the South African Neutrality Crisis’, p. 955. 
69  Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 36, 2-5 September 1939, col. 27-28; Smuts, Jan Christian 
Smuts, p. 367. 
70  SANAP, Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 246, Private Letters, Smuts to M.C. and A.B. Gillet, 3 August 1939. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
 
the British connection and longed for a Boer Republic.71 Matters came to head after Germany 
invaded Poland on 1 September 1939 and Britain declared war on Germany two days later. 
Britain was at war and the Union had to determine her policy position. As Hertzog and Smuts 
had on various occasions indicated that the Union parliament would decide the matter, their 
opposing motions72 were thus debated on 4 September 1939.73 The outcome favoured Smuts, 
with a narrow majority of only thirteen votes.74 Hertzog, thereafter, failed to persuade the 
Union’s governor general, Sir Patrick Duncan, to dissolve the parliament and call a general 
election. He resigned and Duncan asked Smuts to form a government. Smuts agreed and 
formed a new cabinet that took South Africa into the war.75 He became the Prime Minister, 
and also assumed the portfolios of external affairs and defence.76 Proclamation no. 197 of 6 
September 1939 formally announced the severing of the Union’s ties with Germany and 
entering a state of war against her.77 
 
Surprised by the developments, Smuts wrote to Gillett and remarked that he was planning a 
life of leisure away from public life as he expected to be out of office soon. In contrast, he 
was in his old job as a Prime Minister and had to ‘face a very anxious and difficult 
situation’.78 (See Gen Smuts in 1914 and in 1939, figs. 1 and 2) Following the parliamentary 
decision, extreme Afrikaner nationalists held demonstrations for some weeks, with 
accusations that Hertzog had been ‘double-crossed’ by his coalition “friends” (by Smuts).79 
Intelligence officials provided numerous reports about the volatile political situation and the 
                                                 
71  Stewart, ‘The British Government and the South African Neutrality Crisis’, p. 949; Jackson, The 
British Empire and the Second World War, p. 240; A. Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions 
and the Second World War (Continuum, MPG Books, London and New, 2008), p. 22. 
72  Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 36, 2-5 September 1939, col. 18-19; Debates of the House of 
Assembly, vol. 36, 2-5 September 1939, col. 30-31. 
73  UCT, Sir Patrick Duncan Papers, BC 294, A27.1-2, Memorandum on House of Assembly Debates on 
the War or Neutrality, 6 September 1939, pp. 1-4; D. Reitz, No Outspan (Faber and Faber, London, 
1942), pp. 240-242; Stewart, ‘The British Government and the South African Neutrality Crisis’, p. 952. 
74  Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 36, 2-5 September 1939, vote results, col. 95-100; UCT, Sir 
Patrick Duncan Papers, BC 294, A27.2, Memorandum on House of Assembly Debates on the War or 
Neutrality, 6 September 1939, p. 3. 
75  UCT, Sir Patrick Duncan Papers, BC 294, A27.3-6, Duncan to Hertzog, 5 September 1939. 
76  Union of South Africa, Proclamation no. 197 of 1939, Union Government Gazette Extraordinary, vol. 
117, no. 1344, 6 September 1939; ‘Smuts Cabinet Sworn In’, Cape Times, 7 September 1939; Reitz, 
No Outspan, p. 243. 
77  Union of South Africa, Proclamation no. 197 of 1939, Union Government Gazette Extraordinary, vol. 
117, no. 2676, 6 September 1939. 
78  NASAP, Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 246, Smuts to A.B. Gillett, 6 September 1939. 
79  South African National Defence Force Archives (SANDFA), Union War Histories (UWH), Box 265, 
B.I .20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939; Reitz, No Outspan, pp. 243-
244;See also Roberts and Trollip, The South African Opposition, pp. 20-21. 
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prevalent anti-government activism which also included death threats to Smuts.80 Massive 
political warfare was waged against him, as he remarked: 
 
My political opponents are extremely active and extremely mischievous, holding meetings and 
holding me up as an agent of England, and doing their best to mislead our poor ignorant 
backveld who largely believe that neutrality would have saved them and kept things sweet and 
pleasant for them. I cannot at present join in this wretched political campaigning as I have 
my hands more than full with the affairs of country.81 
 
Once more in South Africa, as in 1914, war had reinvigorated latent tensions which saw the 
country confronted with internal unrest and subversive activities in many areas. The country 
was divided politically into two broad categories: pro-war party that supported government’s 
war policy, and the anti-war party that rejected the war policy.82 To a large degree, the 
growing anti-war activism in the Union had been cultivated through Nazi propaganda 
throughout the 1930s and intensified in the early stages of the war.83 The next section, 
therefore, will illustrate the pre-war developments and Nazi machinations in South Africa, 
and how these impacted on the country’s wartime politics. 
 
NAZI INTRIGUES IN THE UNION DURING THE 1930s 
 
Seven years before the outbreak of the war, Nazi Germany had established its presence in 
South Africa through the founding of the NSDAP branch in 1932.84 The German intelligence 
service of the Ober Kommando Wehrmacht (OKW) (German High Command) called the 
Abwehr, had been engaged in coordinating the collection of operational intelligence, i.e. 
espionage and counter-espionage, the organisation of sabotage and subversion in enemy or 
potential enemy territories, including South Africa.85 Before the war, agents were sent across 
                                                 
80  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1941; NASAP, Smuts Papers, 
A1, vol. 246, Smuts to A.B. Gillett, 13 September 1939. 
81  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 246, Smuts to A.B. Gillett, 13 September 1939. 
82  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 21 September 1940. 
83  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1941; Lawrence Papers, 
BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Activities and Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa from the Year 1933 to the Outbreak of War in September 1939, vols. 2-5; SANDFA, ZB, Box 1, 
WR 65/9/41, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 11 November 1941; SANDFA, PP, Box 1, Zeesen 
Broadcast, October 1940; UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 9 - 10 October 1939. 
84  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa Before and During the 
War, December 1945; Strahl, Seven Years, p. 69; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 16. 
85  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 47, G.C. Visser, Strictly Confidential Report on the Affidavit of Dr 
Luitpold Werz, 25 November 1946. The Luitpold Werz affidavit was collected as part of the Lawrence 
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the world with the essential function of obtaining knowledge about the prevailing conditions 
in targeted countries as well as key personalities, so that in the event of hostilities, they could 
discharge their duties efficiently.86 As far as South Africa was concerned, it would later 
transpire, through the Union’s intelligence reports of 1939, that there was a plot to 
disseminate Nazi ideas to pave the way for the eventual incorporation of the country into 
Germany’s sphere of interest.87 The “annexation plot” exposé was conducted through the 
Union’s newspapers in 1940.88 
 
To facilitate the realisation of such ambitions, information about South Africa was collected 
and channelled through to the German Foreign Office, Berlin, via the German Consulate in 
Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) in Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). The Political 
Section 10 (Pol. X) in the German Foreign Office, under Dr Harold Bielfeld, was responsible 
for dealing with colonial questions south of Sahara, including South African internal affairs.89 
Information on shipping and matters of military significance from Lourenço Marques, for 
example, troop movements and naval intelligence, would be received by the German Foreign 
Office in Berlin and then passed on to the relevant section of the OKW. Information dealing 
with South Africa’s internal politics would be handled by the Foreign Office.90 German 
                                                                                                                                                        
Conrad Barret Mission (Attorney General in Pretoria) that sought to investigate special cases that could 
have implications of treasonable offences against South Africa in collaboration with German agents. 
See the details of the Barret Mission in G.C. Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots? (Macmillian, 
Johannesburg, 1976), pp. 176-177; See also E.D.R. Harrison, ‘British Radio Security and Intelligence, 
1939-43’, English Historical Review, vol. 124, no. 506, January 2009, pp. 58-60; E.D.R. Harrison, ‘On 
Secret Service for the Duce: Umberto Campini in Portuguese East Africa’, 1941-1943, English 
Historical Review, vol. 122, no. 499, December 2007, pp. 1318-1349; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage 
and British Counter-Intelligence in South Africa and Mozambique’, pp. 209-230; Furlong, ‘Allies at 
War?’, pp. 16-29. 
86  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa Before and During the 
War, December 1945. 
87  University of Kwazulu-Natal (UKZN), Killie Campbell Archives and Manuscripts (KCM), Durban, 
E.G. Malherbe Papers, File 443/1, KCM 56975 (6b), Summary of the Dürckheim Report. Plot to 
Annex Union Revealed, no date; Malherbe Papers, File 443/1, KCM 56975 (8b), ‘Die Duerckheim 
Rapport. Offisiele Dokument oor Nazi Komplot in die Unie: Beoogde Anneksasie’/‘Summary of the 
Dürckheim Report. Plot to Annex Union Revealed’. Both these documents have no dates; Lawrence 
Papers, BC 640, E3. 50, Political and Subversive Correspondence Located in old German Consulate, 
South West Africa, Acting Deputy Commissioner, South African Police Commanding SWA Division 
to Commissioner of South African Police, Pretoria, 30 November 1939; Malherbe, Never a Dull 
Moment, p.187; Hagemann, ‘Very Special Relations’, pp. 129-130. 
88  ‘Nazi Designs on South Africa. A Plot to Annex the Union’, n.d. unmounted paper; ‘German Intrigue 
in the Union Disclosed’, The Star, 3 September 1940; ‘Amazing Nazi Plot to Annex S.A. Revealed’, 
Sunday Times, 1 September 1940. 
89  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 47, Affidavit of Dr Luitpold Werz, 25 November 1946; Furlong, 
Between Crown and Swastika, p. 157. 
90  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa, December 1945; 
Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 47, Report on the Affidavit of Dr Luitpold Werz; Harrison, ‘On Secret 
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interest in South Africa developed rapidly after 1933, both in the economic and political 
spheres. The political developments were particularly observed, mostly with keen interest on 
the internecine conflict within white politics dealing with the South African relationship with 
Britain. Citino observes that Nazi Germany was on alert to see if there were any elements of 
weaknesses in South Africa that could be exploited to disconnect her from Britain and to 
orchestrate the return of SWA to Germany.91 There was a manifest significance of South 
Africa to the Nazi government as detailed information about the internal developments in the 
country was requested from employees of the German press organisations and in the Union.92 
 
Nazi activities spread across the world, mostly in those countries with the potential for being 
neutral in the event of international hostilities. The aim was to disseminate as far and as deep 
as possible, Nazi doctrines, theories, ideas and world philosophy to the German nationals 
(Reichs Germans) and naturalised Germans (Volk Germans) living abroad, as well to the 
non-Germans who exhibited inclinations towards the Germans.93 As indicated above, South 
Africa and SWA fell within the Nazi regime’s sphere of interest. In addition, Portuguese East 
Africa, a colony of Portugal, a country which remained neutral during the Second World 
War, also became the centre of Nazi espionage networks and the main conduit of intelligence 
on southern Africa to Berlin. It also had a significant number of Germans.94 Many of the 
German officials and individuals stayed in Portuguese East Africa for the duration of the war, 
and some moved through that country to go back to Germany.95 Thus, throughout the war, 
Nazi manoeuvres and intelligence regarding South Africa were coordinated through the 
office of the German Consul in Portuguese East Africa, particularly in the early 1930s when 
the Nazi Party assumed power in Germany.96 
                                                                                                                                                        
Service for the Duce’, pp. 1318-1349; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-
Intelligence in South Africa and Mozambique’, pp. 209-230; Furlong, ‘Allies at War?’, pp. 16-29. 
91  Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa in the Nazi Period, pp. 61-62. 
92  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in South Africa, vol. 5, 
pp. 477-624; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 19. 
93  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in South Africa, vol. 3, 
pp. 247-433; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 17; Strahl, Seven Years, p. 69. 
94  Furlong, ‘Allies at War?’, p. 18. 
95  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3. 38, J. Goodwin, Commissioner of Immigration and Asiatic Affairs, 
Lorenco Marques, reply to E.K. Scallan, Union Consulate General, Lorenco Mraques, 11 October 
1939. 
96  Although there are some references to German activities in the Union and SWA in the 1920s, 
developments regarding the intensified coordination of Nazi operations manifested in the early 1930s 
with the coming to power of Hitler’s Nazi Party. See Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 50, Political and 
Subversive Correspondence Located in old German Consulate, South West Africa, Acting Deputy 
Commissioner, South African Police Commanding SWA Division to Commissioner of South African 
Police, Pretoria, 30 November 1939; UCT, Jagger Library, Archives and Manuscripts, Morris 
Alexander Papers, BC160, List IV, File 24, A Memorandum on the anti-Jewish Movements in South 
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In 1932, a German electro-technics academic at the University of Cape Town, Professor 
Herman Bohle, founded a branch of NSDAP in the Union.97 From its inception, this NSDAP 
was directed exclusively at the communities of German extraction residing in South Africa 
and not necessarily aimed at the white Afrikaner population. Through NSDAP, Herman 
Bohle gave lectures in Cape Town on Nazism, amidst strong objections from members of the 
Jewish community because of Hitler’s anti-Jewish agitations in Germany.98 The South 
African government took no action. The NSDAP expanded its operations to Johannesburg, 
Pretoria, Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein, Tzaneen and Philippi (Cape 
Province).99 
 
In October 1939, a memorandum titled ‘Nazi Plot in SA, Attack from Within’, circulated 
within the Union’s intelligence structures. It described the methods and channels utilised by 
the Nazi agents to gain a foothold and spread Nazism in South Africa and in many countries 
throughout the world. Operations were coordinated through the NSDAP’s chain of local 
structures, particularly the cells which operated in secret. Around the cells there were 
subsidiary organisations such as the Labour Front, the Schools Associations, the Church 
Associations, the League of German Women Abroad, the Hitler Youth Movement and the 
Winter Help, which were directed through the German diplomatic structures and 
representatives.100 The political activities were coordinated through the NSDAP’s 
Landesgruppe Südafrika (local “National Committee” or Country Group of South Africa) as 
the main organisation which controlled a network of related sub-organisations: Ortgruppen 
(Local Groups) and Stützpunkte (Supporting Points), operating in various centres across the 
Union.101 
                                                                                                                                                        
Africa, 1935, pp. 1-13; See also Saron, ‘It did Happen Here: How the Nazi Conducted Propaganda in 
South Africa’, Common Sense, from January to March 1940. 
97  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa, December 1945; 
Strahl, Seven Years, p. 69; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 16. 
98  See chapters 1 and 2 of Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika; S. Gilbert, ‘Jews and the Racial State: 
Legacies of the Holocaust in Apartheid South Africa, 1945-60’, Jewish Social Studies: History, 
Culture, Society, vol. 16, no. 3, Spring/Summer 2010, pp. 32-64. 
99  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa, December 1945; 
Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 17. 
100  UWH, Box 279, B.I. 30, Nazi Plot in SA, Attack from Within, 28 October 1939, pp. 1-12; A similar 
copy is found among the official documents regarding policy and related materials of Harry Lawrence; 
See Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 9, Very Confidential Memorandum Relating to Nazi Activities in 
the Union of South Africa, pp. 1-8. 
101  UWH, Box 279, B.I. 30, Nazi Plot in SA; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi Activities in the 
Union of South Africa; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 9, Very Confidential Memorandum Relating to 
Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa, pp. 1-8; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 17-
18. 
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Herman Bohle was the Landesgruppeleiter (Country Group Leader) in South Africa from 
1932 to 1934 and was succeeded by Bruno Stiller, who was also a German Consul in Cape 
Town and later Counsellor of German Legation in Pretoria.102 Various other organisations, 
such as societies, clubs, press, libraries and business, were targeted for Nazi influence.103 The 
Nazi government in Germany maintained control and supervision of these local organisations 
through the agency of the Auslandsorganisation (AO) (Foreign Organisation), the central 
body based in Berlin, under the leadership of Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, the son of Professor 
Herman Bohle.104 These organisations promoted Nazi doctrines by ‘extolling the virtues of 
National-Socialism’ within the German-speaking communities living outside Germany and to 
sympathetic groups and individuals in foreign countries.105 
 
In October 1933, the German Nazi Minister of State for Enlightenment of the People and 
Propaganda, Dr Joseph Goebbels, issued a circular to the German diplomatic representatives 
and passport officials abroad, reflecting on the Nazi government’s foreign policy direction: 
 
The ‘Refutation’ section of this Department does not limit itself to refuting the lies and 
inciting propaganda of other countries, and to the supply of informative material, but 
considers its main task to be to explain to other countries the ideas championed by National 
Socialism, while it undertakes to carry out the Führer [Adolf Hitler]’s high principled ideas, 
expressed in his speeches and in the utterances of leading personalities of the movement, in a 
form adapted to the mentality and psychological make-up of the foreigners.106 
 
The main forms of Nazi penetration were through the press, clubs, German educational 
classes, correspondences and propaganda – the chief weapon. Various groups and 
                                                 
102  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa; Furlong, Between 
Crown and Swastika, p. 18; Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa, pp. 115-118; Strahl, Seven 
Years, p. 99. 
103  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in South Africa, vol. 3, p. 
253. 
104  UWH, Box 281, B.I 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, no date; UWH, Box 279, B.I. 30, Nazi Plot in 
SA. E.W. Bohle came from England as boy and attended school in South Africa, see P.J. Furlong, 
‘Fascism, the Third Reich and Afrikaner Nationalism: An Assessment of the Historiography’, South 
African Historical Journal, no. 27, November 1992, pp 113-126. The Foreign Organisation was 
incorporated into the German Foreign Office and its activities received diplomatic protection. The 
Organisation coordinated activities across the world where there were an appreciable number of 
German-speaking people. 
105  UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, n.d.; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.45, Nazi 
Activities in the Union of South Africa. 
106  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 3, pp. 248-249.  
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organisational structures such as societies, schools, teachers, missionaries, churches, farmers, 
sympathetic foreign officials, editors of the press, restaurants and libraries, were targeted with 
a stream of propaganda material in furtherance of Nazi ideals.107 Whilst the main aim was to 
foster internal unity within Nazi Germany, propaganda was also intended to influence foreign 
countries by disseminating Nazi doctrine, methods and ideas in order to gain a foothold and 
to gather information about the country.108 It was also introduced in foreign states as an 
instrument to create disunity and confusion. Nazi policy in foreign countries was intended to 
exploit internal grievances and latent frictions in a society, for example, stimulating racial 
antagonisms, exaggerating labour and management differences, sowing suspicion and distrust 
between the government and its subjects, encouraging and supporting disruptive and 
obstructive organisations in a given country.109 Propaganda was considered a reliable weapon 
for weakening the internal social cohesion and political unity of a targeted foreign country. 
 
In order to provide the basis of understanding and to create awareness within the country’s 
political corridors, intelligence authorities in the Union produced documents that outlined the 
main purpose of Nazi foreign propaganda: 
 
To act as a solvent – to extend the lines of cleavage within foreign states and so to widen them 
that the composite body splits up and disintegrates…the points of difference may be found to 
exist between allies, between a government and its subjects, between minorities and 
majorities, between social classes. Nazi propaganda is simply to emphasize these differences 
and widen them until complete disintegration is achieved.110 
                                                 
107  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vo.l 3, p. 253 
108  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.262, Otto von Strahl, ‘Protect your Home Country’, 18 July 1941, pp. 
1-19; Strahl, Seven Years, p. 69. 
109  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.262, Otto von Strahl, ‘Protect your Home Country’, 18 July 1941, pp. 
1-19; Disruptive efforts were undertaken in many countries in Europe: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, 
Ukraine, Belgium and Holland. See also Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, pp. 112-
113. 
110  UWH, Box 279, B.I. 30, Nazi Plot in SA. The document also mentioned the influence of Professor 
Ewald Bause, an expert on Military Science. In his book, “Germany Prepares for War: the Nazi Theory 
of ‘National Defence”, he urges that disruptive propaganda should be exploited to “dissolve a united 
mass of enemy people”. Prof Bause’s influence on Nazi thought was controversial because his book 
“The Science of Offence” was banned in Germany on 22 October 1933 after it was considered to be 
glorifying the war, thus creating suspicion around the world against Nazi aspirations and intentions. 
See The Courier-Mail, 23 October 1933. The South African-based newspapers and the Board of the 
German African Party (anti-Nazi), in their warnings against Hitler’s quest for world domination, also 
refer to Bause’s book, “Raum und Volk” (Space and Folk) as the basis of Nazi Germany’s foreign 
policy which had implications for South Africa. 
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Nazi agents in the Union were widespread and operated secretly in various structures before 
and during the course of the war. Many of the Nazi activities in the Union were recorded and 
reported by Baron Otto von Strahl, the former German Consul based in Durban, South Africa 
from 1936 to 1938.111 According to his reports, a number of Germans, posing as experts in 
varied fields, came to the Union during the 1930s. Most of them belonged to the Geheime 
Staatspolizei (Gestapo) (Secret State Police), the Foreign Organisation (German, AO), the 
Hitler Youth Movement, or the Labour Front, and were sent by the Nazi government to 
acquire knowledge about the Union. These agents came in various professional capacities, 
such as geologists, zoologists, medical men, journalists, architects, technicians, road 
engineers, artists, ex-generals and naval officers. Several of them served in the diplomatic 
sphere as well as in the South African commerce and industries such as shops, mining, hotels, 
restaurants, hair salons, mission stations and local harbours (as German boats employees).112 
Their tasks were to collect information about the various aspects which related to the 
Germans in the country, as well as espionage work for the Nazis, and to report to Berlin 
headquarters. Such information was consolidated in four broad categories: 
 
a. Information about the existence of a German colony, a number of Germans there and 
their membership to the Nazi Party. 
b. Information on the German medical facilities and medical practitioners, schools, churches 
and newspapers in their vicinity. 
c. Information the number of German offices, their sizes, club and meeting rooms, sports 
facilities, libraries and flags. 
d. Information on the available codes, addresses for secret communication and routes for 
propaganda material.113 
 
This information was critical for the establishment of a Nazi power base among the German 
nationals and those of German extraction in a given country (e.g. Oswald Pirow in South 
                                                 
111  Baron Otto von Strahl worked as a German diplomatic representative for about twenty years since 1918 
and became the German Consul in Durban, South Africa, in 1936 (representing the German 
government led by the Nazi Party). He was dismissed from his diplomatic post in Durban on 4 
November 1937 as he refused to join the Nazi Party and left South Africa on 11 March 1938. He was 
the main informant of the Allies on Nazi activities around the world and in the Union of South Africa. 
See Strahl’s diplomatic service details in the German Foreign Service in his book, Seven Years as Nazi 
Consul, published during the war in 1942. See also Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 17-18. 
112  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.262, Otto von Strahl, ‘Protect Your Home Country’, 18 July 1941, pp. 
15-16. 
113  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.262, Otto von Strahl, ‘Protect Your Home Country’, 18 July 1941, pp. 
15-16; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.45, Nazi Activities in South Africa. 
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Africa). In addition, espionage and propaganda efforts would be coordinated through such 
structures to advance the Nazi cause and to render countries susceptible to subversion in the 
event of international hostilities.114 Agents in the Union collected intelligence on economic, 
military and political conditions. Four of such agents operated in the South African ports: 
Durban - Hans Mladeck, agent-general of the German African Lines and Sven Behrmann, 
cargo inspector of the German African Lines, Cape Town - Rheinhold Ihlenfeldt, passenger 
office manager of the German African Lines, and Heinz Gaertner, a wool buyer for German 
firms who operated in East London. These agents were interned in the Union and, in June 
1944, were repatriated to Germany by the SS Drottingholm.115 
 
The South African cultural sphere was the most targeted area of Nazi penetration. Among 
other avenues, agents facilitated the infusion of Nazi ideals in the arts and sciences, youth 
education (in schools), university students, music and theatre, religious science, films and 
broadcasting, as well as through the celebration of Nazi customs and traditions.116 These 
activities were mainly directed at German nationals in order for them to maintain connections 
with their home country. The Von Strahl report on Nazi activities in the Union, specifically 
identified and stressed the domain in which the Nazis, for seven years, were overtly active 
and the aims thereof: 
 
In fact, in the cultural sphere the Nazis in this country [Union] made even more gestures than 
in the political sphere and introduced into the Union everything from Nazi Germany of which 
it was susceptible, with the clearly the visible intention of making this country slowly but 
surely another victim of their objectives and lust for annexation, or of consciously preparing 
the soil for such.117 
 
The editor of the German weekly publication in South Africa, Der Deutsche Afrikaner, Dr 
Wilhelm Stark, was tasked to facilitate the advancement of the Nazi cause after replacing a 
certain Dr Hanisch in 1935.118 On 21 December 1937, the AO directive from its press office 
                                                 
114  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.262, Otto von Strahl, ‘Protect Your Home Country’, 18 July 1941, pp. 
15-18. 
115  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.45, Nazi Activities in South Africa, December 1945. 
116  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 3, p. 247. 
117  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 3, p. 248. 
118  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 5, pp. 480-481 and 503; See also Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 19; The 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
13 
 
in Berlin, requested Stark, as part of undertaking Nazi missions, to furnish full volumes of 
various South African newspapers along with periodicals to Germany. The rationale given 
was that these publications would add value to the Ausland (Foreign) Press Literature in the 
Prussian State Library in Berlin. Similarly, in January 1939, the German Labour Front’s 
Ausland (Foreign) Section Press Bureau in Berlin, instructed W. Krause, leader of the Labour 
Front in South Africa (Johannesburg), to provide a report containing publication titles, 
editorial information, circulation and related publication details concerning all English, 
Afrikaans and German papers and periodicals published in South Africa.119 The required 
reports were to reflect the situation in South Africa on perspectives and activities relating to 
the Nazis. This actually underscored an enormous level of attentiveness Nazi Germany paid 
to South Africa, essentially in the political sphere. 
 
The Deutsche Afrikaner paper, which had focused its content on Germany from a 
nationalistic perspective, swung to Nazism when Hitler came to power in 1933. In the Union, 
it was published in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, East London and likewise in 
Windhoek and Swakopmund (SWA).120 The paper intensified its Nazi propaganda objectives 
in its policy objectives. On 19 July 1937, it issued an appeal to Germans living in South 
Africa, revealing its policy: 
 
To the Germans in South Africa, with today’s issue … the “Deutch Afrikaner” has arrived at 
a decisive turning point in its history. We won’t rest until our paper has become an influential 
paper, which as an undaunted champion forcible represents our German interests to the 
world…121 
 
The paper also reflected on the anti-Nazi agitations in the country and across the world, to 
strengthen its appeal and message to the Germans. It purported to be an “all-uniting paper” 
aimed at championing the German cause, by conquering opposition and promoting German 
                                                                                                                                                        
editorial content of the publication was a subject of controversy in South Africa. According to Citino, 
the Minister of Defence, Oswald Pirow, who had financial stake in paper, argued with the German 
Minister Plenipotentiary in South Africa, Emil Wiehl, regarding the paper operating as a Nazi organ. 
Reportage focused on the Nationalist Party and neglected the ruling United Party (of which Pirow was 
the defence minister). See Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa, pp. 129-131. 
119  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 5, pp. 480-481. 
120  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 5, pp. 503-504. 
121  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 5, p. 506. 
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solidarity. In addition, the political attitudes of the Deutsche Afrikaner were discernible from 
the numerous articles that were published. Since Stark took over its editorship, he cultivated 
anti-British animosity through pictures and articles by ascribing the liability of dissatisfaction 
and war in the world to the British.122 At the same time, whilst criticizing British actions in 
the Union, for example, through historical examples of the circumstances leading to the 
Anglo-Boer War, the paper also presented Germany as a friendly nation that supported the 
Afrikaners and protected the President of the South African Republic (Transvaal), Paul 
Kruger. But, due to the influence and dominance of British imperialism, they (Afrikaner) 
invaded SWA (during the First World War). An excerpt of the article reads in the following 
manner: 
 
In this critical hour German men in Pretoria formed a body guard which day and night kept 
their eye on the old Boer President. German Transvalers formed a living shield for the 
protection of Paul Kruger, for didn’t the whole of Pretoria have to be on their guard against 
a sudden attack by Jameson’s friends in Johannesburg? Spontaneous friendship for this Boer 
nation which was of the same stock, prompted these German men to act, and those German 
volunteers who fought and fell during the Anglo-Boer War for the liberty of the Africander 
[sic] nation were inspired by the same spirit. And what thanks did they get? Africanders [sic] 
conquered South West Africa for the Empire and the Hitler Youth Movement and the 
N.S.D.A.P were prohibited and their leaders banished from the country. … When one looks 
for the only one who benefits by this discord, namely British Imperialism. If the Africander 
[sic] nation wants to preserve its originality against British culture, it cannot forego friendly 
relations with other nations, and who else would primarily deserve consideration in this 
respect as an unselfish friend, if not Germany.123 
 
Similar articles appeared regularly in the Deutsche Afrikaner, stimulating prejudice against 
the British and promoting German perspectives. Together with similar papers published in 
other parts of the Union, the Deutsche Afrikaner facilitated the favourable perspectives about 
Nazism in the country. With Stark at the helm, the paper introduced competitions where 
many questions were about the Nazi and the prizes for the correct answers were only Nazi 
                                                 
122  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 5, p. 567. 
123  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 5, p. 570. 
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books. The targets were the youth, who also received a covering letter with the prize.124 
Another feature of the paper was to promote Nazi customs and practices, with the view of 
educating the Germans living abroad about Nazi traditions. 
 
Explanatory information about certain Nazi customs and practices were published regularly. 
They included the so-called Solstice festivals, “German Christmas festival”, blood weddings, 
baptisms in Hitler’s name, along with other known activities like the Winter Relief function 
of the Labour service and Labour Front, which were observed annually.125 Throughout the 
Union, festivals were introduced to the boys and girls in their various structures and 
celebrations, accompanied by speeches honouring Hitler.126 German teachers and teachers’ 
organisations were implored to advance the struggle for the establishment of a German 
community abroad in service of Germany. During meetings of teachers in their associations, 
they were often informed that they should carry out their duties of conquering the hearts and 
minds of the youth to secure the future of Nazi Germany abroad.127 The National Socialistic 
Teacher’s Association, an organisation for German teachers abroad founded by the Nazi 
Party in Germany, exercised control and influence on youth education. It ensured that 
education was carried along the Nazi lines. 
 
The perpetuation of Nazi ideals among the youth became mostly evident in Natal, at a 
German school in Hermannsburg. According to the reports found amongst the documents 
seized from a certain Heinze Hecker, a Reich German teacher who was sent to the 
Hermannsburg school years before, Nazi guidance was carried out to boys and girls. That 
school, situated near Greytown, belonged to the mission centre, Hermannsburg Synod, led by 
Rev W. Bodenstein, stationed at Moorleigh near Estcourt in Natal. In that school, educational 
themes and instructions were based on the glorification of Hitler and the Nazi cause. Subjects 
such as “race problems”, “blood and soil” and “Germanic Paganism” were introduced into 
the syllabus, along with performing other practices like singing Nazi songs and giving the 
                                                 
124  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 5, p. 510. 
125  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 3, p. 367. 
126  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 3, p. 368. 
127  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 3, pp. 253-254. 
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Nazi salute to German visitors at the school.128 The German culture, character and the Nazi 
mission to the world were also required to be extended to the children of foreign nations.129 
These were meant to increase the number of admirers of the Nazi state. It was therefore with 
little surprise that some schools and teachers in the Union, whether German or non-German 
(mainly white and Afrikaans), engaged in the propagation of Nazi notions and anti-
government feelings after war broke out.130 This caused major concerns for the Union 
authorities at the outbreak of the war and during the early stages of the conflict. 
 
Churches, clergymen and missionaries, some of whom having established themselves in the 
Union since the nineteenth century131, were also infiltrated and became important channels 
through which the Nazi cause was advanced. German missionaries, especially those who had 
been in South Africa for longer periods, were pressed to be part of the Nazi Party and 
advance the Nazi cause or threatened with a loss of their stipends, whilst new ones were sent 
to the country to preach along Nazi lines, combining Hitler’s policy with religious teachings 
whenever it was possible.132 This effort of applying pressure was orchestrated by Bruno 
Stiller. Stark of the Deutsche Afrikaner, using a list of names in his possession, also pestered 
many of clergymen and missionaries to subscribe to his paper at reduced costs.133 Working 
through the German Legation in Pretoria, which provided him with the list, Stark was 
instrumental in contacting missionaries with various kinds of requests, including writings 
about Christian character of the Nazi paper, ensuring the congregations understand their 
                                                 
128  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.221, Nazi Activities and Propaganda in Schools in Natal, 22 February 
1940. 
129  This was quoted as a speech by E.W. Bohle, the AO leader in Germany, to the gathering of German 
teachers abroad in Brunswick on 17 August 1935. See Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official 
White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol 3, p. 253.  
130  Lawrence Papers, B640, E.280-282, Subversive Activities in the Schools of the Union, Office of the 
Controller of Censorship to the Minister of Interior and Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on 
Security, 30 January 1941. Schools that were specifically mentioned in the reports with regard to their 
anti-government propagation were in Malmesbury, Morressburg, Piquetsberg, Clanwilliam, Van 
Rynsdorp, Gariep, Springbok and Disctricts, Port Nolloth, Calvinia, Williston (probably Wellington), 
Fraserburg, Sutherland, Ceres, Butterworth, Greytown Natal, Dordrecht, Berdford, Barkly East, Berlin 
Cape, Molteno, Klerksdorp and Laingsburg. 
131  Most notably, the Berlin Missionary Society which became active in South Africa from 1834. See G. 
Pakendorf, ‘A Brief History of the Berlin Missionary Society in South Africa’, History Compass, vol. 
9, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 106-118; A. Kirkaldy, ‘Klaas Koen: Identity and belonging in the Berlin Mission 
Society during  the late Nineteenth Century’, Historia, vol. 55, no. 2, November 2010, pp. 99-120; B. 
Brammer, ‘Adele Steinwender: Observation of a German Women Living on a Berlin Mission Station 
as Recorded in her Diary’, (Unpublished Master’s thesis, Heritage and Cultural Studies, University of 
Pretoria, 2007), pp. 44-68, 70-80. 
132  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 3, p. 378. 
133  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 3, pp. 380-381. 
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mission of spreading Nazism.134 In some instances, the missionaries preaching among black 
South Africans were required to indicate that Hitler was coming to bring salvation and good 
luck to them.135 
 
The increased number of missionaries in South Africa, many of whom were coming through 
the Rhenish Mission Society and the Berlin Mission Society, prompted the Secretary for 
Native Affairs, D.L. Smit, to request legislative amendments. In a confidential memorandum 
to the Union Prime Minister, Hertzog, Smit noted that in 1937, immigration officials granted 
permits to 162 foreign missionaries, of whom 130 were German, and in 1938, it was 240 
missionaries, with 186 being German.136 This was particularly alarming. In discussions with 
the Union’s chief of general staff (CGS), General Sir Pierre van Ryneveld and also with the 
UDF general staff, Smit raised similar concerns and was perturbed by the state of affairs. 
Concerns derived from the belief that those foreign missionaries were still loyal to their home 
countries and in the event of war, they might organise amongst black South Africans and 
embarrass the defence authorities. Smit went on to argue that, because of the enormous 
religious influence the missionaries had on blacks, they formed ‘a perfect intelligence system 
and may later prove a serious danger to safety of the State’.137 The legislative changes 
proposed by Smit dealt with section twenty-four and paragraph forty-five of the Native Trust 
and Land Act of 31 August 1936. Since the missionaries moved freely within black areas in 
South Africa, it was deemed necessary to restrict their movements and to prevent new ones 
from entering the country, except in exceptional circumstances. The proposed amendment 
was developed in the following manner: 
 
Missionaries and their non-European employees, irrespective of creed or race, other than 
those who were resident in the Native areas prior to the coming into operation of the Native 
Trust and Land Act, 1936 (31st August 1936), will have to obtain the written permission of the 
Minister of Native Affairs to be in the Native Areas … that the Department of the Interior be 
instructed for the present not to admit any more missionaries of alien nationality into the 
                                                 
134  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 5, pp. 503-510. 
135  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South 
Africa, vol. 3, p. 379. 
136  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 130, Secretary for Native Affairs, Memorandum on Foreigners in Native Areas, 
D.L. Smit to General Hertzog, 24 April 1939. 
137  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 130, Memorandum on Foreigners in Native Areas, 24 April 1939. 
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Union, save in exceptional circumstances bona fide filling of vacancies due to wastage, and 
then only with the concurrence of Minister of Native Affairs.138 
 
Despite assurances from the German missionary who served the Roman Catholic mission in 
Kimberley, Bishop Meising, that due to the bad treatment of Catholics by the Nazi 
government, they were not favourably disposed to that regime, Germany still made 
arrangements for funding of missionaries through the German companies operating in South 
Africa. One implicated company was identified as the South African Motors, Imports and 
Industries, which was established in 1938 to “push German goods.”139 In a summary on the 
subject of the foreign Roman Catholic missionaries operating in black areas, out of a total of 
fifty-two naturalised foreigners (missionaries), seventeen were German, and the non-
naturalised Germans accounted for 618 out of the total of 866. Missionaries from Protestant 
Societies included twenty-seven naturalised Germans out of forty, and seventy-eight non-
naturalised ones out of 297.140 It was indeed an alarming development in the country since 
the German missionaries in the Union exceeded all other foreign missionaries, and mostly in 
black areas. In the light of the deteriorating international security situation that was 
orchestrated by German expansionism, the increasing German presence produced trepidations 
among the Union authorities, of course, depending on their particular dispositions towards 
that country. 
 
Church bodies and structures in the Union, such as the Berlin Mission Society, Cape Synod 
and Hermannsburg Synod141, gatherings and conferences as well as leading personalities 
loyal to the Nazi regime, were canvassed and utilised for communicating Hitler’s mission of 
“reconstructing Germany”. Missionaries like Bodenstein of the Natal-based Hermannsburg 
Synod, advocated for bringing Germans together in one fold, and, for this purpose, through 
                                                 
138  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 130, Memorandum on Foreigners in Native Areas, 24 April 1939. See further 
details about the specific amendments to the Act given as Appendix C and Appendix D of the 
memorandum. 
139  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 130, Memorandum on Foreigners in Native Areas, 24 April 1939. 
140  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 130, Memorandum on Foreigners in Native Areas, 24 April 1939. 
141  Hermannsburg Mission Society was one of the leading German missionary establishment in Natal 
founded by the German missionary Ludwig Harms in 1854. The Hermannsburg mission society was 
permeated with Nazi influence in the 1930s and through the work of its Luthern priest, Rev. W. 
Bodenstein, facilitated the establishment of organisations for the promotion of German interests in 
Natal and elsewhere in the Union of South Africa. Von Strahl mentioned the influence of the Hermanns 
mission society in his numerous reports that he submitted to the wartime Union Minister of Interior, 
H.G. Lawrence. For a brief history, development and growth of the German population and culture in 
Natal through the facilitation of the Hermannsburg mission societies, see H.J. Oschadleus, Natalia 22, 
1992, pp. 27-38; See also Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 71. 
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the synod committee system, founded a German Association for the Promotion of German 
interests in Natal on 24 January 1935. A similar organisation was established in the Cape in 
1936, under Bruno Stiller. He organised lectures, musical evenings, and with the help of 
some Stellenbosch University professors and students, arranged for Nazi film exhibitions.142 
 
These efforts, facilitated through the German diplomatic services in Pretoria, were designed 
to unite and organise Germans in their respective localities and to firmly inculcate Nazi ideals 
in their minds. German missionaries, mission stations and the synod system in the Union and 
SWA played an integral part in disseminating and entrenching Nazi Germany’s political 
perspectives. It was however, in the political context where the greatest risks for internal 
security and stability in the Union became acute. Some Union individuals and groups, who 
displayed sympathetic inclinations to Germans, created an opportunity for Nazi growth and 
influence in the country. The far right nationalistic persons and movements became 
particularly susceptible, and directly or indirectly, contributed to the Nazi cause, by creating a 
context of confusion, antagonism and security vulnerabilities in the Union.143 
 
NAZI STIMULUS AND AFRIKANER NATIONALISTIC MOVEMENTS 
 
Interaction between South Africa and Nazi Germany was conducted extensively through 
trade and, for the Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, through cultural exchanges.144 Bilateral 
trade between the two countries grew rapidly from 1933. Germany was regarded as the 
“second best customer” of South Africa after Britain, with a total of fourteen percent of the 
country’s exports taken up by Germany and forty-two percent by Britain.145 Economically, 
both countries benefited as they obtained the much needed material from each other. 
Germany acquired raw materials such as vanadium, manganese, ore and diamonds, whilst the 
Union benefited from German technical support in fisheries, breweries and in the rail 
system.146 Thus, at that time, economic benefits influenced the South African government 
officials to tread carefully when dealing with the Germans and not to “strain the relations” by 
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entertaining the growing concerns regarding the existence of the Nazis in the Union.147 
Within German circles, it was even believed that the British influence in the South African 
commerce and industry would diminish and Germany would outstrip other states as the main 
economic partner.148 It was, however, in the cultural sphere where German influence was 
crucial and also pervaded the political corridors of the Union. 
 
“Ties of blood” between the Germans and the Afrikaners were opportunisically invoked to 
facilitate an understanding of the historical connections.149 Closer affinity between the two 
groups derived from the Afrikaners who had German ancestry and historical sympathies and 
the support offered by the Germans during the Afrikaner struggles against the British. 
Throughout their history of settlement in South Africa, many Afrikaners perceived the British 
to be their arch-rivals in the dominance of the country since the nineteenth century. The 
British occupation of the Cape (first in 1795 and second in 1806), the migration of the 
Voortrekkers, known as the Great Trek, from the Cape into the South African hinterland 
(between 1836 and 1838) to escape British authority, and the failed attempts in achieving 
Afrikaner independence in the First-Anglo Boer (1880-81) and the Second Anglo-Boer War 
(1899-1902), were some of the historical events that cultivated anti-British feelings among a 
number of Afrikaners.150 
 
Germans, perceived to be the main power with the capacity and willingness to challenge 
British supremacy in the struggle for European hegemony, were considered worthy Afrikaner 
partners in the South African context. Some ardent nationalistic elements within the 
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Afrikaner ranks even engaged in extreme measures of launching an abortive rebellion against 
the Union government in 1914.151 These elements were hoping to exploit the British focus on 
European hostilities and military commitments at the outbreak of the First World War, to 
overthrow the Union government which supported Britain, and establish an independent 
republic. The then Union Prime Minister, General Louis Botha, led the South African forces 
against his brethren and suppressed the rebellion.152 It was therefore imperative to ensure and 
intensify relations with an alternative power that had the potential to aid the nationalistic 
Afrikaner cause – the elimination of the British dominance in South Africa and the 
establishment of a republic. That power was perceived to be Germany, as it appeared to be 
successful during the early stages of the war.153 
 
Formal and informal interactions between the two groups were encouraged, particularly in 
the 1930s as pro-German and some anti-British Empire politicians were in power in the 
Union: Hertzog and Oswald Pirow.154 Hertzog’s National Party came to power in 1924, after 
forming a coalition with the Labour Party to become a majority over Smuts’s South African 
Party (SAP) in the Union parliament. It was during his (Hertzog) administration that German-
South Africa relations were heightened. Closer German-Afrikaner interfaces were forged 
through the agency of the Afrikaans-Duitse Kultuur-Unie (ADK) (Afrikaans-German 
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Cultural Union), an organisation that was instrumental in facilitating the exchange 
programmes, especially for students and scientists.155 
 
Through the ADK, nationalistic Afrikaner intellectuals engaged regularly with German 
representatives, including members of the Nazi Party, thus creating a platform for exchanging 
ideas.156 These exchanges, as much as they influenced the intellectual development of radical 
nationalists, seemed to benefit the Germans more.157 German “experts” such as Werner 
Schmidt-Pretoria, learned more about South Africa and provided reports on how to expand 
German influence in the country.158 This was highlighted further in a secret report by another 
German “expert”, Count Graf Karlfried von Dürckheim-Montmartin, an emissary of the 
German Foreign Office, who “toured” South Africa and SWA during 1934-1935, and worked 
together with other Nazi agents such as Stark.159 
 
Reflecting back on his time as a Director of the National Bureau for Educational and Social 
Research in South Africa and an organiser of the New Education Fellowship Conference 
which was held in Cape Town and Johannesburg in July 1934, Dr Ernst Gideon Malherbe 
recalled the name of Count von Dürckheim-Montmartin, a German speaker who was actually 
not invited.160 The conference’s theme was “The Adaptation of Education to the Changing 
Social and Economic Needs with Special Reference to South Africa.”161 Dr Malherbe did not 
approve of Von Dürckheim-Montmartin because he had actually invited renowned German 
scholars on education, Dr Gertrude Bäumer, the Minister of Social Welfare in the German 
Weimar Republic (before Hitler came to power in 1933), and had publications to her name, as 
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well as Professor Friedrich Schneider, professor of education at the University of Cologne 
and editor of the International Education Review.162 These scholars were refused permission 
to attend the conference in South Africa and were also dismissed from their positions by the 
Nazi government in about October/November 1933.163 No reasons were provided for their 
dismissal. However, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Konstantin Freiherr von 
Neurath, stated in a letter to the high commissioner of the Union of South Africa in London, 
Charles te Water, that the two scholars were not appropriate persons to speak on the “new” 
education system of Germany. Freiherr von Neurath, in reply to Te Water, who had 
intervened on behalf of the conference organiser, Dr Malherbe, presented the following the 
reasons for the replacement of the two delegates: 
 
Professor Schneider and Frau Dr Bäumer have not taken any active part in the 
reorganisation of the German educational system which has been initiated in the last few 
months, and, consequently, will hardly be in a position to give an absolutely accurate and 
complete description of the motives and tendencies of this latest educational development.164 
 
What was required, from a Nazi German perspective, was to bring someone who ‘would be 
in a position to give an expert description of the fundamental principles and aims of the 
National-Socialist educational policy’, argued Von Neurath, and concluded by suggesting a 
certain “expert”, senator Dr von Hoff, the director of education in Bremen.165 This was a 
clear indication that the Nazi government wanted to use the conference as an occasion to 
propagate the Nazi ideals; in consequence, they could not support anyone who did not play 
along. Dr Malherbe did not entirely disapprove of the new name added, but expressed the 
view that the conference was designed to have the speakers advising South Africans on the 
educational problems and the organisation of social work, not to hear about ‘the recent 
developments under the National Socialist regime’. He also pointed out that if Prof Schneider 
and Dr Bäumer were to come, Dr von Hoff might be feared as a Nazi spy, thus impacting on 
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the presentations of the two academics.166 Though ultimately none of the suggested names 
came to the conference, the “spy” concerns could not have been closer to the truth, as it was 
later revealed, in the person of Von Dürckheim-Montmartin, who used a conference as a 
cover.167 His real task was revealed later in a secret report which was confiscated in SWA, 
about his reflections on the prospects of advancing Nazism in South Africa. 
 
At the behest of Hitler, Von Dürckheim-Montmartin, a Teachers Training College lecturer at 
Kiel, and Frau Nitsche, who taught at a social work training college, were sent to South 
Africa as replacements. These two were “unknowns” and Dr Malherbe, at the time still naïve 
about Nazi Germany’s ulterior motives, complained to Hertzog, who replied that Hitler must 
not be offended in anyway.168 This type of rebuff came to characterise the South African 
government’s response to concerns about the rising Nazi activities in the country until the 
outbreak of the war.169 Von Dürckheim-Montmartin and Frau Nitsche came as German 
speakers, presented unimpressive papers170 at the conference and disappeared shortly 
thereafter.171 
 
Von Dürckheim-Montmartin’s activities and purpose in South Africa and SWA would later 
be revealed. Dr Malherbe, in his capacity as director of intelligence in South Africa, learned 
more about Von Dürckheim-Montmartin from a captured copy of a secret report172 written to 
Hitler via the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, who had 
replaced Baron von Neurath in 1938. That copy of a secret report was seized by the South 
African intelligence authorities in the German consulate’s offices in SWA in 1939. The 
contents of the report, published in 1940 as part of the Union government’s pro-war 
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propaganda effort to reduce pro-Nazi bias in the country, reflected the real purpose of Von 
Dürckheim-Montmartin’s visit to the Union during 1934-1935.173 
 
Von Dürckheim-Montmartin was a Nazi spy with a mission to learn about South Africa and 
to determine the way in which the Nazi philosophy could be disseminated in schools, 
churches, and via German newspapers, for the purpose of preparing for the eventual 
annexation of the country.174 Contents of the report were published in the bulletin by the pro-
Smuts and pro-war organisation called the Union Unity Truth Service (UUTS). It dealt with 
Nazi espionage and propaganda operations in the Union, as well the desire to secure 
Afrikaner support due to their pro-German sentiments. 175 About 60 000 copies of the bulletin 
were distributed and also provided to various newspapers for reproduction, to expose the 
German ambitions.176 The report mentioned various factors, particularly the imperative of 
propaganda, to ensure that Nazi Germany would prevail in South Africa: 
 
All Nazis’ efforts and operations should be fused with German ‘kultur’ … and intensify the 
work and activity of the German church officials, schools, school masters, missiona[ri]es, 
newspapers [and] societies. English and Afrikaans newspapers which show any noticeable 
inclination towards the Nazi way of living, should be supported and subsidised; similarly 
non-German newspapermen should be “cultivated”, and if necessary, bribed. Propaganda 
work among the natives in reserves and separate territories should be increased, whilst the 
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discontented, dissatisfied Indian elements in all parts of the Union, particularly in Natal, 
should be stirred up, incited, exploited, continually.177 
 
Nazi efforts, noted the report, needed to be directed at increasing a wedge between the 
English and the Afrikaners, and to facilitate cooperation between Germans and Afrikaners.178 
The great opportunity, argued Von Dürckheim-Montmartin, ‘lies in the disunity of the 
opponents, that is, in the opposition between British and Boers’.179 This aspect of the internal 
dynamics in white politics was observed keenly by the Germans in the 1930s. Any sign of 
weaknesses or tensions regarding the British-South Africa relations were reported with 
enthusiasm to Berlin, for example, the controversial appointment of Duncan as governor 
general of South Africa in 1937.180 
 
Duncan, a former member of Sir Alfred Milner’s kindergarten and Union member of 
parliament for Fordsburg in the Transvaal since 1916, had a German wife, Alice Dold181 from 
Kokstad in East Griqualand, and had lived in South Africa for more than thirty years since 
1901.182 His appointment as governor general to replace George Villiers, Earl of Claredon, 
broke with a historical tradition of appointing non-South African citizens to that post, though 
it was a new development in other Dominions.183 In the German circles, the appointment of 
Duncan, a South African citizen, was considered significant in a process towards dissolution 
of ties between the Union and Britain.184 It was in such areas of internal contestations that 
German officials in South Africa earnestly reported to Berlin. The Von Dürckheim-
Montmartin report also mentioned the names of high profile South African nationalist 
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leaders, Hertzog and Pirow, as being well disposed to the Germans and the new German 
outlook.185 Also, far right movements, some of which openly embraced Nazi ideals, made 
their way into the reports as they became locally originated representations of the fascist 
designs in the Union. The Greyshirts movement was singled out for its “hard fight” against 
the Jewish community – a major pre-occupation which characterised Nazi propaganda.186 At 
the time of Von Dürckheim-Montmartin’s visit, the Greyshirts were one of the rightist ‘shirt” 
movements inspired by European fascist concepts which had sprung up in various countries 
around the world, including South Africa.187 
 
The Von Dürckheim-Montmartin report merely revealed the extent of Nazi manoeuvrings in 
South Africa which, in the 1930s, appeared insufficient to bring many Afrikaners to the side 
of the Germans. Hagemann, drawing from the German sources, argues that German 
diplomats in the Union were not naïve. Emil Wiehl, the German Minister Plenipotentiary in 
South Africa, after being requested to comment, to criticise and to endorse the plans 
contained in the Von Dürckheim-Montmartin report, noted that Afrikaners wanted to profit 
from the German power in their historical struggle against the British. They did not 
necessarily view themselves as “subjects” of a foreign power – Nazi Germany.188 Citino, 
reflecting on the German official records of communication, also makes the same argument. 
He notes that though the nationalistic Afrikaners’ race consciousness, anti-British sentiment 
and anti-Jewish perspectives were consonant with Nazi ideals, however, they were ‘not 
German’ and the Afrikaners ‘had no desire to trade “God Save the King” for ‘Deutchland 
über Alles’ or the ‘Horst Wessel Lied’.189 Pertaining to the fight against the Jews, 
nonetheless, the Nazis found a reciprocated point of agreement with some of the most 
extreme nationalistic Afrikaners. 
 
Nazi Germany’s anti-Jewish persecution and propaganda were transplanted to South Africa. 
At that time, various agencies intensively engaged in the production and distribution of 
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propaganda to various foreign states. It was estimated that in 1934, about thirteen million 
pounds were spent on foreign propaganda, and by 1937, the reported funding expenditure, 
according to the Dutch newspaper, Het Volk, of 16 December, was estimated to have reached 
twenty-one million pounds, for the promotion of Nazism in other countries.190 Similar reports 
also appeared in a series of articles in Common Sense, a joint publication by the Society of 
Jews and Christians, Johannesburg, which aimed at countering Nazism in South Africa. A 
quote from an unnamed writer of Quarterly Review of October 1938, in a “Nazi 
International” section, was reproduced as follows: 
 
The organisation of foreign propaganda by the German Government is so vast, so intricate 
and widely ramified, that it almost baffles description. There is not just one agency for the 
purpose, but a variety of bodies, each sub-divided into departments and sections, linked up 
with the other main organs of Government, such as the Foreign Office, the War Office, and 
the Gestapo (Secret State Police), and sending out their multitudinous tentacles to the 
remotes corners of the universe, yet all controlled by central authority.191 
Such was the German devotion to influencing thoughts and attitudes of foreign nations, 
mainly with regard to creating favourable disposition towards the country. One of the 
influential means of propaganda was the utilisation of radio broadcast. After the construction 
of the short-wave transmitter in Zeesen, Germany, in 1931, the Nazi regime exploited this 
technology in 1933 to conduct propaganda.192 Broadcasts were conducted in eighteen 
different languages, including Afrikaans to South Africa, by the time war broke out. It was 
already established that some Afrikaner nationalistic movements in the country were opposed 
to a war. The Afrikaans announcer at Zeesen Radio was Dr Sidney Erich Holm, a South 
African of German origin, who was recruited by German diplomatic representatives and 
together with his wife and children, went to Germany aboard the S.S. Pretoria, on 20 March 
1939.193 Initially, German information about the country was conducted via Lourenço 
Marques. Later a secret wireless transmitter was installed in South Africa and operated on the 
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in South Africa’, pp. 148-172; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 134-135. 
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farm of Ossewabrandwag (OB) leader, Dr J.F.J. van Rensburg, near Vryburg.194 The wireless 
service was run by Nazi spy, Lothar Sittig (codename Felix), a South African with German 
roots, and assisted by Dutch journalist, Henri Jacques (Hans) Rooseboom, who was inserted 
into the Union by the Nazis in October 1939.195 Zeesen Radio utilised Afrikaans press reports 
and the secret transmitter to broadcast “credible” news about the country to the South African 
audience.196 Through Zeesen, Nazi propaganda was transmitted, using emotive language to 
arouse anti-British feelings, chiefly through reference to atrocities of the Anglo-Boer War: 
 
… courage and deep sense for righteousness and freedom. These characteristics will inspire 
South Africa although Afrikaner renegades, jingoes and Jews are suppressing the freedom of 
expression of the Afrikaner with force and cunning, and forced him into war for the interest of 
England, who is the arch enemy of the Afrikaner … the Boer nation had repeatedly to fight 
bitterly [against Britain] for its independence and rights … English and Jews systematically 
prepared the war for England against the Boers in 1899. 75, 000 Boers fought againts 450, 
000 British soldiers … the Boers fought stubbornly until the British directed their efforts in 
the most brutal manner against women and children in order to bring the fighting men to 
their knees. During these years, 26, 000 women and children died. A terrible guilt over which 
many British are shamed of. But they soon forgot.197 
 
Zeesen Radio critised South Africa’s participation in the war and referred to Smuts in a 
variety of ways: ‘Smuts, the friend of England’, ‘Smuts, handyman of the Empire’ and ‘the 
little South African Dictator’.198 As war progressed, there were also insinuations that Smuts 
had invited British soldiers to settle in South Africa after the war, invoking further emotions 
from the ultra-nationalist Afrikaners to regard such action as the ‘occupation of land by the 
enemies of the Afrikaner nation’.199 Zeesen Radio became such a menace to the Smuts 
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government that arrangements were made via the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC) for the specific purpose of countering the claims made in the broadcast.200 
 
In addition to Zeesen Radio, two other agencies were also significant in advancing Nazi 
influence in South Africa. They were the German Fitche Association (Duitse Fitchebund), 
with its central offices in Hamburg201 and the World Service (Welt Dienst), based in Erfurt, 
Germany.202 The Fitche Association’s object was to refute Germany’s war culpability 
regarding its role in the First World War. Leaflets, books and pamphlets were produced and 
sent out. In 1935, about five million leaflets were reported to have been sent abroad. The 
published leaflets were written in several languages, including brilliant Afrikaans.203 This 
highlights that the Afrikaans-speaking community was essential to the Nazi cause. In one of 
the requests to the Deutsche Afrikaner, Dr Kurt Johannsen, who was running a secret press 
propaganda office in Hamburg, newspapers in the Union, both Afrikaans and English, were 
to be identified for the purposes of publishing Nazi propaganda paper, “Germany Speaks”.204 
Stark listed about eight Afrikaans and five English newspapers ultimately, and gave their 
titles to Johannsen.205 
 
A stream of other literature flooded the Union, and many of them served to discredit the 
existing liberal democratic institutions, to amplify the peril of communism, to exalt the pre-
eminence of the Aryan race and to vilify the Jewish community.206 On each sheet of the 
pamphlets distributed by the Fitche Association, it was stated that, “further copies may be 
obtained free of charge from the Secretary … please distribute them among your friends”, 
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and a Hamburg address was provided.207 The Jews and Russian Bolshevism in particular, 
were the dominant features of propaganda.208 Numerous ways were devised to disseminate 
the pamphlets in the country. Bundles of these pamphlets would at times be sent by “friends” 
for distribution, wrapped up in merchandise and smuggled into the Union. Sometimes the 
pamphlets would be brought in by German sailors and given to their associates at the 
harbours. In another situation, pamphlets were mailed to the addresses in the country. Many 
church ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church received such mails which were 
progressively sent on a larger scale.209 
 
Another agency, World Service (Welt Dienst), published weekly Nazi propaganda bulletins in 
eight languages.210 Despite the publications by the Fitche Association, the World Service 
unleashed the most negative portrayal of the Jews. They were referred to as capitalists, 
Christian babies ritual killers, and people who were out to dominate the world.211 The 
German Minister, Wiehl, exploited anti-Jewish agitation as a weapon against the anti-German 
protests and boycott of German goods that took place in the Union and other parts of the 
world as a result of the persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany.212 Due to the stimulus, to 
some extent, of Nazi agents, imitation movements in South Africa were founded on the anti-
Jewish platform. A memorandum issued by the Jewish leadership in the country provided a 
brief appraisal of the various anti-Jewish “shirt” movements that developed in the country 
soon after Hitler came to power in 1933. The South African Greyshirt Movement (the South 
African Christian National Socialist Party), was founded on 26 October 1933 in Cape Town 
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by Louis T. Weichardt. At its gathering, a Nazi salute was given and the movement became 
active in the Eastern and Western Cape. In the Transvaal, Manie Wessels established the 
South African Democratic Movement (the Blackshirts) in December 1933 and also operated 
in the Orange Free State.213 Jewish businesses and services were confronted with organised 
boycotts and in Bloemfontein, some of the Jewish shops had swastikas affixed on the 
buildings.214 From 1934 onwards, there were additional anti-Jewish movements founded in 
South Africa and some of the original ones were reconfigured in the process. 
 
In May 1934, the reconfigured and renamed South African National Party (SANP) (not 
Hertzog’s or Malan’s National Party), led by Weichardt came into being. It was a 
consolidation of the South African Gentile National Socialist Movement (variation of 
“Christian” and “Party” in the name of previous organisation) and the “South African 
Greyshirts” which then referred to itself as the “Storm Troopers”. The “South African 
Greyshirts” or “Storm Troopers” was designed to provide bodyguards to speakers and 
maintained order at meetings. A branch of the SANP, under the leadership of R.K. Rudman 
was active in Natal. Due to internal dissensions, the SANP splintered and its former 
organising secretary, J.H.H. de Waal, Jnr., apparently unhappy with Weichart’s advocacy of 
dictatorship, formed the Gentile Protection League in Cape Town in January 1935. Another 
splinter group, the South African Fascists, was founded by J.S. von Moltke, and operated in 
the Eastern Provinces and Free State. In Cape Town, a movement under the name of The 
People’s Movement, describing itself as “non-political” and “disavowed connections” with 
either Weichardt or Von Moltke, was founded by H.S. Terreblanche.215 In another splinter, 
this time from the “Blackshirts”, Die Volksbeweging (an Afrikaans renaming of the People’s 
Movement) was founded by Chris Havemann.216 
 
All these movements, despite slight variations in their stated perspectives, predominantly 
shared common anti-Jewish policy in their respective programmes.217 Anti-Jewish 
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publications were produced and distributed in various parts of the country where these 
movements were active. Among others, Die Waarheid (The Truth) was published by the 
Greyshirts, Ons Reg (Our Right) by the “Blackshirts” and the Terre Blanche by The People’s 
Movement.218 Bruno Stiller, counsellor in the German Legation in Pretoria and a Nazi Party 
leader in the Union, was particularly mentioned in the South African intelligence reports as 
the key figure in fostering these “shirt” movements.219 
 
The Greyshirts under Weichardt became the main vociferous movement which modelled 
itself along the Nazi lines, and led the campaigns against the Jewish community.220 This 
movement was highly regarded in the Nazi circles. After a raid on the Nazi headquarters in 
SWA in 1935, the Greyshirts were mentioned in the German documents as a ‘sister 
movement’, with its leader, Weichardt described as ‘leader of the South African Nazis’ and 
as ‘an honest fanatical Nazi’.221 Morris Alexander, a leader of the Jewish board of deputies in 
Cape Town, provided a summary of the contents of the seized Nazi documents, which 
specifically refer to South Africa. It was indicated that, though no evidence was found, 
funding was considered for promoting anti-Semitic campaigns in South Africa.222The South 
African intelligence authorities also referred to the same report and mentioned ‘several 
hundred pounds out of some political fund to place at the disposal of the Greyshirt 
movement’.223 
 
In 1937, the Greyshirts were represented at the annual World Service congress held in Erfurt, 
by one Miss A. Marshall, who published the accounts of the congress in the publication of the 
movement, Die Waarheid.224 The implications of these “shirt” movements in the Union lay 
more in their anti-Jewish messages based on Nazi ideals, in the context of the existing socio-
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economic problems.225 The Greyshirts apportioned blame to the Jews for the economic 
hardships, communistic influences and other ‘machinations’ orchestrated to ensure (Jewish) 
control in all spheres of the South African society, thus requiring strong resistance.226 
 
In September 1938, Weichardt, unable to attend the World Service Congress in Germany, 
sent a message and urged the Congress for the formation of a “united front throughout the 
world against the Jews”.227 In his efforts to draw support from the extreme nationalistic 
elements in the white Afrikaans-speaking society, Weichardt exploited the ‘poor white 
problem’ largely produced by the Economic Depression of the early 1930s228, and poor 
agriculture, difficulties for white unskilled workers in urban centres, as well as the influx of 
blacks to urban centres who competed for unskilled job opportunities with whites, to 
apportion culpability to the Jews.229 The German officials in South Africa emphasised the 
fact that it was the English-Jews, with capitalistic tendencies, that promoted their self-interest 
to the detriment of the Afrikaners.230 Through the “rhetoric of protest and opposition” 231 to 
the Jewish community in South Africa, the Greyshirts facilitated the growth and visibility of 
the Nazi influence in South Africa. To a limited extent, the Blackshirts also fostered anti-
Jewish antagonism in the Union, making pronouncements that the Jews were dominating the 
world.232 The fomenting of anti-Jewish hostility, by fostering ideas of Jewish domination in 
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the world, was an essential element in the promotion of the broader Nazi aims. By the second 
half of the 1930s, anti-Jewish protests and campaigns became increasingly manifested in 
South Africa.233 
 
Closer magnetism between the German National Socialists and the South African narrow 
conception of nationalism - exclusive Afrikaner nationalism, derived from the construction of 
‘common enemies: communism and Jewry.’234 The memorandum on anti-Jewish movements 
suggests that the concentration of the activities of these movements were ‘on the 
economically depressed classes and poorer parts of the country – more especially in the 
Western Transvaal and the hinterland of the Cape’.235 The memorandum further asserts that 
the anti-Jewish messages exploited the ‘ignorance of their listeners’ by making ‘capital of 
their economic hardships by attributing the cause of these to the Jews’.236 Through public 
speeches, pamphlets and mail, anti-Jewish propaganda was disseminated, even to the school 
children, and in certain cases, to coloureds and blacks, urging them to view Jews as 
“dominant” in commerce and professional aspects of the country.237 Racial animosity in the 
Union was thus incited at grassroots level. Hence, even the previously mainstream Afrikaner 
nationalistic leaders such as Dr D.F. Malan of the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party (‘Purified’ 
National Party), evolved their views and became openly anti-Jewish, with the view to 
reaching peripheral classes of the society. Malan commented in 1937, that the Jews were to 
blame for the disunity and marginalisation of Afrikaners.238 
 
The ‘Purified’ National Party (PNP) was a product of party political realignments in South 
Africa after the economic crisis of the early 1930s.239 This party was initially not overtly anti-
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Jewish, despite the radical elements inside. In the mid-1930s, anti-Jewish attitudes became 
apparent within the PNP. This became predominantly evident in 1936 when Dr Malan and 
radical leaders such as Dr H.F. Verwoerd, protested against the arrival of Jewish refugees on 
a chartered ship, the SS Stuttgart, from Germany.240 The PNP was advocating for the 
imposition of stricter immigration regulations which effectively affected the Jewish 
community. Anti-Jewish protests were carried out when the SS Stuttgart arrived in Cape 
Town to beat the deadline of restrictive immigration law which was to be effective on 1 
November 1936.241 
 
By 1937, anti-Jewish activism had developed into an integral part of the PNP’s political 
programme in opposition to the United Party-led government. It was no longer about 
dreading economic competition, but a racially-charged political antagonism against the 
Jews.242 This became a matter of extreme significance to Nazi Germany, as Malan was in the 
political mainstream and also enjoyed the growing support of many Afrikaners.243 Besides, 
the “shirt” movements became smaller and weaker due to constant sub-divisions, and also 
operated in the political periphery.244 Malan’s PNP, thus, had the opportunity and latitude to 
incorporate anti-Jewish messages into its political programme to obtain grassroots support 
which was often neglected. 
 
Malan also courted overt admirers of Hitler’s Nazism, the Greyshirts and the Blackshirts, in 
his attempt to obtain electoral support.245 These overtures failed primarily due to the 
Greyshirts rejecting pluralistic party politics and constitutionalism. Malan and the PNP were 
committed to, and did not want to deviate from constitutional democratic imperatives as a 
platform for facilitating the realisation of Afrikaner dreams – the achievement of an 
Afrikaner-dominated republic. Dr Malherbe made the association between the National Party 
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and its Nazi affiliation through a membership card dated 31 August 1937.246 This card was 
issued to M.J.F Bergman, membership no. 7719 of Dundee, Natal. It reflected a clear 
connection with the Nazi movement and had a swastika emblem on the top left page and on 
the stamp at the bottom left. On both emblems, the South African National Party and its 
abbreviated letters, S.A.N.P., were printed. On the right page, the following words appear: 
 
[English] The South African National Party emanates from the S.A. Gentile National-Socialist 
Movement and incorporates the said Movement as also the S.A. Grey Shirts. 
 
[Afrikaans] Die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Party spruit uit die S.A. Christelike Nasionale-
Sosialistiese Beweging en sluit in die gesegde Beweging asook die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Gryshemde.247 
 
Dr Malherbe reproduced it in his book, Never a Dull Moment, and indicated that, ‘then 
[before the war] already the National Party had adopted the Nazi swastika as its symbol’, and 
went on to note that the word “Gentile”, written in the Afrikaans translation as “Christelike”, 
was an indication of ‘the strong anti-semitic leanings in the National Party at the time’.248 
Anti-Semitism, continued Malherbe, ‘was fundamental to Hitler’s theory which he put into 
practice in the most barbarous way during the war.’249 
 
In 1934, after the fusion of Hertzog and Smuts’s parties to form the United Party, Malan 
broke away and formed the PNP, known in Afrikaans as “Die Gesuiwerde” Nasionale Party, 
sometimes just referred to, in short, as the “Purified” or “Die Gesuiwerde”. Weichardt’s 
Greyshirts, notorious for its frequent changing of names in the 1930s and 1940s, also called 
itself the South African National Party in 1934 (as discussed above). It had changed from its 
previous name, the South African Christian National Socialist Movement. From the words on 
the membership card, it can be inferred that the National Party referred to here, was actually 
the Greyshirts, not Malan’s PNP. This is because the “Purified” did not have the words, 
“South African”, in the Party’s name, which the renamed Greyshirts had. The previous name 
of the Greyshirts, the South African Christian National Socialist Movement, is actually 
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Party, “The South African National Party”. 
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captured in the Afrikaans translation in the card. The connotation of this membership card is 
in the fact that the pre-war Nazi linkages with the nationalistic movements in South Africa 
really existed, and, judging from the membership number on the card (7719), that by 1937, 
there were already adherents of over 7700.250 (See Illustration 2) 
 
The proliferation of the “shirt” movements and their association with Nazi ideals, especially 
on the anti-Jewish policy, stirred up the political currents in South Africa. It was however, the 
founding of the Ossewa-Brandwag (OB) (Ox Wagon Sentinels) in February 1939, with Nazi 
links, which presented a menacing political force and a threat to the Union government 
before and during the course of war. In its seemingly innocuous self-promotion, on a cultural 
platform, the OB stimulated popular appeal among the Afrikaans-speaking sections of the 
population. (See Illustration 3) It developed rapidly as a mass movement, advocating for 
Afrikaner national unity, with, according to the author, Marx, a vague and ‘least fixed 
programme’ of all.251 Consequently, the OB benefitted from a “mass influx” of adherents to 
the organisation, and later, gravitated into the political terrain, where it threatened the 
established nationalistic movements, such as the “Purified”, that have been fighting for the 
advancement of Afrikaner interests. The movement, also, threatened the South African state 
when it embraced violence as means to achieving its goals and, according to intelligence 
reports, collaborated with the Nazi agents in the destabilisation of the country.252 
 
In June 1944, the OB leader, J.F.J. (Hans) van Rensburg, with the title, Commandant 
General, reflected on the origin and development of the movement. He spent five hours on 
his farm, giving an interview to an American, Dr Jack S. Harris, a ‘special assistant’ in the 
United States Office of War Information in South Africa, in which he described the OB as 
follows: 
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B.I. 20, Secret Internal Security, Weekly Intelligence Reports, 1939-1945; Malherbe Papers, File 
444/7, KCM 56975 (87-100), Secret Military Intelligence Reports on the Ossewabrandwag, c1940-5; 
See also Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots?, chapters 3 (Stormjaers), 4 (Violence), 12 (Sabotage) and 13 
(The Wire Cutting Circuit); C. Marx, The Oxwagon Sentinel, pp. 515-519; H. Strydom, For Folk and 
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A national revolutionary movement which is the herald and the fore-runner of an 
Authoritarian Republic, national in its approach to social problems and social in its 
approach to national questions. If our opponents call that National-Socialism the accusation 
leaves us unmoved. Indeed, we take it as a compliment.253 
 
In that interview, Van Rensburg expressed his admiration for Germany’s efficiency and 
material progress, and most importantly, praised Hitler as a “saint” who was like a 
“supernatural force that was outside the mundane world”.254 It was on this basis that Dr 
Harris, in his account and analysis of the OB, raised concerns about the “inaction” of the 
South African authorities. His criticism in the report, which he sent to the American Secretary 
of State, John Foster Dulles, is expressed in the following fashion: 
 
The most striking of the many anomalies in the Union of South Africa is the fact that while it 
is allied with the other United Nations in the fight to the finish against Hitlerism, it permits its 
local brand of Hitlerism to thrive virtually unchecked. Still on the loose are its local 
“fuehrer” and all but a few of his followers, although their declared objective is the 
overthrow by revolutionary means of the government now in power. The incredulous observer 
from abroad finds that while loyal “Springboks” are fighting and dying to destroy the Nazis 
of Europe, the Nazis of South Africa are carrying on with only slight interference [in] their 
campaign to establish a National-Socialist State. 255 
 
Dr Harris went on to describe van Rensburg and his various positions, evidently emphasising 
the point that he was a former military officer and government official in the Union: 
 
This “fuehrer” is Dr.J.F.J. (Hansie) Van Rensburg, ex-Colonel of the Union army, ex-
Secretary of the Union Department of Justice, ex-administrator of the Orange Free State 
province, but currently the “Kommandant-General” of the Ossewabrandwag (Ox-Wagon 
                                                 
253  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 84, “Exhibit A”, Foreword Written by J.F.J. van Rensburg, The 
Ossewabrandwag. Some Information on its Origins, its Development and its National Political Aims, 
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254  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 83, Interview with Dr. J.F.J. van Rensburg, Kommandant-General of the 
Ossewabrandwag, 5 June 1944. 
255  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 83, Interview with Dr. J.F.J. van Rensburg, Kommandant-General of the 
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Sentinels), an organisation whose methods and objectives are indistinguishable from those of 
Hitler’s Nazi party during its palmist days.256 
 
This characterisation of the OB reflects the extent of the change which the movement had 
undergone, from its inception in 1939. The OB, from its beginning in Bloemfontein, was 
founded as a cultural movement, with the intention of keeping the spirit of the symbolic Great 
Trek, after the centenary celebrations of that event in 1938.257 The ox-wagon, explained Van 
Rensburg, represented the ‘unifying symbol … a token of nationhood’ which had been 
lacking in the Afrikaners in the Free State, Transvaal, Natal and the Cape Province.258 It was 
considered a reflection of the whole Afrikaner history and heritage which needed to be kept 
alive. These views had been consolidated earlier, in June 1942, with the publication of the 
brochure titled, ‘Die Ossewa-Brandwag: Vanwaar en Waarheen’,259 under the signature of its 
Kommandant-General, Dr Van Rensburg. This brochure recalled the history of the Afrikaners 
and their past sufferings under the yoke of British Imperialism, criticised the Union’s 
participation in the war and then envisioned the country as a Christian National Republic 
under a strong leadership and without the complexities of parliamentary politics.260 Until 
then, the founders of the movement had exploited that ox-wagon symbol associated with the 
Afrikaner history and heritage to invoke the emotional fervour and established an 
organisation with broadly defined objectives.261 
 
Its foundation was initially one of the many nationalistic movements that had mushroomed 
during the 1930s, with the object of advancing Afrikaner aspirations. It however emerged 
strongly above other movements. Its main attraction lay in its strategy of styling itself as a 
cultural movement and its indifference to party politics. Its primary focus was in the 
maintenance of Afrikaner unity and the preservation of its traditions and cultural heritage. 
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This aspect of the movement, Roberts and Trollip, noted in 1947, that it provides the reasons 
why the OB’s message was powerful and effective: 
 
The O.B. succeeded because it seemed to offer everyman – and at first also to every woman – 
the chance of an individual and ponderable contribution to the great task of unifying the 
Afrikaner nation. At ‘braaivleisaande’, at ‘jukskei’ meetings, at the local ‘kultuurvereniging’, 
and even on occasion at church, Afrikaners could meet in that Trekker dress which was to be 
the uniform of the movement, and feel a sense of community of culture, of common heritage, 
of organised progress towards a great goal – a feeling which they did not always (or even, 
perhaps, often) experience within the framework of their political parties. The O.B., indeed, 
aspired to embrace the whole Volk. Where parties divided, quarrelling over sordid personal 
issues, the O.B. united. It was to be Highest Common Factor of Afrikanerdom …262 
 
Upon its founding, the OB announced its aims which were presented in general terms that 
they appealed to every nationalistic Afrikaner. During an interview with the Afrikaans 
newspaper, Die Volksblad, in February 1939, its first Kommandant-General, Colonel J.C.C. 
Laas, outlined the objectives of the movement, deriving from its constitution, in the following 
manner: 
 
a. The perpetuation of the spirit of the ox-wagon in the Union. 
b. Sustaining, intensifying and giving expression to the traditions and principles of the Dutch 
Afrikaner. 
c. The protection and advancement of the religious-cultural and material interests of the 
Afrikaners. 
d. The nurturing of loyalty and national pride of the Afrikaners. 
e. The binding and uniting of all Afrikaners, male and female, who supported these principles 
and have the will to expend energy in striving to realise them.263 
 
It was, argues Marx, this ‘vagueness and lack of clarity’ that attracted many Afrikaner 
nationalists, including members of established political parties, to contribute to the 
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movement.264 By the outbreak of the war, the OB was stirring up the entire political 
environment, through anti-war activism and sabotage. It became the main preoccupation of 
the South African intelligence and security authorities during the war, because it undermined 
state authority and threatened internal stability.265 Undercurrents of unrest had been festering 
in the country for sometime during 1939. The Orange Free State (OFS) command intelligence 
officer reported that republican spirit was vigorous in the many areas and the “anti-
government section is ready for action if, and, ‘orders come from Pretoria.’”266 Then, the 
OB’s influence was seemingly clandestine and it was still, to some extent, not fully 
developed organisationally to present a major threat. At the beginning of 1940, intelligence 
reports on the OB multiplied. There was a new drive to recruit members for the movement, 
and, it was anticipated that some OB members serving in the Union Defence Force (UDF) 
would refuse to go north of the Zambesi River for military operations, should the situation 
arise.267 
 
According to the intelligence reports, the OB was organising with the view that, as soon as 
military forces were called northwards, the ‘society would expect Mr [Oswald] Pirow to give 
his long awaited “lead”, and should the political crisis arise in the Union, the whole Ossewa 
Brandwag organisation will be placed at the disposal of the republican section’.268 This view 
was expressed mainly in the OFS. During December 1939, reports indicated that the some 
officers in the UDF were intending to undermine the government’s position. UDF officers 
were envisaged to retain their commissions in the various commandos so as to keep 
government supporters out of key positions. The implication was that ‘in a time of crisis, the 
Government will be faced with opposition in the ranks of its own forces’.269 The situation 
pertaining to the OB changed rapidly in the second quarter of 1940. In April, the concerns of 
the intelligence authorities were confirmed. At a meeting in Bloemfontein, the OB’s 
Kommandant General, Laas, revealed that the movement was a military organisation. The 
intelligence officer in OFS established that the movement would be constituted by 
undetermined number of generals, with 3 400 men under each. The arrival from Germany, of 
                                                 
264  Marx, The Oxwagon Sentinel, p. 331. 
265  Malherbe Papers, File 445/3, KCM 56975 (194), The Afrikaner Broederbond by Capt. Janie A. 
Malherbe, first report produced in February 1941, and since then updated, 29 March 1944; See also 
Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots?, pp. 13-14, 26-29, 100-111; Brits, ‘The Pact and South African 
Society’, in B.J. Liebenberg and S.B. Spies, eds., South Africa in the 20th Century, pp. 199-200. 
266  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summary, 11 November 1939. 
267  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summary, 5 January 1940. 
268  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summary, 5 January 1940. 
269  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summary, 16 December 1939. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
43 
 
15 000 badges for the OB, was also announced. When one member asked why the OB did not 
take over the government on 4 September 1939, when the war policy was adopted, Laas 
explained that ‘it was inadvisable then as there were British warships round our shores’.270 
What the informant revealed about Laas’s report in the meeting was disconcerting: 
 
The OB has completed or is completing a fourteen days intensive organisation. In this period 
of 14 days every General had to have 3, 400 men in readiness. The object of this activity [is] 
to have a large number of men in readiness when Government declares Martial Law. These 
men would then be armed by Government [reasons thereof not provided] and the majority of 
the Government supporters are sent north the OB would overthrow the Government in the 
Union.271  
 
In the final analysis of the OFS command intelligence officer, the statement above was one of 
many that reverberated in the area. However, when the issue of OB uniforms was introduced, 
it represented a possible challenge to other lawful military establishments in the Union. It 
therefore warranted stronger action.272 Laas, due to his secretive nature and weak 
organisational skills, was forced to resign from the OB in October 1940, and Dr J.F.J. van 
Rensburg, then the administrator of the Free State, was voted in as the Kommandant General 
of the movement in December 1940.273 He was inaugurated on 15 January 1941. In the 
process, the OB also began to articulate its stance on politics – anti-parliamentary politics - 
through its official newssheet, Die OB (Amptelike Ossewabrandwag –Mededelings), which 
was published weekly from October 1941.274 
 
Van Rensburg led the OB into direct confrontation with the government due to the role of the 
movement’s sub-organisation, the Stormjaers (Storm Troopers).275 It started off as an elite 
unit for providing security at OB meetings and other gatherings, but developed along military 
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lines, with the old Boer commando ranks, for the purpose of undertaking violent operations in 
the Union.276 According to the affidavit of Dr Luitpold Werz, Van Rensburg had already 
made contact with Nazi agents and proposals for the organisation of a rebellion inside the 
Union, with German assistance, were suggested in August 1940.277 The central objective was 
to orchestrate South Africa’s internal revolution was to assassinate Smuts and thus 
demoralise the forces of the British Empire.278 From late 1940, the country descended into an 
internal security emergency, with the state confronted with the anti-war para-military 
movements which engaged in various subversive activities (see below for further details).279 
 
Then, there was of course, the Afrikaner-Broederbond (AB).280 During the war, Union 
intelligence and censorship officials produced reports on the AB and its growing influence on 
other organisations and the threat to the state. For example, during 1943, Hastings Beck 
furnished an intelligence report to Dr Malherbe indicating that the AB had entrenched itself 
in the education system through the increase of its membership from teachers, and the placing 
of its members on the school committees.281 The AB, through its subsidiary organisation, the 
FAK, intended to organise an open protest against dual language medium education and to 
engage in a general strike in schools and colleges.282 School children were incited to reject 
English and to go on strike in places such as De Aar and at Vryheid. In one of the comments 
by a school teacher, it was stated that English does not belong to South Africa, and another 
teacher commented about the longing to teach German only.283 In schools and in higher 
education institutions, strong aversion to English as a language of instruction, the 
appointment of teachers and lecturers as well as the utilisation of textbooks, was reflected in 
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numerous censorship letters intercepted by the Union authorities. What was significant in this 
context was the racial antipathy that was cultivated through speeches at various gatherings 
and in pamphleteering. It was also a reflection of a growing strength and influence of the AB, 
thus creating anxieties for the authorities. Hence the strong devotion to unpacking the 
complex network of the AB structures and associations in order to understand and deal with 
it. 
 
According to Dr Malherbe, the AB had permeated various structures of the Union society and 
government departments. Its structural organisation was charted as a diagrammatic 
representation of the various elements and the extent of its linkages with related 
organisations. Dr Malherbe asserted that the organisational arrangements were based on Nazi 
patterns and it was entrenched in government departments including the railways, justice and 
police, welfare, labour, provincial education departments, agriculture, and even churches and 
political movements such as the OB and the Nationalist Party of Malan.284 (See Illustration 1) 
Through local divisions and cells, the movement reproduced itself up to the lower levels of 
the society. Intelligence reports contained a list reflecting the membership and organisations 
that were controlled by the AB.285 
 
On 13 December 1943, Dr Malherbe recounted, the AB celebrated its twenty-five year 
anniversary in Bloemfontein. On this day, distinguished Nationalist Party leaders such as the 
Hendrik F. Verwoerd (future Prime Minister of South Africa) and Nico Diederichs (a future 
State President of South Africa), as well as other leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church, 
gave speeches and praised the achievements of the AB. Dr Malherbe managed to get hold of 
the meeting’s proceedings and a list of about 300 members in attendance. He then urged 
Smuts to allow him to give the names to the newspapers for publication; but he refused.286 
The list in the intelligence reports of 1943-1944, had about 150 names on it. Dr Malherbe 
lamented Smuts’s refusal to publish the list, as it would have publicly exposed the AB’s 
operations and facilitated an understanding of the reasons behind various appointments to 
prominent positions in the government service, churches and educational institutions.287 It 
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could be inferred that Smuts’s caution was intended to reduce the cleavages within the white 
society as a result of the war. 
 
The political motivations of the AB emerged after 1934, with the fusion of former political 
adversaries, the NP and the SAP. On 16 January 1934, an executive council of the AB, 
chaired by Professor J.C. van Rooy of Potchefstroom University, produced a secret circular 
which was signed together with the AB general secretary, I.M. Lombard. The circular stated 
that ‘the main point is for Afrikanerdom to reach its ultimate goal of dominance in South 
Africa … the Afrikaner-Bond must rule South Africa.’288 In May 1939, this perspective was 
confirmed by Diederichs during an interview with Herr Kirscher of Germany’s Foreign 
Office, that the Broederbond’s central aim was to conquer the entire state machinery from 
inside, with the main focus being on the leadership.289 That is why, the schisms that existed 
within the nationalist Afrikaner political circles, since the establishment of the Fusion 
government in 1934, threatened such ambitions of the AB. 
 
After the centenary celebrations of the “Great Trek” in 1938, leading to the founding of the 
OB in 1939, the hopes of achieving Afrikaner unity were dashed when a promising 
movement eschewed its cultural pretensions and entered the political terrain when war broke 
out. Initially, common hostility to the government’s war policy seemed to provide an 
opportunity for mutual harmony among nationalistic Afrikaner movements to advance their 
cause at multi-levels. Malan’s “Purified” and the OB even attempted a Cradock Agreement in 
October 1940, each undertaking to operate in its sphere of competence: OB work on cultural 
grounds and the “Purified” in the political realm.290 The agreement failed to achieve its 
intended objectives as the OB rejected parliamentary politics and campaigned for the 
realisation of the republic through revolutionary action. Malan’s “Purified” remained the 
mainstream political opponent of the government’s war policy. Until the outbreak of the war 
and during the course of the war, Nazi Germany continued to maintain contact with extreme 
                                                 
288  Lawrence Papers, B640, E3. 263, The Afrikaner Bond, 11 November 1941. This report is a 
reproduction of a speech delivered by the then Prime Minister, General Hertzog, at Smithfield, titled: 
‘Aims of the Afrikaner Bond. Secret Society backed by Nationalists. Dangerous Policies. Folly of 
Domination by one Race in the Union’. It was subsequently published in The Star newspaper, 7 March 
1935; Malherbe Papers, File 445/3, KCM 56975 (194), The Afrikaner Broederbond by Capt. Janie A. 
Malherbe, 29 March 1944. See also Pelzer, Die Afrikaner-Broederbond, pp. 63-64. 
289  Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 81-82. 
290  The so-called Cradock Agreement between the OB and the reformulated Herenigde Nasionale of Volks 
Party (HNP) was completed on 30 October 1940. See Roberts and Trollip, The South African 
Opposition, pp. 77-78. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
47 
 
Afrikaner nationalist movements and individuals to foment instability, thereby creating 
cracks in the unity of the British Empire. 
 
Hageman asserts that Germany failed to cultivate the neutrality of the Union, and that Berlin 
did not regard South Africa as a key factor in international diplomacy.291 The Nazi interaction 
with the OB, the abortive attempts at using Sidney Robey Leibbrandt to instigate armed 
rebellion and assassinate Smuts through “Operation Weissdorn” in 1941292, the maintenance 
of spy networks in the Union, carrying out and supporting subversive and anti-war activities 
in the country, however, provide a different picture. In fact, strategically, Citino shows that 
South Africa’s entry into the war achieved many objectives. It weakened the strategic 
position of Germany as the Union harbours provided a safety zone for Allied shipping, for 
repairs and refuge, as well as keeping the British communications to India open, as the 
Mediterranean and the Suez Canal in the north were threatened by Italy. German-Japanese 
linkage in the Indian Ocean was, in a broader strategic context, also prevented by the Union’s 
participation in the war.293 
 
Citino also blames the German diplomatic efforts which were directed at the German 
minority whose role in influencing South Africa to remain neutral was limited. German 
diplomats such as Wiehl and later Rudolf Leitner, bet on the wrong Union politician, Oswald 
Pirow, due to their obsession with his “German roots”, whose political ability was weak. 
Malan, argues Citino, would have presented the best option as he was ‘anti-Semitic, anti-
British, and likely to remain neutral in a war’.294 However, the Germans were blinded by the 
fact that Malan was not a German, his loyalty was with the Afrikaners and would never 
replace English oppression with German oppression. Had they supported him quietly, the 
prospects of having a “congenial government” in power, thereby strengthening their hands in 
ensuring that South Africa was kept out of the war, would have been enhanced. Nonetheless, 
Nazi agents continued to inspire anti-war movements and subversive activities in South 
Africa, thus creating a climate of instability and insecurity in the country during the war. 
 
 
                                                 
291  Hagemann, ‘Very Special Relations’, pp. 140-141. 
292  Strydom, For Folk and Führer, pp. 1-8; For Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots?, pp. 66; Furlong, 
Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 145-147. 
293  Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa in the Nazi Era, p. 229. 
294  Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa in the Nazi Era, p. 230-231. 
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GROWING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES 
 
Anti-government attitudes were increasingly cultivated in many parts of the Union, mainly 
amongst the Afrikaner nationalists. In the OFS, the police reported that lantern slides, 
showing pictures depicting the concentrations camps during the Anglo-Boer War, farms 
burned down and men on commando, with folk songs in between, were exhibited to about six 
to seven hundred people at Visser Hall, Normal College, Bloemfontein. 295 The slides were 
exhibited by a certain Christo Kriel, who provided commentary on the slides and mainly 
emphasised negative British actions during the Anglo-Boer War.296 Pictures of this nature 
were intended to stir up feelings and escalate anti-government hostility. The audience even 
shouted “Good Old Hitler”, when a picture of a German woman handing General Louis 
Botha a 10 000 pounds cheque to rehabilitate ruined Afrikaners, was shown on the slide. The 
Attorney General, however, replied that action against such exhibitions could be undesirable, 
and advised the police to warn Kriel instead, until the Minister of Justice had given 
instructions.297 
 
Reports of a similar nature, which reflected efforts by extreme nationalistic elements to 
undermine the morale of the society and threaten state authority, were produced frequently by 
the Union intelligence officials. In Natal, residents of Ashely, a suburb in Pinetown, were 
opposed to the government’s war policy and were advocating for a republic. It was feared 
that, because many of the residents of Pinetown were railway workers who travelled in an out 
of Durban, they would spread ill-feeling against the government regarding the war policy. It 
was further reported that wild rumours were spread among blacks in that district. However, 
those rumours had little effect as blacks ‘trusted the officials to tell them the truth [about 
Germany and the war]’.298 Activities of school teachers in various parts of the country also 
cultivated hostile attitudes against the government. In OFS districts, the intelligence officers 
reported that some teachers expressed their political views to children instead of confining 
their efforts to the school curriculum.299 Expressions of anti-Jewish feelings were also taking 
                                                 
295  NASAP, Archives of the Department of Justice (hereafter JUS), Box 1506, 1/62/39, Lantern Slides. 
Complaint against Christo Kriel, South African Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Deputy 
Commissioner of Police to Attorney General, Bloemfontein, 13 September 1939. 
296  JUS, Box 1506, 1/62/39, Complaint against Christo Kriel, 13 September 1939. 
297  JUS, Box 1506, 1/62/39, Attorney General to Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bloemfontein, 14 
September 1939. 
298  JUS, Box 1506, 1/62/39, Magistrate of Pinetown to Secretary for Justice, 4 October 1939. 
299  UWH, Box 265, B.I.20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939. 
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place in OFS rural districts. Afrikaner communities were told that the Jews controlled the 
country, the mines, the banks and big businesses while they (Afrikaners) were left 
destitute.300 Government censorship reports were replete with information that Nazi ideas had 
been embraced in some schools. In some Transvaal schools, for example, the Nazi salute was 
used to open the lessons. Pupils cited Hitler as a person who stood for freedom.301 In the 
Cape, support for the OB and pro-Nazi sentiments grew. Many white schools in the 
surrounding areas of Touws River, including Clanwilliam, Van Rhynsdorp, Calvinia and 
Klipwerf, as well as at Lambert’s Bay, had gone over to the OB and had embraced Nazi 
sympathies.302 People loyal to the government did not trust the police, hence they did not 
report such cases.  
 
Nazi and anti-government propaganda was also spreading among school children in the 
Transvaal districts. Some parents and children complained about the attitude of teachers in 
Central and Western Transvaal, that ‘children were deliberately taught to be politicians and 
not citizens’.303 The influence of the teachers was enormous since some of them also owned 
stores, farms and agencies, thus able to spread their anti-government propaganda beyond their 
schools. People who did not have radio sets were invited to converge at central points where 
they could listen to Nazi broadcast through Zeesen.304 In Rustenburg, a lorry carried poor 
whites to a central point to listen to Zeesen and thereafter they were provided with foodstuffs. 
In the Bethal and Klerksdorp districts, Zeesen news service was relayed to friends and 
sympathisers through the telephone by those who own wireless sets. Farmers in the area were 
thus encouraged to express pro-German sentiments as a result.305 Broadcast from Zeesen 
were directed at denouncing the war effort, invoking Afrikaner plight and suffering, 
disparaging Smuts and instigating internal revolution.306 Besides Zeesen, various other 
subversive activities were reported. 
 
                                                 
300  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939. 
301  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 25 November 1939; See also 
Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 150-151. 
302  Lawrence Papers, B640, E3, 280-282, Subversive Activities in the Schools of the Union, Office of the 
Controller of Censorship, Cape Town, 30 January 1941. 
303  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 25 November 1939. 
304  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 25 November 1939. 
305  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 16 December 1939. 
306 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1941; SANDFA, Zeesen 
Broadcast, WR 65/9/41-WR 65/9/43, Broadcast from Enemy Radio Station, 1941-1945; UWH, Box 
265, B.I .20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 16 December 1939; Chief of the General Staff, 
War, (CGS, War), Box 197, 42/2, Extracts and Intercepts. Foreign Papers and Broadcast, 27 September 
1940. 
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Those activities included rumour mongering, anti-government press307, political speeches, 
pro-German propaganda by missionaries308, and the dissemination of subversive pamphlets. 
In one pamphlet, Afrikaners were urged to fight for a republic by “decisive action”. It 
referred to sabotage ‘as a weapon to deal a deathblow to the present government and to attain 
South Africa’s freedom’.309 One farmer was reported to have said that ‘they ought to shoot 
the Smuts Government out of office’.310 The aim was to generate anti-government political 
resentment and deprive it of popular will and support. Before the war, particularly in rural 
districts, people were told that ‘if Great Britain went to war and South Africa joined her, 
martial law would be proclaimed and a republic declared’.311 The mine workers in the 
Witwatersrand were reportedly going to instigate instability by using the South African Mine 
Workers’ Union to make impossible demands – for a larger share of the gold premium – 
which would not be granted and trouble would start.312 Among blacks, Nazi propaganda 
focused on socio-economic conditions. The Witwatersrand command intelligence officer 
reported that blacks were informed that they would receive their land back and the passes 
would be abolished when Hitler wins the war. Missionaries were considered to be the main 
culprits in disseminating subversive Nazi propaganda among blacks.313 
 
Hence, Smuts often lamented the unchecked growth of Nazism in the country.314 He was 
called the “great Afrikaner Judas” who was betraying South Africa.315 His CGS, Van 
Ryneveld, also noted that ‘the Union is being subjected to a subtle but concentrated offensive 
by the Nazis with their propaganda machine, all according to Hitler’s “conquest from 
within”. Unfortunately a large number of our own people are dupes and are consciously or 
unconsciously playing to the Nazi game’.316 Subversive activities were likewise extended to 
the military. 
 
                                                 
307 The main Afrikaans papers critical of the government were Die Vaderland, Die Volksblad, Die 
Transvaler and Die Burger. These papers carried reports that covered speeches of opposition leaders 
such as Dr. D.F. Malan, Oswald Pirow, Dr. J.F.J. van Rensburg (OB), which were mainly critical of the 
government’s war policy and internal security measures. 
308  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 12 October 1940. 
309 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 5 January 1940. 
310  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 16 December 1939. 
311  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 25 November 1939. 
312  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 25 November 1939. 
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315 UWH, Box 265, B.I.20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 16 December 1939; CGS, War, Box 
197, 42/2., Extracts and Intercepts. Foreign Papers and Broadcast, 27 September 1940. 
316 CGS, War, Box 223, 49/1, Van Ryneveld to D.P. Mercier, Winburg, Bloemfontein, 17 January 1940. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
 
The OB, by the outbreak of the war, had infiltrated the security establishment and threatened 
the reliability of the forces. Recruitment was also hampered due to subversive activities and 
the influences of the OB. Regiments constituting the 4th Infantry Brigade were understrength 
due to the prevailing political hostility to the government and as a result of propaganda. 
Young men were informed that, after undergoing military training, they would be the first to 
be sent out and were afraid of losing their jobs.317 Colonel D. Pienaar, officer commanding 
Voortrekkerhoogte and Transvaal (TVL) Command, received reports that a farmer, Theunis 
Lourens, rebuffed recruitment efforts for the Botha Regiment, in the Standerton district, 
ironically Smuts’s own constituency. Lourens reasoned that he was a Blackshirt and the 
Germans were relying on his support.318 
 
In Queenstown, members of the Defence Rifle Association (DRA), Dordrecht Commando, 
were considered untrustworthy as well as susceptible to a rebellion ‘at the slightest pretext’ 
due to poor leadership of the officers and pro-Nationalist and pro-German political 
tendencies.319 Major P.W. Baker, officer commanding Dordrecht-Indwe Commando, was 
described as ‘hypocritical, deceitful and treacherous’.320 The officers of the Thabanchu-
Ladybrand-Ficksburg Commando and related areas were reportedly disloyal and even 
indicated that they would refuse to take up arms to fight “England’s war”.321 Intelligence 
reports further indicated that a rebellion was contemplated soon after war broke out. P.J. 
Oosthuizen, principal of the Reitz High School and a member of the OB in the OFS, 
disclosed that an armed rebellion in South Africa was very possible shortly after the outbreak 
of the war, ‘if a lead had been given’ and if support from sections of the UDF was provided 
to Oswald Pirow.322 
 
The police were also penetrated. In the Witwatersrand, a police constable “commanded a 
police battalion” of eight hundred and ten members comprising of units from the railway 
police, South African Police, Johannesburg Traffic Police and the Prison Service.323 Thus, 
there were significant challenges to the state in terms preserving internal security and also of 
                                                 
317  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939. 
318 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 8 December 1939;  
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combating the threat of subversion. These challenges also impacted on the efforts of the 
Smuts government to mobilise the South African society to support the war effort. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Union’s intelligence officials had already established, in their reports and 
recommendations of November 1939, that, as part of the war effort, government propaganda 
was to be considered as a ‘weapon worth many battalions’ in influencing public opinion for 
their loyalty and support for the war policy. The reality and impact of Nazi influence was 
realised to have penetrated deep and over many years leading to the outbreak of the war. 
When taking stock of the extent of subversive forces in the Union, intelligence officers 
concluded that it was imperative to ‘review our publicity weapons and see if they are being 
used to the best advantage in a more intensely attack on the insidious propaganda which has 
saturated the platteland [countryside].’324 
 
At the outbreak of the war, the country was divided. The nationalistic movement spearheaded 
by the mainstream political parties such as Malan’s “Purifieds” as well as the extra-
parliamentary and militant organisations like the OB, remained hostile towards the 
government’s war policy. Revolutionary euphoria and anti-government activism gripped the 
Union and began to escalate with the apparent German military successes in the early stages 
of the war. On the other side, black South Africans, due to the prevailing racial policies of the 
country and their failure to secure any social and political concessions they hoped for after 
their participation in the First World War, were ambivalent towards getting involved in the 
war again. The Union authorities, therefore, had to re-examine the domestic situation in terms 
of military requirements and to intensify efforts to progressively gain public confidence, 
stabilise the volatile home front, mobilise the society and effectively place the country on a 
war footing. Existing policies had to be reviewed and refined, strategies devised and 
institutional structures reorganised to provide the framework for the effective prosecution of 
the war effort. However, given the complex dynamics of the South African society and the 
multiple audiences with varying perspectives and aspirations regarding the war, it would 
prove to be a mammoth task for the Union authorities in attempting to mobilise public 
support for the war policy. Throughout the war, various measures were adopted to engender 
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public interest and to sustain the mobilisation efforts for the war. Propaganda was the main 
instrument in that regard. 
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Fig. 1: Gen JC Smuts in 1914: The Nonqai, Oct 1939 
 
Fig. 2: Gen JC Smuts in 1939: The Nonqai, Oct 1939 
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Illustration 1: The Afrikaner Broederbond Structure: EG Malherbe Collections, vol. 
444/3, UKZN, Durban 
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Illustration 2: South African National Party Membership Card: EG Malherbe 
Collections, vol. 443/3, UKZN, Durban  
 
 
Illustration 3: The Ossewa Brandwag Badge: EG Malherbe Collections, vol. 444/7, 
UKZN, Durban 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
POLICIES, STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES: SA’S INSTITUTIONAL 
RESPONSE 
 
The Union’s governor general, Duncan, signed a proclamation on 6 September 1939 for 
officially marking South Africa’s entry into the Second World War.325 This also signified 
Smuts’s political triumph over his adversaries, chiefly Hertzog and Malan.326 Yet, this 
political triumph was tenuous. Fresh in his thoughts were the bitter internal debates327 that 
saw him narrowly defeating Hertzog’s motion on non-belligerence.328 Thus, Smuts, with 
heightened consciousness, contrasted the level of support he might command in the country, 
with the nature of organised opposition against him, and also appreciated the enormity of the 
challenges that confronted him: 
 
My stand has of course the unanimous approval of the English and of a large section of 
Africanders (sic). But mere approval is nothing as against strong organisation; so my 
opponents are organising while I am governing the country and tackling its problems … Here 
in S. Africa I have had my hands more than full – in coping with all the new problems of 
organisation for war, in reorganising our DOD, and not least in fighting with our political 
opponents who are moving heaven and earth to strengthen their position and weaken mine.329 
 
In response to the challenges reflected in his comments, Smuts had to determine how the 
Union’s war policy would be executed. From the above comments, three broad objectives 
emerged: a strong government to coordinate the war effort, the restructuring of the 
department of defence (DOD) to improve the Union’s military position, and the need to 
counter the anti-war activism and enemy propaganda. In addition, the South African society, 
the source of manpower for military service and war production, needed to be mobilised to 
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support the government’s war policy. To achieve the stated goals, several measures were 
introduced to ensure an efficient prosecution of the war. This chapter, therefore, intends to 
analyse South Africa’s institutional response to give effect to her war policy. Firstly, it will 
briefly review the strategic challenges and the policy constraints that confronted Smuts at the 
beginning of his administration. Then, it will reflect on the development of defence and 
security policies in order to facilitate the prosecution of the war. In the third place, the chapter 
will discuss the various government strategies which were contrived and structures that were 
established to facilitate the execution of the war policy. The chapter is designed to unpack the 
organisational configurations and programmes of the Union government to facilitate the 
various publicity and propaganda schemes with regard to supporting the war policy. It also 
lays the basis for the subsequent chapters which will analyse the means and contents of war 
propaganda to facilitate the realisation of the objectives of the Union’s war policy. 
 
STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND POLICY CONSTRAINTS 
 
After taking office on 6 September 1939, Smuts was confronted with a number of problems: 
military position, defence policy, political opposition and internal security. The key factor in 
considering participation in a war was the state of the armed forces. In a memorandum of the 
Union’s military position on 7 September 1939, submitted by Major General J.J. Collyer, 
military secretary to Smuts, the UDF was found wanting. In terms of the command and staff, 
the memorandum stated that, an ‘elementary but necessary feature’ of military preparations 
was neglected.330 It was noted that ‘in the case of the Union military forces, where both 
commanders and staff officers with any real knowledge of their duties in war are rare, 
especially in the second instance, a careful and deliberate selection of the best men is of vital 
importance’.331 
 
Due to the difficult economic circumstances after the First World War, and the reshuffling of 
posts during Hertzog’s administration (1924 and 1933), few competent and experienced 
military officers were available. Van der Waag explains that due to disillusionment, many 
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capable officers resigned, took early retirement or ‘lost their enthusiasm’.332 This was also a 
product of long term political infighting and dissension, resulting from the historical contest 
and tensions between Afrikaner nationalists and English speakers in South Africa. The blame 
for the poor state of military leadership and neglect of proper military preparations was 
ascribed to Oswald Pirow, Hertzogs’s Defence Minister from March 1933 to September 
1939.333 His political disposition334 and passive defence policy resulted more in making 
pronouncements and limited action.335 Thus, Smuts inherited a military force which 
was‘without appointed leaders or trained staff, unfit to take the field, untrained, unequipped 
and unorganised’.336 Authorities were confronted with the question of the limited strength of 
UDF units, the availability and quality of training facilities and military equipment in all arms 
of services: army, air force, navy and medical personnel.337 Hence, the Union’s Secretary for 
Defence, C.H. Blaine, in his report to the defence advisory committee on 5 September 1940, 
asserted that South Africa was not dealing with military expansion, but a question of 
‘creating an army’.338 
 
The military position was also complicated by discontent and disloyalty reported within the 
general staff of the UDF and the Union, including the burgher commandos or DRA.339 In an 
undated ‘most secret’ memorandum titled ‘Security of Own Forces’, there were descriptions 
such as the “admirer of Hitler”, “pro-Nazi”, “hostile to government”, “associated with 
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Ossewabrandwag”, “anti-British”, “disloyal”, “ready to take action against the government” 
and “likely to rebel at first opportunity”, which were attributed to many officers in the 
UDF.340 Thus, Smuts was severely handicapped with regard to appointing loyal and 
politically reliable officers to command his forces. 
 
Another difficulty pertained to the Union’s defence policy. The South African Defence Act of 
1912341, which underwent some amendments in the 1920s and 1930s, was a constraint in 
terms of South Africa’s policy towards the war. Its original stipulation that, ‘every citizen 
shall be liable between his seventeenth and his sixtieth year to render in time of war personal 
service in defence of the Union in any part of South Africa whether within or outside the 
Union’342, was the source of controversy. When Hertzog assumed power in 1924, the focus of 
the UDF was ‘for the defence of South Africa in any part of southern Africa … in the event 
of South African involvement in a war outside the Union, the Active Citizen Force would not 
be sent’.343 
 
In the 1930s, in view of the deteriorating international security situation and with the rise of 
the totalitarian states spearheaded by Germany, the Union’s defence policy changed. Pirow, 
then the Defence Minister, stated that the Union would consider rendering assistance ‘in the 
defence of British interests in East Africa but then only if the white populations were 
threatened’.344 But, the UDF would not serve outside Africa and, if the interests of South 
Africa made it inevitable to participate in a war, the parliament would have to decide the 
matter.345 The general line of argument perpetuated by the Nationalists was that of confining 
South Africa to her own defence or around her immediate borders, not for European wars. 
This view became a central feature of the opposition movements’ campaign against the 
Union’s war policy. There were agitations and insinuations of revolutionary repercussions if 
the UDF was to be employed beyond the limits of the Defence Act.346 Hence, to support the 
war policy, Smuts opted to establish a military force based on a volunteer system and the 
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main theatre would be outside South Africa – the main defence line was further afield in East 
Africa. His political opponents continued to use the defence policy to mount the anti-war 
campaigns. Some members of the Union parliament and ex-members of the government 
vehemently opposed the government’s war policy and, even undermined morale and 
threatened recruitment for military service.347 
 
After the vote of 4 September 1939, the defeated members of parliament were determined to 
unite their efforts in opposition to Smuts’s war policy. On the evening of 6 December 1939, 
Hertzog was bid farewell by an enthusiastic crowd when he boarded a train for the Pretoria. 
At the station, the crowd carried him and Malan shoulder-high, singing songs and hymns, 
listening to encouraging speeches from the other nationalistic leaders, including the PNP 
parliamentarians.348 Some Stellenbosch University students expressed gratitude to Hertzog 
for his stance and personal sacrifice.349 He told the crowd to remain calm if ‘they were to 
build up proper Afrikanerdom’.350 Pirow had previously left for Pretoria and took formal 
leave at the Defence Headquarters.351 Malan and Hertzog were to attempt an abortive 
“nationalist Afrikaner reunion” as an opposition front against Smuts.352 The attempted 
“Afrikaner re-union” gave birth to a new nationalist party called Die Herenigde Nasionale 
Party of Volksparty (Re-united Nationalist Party or People’s Party) (HNP).353 However, the 
two Afrikaner leaders had divergent principles. Hertzog was opposed to republicanism and 
emphasised equal political rights and status between the English-speaking South Africans and 
the Afrikaners, whilst Malan stood for complete Afrikaner dominance.354 The re-union 
collapsed. 
 
Pirow, who remained with Malan, also created tensions within the HNP due to his close 
association with the Nazi doctrines when he published Die Nuwe Orde (New Order) 
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pamphlets during the period 1940-1941.355 The Nuwe Orde (NO) was constituted as a study 
group within the HNP, supported mostly by the ex-Hertzog followers. Malan did not approve 
of the development of internal cliques that could threaten HNP cohesion. Pirow espoused 
Nazi ideals and advocated an authoritarian state.356 Malan objected to the importation of 
foreign ideologies. He wanted to consolidate the Afrikaner nationalism and to establish a 
republic, not a dictatorship.357 Nonetheless, the Union’s political landscape remained a 
contested area throughout the war, with the opposition movements, despite their divergent 
approaches, campaigning against Smuts’s government, mostly on the war policy.358 
 
For that reason, Blaine contended in his analysis of the progress of the military forces in 
1940, that the DOD was confronted with a ‘subtle, undermining influence – the campaign 
against recruiting’, leading to a conclusion that, ‘somewhere in the mechanism of the nation’s 
war machine, there must be 5th columnists whose complex or aim is to hinder or destroy’.359 
In one example of recruiting challenges at the Western Province Regiment, some men were 
reluctant to enlist for service as officers openly declared their opposition to serve outside the 
Union.360 Numerous intelligence reports refer to young men being dissuaded from joining the 
UDF with threats such as that, ‘if they volunteer for service … they will have no job to return 
to after the war’.361 It was, therefore, largely due to the Union’s political ambivalence and 
internal discord that resulted in the failure to conceive and implement effective defence 
policies. This failure manifested in the state of military unpreparedness, with a substantial 
lack of air force equipment, a small-sized army and lack of a navy when war broke out in 
1939.362 Similarly, the political dissentions also impacted on the internal security situation. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Union’s security officials remained concerned about 
the increasing threat of subversion in the country. At the end of May 1940, the inter-
departmental committee on security noted the alarming security situation in the country: 
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It is an undoubted fact that the so-called “Fifth Column” is strong in the Union. All political 
opponents of the Government are not necessarily members of the column. But no section of 
the opposition has exposed their cards and it is not known to what extent defections from 
Hertzog-Havenga group have joined the Malan extremists. If support for the 
Ossewabrandwag is to be taken as an indication of the strength of the pro-German element, 
then it can be accepted as a fact that the Government has to contend with something that is 
widespread and not weak. Evidence keeps pouring in that in every corner of the Union the 
cankerous growth has taken a foothold and is showing its existence now that Germans are 
enjoying success overseas.363 
 
Pro-German feelings were reflected in the Afrikaans comments such as ‘Hitler gaan wen’ 
(Hitler is going to win), ‘Niks kan hom stop nie’ (nothing can stop him), ‘Hitler sal dinge reg 
maak’ (Hitler will make things right), and ‘Hitler sal ons 10/- per dag en meer grond en al 
die bier wat ons wil hê, gee’ (Hitler will give us 10/- per day, more land and all the beer that 
we want).364 These comments made the government anxious about the prevalence of the anti-
war spirit which could also have huge security implications for the Union. According to the 
inter-departmental committee on security, the so-called “fifth column” - a subversive 
movement to undermine state authority – comprised of those sections of the population who 
supported Hitler, those who believed that the Union was British, thus would do anything, 
including assistance to the enemy, just to damage Britain, those who just hated Britain, those 
who were pro-Nazi and the Germans in the country.365 While contending with the political 
problems, defence policy obstacles and the anti-war agitations, Smuts’s own welfare was also 
precarious. He privately expressed his anxiety: 
 
The police guard are of course annoying, but say that they act on strict instructions based on 
information from confidential sources. I heard on the radio tonight that the Prime Minister of 
Roumania [Rumania] has just been assassinated; so I ought not to be too confident about my 
own safety.366 
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Furthermore, on 3 November 1939, during a public address in Bloemfontein Town Hall, 
Smuts vocalised his concerns about the influence of the Zeesen broadcast on the South 
African public and the opposition factions. He lamented the impact of the Zeesen propaganda 
on the convictions and sentiments of the population. An excerpt from the Bloemfontein 
speech reflects the expression of Smuts’s concerns: 
 
“Night by night this country is being attacked and bombarded with propaganda from 
Germany, in a way far more dangerous, subtle and insidious than any attack by armies. Night 
by night, the soul of the people of South Africa is being sapped and their convictions 
undermined by that broadcast from Zeesen. There are other broadcasters going about this 
country from platform to platform and they are even more dangerous than the announcer 
from Zeesen. 367 
 
The Zeesen announcer carried on with his criticism of Smuts as an agent of the British 
Empire and a pawn of Jewish capitalism, and often quoted newspaper articles from neutral 
countries such as Belgium, to exalt the anti-war factions as heroes and to place the culpability 
for the war on the British.368 At the same time, Zeesen made calls for the public to take action 
against Smuts and for South Africa to leave the war.369 Such negative utterances convinced 
the government authorities that the main object of waging publicity campaigns was to refute 
and discredit Zeesen broadcasts. It was considered that the targeted audience to German 
propaganda was a section of the white Afrikaans-speaking people who supported Malan and 
also harboured strong pro-Nazi and anti-British bias.370 
 
The Zeesen announcers were Holm (Neef Holm), Jan A. Strauss (Neef Buurman), Michael J. 
Pienaar (Neef Hermanus), Eckart W. Becker (Neef Sagie) and Johannes J. Snoek (Neef 
Bokkies), who constituted the team of the Africa-zone editorial office of that radio station in 
Germany. They targeted the Afrikaner audience in framing propaganda messages to intensify 
anti-war activism.371 Emotive language was employed to appeal to sentiments with references 
to the Afrikaners’ history and to direct anger at the British. Based on the peculiarity of 
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context, derogatory expressions such as ‘Smuts, a Jew’372, ‘the English jingos’373, ‘Mr Smuts’ 
(not General Smuts)374, ‘the British leader’ (not South African), ‘Jannie Smuts or Slim 
Jannie’, ‘accidental majority Parliament’, ‘Smuts and his Jewish pals’375, ‘treason and misuse 
of military principles’376, ‘Smuts, Imperial friend’377, and ‘the traitor and liar’378, were the 
characteristic features of the Zeesen broadcast. Even some South Africans began to 
appreciate German propaganda, especially when it appealed to historical adversities suffered 
by the Afrikaners, for example, the concentration camps during the Anglo-Boer War. One 
government opponent employed Zeesen language such as ‘Jan Smuts, the traitor of our 
nation, the liar, the hypocrite, the British-Jewish Imperialist’379, to express his indignation at 
the government’s support of Britain in the war. It was hardly surprising that, from the 
beginning of the war, the Union authorities became more concerned with devising strategies 
to counter the Zeesen broadcast, as it was considered too influential and detrimental to the 
morale of the public.380  
 
The Union government sought, from the start, to extend state power and government 
responsibility. Given the problems outlined above, Smuts’s administration orchestrated 
various schemes to expedite preparations for the implementation of the war policy. These 
included measures to circumvent the defence policy constraints, to confront the anti-war 
activism and to safeguard internal security and stability in order to prevent a repeat of 
‘another 1914 Rebellion’.381 Censorship and propaganda were interrelated areas of immediate 
activity. Smuts firstly appointed a war cabinet, developed enabling policy provisions and 
devised strategies to effect the Union’s war policy. At the same time, he also initiated 
institutional structures to improve the military position, to safeguard internal security and 
stability as well as to facilitate recruitment and to sustain national morale. With regard to the 
latter point, Smuts and his government needed to assuage the loyalists that the government 
was imposing its authority and also to create an opportunity for converting the neutral and 
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ambivalent public towards the government. The supporters of the opposition also had to be 
influenced and swayed towards the government, for example, to create awareness for 
economic opportunities presented by wartime conditions. 
 
WAR CABINET, POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES 
 
Smuts’s first task was not too difficult. Pragmatism and political expediency determined his 
actions and rationale. He was never shy to turn to ‘old friends’, and even ‘old opponents’ to 
fill various portfolios in his wartime administration.382 ‘With patience and experience of the 
difficulties of teamwork in the government’, noted Smuts, these old opponents could ‘mellow 
into real workers … But I expect some fun and even trouble as we move along’.383 He was 
referring to W.B. Madeley of the Labour Party and C.F. Stallard of the Dominion Party, who 
formed part of Smuts’s war cabinet.384 Over and above his position as Prime Minister, Smuts 
assumed two other portfolios: defence and external affairs - critical portfolios for effective 
coordination of the war strategy. 
 
Among other appointments, Deneys Reitz became the Deputy Prime Minister,385 Minister of 
Native Affairs, and later a member of Smuts’s war committee.386 A liberal Afrikaner, Jan 
Hofmeyr, who became known for his sympathies with the plight of blacks in South Africa387, 
was the Minister of Finance and Education. It was an important position for coordinating 
funding for the war effort and maintaining balance with the economic imperatives for the 
civilian sector. For communications, C.F. Clarkson became the Minister of Posts and 
Telegraphs, and C. Steyn was the Minister of Justice.388 H.G. Lawrence became Minister of 
Interior and Public Health, and later also chaired the inter-departmental committee on internal 
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security. Hofmeyr, Lawrence and Steyn were the key role-players in Smuts’s internal security 
coordination and the facilitation of government propaganda. Smuts, confident of his wartime 
cabinet, described them as ‘a happy family, consisting almost entirely of old comrades who 
trusted my leadership’.389 (See Smuts’s Cabinet in 1939, Fig. 3) He further noted that: 
 
I have the advantage of having inspired confidence through long years of patience and at last 
serving the country’s interest in a supreme crisis. And this reputation may stand me in good 
stead in the very difficult days ahead. And the Nats [Nationalists] of course make out that all 
this was dark plotting on my side which in the end caught them napping.390 
 
In July 1940, after a review of the state of the DOD, Smuts created the defence advisory 
committee. He explained that in order to facilitate proper efficiency, there was a need to ‘cut 
out overlapping’ and to ‘revise functions and responsibilities’ as well as ‘to provide proper 
liaison and consultation’.391 The purpose of the defence advisory committee was to examine 
the DOD and its sub-divisions in terms of control systems, and to provide advice where 
necessary with regard to the required improvements in its workings and organisation.392 Van 
Ryneveld was also instructed to allow members under his control to give evidence to the 
committee in terms of the requirements for improvement and in the performance of their 
functions.393 
 
Smuts also introduced various policy measures to accelerate military organisation and to 
safeguard internal security. Because of the political controversies regarding the defence 
policy, the government introduced the Africa Oath policy on 7 February 1940 for military 
volunteers.394 Those volunteers who accepted the Oath, wore ‘an orange flash’ on their 
uniforms, and were required ‘to serve anywhere in Africa’.395 That Oath, however, was not 
generally accepted and it elicited controversies. Some of the UDF members refused to sign it 
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and some resigned.396 Nonetheless, the adoption of the volunteer-based military service 
enabled Smuts to overcome the defence policy constraints. It provided a sense that, those who 
volunteered would be loyal and committed to the government’s war policy. The next step, 
with regard to policy matters, related to the introduction of a series of guidelines and 
protocols to enhance internal security and stability. A number of censorship and national 
security regulations were thus introduced. 
 
‘The popular impression that the censor’, stated the British Military Regulations on 
Censorship in Time of War or Emergency, ‘is merely an iron hand with blue pencil scoring 
out anything of interest’.397 Yet in practice, lessons from the First World War had proven that 
examining and censoring correspondence provided invaluable information, particularly 
regarding the injustices and criticisms that impact on the morale of the public and the serving 
members in the military. Smuts and the war cabinet moved swiftly to take pre-emptive 
actions. Several emergency regulations were passed for facilitating the execution of the war 
policy and to deprive the anti-war elements of the means to organise and undermine 
government efforts. The key regulations were Proclamation no. 201 of 1939 and the War 
Measures Act, No. 13 of April 1940, which formed the basis for managing wartime economy 
and to maintain internal security.398 
 
The department of justice issued a general minute in September 1939, warning its officials 
about the imperative of loyalty, obedience, resource conservation and also invoked the 
regulatory frameworks limiting the issuing of firearm licences.399 Based on these, suspected 
persons and enemy aliens were monitored and interned, private firearms and ammunition 
were confiscated, and in order to eliminate opportunities for uprisings, the government also 
suspended the activities of trade unions, mainly for white workers.400 In view of the 
prevailing political conditions, the Union authorities gradually imposed censorship which 
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began in November 1939. During the cabinet committee meeting in October 1939, it was 
suggested that no rigid censorship should be imposed and also, counting on the cooperation 
of the loyal press, a voluntary press censorship was to be obtained from the Press Union.401 
Based on the British Regulations for Censorship, South Africa imposed censorship on all 
postal and telegraphic communications passing between the Union and SWA, and all 
countries other than the members of the British Commonwealth.402 As war progressed, there 
was a deterioration of security due to the growing activism of the anti-war elements, which 
also hampered recruitment. Thus, it was becoming apparent that the tasks of the Union 
security services would be enhanced if the scope of censorship was expanded. In June 1940, 
through the publication of the notice called the Censorship and Despatch of Correspondence 
Regulations, the government granted authority to subject ‘all communications whatsoever’ to 
censorship.403  
 
To give effect to the censorship policy, authorities decided to establish four primary 
censorship stations in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Durban and Windhoek, with a subsidiary 
station in Pretoria. For effective control of all external telegraphic traffic, three major 
telegraphic censorship points were established in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban.404 
Colonel (later Brigadier) H.J. Lenton, director of signals and postmaster general of the Union 
of South Africa, was appointed as controller of censorship.405 He was based in Cape Town, 
the country’s legislative capital and the headquarters of the naval intelligence section. Shortly 
thereafter, the Union’s censorship policy was extended to the British High Commission 
Territories of Basutoland (Basotholand) (now Lesotho), Bechuanaland (now Botswana) and 
Swaziland. In addition, new smaller censorship stations were established in De Aar, a 
strategic railway junction in the northern Cape, to deal with correspondence from SWA, and 
also in Port Elizabeth, East London and Bloemfontein. These places were regarded as 
strategic locations – the major railway routes into the interior, and became important 
censorship points for the treatment of inland correspondence.406 
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The types of correspondence requiring censorship included telegrams, letters, postcards, 
photographs, sketches, printed matter, packets, parcels as well as the telegraph and telephone 
communications.407 Private correspondence was required to be conducted in plain English or 
Afrikaans only, and codes, cyphers and shorthand were forbidden.408 Reference to, or any 
publication of military information such as troop strengths, location, movements, armament, 
equipment, plans and forecast of future operations, position, billets, camps, shipping 
movements, criticisms of forces as well as casualties was prohibited under the censorship 
regulations.409 
 
In an undated memorandum on unit censorship, Lieutenant B.J. Olivier, one of the officers in 
the intelligence section (who often undertook research among troops), argued that, ‘the Army 
must be strong in health and morale’, and that the morale is strengthened by the conviction of 
the freedom of writing which grants the soldier an outlet to feelings, otherwise, due to 
restrictions, they may repress those feelings, then leading to discontent and poor morale.410 
For censorship to be effective and to enable the authorities to counter subversive propaganda, 
it was decided to implement secret selective censorship, to trap suspects and to give ‘enemy 
propagandists’ a false sense of security and put them off their guard.411 Through censorship, 
the government was able to intercept harmful material and to gain insight into the feelings 
within the armed forces and the dissatisfactions within the population in order to determine 
areas where instability could emanate and to institute preventive measures expeditiously. 
 
Anxiety about the growth, influence and militancy of the anti-war elements, prompted the 
Union authorities to consider further “comprehensive measures” to combat internal security 
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Staff Intelligence to Deputy Director of Intelligence, 27 August 1940. 
410  Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Memorandum on Unit Censorship, n.d. 
411  Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Telegram, General Staff Intelligence to Deputy Director of 
Intelligence, 27 August 1940; Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Memorandum on Unit 
Censorship, n.d. 
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threats.412 Seventeen months after the emergency regulations were promulgated, the 
government published the War Measures Act No. 4 of February 1941, containing a 
comprehensive set of fifty-four regulations, constituting the framework for a “National 
Security Code”.413 The preliminary provisions were muted at the end of 1940, when the 
security conditions in the country deteriorated and the judicial system was hamstrung by the 
existing legal framework to effectively deal with the prosecution of the anti-war elements. It 
was regarded as crucial to introduce effective measures ‘to maintain internal order and 
security, and to safeguard public safety’.414 These regulations dealt with various subjects 
including prohibitions of unauthorised drilling, attacks on serving uniformed members, 
making, printing, writing or displaying subversive statements, authorising the minister of 
interior to seize books or documents deemed to hamper security and defence, illegal use of 
explosives, restriction on listening to enemy wireless, spreading of rumours, public violence, 
ban on organisations considered detrimental to defence and internal security as well as 
restricting the participation of state employees in suppressed associations.415 
 
One of the organisations considered to be a security threat, falling under the provisions of the 
Security Code, was the Ossewa-Brandwag (OB). Subsequently, the Secretary for Defence 
issued instructions that members of the public service were forbidden from being members of 
the OB, as well as from participating in, or representing any subversive organisation.416 In the 
following months, the government continued to promulgate emergency regulations to provide 
for war-related offences such as “special crimes” (contravening post-office administration 
                                                 
412  Unisa, UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Reports, Resolutions of “Die Unie Bond”, 14-15 
March 1939; Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 186, Committee on Internal Security Report, Lawrence to 
Smuts, 1 June 1940. 
413  CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly  Intelligence Reports, 10 February 1941; Union of South 
Africa, Government Gazette Extraordinary, n. 2851, February 1941. 
414 Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 253, National Security Regulations, November 1940; ‘New Security 
Code’, The Star, 14 December 1940; ‘S.A. Determined to Stamp Out Treachery’, Rand Daily Mail, 21 
October 1940; ‘National Security Code’, The Cape Argus, 4 February 1941. 
415  CGS, Group 2, Box 93,169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Reports, 10 February 1941; Lawrence Papers, 
BC 640, E3. 253, National Security Regulations, November 1940; Union of South Africa, War 
Measure No. 14 of 1941; ‘New Security Code’, The Star, 14 December 1940; ‘S.A. Determined to 
Stamp Out Treachery’, Rand Daily Mail, 21 October 1940; ‘National Security Code’, The Cape Argus, 
4 February 1941. 
416  SANDFA, Secretary of Defence Archives (DC), Box 3841, DF 1887, Circular No. 1 of March 1941, 
inviting attention to observe Proclamation No. 44 of March 1944 regarding the prohibitions of public 
servants from being members of an association known as “Die Ossewabrandwag” under the National 
Security Regulations, Secretary of Defence to all Heads of Sections and Os.C. Commands, 19 March 
1941; CGS (War), Box 223, 0200, Internal Security Measures, Declaration Regarding the Association 
known as “Die Ossewabrandwag”, 19 March 1941; For a recent analysis and details of the OB see 
Marx, Oxwagon Sentinels. 
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and shipping combinations or housebreaking with intent to steal or theft)417, prosecution of 
persons suspected of hampering the government’s war effort and the provisions for the 
special high courts to deal with serious cases on sabotage.418  
 
Other than the development of policies, the government also devised strategies to facilitate 
the execution of those policies. On 18 September 1939, after the appointment of the war 
cabinet, Lawrence discussed a number of response strategies with Smuts, regarding internal 
security and counter-propaganda measures. Smuts’s major anxiety came from the persistent, 
nightly Zeesen broadcast to South Africa, which incited the public against him and his 
government.419 In mid-September 1939, during a meeting with regard to the introduction of 
security measures, Smuts informed Lawrence that he could not allow the continued Zeesen 
propaganda offensives and the agitation of the people against him.420 He urged for the 
implementation of effective counter-measures. In the same month, displaying some measure 
of anxiety, he wrote to a friend about the personal attacks he endured from the Zeesen 
broadcast: 
 
One of the funniest minor features of the German propaganda is a nightly Afrikaans tirade 
against me from Zeesen. It is the most awful filth imaginable. Night by night South Africa 
listens to my infamies – some distortions of the facts but mostly pure inventions. I have not a 
shred of character left, and the question at the end often is why such a criminal is still 
allowed to live!421 
 
As a result, Smuts urgently needed to have measures in place to counter Zeesen’s broadcast 
of negative news about the Union leadership and also to inform the public about the 
government’s policies. At first, he suggested the “jamming” of Berlin broadcast, but 
Lawrence felt that it might eliminate wireless if Germany retaliates with the same (jamming) 
                                                 
417  SANAP, Archives of the Union Executive Council (URU), Box 2023, 1534, Proclamation relating to 
War Measure No. 37, April 1942; URU, Box 2002, 367, Measures for Perpetrators of Acts of Violence 
and Sabotage, December 1941.  
418  URU 2034, 2062, Trial of Serious Cases of Sabotage, June 1942. 
419  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 246, Smuts to A.B. Gillett, 13 September 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, 
Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1941; SANDFA, ZB, WR 65/9/41-WR 65/9/43, 
Broadcast from Enemy Radio Station, 1941-1945; PP, vols. 1-31, Zeesen Broadcast, 1940-1945. 
420  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 
September 1939. The extracts from Zeesen Broadcast Archives start from 1941 and those in the Press 
and Propaganda Archives focusing on the Zeesen Radio Broadcast, vols. 1-31, commence in 1940. 
Most of the extracts covering 1939 come from the Union’s Intelligence Summaries from 1939. See 
UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, September to November 1939; See also Marx, 
‘Deal Listeners in South Africa’, pp. 148-172. 
421  Smuts Papers, vol. 246, Private Letters, Smuts to Gillett, 21 September 1939. 
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approach.422 Instead, it was suggested to have a thirty-minute government broadcast on the 
war policy. On the advice of Dr H. van der Bijl, the director-general of war supplies, it was 
considered a better strategy to ‘adopt Hitler’s method, and, by constant repetition, get our 
view across’.423 The government policy and war position, and not party politics, were to be 
the subject of the broadcast.424 Lawrence further suggested the establishment of the cabinet 
sub-committee to meet on weekly basis to deal with propaganda. ‘It was a good idea’, 
believed Smuts, and suggested that Reitz and Hofmeyr should assist Lawrence.425 
 
Shortly after the war broke out, the Government Information Bureau was established and in 
October 1939, A.N. Wilson of the Argus Printing and Publishing Company was appointed as 
the government information officer (also director of the Bureau of Information) (BOI), with 
the initial mandate to counter Zeesen propaganda.426 Wilson was required to provide the news 
and to provide confidential information for background to leading articles and to put out 
broadcast every evening at 7:15. He was also to ensure the distribution of information from 
the ministers or government departments to the press, but firstly had to obtain the ministers’ 
authority to make major announcements.427 Hofmeyr, who sat on the cabinet committee on 
publicity, indicated that Wilson should liaise with ministers for statements on government 
policy and not only limit information relating to the war, but to provide coverage to other 
aspects of government activities. He concluded that the Union’s propaganda should be more 
indirect and not direct. In addition, Wilson was to liaise with the British Ministry of 
Information (MOI) to determine what kind of information was required about South Africa in 
relation to the war.428 
 
                                                 
422  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 
September 1939. 
423  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 
September 1939. 
424  See the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Annual Reports, 1937-1949, Board’s War 
Policy, 1939, SABC Library, Johannesburg, pp. 3-4. The policy of the SABC did not support party 
politics. 
425  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 
September 1939. 
426  Union of South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 40, August – September 1940, col. 
1247; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.4, Notes of the Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee on 
Publicity, 5 October 1939. 
427  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.4, Notes of the Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Publicity, 5 
October 1939. 
428  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.4, Notes of the Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Publicity, 5 
October 1939. 
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From the onset, the government strategy was to refute the misrepresentation of facts by 
Zeesen, and to supply the “right” information on the war or government activities.429 In 
November 1939, Wilson submitted a memorandum for the cabinet sub-committee on 
publicity, outlining the envisaged scheme that would be adopted by the BOI to facilitate 
government publicity and to counter Zeesen. The BOI’s envisaged activities as outlined in the 
memorandum were as follows: 
 
a. The collection and organisation of information related to government policy and 
activities for purposes of publication. 
b. The examination of Zeesen broadcast and the preparation of statements relating 
thereto for transmission over the radio and to the Press. 
c. The preparation of statements of a more direct propaganda value for radio 
transmission and publication to the press. 
d. The liaison with London, arrangement and supply of publicity photographs, 
weekly press cuttings and news summaries to the British Press Relations Officer. 
Also, to maintain contact and exchange information with the British High 
Commissioner in South Africa. 
e. The maintenance of friendly contacts with the Press and distribution of news to 
newspaper correspondents, and also to maintain a close watch at the South 
African Press for all comments and news of interest to the Union government.430 
 
Furthermore, it was also emphasised that the material for broadcast in English and Afrikaans 
should be identical and the writers or translators should endeavour to use simple language 
and explanatory words where technical concepts are unavoidable. Propaganda was to appeal 
to an ordinary person and not for complex intellectual reasoning.431 This was similar to the 
German approach which also used simple language to mobilise sentiments and to discredit 
opponents.432 It was suggested that, in terms of the culture and psychology of the Afrikaans 
speakers, the treatment and presentation of material ought to be more subjective and directly 
                                                 
429  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 
1939; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531b), Memorandum on State Publicity, no date. 
430  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939. 
431  Marx, ‘Dear Listeners of South Africa’, p. 155; Smuts Papers, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-
Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939. 
432  G. Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (Harper and Row, New York and London, 1968), p. 
65; Qualter, Propaganda, p. 113; Marx, ‘Dear Listeners of South Africa’, p. 155. 
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appeal to their sentiments, in particular, the use of sarcasm, irony and humour was desirable 
and effective.433 
 
‘Propaganda’, noted the BOI’s memorandum, ‘must be directed to a specific purpose’ or it 
could lead to confusion in the public mind, thus rendering it ineffective. For the South 
African audience (white Afrikaans speakers), the “specific purpose” towards which the focus 
of propaganda was essentially required was as follows: 
 
To try and convert the [white] Afrikaans-speaking section of the population from their present 
pro-Nazi attitude of the mind, to a belief in the justice of the Allied cause, and to a subsequent 
or consequent belief in the correctness of South Africa’s policy of entering the war. A 
subsidiary purpose must be to satisfy the English-speaking section that the Government’s 
activities in the conduct of the war are efficient.434 
 
Since South African mainstream politics was dominated by white English-Afrikaans divide, 
the efforts of the BOI mostly targeted the Afrikaans-speaking section of the population as an 
important political and electoral constituency. White Afrikaans speakers also constituted the 
majority (among whites) and were to be the main source of supply for military recruits. In an 
assessment of the white Afrikaans speakers’ potential for support or opposition to the 
government and its war policy, the BOI’s memorandum estimated that there were four 
categories: 
 
a. Those who were convinced supporters of Smuts. 
b. Those who were waverers and open to persuasion. Among this group were the 
supporters of Hertzog. 
c. There were those who supported Dr Malan. This group was susceptible to sentimental 
appeal and argument. It is at this category where propaganda must be rigorously 
directed. 
d. Those who were so rabid that they would always be impervious to propaganda.435 
 
The strategy was, therefore, to wage a propaganda campaign of breaking down and 
destroying the pro-Nazi bias in order to create a platform for building goodwill towards the 
                                                 
433  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939. 
434  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939. 
435  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
76 
 
government and the cause of the Allies. Efforts were to be directed at exposing the Zeesen 
inaccuracies, misstatements, factual distortions and deliberate lies, and to provide authentic 
information instead. It was considered that this strategy would discredit the Nazis and the 
Zeesen radio for its untrustworthiness. Through an element of ridicule, sarcasm, irony and 
humour in government broadcast, ‘people must laugh at Zeesen.’436 
 
The German propaganda approach, in contrast, was designed to provoke anger, even used 
vulgarity, to inflame opinion and to magnify social tensions.437 As far as the Zeesen broadcast 
to South Africa was concerned, its objective was to destabilise the Union’s war effort by 
appealing to Afrikaner nationalism and to the opposition movements to believe in the 
German victory.438 In addition, the government’s participation in the war was presented as 
ludicrous and devoid of any political rationale, “national” legitimacy and the consent of the 
majority of the population.439 Since these accusations against the government were 
manifesting in the public psyche and enhancing the pro-Nazi sentiment in South Africa440, it 
was recommended to counter these by incorporating Nazi comments which derided South 
Africa and expressed contempt for the South African conditions. Furthermore, it was 
recommended to undermine the faith some Afrikaners had in the Nazi ideas, by exposing the 
inherent perspectives on religion, race, education and culture. 441 In this way, the pro-German 
sentiment would gradually be reduced as the Afrikaners were particularly sensitive towards 
their religious values and would never withstand German attacks on their pride as a race and 
culture. It was therefore vital to persuade the people of South Africa that their interests were 
at stake and it was imperative to participate in the war to ensure that those interests were 
preserved. 
 
Following these suggestions, Wilson commenced with his plans to discredit Zeesen. He 
arranged with the SABC442 to allocate fifteen minutes every evening for national 
                                                 
436  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939. 
437  Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, p. 65; Qualter, Propaganda, p. 113; Marx, ‘Dear Listeners of South 
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438  UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Axis Broadcast by Traitors, 30 October 1939; UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts 
of Zeesen Broadcast, 4 November 1939. 
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broadcast.443 Adequate organisational arrangements were also necessary to give effect to the 
policy provisions and to operationalise the response strategies. Thus, Smuts started off by 
reorganising the DOD as well as by establishing the security structures to provide physical 
security to vital and vulnerable economic points in the country.444 Most importantly, in 
addition to reorganising the military and related support structures, Smuts had to institute 
multiple publicity and propaganda mechanisms to stimulate public interest, to mobilise public 
support, to facilitate military recruitment and, at the same time, to combat the anti-war and 
anti-government propaganda. 
 
MILITARY ORGANISATION AND INTERNAL SECURITY STRUCTURES 
 
As indicated above, Smuts inherited a weak military set-up. It was critical for him to place 
the Union’s military in a proper war footing. This was done through the restructuring of the 
DOD, mainly by making strategic appointments to head the various sections. At the head, 
Van Ryneveld, who was appointed as CGS in 1933, remained defence chief (abbreviated 
Dechief in military correspondences), ‘for the overall supervision and administration’ at 
DHQ.445 According to Martin and Orpen, Van Ryneveld also became too close to Smuts, 
virtually ‘the operational chief of staff to the Minister (of defence –Smuts)’.446 His position 
gave him so much authority that, as C.G. Kerr, chairman of the war histories advisory 
committee would write later on (in 1979), wartime South Africa was ‘completely dominated 
by Sir Pierre Van Ryneveld whose personalised style of command enabled him to control 
every aspect of Defence … he proclaimed himself as the sole Executive Officer of the 
UDF’.447 His authoritarian approach created tensions between himself and Blaine, who in 
September 1939, had been brought in from the department of justice, to replace A.H. 
                                                                                                                                                        
started with broadcast in English and in 1937, broadcast in Afrikaans. However, because of the 
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447  Martin and Orpen, Chairman’s Foreword, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. v. 
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Broeksma as Secretary for Defence.448 Brigadier Piet de Waal was appointed as director-
general of operations (DGO). He was responsible for all military intelligence and security, as 
well as censorship and propaganda when the UDF was deployed outside the country.449 
Brigadier de Waal was the grandson of General Louis Botha, the first Prime Minister of the 
Union of South Africa (1910-1919).450 Collyer occupied the military secretary position and 
also served on the war committee chaired by Smuts.451 (See Illustration 4) 
 
For the proper coordination of war supplies, the directorate of war supplies was constituted 
on 24 November 1939. Its director-general was Dr Hendrik J. van der Bijl, assisted by H.C. 
McColm as commercial deputy and O.H. Hansen as technical deputy.452 In anticipation of the 
nature of the technical demands and in the handling of the commercial side of technical 
contracts, Van der Bijl recommended both deputies to Smuts, despite the fact that they were 
all (including Dr van der Bijl) recruited from Iscor.453 Blaine, as Secretary for Defence, was 
appointed as one of the three directors in war supplies directorate (two others were Lieutenant 
Colonel A.G.E. Pienaar, chair of the Union Tender Board and F.J. Fahey, chair of the 
National Supplies Control Board).454 Van der Bijl and McColm also served as member of the 
war supplies committee chaired by Collyer. 
 
And the intelligence section, then headed by Colonel B.W. Thwaites (since April 1937)455, 
was duly upgraded during the war. In February 1940, the post of the director of intelligence 
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(DMI) was created. It was responsible for civil security, intelligence, local censorship and 
propaganda.456 In addition, the post of the deputy director of military intelligence (DDMI) 
was established, mainly for military-related intelligence, censorship as well as for military 
security and propaganda when the UDF was on active service.457 Lieutenant Colonel H.T. 
Newman was appointed as the DDMI and reported to the director general of operations 
(DGO), Colonel de Waal.458 Fokkens explains that military intelligence (MI), in collaboration 
with Allied intelligence agencies ‘waged a silent war against pro-German and anti-
government’ elements as well as engaged in counter-espionage against German spies.459 
Collaboration with the Union SAP’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the 
exchange on information on subversive activities in the country also constituted part of the 
operational scope of Military Intelligence. 460 (See Illustration 5) 
 
Owing to the developments in the war situation and the general expansion of the army, more 
reorganisation in the UDF’s DHQ took place. In 1942, an expanded intelligence structure 
called directorate of military intelligence (retaining DMI abbreviation) came into 
existence.461 Dr E.G. Malherbe, after introducing and being in charge of the educational 
services of the UDF members from February 1941, was asked by Smuts to become the 
director of military intelligence.462 Major C.S.B. Powell from the South African War College 
became the DDMI in June 1942.463 Dr Malherbe, previously the director of census and 
statistics, had volunteered for service in the UDF in November 1939, and served on fulltime 
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basis as an educational officer from February 1941, teaching soldiers in the various training 
camps in the Union regarding the reasons for war service.464 
 
In September 1940, Dr Malherbe, together with Prof R.F.A. Hoernlé, Prof H.J. Rousseau and 
Lieutenant (later Major) Leo Marquard, cognisant of the “misunderstanding” deriving from 
the liberal use of the words such as Nazism, Fascism, Communism, and Democracy, wrote a 
memorandum to the military authorities, defining the need, purpose and method of an army 
education scheme for soldiers. It was considered imperative to develop the consciousness of 
the soldiers not only on what they were fighting against, also what they were fighting for – to 
preserve the country’s political, cultural and economic assets.465 Smuts believed it was ‘an 
excellent idea’, and after further discussions and refinements, that “educational” scheme was 
approved in February 1941.466 The CGS, who approved the scheme, requested that it be a 
branch of intelligence, designated I(M), with “m” standing for morale (of the UDF 
members).467 Dr Malherbe was in charge of the army education scheme (AES)468, and in June 
1942, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, he assumed the position of DMI in the South 
African Intelligence Corps (SAIC).469 Until the end of the war, Dr Malherbe was the DMI 
and head of AES, assisted by Marquard as his deputy and chief education officer.470 All the 
education officers were referred to as the information officers (IOs). According to Roos, the 
AES was designed by Afrikaner liberals who feared the influence of Nazism on the 
development of extreme political tendencies among white soldiers, thus desired to “educate” 
them on responsible citizenship within the liberal democratic institutions.471 The AES was 
thus one of the main propaganda instruments to foster positive attitudes in support of the 
government’s war policy (details in the next chapter). 
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466  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945. 
467  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945. 
468  According to Dr Malherbe, the name of the Army Education Scheme was changed to Army 
Information Service, as soldiers were averse to the word “education”.  
469  Malherbe Papers, File 432/1, KCM 56974 (14) Record of Service Notes; Marquard Papers, BC 587, 
D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, Significant Date in the History of 
Army Education Scheme. 
470  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945; Malherbe, 
Never a Dull Moment, pp. 215-217. 
471  Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 48. 
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The DMI was responsible for the organisation, collection and distribution of military 
intelligence, control of the Film Production Unit, control of the War Museum, control of the 
Historical Records Branch as well as carrying out government policy regarding the AES.472 
The configuration of the DMI consisted primarily of three main parts: intelligence 
organisation, miscellaneous and army education services.473 The intelligence organisation 
component, besides its Intelligence Corps, was further divided into three sub-sections, Ia 
(information), responsible for collecting, collating and distribution of information relating to 
the enemy, Allies and neutrals (mainly in Africa); Ib (security), responsible for collecting 
information, civil security and intelligence, military security intelligence and dock security; 
and Ic (censorship, publicity and propaganda), responsible for censorship of military 
correspondences, managing war correspondents, for publicity of military activities and public 
relations, and propaganda towards the troops, control of war artists as well as the 
coordination economic propaganda. The production and circulation of army training and 
propaganda films, the production and management of army history and the war museum fell 
under the miscellaneous, in conjunction with the Ic sub-section.474 The army information and 
morale (Im) resorted under the AES, which later also dealt with the books for troops, in 
addition to facilitating the scholastic education and correspondence courses.475 These 
arrangements were purely for the military. A separate arrangement for the mobilisation of the 
civilian population was facilitated through BOI (discussed below). 
 
Within two years after the establishment of the intelligence organisation and structure, the 
defence advisory committee wrote a report, under the signature of its chair, Reitz, 
complaining about the lack of a ‘coordinating centre’ to process and transmit sensitive 
information to the relevant authorities for action. As a result, there was excessive ‘confusion, 
overlapping and delay’ pertaining to the ‘collection and dissemination of intelligence 
information’, thus leading to forfeiture in value and failure to act.476 To remedy the situation, 
the report recommended the establishment of an Intelligence Clearance Bureau (ICB), ‘as the 
central point for receiving intelligence information, recording it and distributing it promptly 
                                                 
472  AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 13 July 1943. 
473  AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, Organisational Chart. 
474  AG (W), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, DMI Establishment, 14 January 1943. 
475  AG (W), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, Organisational Chart; 
Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945. 
476  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Reitz to Smuts, 27 September 1942. 
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to the proper quarter for action’.477 The ICB was envisaged to be under the minister of 
interior and responsible to the Prime Minister. 
 
On 22 October 1942, resulting from the recommendations of the defence advisory committee, 
an Intelligence Records and Clearance Bureau (IRB)478 was established under Brigadier H.J. 
Lenton in his capacity as the controller of censorship, and under the direction of Lawrence as 
interior minister.479 Senior officials representing censorship, SAP, Railway Police, Military 
Intelligence Section, Treasury, Commissioner for Immigration and Commissioner for 
Customs, constituted the IRB and would meet weekly or whenever necessary.480 The IRB’s 
activities were as follows: 
 
a. To act as a clearing house for all reports pertaining to internal security questions, 
facilitating their swift transmission to the pertinent authorities for executive decision 
and action, and recording that action by the concerned section. 
b. To ensure the preservation of a full set intelligence records. 
c. To keep the minutes of each meeting and send a copy to the Minister of Interior.481 
 
To avoid confusion, the CGS clarified to his subordinates that the IRB would not interfere 
with the normal functioning and obligations of the DDMI, but would supplement it with 
regard to pertinent military material that might be exploited from hitherto untapped 
sources.482 It was also confirmed that the IRB would not ‘undertake outside investigations of 
criminal, subversive or disloyal activities of individuals’, its main focus was for processing, 
recording and dissemination of intelligence information.483 The UDF’s intelligence section, 
particularly the Ic, co-ordinated its efforts with other government and non-government 
                                                 
477  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Reitz to Smuts, 27 September 1942. 
478  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Memorandum, Intelligence Records and Clearance Bureau (IRB), 22 
October 1942. The file refers to the Intelligence Records and Clearance Bureau and in the 
memorandum regarding its establishment; the acronym is indicated as I.R.B. Historians have however 
retained the original acronym of ICB, which refers to the same organisation. For consistency with the 
founding records, this study would use the IRB acronym. 
479  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Van Ryneveld to Adjutant General and the Director of Military 
Operations and Intelligence, 25 October 1942; CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Memorandum, Intelligence 
Records and Clearance Bureau (IRB) 22 Ocober 1942. 
480  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Memorandum, I.R.B (Intelligence Records Bureau), 22 Ocober 1942; 
Fedorowich, German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence, p. 215. 
481  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Memorandum, I.R.B (Intelligence Records Bureau), 22 Ocober 1942. 
482  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Van Ryneveld to Adjutant General and the Director of Military 
Operations and Intelligence, 25 October 1942. 
483  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Memorandum, I.R.B (Intelligence Records Bureau), 22 October 1942; 
Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence’, p. 215; Fokkens, ‘The Role and 
Application of the Union Defence Force’, p. 121. 
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agencies such as the BOI and the Union Unity Truth Service, as well as with the department 
of native affairs (NAD) to deal with matters affecting black South Africans during the war. 
 
In July 1940, the Directorate Non-European Army Services (DNEAS) was established. Its 
object was to facilitate the mobilisation of blacks, so-called coloureds and Indian-Malay for 
military service, however, in non-combatant capacity.484 Three military units, basically 
comprising of the Cape Corps (commanded by Lt Col C.N. Hoy)485, the Indian and Malay 
Corps (commanded by Lt Col G. Morris)486 and the Native Military Corps (commanded by Lt 
Col B.W. Martin)487 were ultimately mobilised for service within, and also ouside South 
Africa.488 The direction, organisation, administration as well as recruitment was under the 
authority of Colonel E.T. Stubbs and also Lieutenant Colonel B.W. Martin who represented 
the director (Stubbs) in the North.489 The government authorities instituted various measures 
to draw recruits to fill up the ranks of these units. However, DNEAS was a separate structure 
in the overall military establishment. The government was more concerned about the white 
political constituency in addressing the manpower requirements of the UDF and in 
resuscitating the security apparatus of the state. (See Illustration 6) 
 
                                                 
484  UWH, Box 89, MS 34, Organisation and Establishment – Indian Services Corps, Adjutant General to 
all Heads of Sections, 15 July 1940; SANDFA, AG (3), Box 224, 154/51/658/0, Organisation – Non-
European Army Services, Memorandum on NEAS, 28 March 1941. 
485  AG (3), Box 224, 154/51/658/3, Organisation and Establishment, Adjutant General to all Heads of 
Sections, 20 May 1940. 
486  UWH, Box 89, MS 34, Organisation and Establishment – Indian Services Corps, Adjutant General to 
all Heads of Sections, 15 July 1940. 
487  SANDFA, Directorate Non-European Army Services (DNEAS), Group 2, Box 3, NAS 3/1/1, Ryneveld 
to Wakefield, 16 August 1940. The functions of DNEAS in UDF were outlined by the Director as 
follows: transport drivers, artisans and sappers, hygiene personnel, loaders, batmen, cooks, tailors, 
bootmakers, labourers, artillery aids, guards, watchmen, medical aids, stretcher bearers, stablemen, 
dressers, postilions, pioneers and mechanics. 
488  CGS (War), Box 129, 32/1, Circular, Non-European Army Services, by Quartermaster General, 12 July 
1940. 
489  See University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), William Cullen Library, Archives and Manuscripts, E.T. 
Stubbs Papers, A954. B6, Telegram about Senator Stubbs’s Appointment as DNEAS, 30 July 1940; 
UWH, Box 86, MS 2, Organisation - Non-European Army Services, Adjutant General to all Heads of 
Sections, 8 August 1940; AG (3), Box 224, 154/51/658/0, Organisation – Non-European Army 
Services, Memorandum on NEAS, 28 March 1941; SANDFA, Native Military Corps (NMC), Box 11, 
NAS 3/21, Report on Publicity and Propaganda, 20 August 1942; See details in Grundlingh, ‘The 
Participation of the South African Blacks in the Second World War’ (unpublished D. Litt et Phil 
Thesis, RAU, 1986); Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 72-73; I. Gleeson, The 
Unknown Force. Black, (Ashanti Publishing, Rivonia, 1994); M. Roth, ‘“If you give us rights we will 
fight”: Black involvement in the Second World War,’ South Africa Historical Journal, no. 15, 
November 1983, pp. 85-104; S. Horwitz, ‘The Non-European War Record in South Africa’, In E. 
Hellman, Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa (Oxford University Press, Cape Town and 
London, 1949). 
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During Lawrence’s meeting with Smuts in September 1939, he noted some of the suggestions 
pertaining to enhancing the internal security measures. Contained in the suggestions was the 
appointment of the former SAP commissioner, Sir Theodore Truter, as chief control officer 
under the department of justice, to deal with internment processes. There was also 
consideration for Colonel I.P. de Villiers, then commissioner of the police, to undertake the 
responsibility for protecting the key industries.490 In October 1939, the Essential Services 
Protection Corps (ESPC), under the Minister of Defence and administered via the Secretary 
for Defence, Blaine, was established, to maintain surveillance and protect the vital points of 
the Union against sabotage.491 The ESPC was organised as a semi-military structure, but not 
as a UDF unit, and its “companies” were established in critical coastal areas of Cape Town, 
Durban, Port Elizabeth, and East London.492 There was also an inland company and roads 
regiment for the protection of the lines of communication throughout the Union.493 
Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Stanford, chief of police and investigation, South African railway 
headquarters, was commanding the ESPC’s railway regiment, which was responsible for the 
protection of the railways in the coastal cities.494 Lieutenant Colonel P.I. Hoogenhout, 
chairman of the national road board, was an officer commanding of the ESPC’s roads 
regiment.495 The powers of suspension, reduction, dismissal and discharge, were delegated to 
the police commissioner (Colonel de Villiers).496 With the exception of Blaine and 
Hoogenhout, the various commanders of the ESPC units were former police officers who 
were selected on the basis of their experience and character.497 
 
Another internal security structure called the Civilian Protection Services (CPS), under Major 
(later Colonel) T.B. Clapham, was established in 1940.498 Its purpose was to perform 
                                                 
490  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 
September 1939. 
491  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13, The Story of the Essential Services Protection Corps (ESPC), 2 December 
1941; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 34; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and 
British Counter-Intelligence’, pp. 213-214. The vulnerable and vital points to be protected included 
railways, roads and bridges, petrol and oil tanks, power stations, electricity supply stations, wireless 
stations, cable stations, telephone exchanges, dock wharfs and airport bases. 
492  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13, The Story of ESPC, 2 December 1941, pp. 2-4; Martin and Orpen, South 
Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 34. 
493  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13, The Story of ESPC, 2 December 1941, pp. 6-8. 
494  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 143, C.H Blaine’s Instruction, Internal Security, 30 May 1930. 
495  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 143, C.H Blaine’s Instruction, Internal Security, 30 May 1930. 
496  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 143, C.H Blaine’s Instruction, Internal Security, 30 May 1930; CGS (War), Box 
223, 49/1, Internal Security Measures, 1940. 
497  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13, The Story ESPC, December 1941, p. 5. 
498  CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13, Civilian Protection Services (CPS), Blaine to Lawrence, 13 July 1940; 
CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13 Memorandum, Adjutant General to OCs and Head of Sections, 17 October 
1940. 
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preventive and protective operations in the defence of the civilian population against possible 
attacks from the air, and the sea, and against the dangers arising from sabotage and sudden 
emergency.499 The CPS was a civilian organisation under the control of the local authorities 
(municipalities) – mayors – who were designated as chief area commandants, with the 
defence authorities maintaining an over-riding responsibility.500 It comprised of 10, 000 
strong Civilian Guard, for public protection and to assist the police in maintaining law and 
order.501 It was considered a significant step by the government in reinforcing the morale of 
the population which had been complaining about the need for civilian defence measures. 
Also, it was deemed necessary to organise home-front counter-measures to protect homes, 
villages, towns and cities against anti-war factions and organised attacks, as well as to 
provide intelligence.502 This effort was undertaken by loyal citizens of the Union. 
 
To counter the subversive activities and propaganda, civilian resources were mobilised in the 
form of vigilance committee, based on the suggestions by Lieutenant General Andries Brink, 
commander-in-chief of the burgher commandos, Major General J.J. Collyer, the military 
secretary, and Louis Esselen, Smuts’s trusted confidant and chairman of the railway board.503 
The tasks of the vigilance committee included: 
 
a. To observe espionage, sabotage, and hostile action by groups. 
b. To promptly report on all cases of intimidation, tampering with natives, subversive 
speech or action, and parachutists, should the latter arise. 
                                                 
499  Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 188, Memorandum on Internal Security, Suggested Scheme, Lawrence 
to Smuts, 12 June 1940; CGS (War), Box 223, 49/1, Internal Security, General Minute, 25 June 1940; 
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c. To immediately report all cases of hardship from whatever cause arising as affecting 
the wives and families of those away on active service, with a view to prompt 
examination and, where necessary, early redress. 
d. Generally to watch for any movement or action which may tend to impair internal 
security.504 
 
A network of vigilance committees would operate in the Transvaal, OFS, Natal and in the 
Eastern Province, where there was a larger proportion of German speakers. The interior 
minister, Lawrence, was ultimately responsible. Given the government’s established 
intelligence system, Lawrence did not want to entrust intelligence work to civilian 
“amateurs”, fearing a ‘disconcerting embarrassment’ should things go wrong. In his 
comments on the local vigilance committees, he cautioned that, ‘the views are bound to be 
coloured by local prejudices, and local gossip, and their recommendations, apart from being 
valueless, may often involve the government in difficulties’, if there was official recognition 
and authority given to them.505 He recommended that the vigilance committees must not 
enjoy official government recognition and should rather be run through local security 
liaisons. Lawrence also saw an expanded role of the vigilance committees, with respect to 
obtaining information about the so-called “fifth column” as well as to mobilise public opinion 
to support government policy. He argued in this manner: 
 
Public opinion plays a very important part in controlling the minds of men already part of the 
military machine, or those just on the point of deciding to become part of that machine. By 
obtaining first-hand information on the feelings of the public, many dangers and difficulties 
can be averted and overcome. Conversely, if it is necessary to launch a certain line of 
propaganda in view of the existing military and other exigencies, numerous committees 
spread throughout the country can be invaluable in helping to shape and direct local 
opinion.506 
 
Therefore, the influence on public opinion was urgently required to counter the escalating 
subversive speeches and the instigation of violence during the war. Hence, as indicated 
above, the internal security scheme was designed for the provision of intelligence (unofficial) 
                                                 
504  Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 188, Memorandum on Internal Security, Suggested Scheme, Lawrence 
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to Smuts, 12 June 1940. 
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information, to facilitate the dissemination of government propaganda, to combat militant 
action, to mobilise public opinion and to win over opponents towards the government 
policy.507 Thus, hand-in-hand with security measures, the government also progressively 
devised various publicity and propaganda systems to mobilise the South African public to 
support its war policies. As Lasswell put it, securing public support was ‘an inescapable 
corollary of large scale modern war’.508 
 
PUBLICITY AND PROPAGANDA ARRANGEMENTS 
 
The BOI was regarded as the primary medium for the dissemination of news and also for 
publicity on the activities of the DOD. Its functions were outlined in its reports of 1940 and 
1942, and were further confirmed by the interior minister in the Union parliament in March 
1942.509 Its press section dealt with a survey of the daily newspapers (about 20 of them) for 
incipient agitations, grievances or complaints and political tendencies, then compiled a press 
report for circulation to all cabinet ministers for responses or to issue authority for 
explanatory statements.510 It also handled official press statements issued by the secretary for 
defence, CGS and other senior officials. Other functions related to liaison with the publicity 
section of military intelligence, serving as publicity agency for recruitment and mediated 
between the press and military censorship on relevant matters, coordinated publicity with 
other state departments and disseminated newsletters, news and broadcast material to the 
Allied and neutral countries.511 The BOI coordinated and performed the general publicity 
functions, from radio broadcast, production, distribution and management of film exhibitions 
in South Africa and abroad, to the facilitation of the press coverage of defence publicity 
campaigns.512 Radio, as mentioned earlier, was envisaged to be used by the BOI for the 
provision of counter-claims against the Zeesen broadcast. This, however, had its own 
problems. (See Illustrations 7-8) 
 
                                                 
507  UWH, Box 264, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 29 June 1940. 
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509  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 
1940; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; 
Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 43, January - March 1942, col. 3005. 
510  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 
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511  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 
1940; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942. 
512  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 
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There were controversies relating to allegations of pro-Nazi and anti-government tendencies 
within the SABC which threatened to derail the BOI’s broadcasting efforts.513 Those 
allegations began early in September 1939 due to the perceptions of inaction from the SABC 
to define its war policy and even not informing its officers of its intentions.514 Some of the 
criticisms emanated from the newspapers, of which the anti-government ones like Die 
Transvaler accused the SABC of being under government control, while others such as the 
Sunday Times complained about the ‘silence’ on the war issue.515 The chief critic was George 
Heard, a political correspondent for the Rand Daily Mail and columnist of the Sunday Times, 
who mysteriously disappeared in Cape Town while ‘returning to a naval ship of which he 
was an officer’ in 1945.516 
 
Through a board resolution, the SABC had declared its war policy on 18 September 1939: 
 
As the Union was at war, the Board considered that it was its duty to support authority in the 
prosecution of the war and to co-operate with the Government in every possible way in 
bringing it to a successful issue … while full effect will be given to the war policy of the 
Corporation, every effort will be exercised by the Board to frame and carry out its 
broadcasting programmes with due regard to both English and Afrikaans culture.517 
 
Prior to officially defining its war policy, the SABC had for fourteen days, every hour from 
6:00 am to 12:00 midnight, aided the government’s war policy by relaying speeches by 
prominent British and Allied statesmen as well as commentators with regard to political and 
military matters.518 The SABC relayed the special news services that came through the South 
African Press Association (SAPA). However, due to the need to have a sitting of full board 
                                                 
513  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1 December 1939; Unisa, United Party (UP) 
Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Report, Report on African Broadcasting Corporation, 8 
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members from various parts of the country to decide on such a critical matter, the delay of 
fourteen days became a source of criticism.519 On 3 December 1939, Heard wrote in the 
Sunday Times accusing the section of the SABC staff of ‘attempting to frustrate the policy of 
the Smuts Government’ and ‘actively parading its sympathy with Hitlerism.’520 He was 
regarded as the voice of the ‘anti-Nazi’ and, due to his strong and unwavering political views, 
J. Langley Levy, the Sunday Times editor, fired him early in the war.521 
 
The criticisms surrounding the SABC, from the Union’s declaration of war on 6 September 
1939, led to calls from the government circles to place the corporation directly under military 
control.522 As a result, the government instituted a commission on enquiry on 25 October 
1939 to probe the operations of the SABC in relation to the war.523 In its annual report of 
1940, the SABC indicates that ‘the board invited the Government to appoint a judicial 
commission to enquire into its affairs’524. The commission initially led by Advocate R. 
Evelyn Wright, later (after adjournment in December 1940) by Advocate P.S. Claasen, was 
required to investigate the claims against the SABC and to determine whether the interests of 
the Union, as a belligerent in the war, were safeguarded.525 It was also required to make 
recommendations on whether to place broadcasting directly under military of other 
government control for the duration of the war.526 
 
After completing its investigation, the commission found that many of the allegations were 
either unfounded or grossly exaggerated, except in one case where, out of the two hundred 
employees, only five were dismissed on the grounds of improper conduct and exhibiting anti-
government tendencies.527 The commission also concluded that the resolution of the SABC 
board to support the government’s war policy, was diligently carried out and there was no 
cause for complaint.528 The SABC director, Major Rene S. Caprara, of Italian descent, was 
however, blamed for entertaining the objections of some of the Afrikaans announcing staff 
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towards broadcasting the statements from the BOI. According to the commission, despite the 
objectors’ ‘artistic and conscientious scruples’, it was ‘their duty to broadcast the statements’ 
in compliance with their contractual obligations and the corporation’s licence which provided 
for the ‘dissemination of statements on official requirements’.529 The commission did not 
recommend placing the SABC under military or government control.530 Meanwhile, co-
operation between the BOI and the SABC continued, albeit with changes in broadcast policy. 
Wilson’s broadcast were discontinued and, instead, prominent people in the society were 
arranged to provide talks on the theme, ‘Why We are in the War’ and on other current topics 
that were considered relevant.531 
 
Tothill argues that the government erred by attempting to counter the Zeesen propaganda as 
its listenership increased instead, and that Afrikaans speakers had to reluctantly listen to 
Wilson and his staff, who were also not fluent in Afrikaans.532 This was later rectified (in 
1940) with the appointment of the fully bilingual speakers in the BOI, namely, M. Uys Krige 
and S.J. Marais Steyn.533 Another criticism came from the opposition papers: Die Vaderland, 
Die Burger, Die Transvaler and Die Volksblad, which attacked Wilson for his language 
deficiency, for political warfare against the Zeesen announcer (Holm) and in attempting to 
sway the Afrikaner opinion towards the government.534 The pro-government English paper, 
Natal Daily News, also criticised Wilson’s war of words against the Zeesen announcer which 
was described as an unnecessary ‘childish backchat’.535 Other criticisms, with respect to the 
BOI’s general conduct and coordination of publicity and propaganda, came from the DOD. 
The BOI was accused by military intelligence officials of monopolising all the news and 
information hoarding536, neglect of the Afrikaans language and the preponderance of English 
                                                 
529  Report of Commission of Enquiry, SABC, p. 13. 
530  Report of Commission of Enquiry, SABC, pp. 5 and 34-35. 
531  Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3.58, Report of the Executive Committee of the National Advisory 
Committee on Publicity, 6 January 1941. 
532  F.D. Tothill, ‘The 1943 General Election’ (Unpublished Master of Arts thesis, University of South 
Africa, 1987), pp. 109-110; Wilson wrote a memorandum to the Prime Minister and responded to 
criticisms of his staff, excluding himself, that those who were not bilingual were taking lessons in 
Afrikaans. See Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 142, Memorandum of the Duties of Information Officers, 14 
February 1940. 
533  PP, Box 63, PU 6/16, Bureau of Information – Reorganisation, Wilson to Kreft (then DDMI), 14 July 
1941; Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 40, August – September 1940, col. 1247; Tothill, The 
1943 General Election, 114. 
534  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, 
Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939. 
535  ‘Official Broadcast Criticised. Childish Backchat with Zeesen’, Natal Daily News, 6 November 1939, 
UWH, Box 274, B.I. 26, press cuttings. 
536  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for 
Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940. 
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publicity material537, interference in military intelligence538, lack of quality reporting539 as 
well as the administrative inefficiency in terms of the dissemination of material to rural-based 
newspapers for publication.540 The DOD preferred to deal with its own publicity operations. 
 
In early November 1939, the DOD appointed the press liaison officer, W.A. Bellwood (later 
Captain and chief press liaison officer), on the staff of Blaine.541 His chief objective was to 
facilitate the effective coordination of the recruiting and publicity efforts in a centralised 
manner. Bellwood recommended a publicity scheme which involved broadcasting and the 
production of material for films on the soldier’s life in the camp, the issuing of booklets and 
brochures, the development of posters for recruitment and for warning people against 
“careless talk” or gossiping, the organisation of the historical war records for posterity (under 
Captain E. Axelson and Captain J. Agar-Hamilton)542, and to ensure the general publication 
of defence activities to the press.543 The press liaison section of the DOD was attached to the 
BOI, for the dissemination of propaganda about the UDF to the public.544 
 
In April 1940, Bellwood was given authority to have the local press liaison officers on the 
staff of the various military units, who would be selected and instructed by him in policy and 
press discipline.545 Three months later, in July 1940, an instruction was issued to all the OCs 
                                                 
537  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 
1941; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (544), Recognition of the Afrikaans Element in 
Propaganda, 1942. 
538  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Reply of the UDF Quartermaster General and the Director General 
Operations to the Director of Information, 28 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a 
Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 
17 October 1940. 
539  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Newman to Lawrence, 28 August 1940. 
540  Malherbe Papers, File 143/2, KCM 56992 (15b), Memorandum Concerning the Bureau of Information, 
Captain (Mrs) Janie Malherbe, 16 March 1942. 
541  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instructions Governing Publicity, 11 November 1939. 
542  AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 13 July 1943; See 
also PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Organisation of Propaganda Projects, Kreft to S. Cooper (of The Star 
newspaper and head of government consultative committee on publicity and propaganda, 13 June 
1941; PP, Box 36, War Diaries and Historical Surveys, June 1945. 
543  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Memorandum on the Plan for Press and Information Division, 3 April 
1940. 
544  Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 40, August – September 1940, col. 1247; PP, Box 63, PU/6/3, 
Report on Relationship between the Bureau of Information and Military Intelligence, DMI (Ic) to 
DDMI, 8 January 1941. The subordination of the military propaganda to the BOI was never an 
acceptable arrangement to the military officials, who constantly complained about how the BOI failed 
them. See CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Press Liaison Officer, Thwaites to Blaine, 13 November 1939; 
CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Report on the Control of Military Information issues to the Public through 
the Press, Newsreels, Broadcast, etc, DDMI’s Reply to Controller of Censorship, 16 April 1942. 
545  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instruction to all Military Commands by the Chief of the General Staff, 6 
April 1940. 
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of the various military commands to facilitate the publication of news of local military 
interest to the press.546 The OCs were to utilise and direct the command intelligence officer to 
perform press liaison tasks, to act as censors on purely local matters, cautiously provide 
liberal views of military publicity to the press, support projects to write stories about 
historical and achievements of military units, support reporters and photographers authorised 
by the DOD to cover the activities of UDF units, and to generally provide support and 
facilities to promote propaganda efforts aimed at depicting the Union’s war effort in the most 
positive light.547 To ensure that no valuable information was inadvertently given to the 
enemy, the OCs were also instructed to ensure that the photographers reported to them on 
arrival and when leaving, that they were to be accompanied by an officer during the course of 
their work, and that all the photographs taken were to be subjected to censorship before 
publication.548 The defence authorities persistently impressed upon the OCs that military 
information such as troop and shipping movements, numbers and position of men and the 
publication of particulars or quality of military exercises and equipment were to be kept out 
of the newspapers.549 To the newspapers though, military information was considered worthy 
“news value” items that, to the annoyance of military authorities, they were not hesitant to 
publish.550 On the other hand, the press also complained about the requests from some 
military commands in the Union, to publish at no costs, the notices and recruiting 
advertisements which were not considered “news items”.551 Blaine subsequently issued a 
circular instructing all OCs to organise the publication of notices and advertisements for the 
press through the government printer in Pretoria, who bore the cost implications. 
 
In June 1940, through the efforts of the BOI, government and the press concluded a voluntary 
censorship agreement whereby the newspapers undertook to ensure that military secrets or 
unauthorised statements that could impact negatively on the conduct of military operations 
                                                 
546  The military was divided into six military commands: the Cape, Eastern Province, Natal, Transvaal 
(with a sub-unit for the Witwatersrand area), Roberts Heights (Voortrekkerhoogte) and Orange Free 
State. See Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 3. 
547  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instruction to all Military Commands by the Director General of  
Operations, 29 July 1940. 
548  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instruction to all Military Commands by the Director General of  
Operations, 29 July 1940. 
549  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instructions on Communications to the Press, 8 February 1940; CGS 
(War), Box 197, 42/4, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, to the Minister of External 
Affairs, Pretoria, 20 July 1940. 
550  ‘Brass Hats have a lot to Learn’, The Sunday Express, 18 February 1940, CGS (War), Box 199, 42/5, 
press cuttings; CGS (War), Box 199, 42/5, Officer Commanding, Voortrekkerhoogte and Transvaal 
Command to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 21 February 1940. 
551  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Circular to all Military Commands by the Secretary for Defence, 13 March 
1940. 
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and on recruitments efforts were not published.552 The government, through the BOI, would 
provide news items to the press via the SAPA and would ensure that military information was 
not provided.553 Additionally, the South African authorities adopted the British instructions 
on restricting the publication of meteorological information in the newspapers. It was feared 
that, although weather affected shipping, aircraft and transport, the weather forecasts, 
reference and information on current weather and photographs should not be published by the 
press as it could be used by the enemy.554 The restrictions were designed to eliminate the risk 
of the enemy to derive deductions from published weather information in terms of the 
implications for the movement of ships, planes and traffic. Although provisions were 
generated to ensure the maximum publicity of the Union’s war effort, with no risk for 
military security, there existed constant frictions, internal rivalries and the overlapping of 
functions among government publicity organs. 
 
On many occasions throughout the war, the government was prompted to facilitate the 
organisational efficiency by the restructuring and consolidation of the state publicity 
apparatus on the one hand, and to deal with complaints against the BOI, as well as the 
subsequent breaches of military security by the press on the other. The BOI was also accusing 
the defence authorities of missing opportunities for wider publicity when military operations, 
aircraft departures and other special manoeuvres could not be photographed due to a lack of 
advance notification from the DOD.555 Wilson suggested an appointment of a military officer 
with ‘journalistic flair’, to be placed in the office of the CGS, with the object of accessing 
confidential documents relating to military operations and manoeuvres, maintaining contact 
and interviewing section heads about developments in their areas for the purposes of 
publication or for useful propaganda.556 Despite the objections from other senior military 
officers557, Wilson’s proposal was accepted, with the proviso that the required officer should 
                                                 
552  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Report on the Control of Military Information issues to the Public through 
the Press, Newsreels, Broadcast, etc, DDMI’s Reply to Controller of Censorship, 16 April 1942; 
Tothill, ‘The 1943 General Election’, p. 97. 
553  Tothill, ‘The 1943 General Election’, p. 97; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the 
Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 
1940. 
554  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, British Circular on the Publication Meteorological Information, 9 March 
1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Meteorological Information: Restrictions on Publications, 29 
October 1940. 
555  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Wilson to Ryneveld, 16 August 1940. 
556  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Wilson to Ryneveld, 16 August 1940. 
557  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Brigadier J. Mitchel-Baker and Col Newman raised objections. In hand-
written notes, Mitchel-Baker complained about the workload, whilst Newman stated that the staff of 
the Bureau did not know what they wanted from the UDF, 28 August 1940. 
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exercise tact and that ‘most officers would resent and resist any suggestion that he has the 
right to cross-examine them’.558 
 
Yet, on 19 October 1940, the director of military operations and intelligence (before the 
reorganisation of the DMI) proposed an appointment of an officer who would be a member of 
the military intelligence section to keep touch with the various departments in the DHQ and 
to collect information for release to the press.559 This proposal was in direct competition with 
the BOI’s request. What appeared to be a final instruction was issued in December 1940, 
when Newman drew attention to the fact that ‘all information intended for publication must 
be given to the Press through director of Military Operations and Intelligence’, including 
information for the director of information (Wilson).560 Consequently, turf wars between the 
BOI and the DOD ensued. 
 
In 1941, Wilson recommended the appointment of a press liaison officer with a rank of 
lieutenant colonel, for the UDF in North Africa, covering the Middle-East, as his war 
correspondents were not provided with adequate facilities and support for publicity activities. 
Approval was given for the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel E.P. Hartshorn as chief press 
liaison officer with South African Forces in Egypt covering the Middle-East, assisted by 
Captain J.W.A. Bell from the The Star newspaper, who also served in Abyssinia as military 
intelligence officer.561 This request was approved on 17 October 1941. The BOI was 
represented in the South African Mobile Field Force (MFF) by Lieutenant C. Norton, 
formerly a chief descriptive reporter of the Rand Daily Mail.562 
 
Constant friction and turf wars between the main state publicity organs persisted throughout 
the war. On a number of occasions, the government had to engage in the restructuring 
processes in order to reduce persistent rivalries and the overlapping of publicity functions 
between departments. Early in December 1940, Lawrence, established a National Advisory 
Committee on Government Publicity to advise the government on publicity and mobilisation 
                                                 
558  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Secretary for Defence to Heads of Sections, 30 August 1940. 
559  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Military Information for the Press, Director of Military Operations and 
Intelligence to Chief of the General Staff, 19 October 1940. 
560  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Military Information for the Press, Director of Military Operations and 
Intelligence, Instruction to all Military Units, 23 December 1940. 
561  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Louis Esselen to CGS, 16 October 1941. 
562  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Bureau of Information, Memorandum to the Press, Director of Bureau of 
Information to DDMI, 1 August 1940. 
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efforts for the war.563 The advisory committee was required to co-opt representatives from the 
defence recruiting, defence intelligence, controller of manpower and director-general of war 
supplies for the purposes of directing the national publicity effort and for considering a 
comprehensive Union-wide propaganda drive for the mobilisation of manpower for military 
service and war production.564 This committee, consisting of six members, was chaired by 
Sisson Cooper of the Argus Company and E.B. Dawson of the Sunday Express, as the vice-
chairman. Members of the DOD, Lenton and Newman, also sat on the committee and it was 
allocated about £47, 000 for propaganda campaign for a period of six months.565 The 
committee served to co-ordinate information about the war and advised on publicity 
campaigns through the means of newspapers, posters, films and radio broadcast. The 
government also used its discretion to entrust many official publicity schemes to private 
advertising agencies, and subsequently to an Association of Advertising Contractors566, to 
maximise the dissemination of information to the country’s population. 
 
The publicity structures were not functioning effectively. In early 1942, the defence 
recruiting and publicity committee replaced the national advisory committee. It was largely 
comprised of military personnel and representatives of government departments. The 
chairman was Colonel Werdmuller (director of recruiting) and Dr Malherbe (director of 
military intelligence), as the vice-chairman, with representations from the BOI. This 
committee, operating under Blaine, was granted advisory and executive powers, and had a 
limited scope of mainly recruiting.567 The BOI remained the chief government publicity 
agency and the DOD utilised its DMI (Ic) section under Captain R.N. Lindsay and Captain J. 
Malherbe (wife of Dr Malherbe) to handle the censorship, publicity of military activities, 
public relations (for UDF) in the Union and in the field, as well as propaganda to the 
                                                 
563  Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 58, National Advisory Committee on Publicity, 6 January 1941; CGS 
(War), Box 43, 10/7, Deputy Director of Recruiting to the Defence Authorities Committee, 3 January 
1941. 
564  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Lawrence to Blaine, 22 December 1941. 
565  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Lawrence to Blaine, 22 December 1941; Adjutant General Group 3 (AG 
3), Box 6, Notes on Meeting of Defence Authorities Committee, 23 December 1940 – 24 January 1941; 
NASAP, Department of Trade and Industry Archives (HEN), Box 2191, 432/1/13, vol. 2, 
Memorandum on Government Publicity and Propaganda by Major P.T. van der Walt and Sergeant V.J. 
Clapham, 27 November 1943. 
566  HEN, Box 2191, 432/1/13, vol. 2, Memorandum on Government Publicity and Propaganda by Major 
P.T. van der Walt and Sergeant V.J. Clapham, 27 November 1943. 
567  HEN 2191, 432/1/13, vol. 2, Memorandum on Government Publicity and Propaganda by Major P.T. 
van der Walt and Sergeant V.J. Clapham, 27 November 1943. 
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troops.568 The DMI (Ic) organised and facilitated propaganda lectures as well as wrote 
motivations for the advancement of propaganda instruction at the South African War 
College.569 As stated in the previous section, the defence intelligence’s Film Production Unit 
was established in December 1940, for the object of producing films of training value for 
distribution among UDF units throughout the Union.570 
 
The defence authorities adopted the practice in Britain and America, to produce and circulate 
military training and interest films. The idea originated from the South African Air Force 
which requested Dr Malherbe, who was then liaising with the department of education with 
regard to the provision of educational films, to obtain training films from the British air 
ministry. The UDF film production unit was thus formed under Major H.C. Weaver. He was 
responsible for directing, producing, writing and editing scenarios, scripts and delivering 
commentary on recruiting and propaganda films.571 The Film Unit initially started with the 
importation and distribution of films from Britain and America, to the training centres and 
camps, then, in 1942, it was able to produce and circulate its own films.572 The unit produced 
and distributed training films, recruiting films, instructional and educational films, (British) 
ministry of information (MOI) films, general interest films as well as information and 
propaganda films for the 16 mm and 35 mm projectors.573  
 
By 1942, the Film Unit had produced twenty-seven films at the cost of five thousand-five 
hundred pounds.574 The demand for the films increased rapidly and, for better co-ordination, 
the BOI’s film section was requested to be incorporated into the expanded UDF Film Unit in 
July 1942.575 It was considered desirable since most of the film production in South Africa 
                                                 
568  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Report on the Control of Military Information issues to the Public through 
the Press, Newsreels, Broadcast, etc, DDMI’s Reply to Controller of Censorship, 16 April 1942; AG 
(War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2, Reorganisation of Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, 13 July 
1943; Malherbe Papers, File 144, KCM, 56949 (110), Propaganda Duties Carried out by Capt (Mrs) 
Malherbe of Ic Sub-section, DDMI, 30 September 1942. 
569  PP, Box 57, PR 31, Theory of Propaganda, Lectures, 19 August 1941; PP, Box 57, PR 31, 
Memorandum by Lt J. E. Sacks of Ic, 6 August 1940. 
570  AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/4, Deputy Chief of Staff to Director of Military Intelligence, 5 October 
1942. 
571  AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 1943; PP, 
Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 1942. 
572  AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 1943; PP, 
Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 1942. 
573  PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 1942. 
574  AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 1943. 
575  PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Expansion of Defence Film Unit to Incorporate Film Section of Bureau of 
Information, DDMI to DCS, 16 July 1942. 
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was directly or indirectly concerned with the national war effort. The defence authorities 
argued that the UDF Film Unit was primarily pre-occupied with training films. Thus, an 
intensive recruitment drive in 1942 (post-Tobruk military disaster for UDF) required military 
propaganda films to stimulate national interest in ‘South Africa at War’, and the military 
needed to play an active role in the production and distribution of those films relating to the 
war effort.576 Van Ryneveld and Blaine agreed to the request in August 1942. The BOI, 
however, still carried on with other contractual obligations relating to importation, 
distribution and exhibition of other films to the public. 
 
In 1943, at the request of Lindsay (Ic), the adjutant general (AG) approved the establishment 
of the public relations unit which included a self-contained film and photographic section to 
operate in the North.577 This unit did not operate effectively due to shortage of manpower and 
technically-skilled personnel. It was criticised for the nature of the photographs taken, of 
which the majority showed troops in camps and social context, not of the troops on the 
frontline in military action.578 Lack of trained personnel was cited as a reason. Nonetheless, 
the Unit was able to produce about a thousand prints per month for the BOI, DMI, British 
MOI, military newspapers, illustrations for articles by observers and war correspondents.579 
 
Rivalries and accusations caused friction between the BOI, the military and the press. The 
DMI (Ic) accused the BOI of not effectively giving publicity to the UDF activities even when 
the military had provided the necessary material.580 Even the existence of the UDF Film Unit 
created anxiety for Wilson as he regarded film production and circulation as an encroachment 
on a trade which was regarded as his preserve and under the monopoly of the African 
Consolidated Films, a private film company working closely with the BOI.581 The question of 
the publication of military news to the press also remained a problem.582 Newspapers 
continued to disregard censorship procedures and often published military information such 
                                                 
576  PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Expansion of Defence Film Unit to Incorporate Film Section of Bureau of 
Information, DDMI to DCS, 16 July 1942. 
577  PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, A Brief History of SAPR Film and Photo Unit, May 1945. 
578  PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Official Photographs, Wakefield to Theron, 7 December 1944. 
579  PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944; PP, 
Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, South African Public Relations Film and Photographic Unit, Italy, April 1945. 
580  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the Relationship between the Bureau of Information and the UDF, 13 
January 1941. 
581  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the Relationship between the Bureau of Information and the UDF, 
Discussion with Mr A.N.Wilson, Report by Capt I. Baries of Ic Film Unit, 6 January 1941. 
582  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Report of Meeting of Newspaper Editors Consultative Committee, 23 October 
1940. 
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as locations, identity of units and casualties.583 The BOI was often blamed for some of the 
mishaps.584 As confusion, overlapping functions and accusations between the different state 
organs with regard to “news”, “censorship” and “publicity” questions ensued, the ruling was 
obtained from Smuts in 1942: 
 
Military Intelligence should be responsible for propaganda about the army to the army, the 
Bureau should be responsible for propaganda and publicity about the army to the public … 
and the Bureau services involved radio broadcast, photographs, film services and general 
propaganda [to the public in South Africa, neutral and Allied countries]585 
 
This arrangement helped to reduce frictions and remained in force for the most part of the 
war. The BOI was able to assist the military with news services from South Africa to the 
troops in North and East Africa, through radio and newspapers. Also, it exploited and 
coordinated existing media: newspaper advertisements, posters, cinema slides, radio 
broadcast, leaflets, recruitment tours, exhibitions, parades and public demonstrations, for 
publicising the efforts of the DOD in recruitment campaigns.586 Publicity activities of the 
BOI were designed to convert the anti-war elements towards the government and to prepare 
the ground for the recruitment operations of the DOD. Other semi-official agencies were also 
utilised to counter anti-government opposition. 
 
The Union Unity Truth Service587 served the interest of the ruling United Party, and the 
Jewish Board of Deputies helped to counter pro-Nazi bias by publishing and commenting on 
                                                 
583  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Secretary for Defence to the Editor of the Cape Times, 14 August 1940; 
CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Cipher Telegram, Dechief to Force Nairobi, 5 March 1941; CGS (War), 
Box 197, 42/4, Colonel R.D. Pilkington Jordan to Adjutant General, 28 November 1941; CGS (War), 
Box 197, 42/4, Adjutant General to CGS, 1 December 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Lawrence to 
Blaine, 22 December 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Major General F.H Theron, General Officer 
Administration (GOA), UDF, Middle East Force to CGS, Military Press Censorship, 1 May 1942. 
584  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Wilson to Blaine, 25 September 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Wilson 
to CGS, 2 October 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Blaine to Lawrence, 25 October 1941; CGS 
(War), Box 197, 42/4, Adjutant General to CGS, 1 December 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, 
Lawrence to Blaine, 22 December 1941. 
585  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943. 
586  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May August 1942. 
587  The Union Unity Truth Service produced posters, stamp stickers, cartoons, magazines, brochures, 
bulletins, newspaper advertisements, cinema and loudspeakers in service of the United Party. It also 
published a pictorial magazine called Libertas, similar to Life of the United States and the Picture Post 
of the British. Unisa, Central Head Office, General Elections and Provincial Elections, 1943; CGS 
(War), Box 199, 42/5, Robertson to CGS, 11 December 1940. 
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captured German documents as well as on reported atrocities.588 The UUTS, through its 
active members and propagandists called the Truth Legion, endeavoured to combat Nazism 
in South Africa and to provide intellectual, moral and political support for Smuts and the 
national government in the prosecution of the war.589 Operating from Johannesburg, the 
UUTS presented itself as ‘the new Crusade’, with Smuts as its commander-in-chief, and 
called for people to serve the nation in war. Its director was T.C. Robertson, the 
parliamentary correspondent for the Rand Daily Mail, who was appointed in August 1940.590 
The UUTS had its own propaganda advisory committee under Senator G. Hartog (Member of 
Parliament) as the chair. The language policy of the UUTS was both Afrikaans and 
English.591 
 
The UUTS advocated for the adoption of militant propaganda which would be carried out by 
an independent organisation as itself.592 In a memorandum on the ‘Co-ordination of 
Propaganda in the Union, Results of the Deputation to the Minister of Interior’, it was 
resolved that the BOI will operate independently of the UUTS, as the former disseminated 
information for the government and the latter conducted ‘aggressive and partisan 
propaganda’ which would not commit the government.593 However, the two agencies (BOI 
and UUTS), had strained relations owing to the lack of clarification of roles. Hence 
Lawrence, as the Minister of Interior, just as he was intervening in the turf wars between the 
BOI and the defence authorities, also had to facilitate a smooth co-operation between the BOI 
and the UUTS. The UUTS organised and facilitated various pro-war propaganda schemes 
such as the production of the Afrikaans-language film, Noordwaarts (Northwards), the 
publication of an illustrated magazine called Libertas, which received good reviews in its first 
issue in December 1940, and also organised publicity campaign called ‘peace through 
                                                 
588  See Morris Alexander Papers, BC160, List IV, File 24, Memorandum on the anti-Jewish Movements in 
South Africa, 1935, pp. 1-13; See also a series of articles in Commons Sense, with regard to Nazi 
Propaganda in South Africa. 
589  University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), William Cullen Library, Archives and Manuscripts, Union 
Unity Truth Service and Truth Legion (UUTS), A 1883, 1, Constitution of the Truth Legion, n.d; See 
also the Suggested Scheme of Organisation for Propaganda to be Known as “Union Unity Truth 
Service”, October 1939. 
590  University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), William Cullen Library, Archives and Manuscripts, T.C. 
Robertson Papers, A 2012, B20.2, Minutes of the Propaganda Advisory Committee of the Union Unity 
Truth Service, 9 August 1940. 
591  UUTS, A 1883, 1, Language Policy of the Union Unity Truth Service, 14 August 1940. 
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593  Robertson Papers, A 2012, B20.2, Co-ordination of Propaganda in the Union, Results of the Deputation 
to the Minister of Interior’, Minutes of the Propaganda Advisory Committee of the Union Unity Truth 
Service, 12 February 1942. 
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victory’, which was against the government opponents who advocated peace with 
Germany.594 In addition, the UUTS operated a radio broadcast called ‘Mystery Radio 
Freedom’ which criticised the anti-war factions and attacked the Zeesen announcements in 
the evenings.595 
 
In December 1940, the UUTS established the School of Propaganda and Political Education, 
which operated from Kero Hotel, Johannesburg.596 This School admitted a special selection 
of five young South Africans from each of the mainly white universities, for expert 
instruction on the principles and application of modern propaganda. The ten-day course was 
presented through a series of lectures by about nineteen prominent individuals and 
academics. Among the lecturers was one Pastor W. Luckoff, former bodyguard of Hitler and 
member of the Black Guards in Nazi Germany, who fled to South Africa following the 
persecution of many priests in that country.597 His lectures were on the menace of Nazism 
and the oppressive practices that would threaten the civil liberties of the people under 
German rule. 
 
Other UUTS lecturers and speakers included Advocate G. Saron, who focused on the Fifth 
Column and the fostering of the anti-Jewish sentiments in a society, Professor Leo Fouché on 
the history of propaganda, Dr Malherbe on the significance of film as a propaganda and 
educational instrument, Robertson on Nationalist Propaganda and Steyn on the question of 
the equality between English and Afrikaans and the need to preserve the political and 
constitutional freedom of South Africa.598 The curriculum of the propaganda school broadly 
dealt with the philosophical foundations of propaganda, historical development, psychology 
of propaganda, practical methods and techniques as well as counter-propaganda.599 The 
                                                 
594  UUTS, A1883, 3, Torch Sparks, A pamphlet for communicating UUTS information to officials and 
members, Issue nos. 5-7, 1940-1941. 
595  Robertson Papers, A 2012, Ae 5.1, Broadcasting, October to November 1941. The establishment of the 
radio broadcast was recommended in the Suggested Scheme of Organisation for Propaganda to be 
Known as “Union Unity Truth Service”, October 1939. 
596  UUTS, A1883, 14, Course in Propaganda Modern Propaganda Scheme for Training of Frontline 
Workers, School of Propaganda and Political Education, 10 December 1940. 
597  UUTS, A1883, 10, The Story of Pastor Luckoff, 1941. 
598  UUTS, A1883, 14, Programme and Lectures for the School of Propaganda and Political Education, 9 
December 1940. 
599  UUTS, A1883, 14, Course in Propaganda Modern Propaganda Scheme for Training of Frontline 
Workers, School of Propaganda and Political Education, 10 December 1940. 
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school’s first class was on 9 December 1940, and the graduates were expected to return to 
their districts and become good propagandists.600 
 
The UUTS also brought in B.F.G. Paver, head of the Bantu Press601, to facilitate propaganda 
through black newspapers. The UUTS arranged for the publication of booklets in different 
black languages to explain the causes of the war and object for which the war was fought.602 
The government, on the other side, had enlisted the services of the BOI, which co-ordinated 
efforts with the NAD, to combat war apathy and subversive propaganda among blacks as 
well as to stimulate recruitment.603 Originally under the auspices of the quartermaster general, 
in December 1940, DNEAS was transferred to the adjutant general, who was in charge of all 
recruiting operations.604 
 
Even prior to the outbreak of the war, the government authorities were concerned about the 
development and spread of subversive propaganda among blacks.605 The Secretary for Native 
Affairs, D.L. Smit, issued a circular in September 1939, informing the native affairs officials 
and the magistrates to maintain surveillance and report deviations from normal activities 
among blacks, missionaries and traders.606 Black political movements were also placed under 
observation in the context of subversive propaganda activities.607 
                                                 
600  UUTS, A1883, 14, Introductory Address by J.W. Higgerty, Member of Parliament, School of 
Propaganda and Political Education, 10 December 1940. 
601  For the historical development of black newspapers, see T. Couzens, History of Black Press in South 
Africa, 1836-1960, Additional Seminar Paper, no. A 15, University of the Witwatersrand, Institute for 
Advanced Social Research, 1984, pp. 24-26. 
602  Robertson Papers, B20.2, Minutes of the Propaganda Advisory Committee of the Union Unity Truth 
Service, 9 August 1940. 
603  NASAP, Archives of the Native Commissioner Johannesburg (KJB), Box 496, N9/13/3, Note for 
Conference, Enemy Propaganda, At the Office of the Director of Native Labour, 5 June 1940; KJB, 
Box 497, N9/13/3, Departmental Circular no. 20 of 1940, Enemy Propaganda, Dissemination of 
Authentic News, 11 June 1940; AG (3), Box 286, 154/189/17/1, Reorganisation of Non-European 
Army Services, Adjutant General to all Heads of Sections, 3 December 1940. 
604  AG (3), Box 286, 154/189/17/1, Reorganisation of Non-European Army Services, Adjutant General to 
all Heads of Sections, 3 December 1940. 
605  NTS, Box 9610, 451/400, Italian Fascist Propaganda, Message to all Magistrates in the Transkeian 
Territories, 9 March 1938, NTS, Box 1681, vol. 1, 2/276, Propaganda by American Negroes in South 
Africa, D.M. Roussouw to Secretary for Native Affairs, 7 December 1938; ‘Two Natives Sentenced for 
Sedition’, Cape Argus, 27 May 1939; Archives of the Governor General (GG), Box 1572, 50/1629, 
Effect of German Propaganda on the Minds of the Natives, A. Cele to the Governor General, 7 
November 1939; NTS, Box 1681, vol. 1, 26/328, Political Movements Amongst Blacks, The Universal 
Negro Improvement Association and African Community League, P.J. du Plessis to the Commissioner 
of Police, J.J Coetzee, 28 June 1940. 
606  NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Departmental Circular No. 19 of 1939, Outbreak of War, 16 
September 1939. 
607  NTS, Box 1681, vol. 1, 26/328, Political Movements Amongst Blacks, The Universal Negro 
Improvement Association and African Community League, du Plessis to Coetzee, 28 June 1940; NTS, 
Box 1681, vol. 1, 26/328, Circular No. 33 of 1940, Acting Chief Magistrate of Transkeian Territories 
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As war progressed, rumours about the German victories and the opportunities for black South 
Africans were spreading.608 For example, the Rand Daily Mail reported that blacks were 
“informed” that if the Germans win the war, blacks will get ‘hundred pounds for a cow, ten 
shillings a day for work, free access to European drinking, best seats in the theatre and racial 
equality’609. In the Sekhukhune district of the north-eastern Transvaal, rumours were spread 
that ‘Hitler is coming to liberate blacks and members of the Zion Church will be given flags 
so that they will not be killed by the German soldiers’610. In a sworn statement to the 
magistrate of Lydenburg, a female resident, Johanna Letuku, reported that Simon Pule, a 
minister in the African Methodist Episcopal church, after a prayer meeting, addressed a 
congregation that, ‘Germans will beat the British and they are right inside England killing 
people’611. German and foreign missionary institutions were suspected of spreading 
subversive propaganda among blacks across many parts of the country.612 
 
The DDMI received many reports about the spread of subversive propaganda among blacks. 
It was suspected that some German missionaries, churches, meetings at the mining 
compounds and migrant black workers were responsible for the dissemination of “war 
statements”.613 In most cases, subversive propaganda was mainly about the imminent German 
victories and the liberation of blacks on one side, or that blacks were placed in the frontlines 
by the British to be fired at first and that the British were also shooting at black servicemen 
when retreating from the Germans.614 Hence the government, through the NAD, instituted 
                                                                                                                                                        
to all Magistrates, 29 October 1940; NTS, Box 9610, 455/400, The Non-European Unity Movement, 
Magistrate of Butterworth to Chief Magistrate, Umtata, 20 November 1940. 
608  NASAP, Archives of the Native Commissioner Johannesburg (KJB), Box 496, N9/13/3, Report of 
Conference on Enemy Propaganda, 5 June 1940. 
609  ‘Natives Promised Golden Age, Insidious Campaign by Pro-Nazis’, Rand Daily Mail, 24 July 1940. 
610  NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Native Subversive Propaganda, DDMI to Secretary for Native 
Affairs, 24 July 1940. 
611  NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Propaganda among Natives in Sekhukhuniland, Report by J.A.M. 
Mitchell, Lydenburg, 11 October 1940. 
612  GG, Box 1572, 50/1629, Effect of German Propaganda on the Minds of the Natives, A. Cele to the 
Governor General, 7 November 1939; NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Alleged Enemy Propaganda – 
Transkei and Ciskei, Houghton Gray to Smuts, 4 March 1942. 
613  ‘Natives Promised Golden Age, Insidious Campaign by Pro-Nazis’, Rand Daily Mail, 24 July 1940; 
NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Native Subversive Propaganda, DDMI to Secretary for Native 
Affairs, 24 July 1940; NASAP, NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Subversive Propaganda among 
Natives in the Transvaal, Report by Major P.J. Pretorius, 28 May 1942. 
614  KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Report of Conference on Enemy Propaganda, 5 June 1940; NTS, Box 9629, 
vol. 2, 511/400, Subversive Propaganda among Natives in the Transvaal, Report by Major P.J. 
Pretorius, 28 May 1942. 
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various publicity and propaganda schemes to counter-act subversive activities among blacks 
as well as to facilitate recruitment. 
 
In mid - 1940, a conference on ‘Enemy Propaganda’ was held in Pretoria to discuss ways and 
means of combating subversive propaganda and to determine the best methods of conveying 
the war news to blacks.615 The committee, which referred to itself as the Bantu News Service 
Committee of the Witwatersrand (BNSC), was mainly concerned with providing news 
services to blacks through radio.616 In other meetings, it was recommended to publish 
pamphlets and news bulletins as well as to utilise wireless transmissions, loudspeakers and 
films shows to stimulate interest in the war and to combat insidious propaganda among 
blacks.617 The NAD, thus, played a critical role in assisting the defence authorities in waging 
propaganda campaings towards the black population of South Africa. 
After recognising its own limitations in the initial propaganda efforts618, DNEAS established 
the propaganda and publicity department in April 1942, to work closely with the NAD.619 
DNEAS co-ordinated efforts to provide publicity for its units, particularly the Native Military 
Corps (NMC), by publishing bulletins in black newspapers, and through the DMI (Ic), the 
native commissioners, magistrates, local chiefs and headmen, engaged in counter-propaganda 
activities to ‘produce the correct frame of mind’.620 
 
In August 1942, DNEAS established a propaganda school for black soldiers at Palmietkuil 
North Training Depot, Welgedacht in 1942, and later at Rietfontein XI, NMC School, 
                                                 
615  NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Report of the Conference on Enemy Propaganda in Office of the 
Director of Native Labour, 5 June 1940. 
616  NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcast to Natives (War News), Meeting of Provisional Committee in 
Regard to News Service and Enemy Propaganda held in the Office of the Chief Native Commissioner, 
Witwatersrand, 11 June 1940. 
617  NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcast to Natives (War News), Meeting of Provisional Committee in 
Regard to News Service and Enemy Propaganda held in the Office of the Chief Native Commissioner, 
Witwatersrand, 11 June 1940; See also NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Report of the Conference on 
Enemy Propaganda in Office of the Director of Native Labour, 5 June 1940; National Archives of 
South Africa, Cape Town (hereafter NASAC), Archives of the Chief Commissioner Eastern Cape 
(CCK), vol. 16, Propaganda and Publicity, D.L. Smit to R. Malcolmson, n.d. 
618  The initial DNEAS efforts were on a “hit and miss” basis, prompting Col Stubbs to initiate 
reorganization and improvements. See Grundlingh, The participation of the South African Blacks in the 
Second World War, p. 55. 
619  NMC Archives, Box 11, NAS, 3/21, Report on Publicity and Propaganda, 20 August 1942. 
620  NMC, Box 11, NAS, 3/21, Report on Publicity and Propaganda, 20 August 1942; Grundlingh, ‘The 
participation of the South African Blacks in the Second World War’, pp. 54-55. 
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Springs in 1943.621 The purpose of arranging propaganda courses for blacks was to avert 
boredom among the troops and to enable troops on leave to be able to influence other blacks 
in justifying their enlistment and how the war had implications for South Africa and blacks in 
particular.622 The syllabus, presented by NMC officers, ranged from geographical origins of 
blacks in the NMC, including other black soldiers in Africa, to German treatment of 
conquered peoples and the reasons for black participation in the war against Hitler.623 The 
content of the three - week course was designed to increase awareness about the danger of 
German victory and the need for blacks to see themselves as part of the bigger effort to defeat 
the worst oppressive states.624 In addition to the propaganda school, other publicity and 
propaganda measures included the production and circulation of films625, recruitment tours, 
the publication of the newspaper called Ndlovu-Tlou, for black troops and the translation of 
the English and Afrikaans News of the War paper into nine black languages, which circulated 
it in the Union, the Protectorates, Rhodesia, East and West Africa as well as in Europe.626 
 
These measures were not so much dissimilar to those employed for the other sections of the 
Union society. They were merely implemented through a separate agency of DNEAS and the 
NAD, due to the perceived racial and socio-cultural differences and needs for blacks and 
whites.627 The friction between the various publicity and propaganda agencies in the country 
remained the same in all circumstances. Even Stubbs submitted that DNEAS needed to have 
a ‘free hand’ in conducting publicity and propaganda, without having to go through the BOI, 
                                                 
621  Directorate Non-European Army Services (DNEAS), Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, 
Native Details, Stubbs to OCs of NMC Units, 21 August 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, 
Propaganda Course, Native Details, DNEAS to all OCs of NMC Units, 3 November 1943. 
622  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, Native Details, Stubbs to OCs of NMC Units, 
21 August 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. 
Antel, 26 September 1942. 
623  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Syllabus of Propaganda Course, 24 July 1942. 
624  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, Native Details, Stubbs to OCs of NMC Units, 
21 August 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. 
Antel, 26 September 1942. 
625  See NMC, Box 12, NAS 3/21, Propaganda and Press Matters (Film Matters and Pamphlets), DNEAS 
to UDF Deputy Chief of Staff, 29 May 1942. 
626  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for Native Military Corps, DNEAS to OCs of NMC 
Units, 4 November 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Bantu Soldiers’ Newspaper: “Ndlovu-
Tlou”, DNEAS to DCS, 4 January 1943; HEN, Box 2190, 432/1/12, Weekly Newsletter, Bureau of 
Information, 19 March 1944. The nine black languages were Xhosa, Sotho, Setswana, Sepedi, 
Xitsonga, TshiVenda and Zulu for the Union, Herero and Ovambo for SWA. 
627  See NMC, Box 12, NAS 3/21, Memorandum on Native Recruiting and Posters, by 2nd Lieutenant J.B. 
Bruce to DNEAS, Lt Col E.T. Stubbs, n.d. 
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which was accused of failing to do anything about the publicity data that was previously 
furnished.628 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although South Africa was geographically removed from the main theatre of military 
operations, the multiple security, publicity and propaganda measures reflected the impact of 
the war conditions, especially given the country’s political fractures and societal divisions on 
the basis of race, class and also gender. The activities of the extra-parliamentary movements, 
subversive operations, sabotage, and declining morale among the Union troops as well as the 
prevalence of the social and economic tensions, required the authorities to adopt various 
measures to maintain control and authority. Censorship, publicity and propaganda systems 
therefore, served to facilitate the containment of the anti-war resistance as well as to inspire 
public confidence in the government, to sustain morale and to effectively execute the war 
policy. 
 
Despite the persistent inter-agency rivalries, turf wars and the overlapping functions, the 
authorities did not impose a single regulatory framework for state publicity. It was a more 
convenient strategy. It could be argued that, in the context of the prevailing political 
conditions, the co-existence of the multiple publicity agencies was necessitated by political 
expediency and the need to maintain flexibility in order to have more scope for publicity 
manoeuvres. In addition, the multiple audiences who had competing perspectives and 
aspirations about the war, required the government and military officials to constantly adapt 
their various publicity and propaganda programmes to sustain public support for the war 
policy. This point will be illustrated in the next chapters whereby the content and context of 
the government’s propaganda mechanisms for shaping public opinion in relation to the war 
policy will be examined. 
                                                 
628  NMC, Box 11, NAS, 3/21, Report on Publicity and Propaganda, 20 August 1942. 
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Fig. 3: Smuts’s War Cabinet, Cape Times, 7 Sep 1939 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 4: Union Defence Force Command Structure in 1939: Military Archives, UWH, vol. 
86 
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Illustration 5: Directorate Military Intelligence Structure, 1943, Military Archives, AG 
(W), vol. 4 
 
 
 
Illustration 6: Non-European Army Services Organisation, 1940, Military Archives, 
UWH, vol. 90 
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Illustration 7: Bureau of Information: Propaganda Channels, Military Archives, PP, 
vol. 63 
 
 
Illustration 8: Bureau of Information Personalities, The Nonqai, Jun 1942 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
HOME-FRONT PROPAGANDA: RADIO AND THE PRESS 
 
As indicated in the previous sections, the Union had no defence plan to swiftly put a well-
trained and well-equipped military force on the ground. Thus, the question of attracting and 
mobilising sufficient volunteers for military service arose in the DOD. In the estimation of 
the military authorities, manpower requirements to fill the ranks of the UDF, particularly 
white males of effective military age of 18 and 44, would be drawn from 452 369, and those 
between 45 and 60 years from 160 604.629 From the key age category of 18-44, where the 
majority of recruits would be needed, about half (meaning approximately 225 000) would not 
be available due to factors such as medial unfitness or employment in key industries. 
Furthermore, the adjutant general explained to the CGS that from the remaining half (of 18-
44 age category), approximately 112 000 would actually volunteer, falling below the 
estimated establishment of 143 000 (139 000 for the field force and 3 900 for home 
defence).630 There was an immediate shortfall of over 30 500. These figures were derived 
from the census of May 1936 and allowance was made for deaths from 1936 - 1939, and the 
possible unavailability of other personnel such as the police, prison services personnel, 
university students, civil servants, mining and personnel in crucial positions.631 
 
The potential military labour from blacks was estimated at 2 million out of the available 7 
million, and 200 000 out of the 600 000 so-called coloureds.632 This figure was an 
exaggeration by DNEAS at the time, when there were fears that Italians would deploy their 
160 000 black troops against whites during their campaign in Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) when 
                                                 
629  UWH, Box 88, MS 22, Organisation of UDF for War, CGS to Chairman of Defence Advisory 
Committee and Chairman of Defence Authorities Committee, 2 October 1940; Further manpower 
estimation, see CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 25 January 1941; UWH, 
Box 239, Economic Consequences for South Africa of a Nazi Victory, by DMI (Ic), 14 October 1941, 
pp. 1-8; PP, Box 57, EC 38/I, Economic Warfare Intelligence Summary, n.d. 
630  UWH, Box 88, MS 22, CGS to Chairman of Defence Advisory Committee and Chairman of Defence 
Authorities Committee, 2 October 1940. 
631  UWH, Box 88, MS 22, CGS to Chairman of Defence Advisory Committee and Chairman of Defence 
Authorities Committee, 2 October 1940; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence 
Report, 25 January 1941; UWH, Box 239, Economic Consequences for South Africa of a Nazi Victory, 
by DMI (Ic), 14 October 1941, pp. 1-8; PP, Box 57, EC 38/I, Economic Warfare Intelligence 
Summary, n.d. 
632  UWH, Box 90, MS 50, Military Employment of Natives, Stubbs to Collyer, 11 June 1940. 
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hostilities started.633 However, a modest assessment of about 1 600 000 blacks between 18-45 
years was more in line with the census of May 1936.634 It was ultimately determined that out 
of the available manpower, over 1 million blacks were already employed in agriculture and 
mining and these were not to be considered. About 600 000 blacks, therefore, could be 
recruited for military labour.635 Nonetheless, the mobilisation of both whites and non-whites 
would become a real challenge. Factors such as the anti-war resistance, opposition 
propaganda, racial policies as well as military service conditions would impact on enlistment. 
The authorities were aware that manpower recruitment would be very slow and required 
intensified efforts to stimulate public interest in the war and to secure support on the home-
front. Therefore, from the outset, a massive publicity and propaganda campaign was 
imperative. In the context of the prevailing circumstances, the following broad objectives 
needed attention: fostering a militant and patriotic spirit in the society, facilitating recruitment 
for military service and war production, countering subversive propaganda as well as 
preserving public and troop morale. Agencies such as the BOI, DMI (Ic), SABC, UUTS, 
newspaper editors and the private advertising companies played a significant role to ensure 
the realisation of those objectives. 
 
This chapter examines the platforms and methods exploited by Union authorities to 
implement propaganda programmes to the public (civilians on the home-front). At the same 
time, it will also analyse the content of propaganda messages in relation to the objectives of 
the government, especially given the diversity of the South African public and their wide-
ranging aspirations and expectations. For the purpose of effective analysis, this chapter on 
home-front propaganda will focus on two major platforms, radio and the press, which were 
the first to be considered by the Union authorities for delivering propaganda messages.636 It 
should also be noted that the same platforms were employed for military propaganda (that is 
propaganda towards the UDF troops). Personal appeals conducted via the radio or at public 
                                                 
633  UWH, Box 90, MS 50, Military Employment of Natives, Stubbs to Collyer, 11 June 1940; Martin and 
Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 74. 
634  CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 25 January 1941; UWH, Box 239, 
Economic Consequences for South Africa of a Nazi Victory, by DMI (Ic), 14 October 1941, pp. 1-8; 
PP, Box 57, EC 38/I, Economic Warfare Intelligence Summary, n.d. 
635  UWH, Box 88, MS 22, CGS to Chairman of Defence Advisory Committee and Chairman of Defence 
Authorities Committee, 2 October 1940; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence 
Report, 25 January 1941; UWH, Box 239, Economic Consequences for South Africa of a Nazi Victory, 
by DMI (Ic), 14 October 1941, pp. 1-8; PP, Box 57, EC 38/I, Economic Warfare Intelligence 
Summary, n.d.; AG (3), Box 342, 154/203/3, Stubbs to Adjutant General, 22 February 1941. 
636  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Matters Discussed with Smuts, 18 September 1939; Smuts Papers, A1, 
vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 1940. 
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gatherings, and the value thereof, will also be analysed in this chapter. The next chapter will 
then examine the role and significance of films, newsreels and military displays, in the 
broader government propaganda scheme to mobilise public support. The rationale for this 
division is to focus attention and for deeper analysis in terms of structure, method and content 
of propaganda programmes in relation to the goals set out by the Union authories and the 
reception of the targeted audience. For the same reasons, subsequent chapters dealing with 
the internal propaganda in the UDF will also be analysed in the same context. Of immediate 
concern though, is to briefly review the main institutional structures and their basic roles in 
the coordination and implementation of the Union government’s propaganda initiatives, both 
for civilians on the home-front and for the UDF troops in the field. 
 
PROPAGANDA INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the main agencies for facilitating the delivery of the 
Union’s propaganda programmes were the BOI, DMI (Ic), SABC, and UUTS, as well as the 
newspaper editors and the private advertising companies, which played a significant role to 
ensure the realisation the government’s policy objectives. The BOI was the main agency for 
government publicity and propaganda, with the object of popularising government policy and 
the Union’s war effort at home and in some neutral countries. Through its broadcast section, 
it coordinated efforts in conjunction with the DMI (Ic) and the SABC, for broadcasting war 
news and film production. Its press section dealt with newspapers regarding war news, 
advertisement and publicity of military activities.637 
 
The UUTS was a semi-official agency and explained its role more explicitly: to conduct 
aggressive and militant nation-wide propaganda in support of Smuts and the national 
government’s war policy, and to combat the ‘lying propaganda’ of the anti-war factions.638 
The SABC had already committed itself towards supporting the government’s war policy 
and, it allocated time slots for government officials and departments.639 The DMI (Ic) 
                                                 
637  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 
1940; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Report of Meeting of Newspaper Editors Consultative Committee, 23 
October 1940; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the Relationship between the Bureau of Information 
and the UDF, 13 January 1941. 
638  Robertson Papers, A 2012, B20.2, Minutes of the Propaganda Advisory Committee of the Union Unity 
Truth Service, 14 October 1940; UUTS, A 1883, 1, Constitution of the Truth Legion; See also the 
Suggested Scheme of Organisation for Propaganda to be Known as “Union Unity Truth Service”, 
October 1939. 
639  SABC, Annual Report, War Policy, 1939. 
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devoted attention to recruitment drives and for sustaining the morale of the UDF troops. The 
defence authorities also preferred to exploit newspapers to publicise special military activities 
of local interest without going through the channel of the BOI.640 As indicated previously, 
this caused constant friction between the DMI (Ic) and the BOI. As the main liaison between 
the DOD and the press, the BOI arranged permits for newspapers, enabling them to gain 
access to military units.641 Occasional inter-agency frictions and criticisms often took place; 
however, there was no permanent damage to relations as co-operation continued on many 
levels throughout the war. Mobilising propaganda effort was imperative and these agencies 
tolerated each other in an endeavour to promote the government’s war policy. 
 
RADIO BROADCAST AND PERSONAL APPEALS 
 
As a matter of urgency, the Union’s government officials considered it crucial to exploit 
radio to counter the damage caused by Zeesen broadcast to South Africa. Radio was a novelty 
which the Germans have been using throughout the interwar years as the main instrument of 
penetration to foreign countries to promote Nazism.642 Britain exploited their main radio 
station, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), to broadcast in forty-seven different 
languages to wage what they called ‘political warfare’ in various countries.643 In South 
Africa, the authorities had realised the significance of radio to advance the government 
publicity and propaganda campaigns. The BOI had liaised with the SABC to allocate time for 
the government and military officials to make direct appeals to the public, indicating to them 
the threats that were posed by Germany against the values of freedom and democracy.644 
                                                 
640  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Report of Meeting of Newspaper Editors Consultative Committee, 23 October 
1940; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the Relationship between the Bureau of Information and the 
UDF, 13 January 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Report on the Control of Military Information 
issues to the Public through the Press, Newsreels, Broadcast, etc, DDMI’s Reply to Controller of 
Censorship, 16 April 1942; Adjutant General (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2, Reorganisation of Director of 
Military Operations and Intelligence, 13 July 1943; Malherbe Papers, File 144, KCM, 56949 (110), 
Propaganda Duties Carried out by Capt (Mrs) Malherbe of DMI (Ic), 30 September 1942.  
641  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Report of Meeting of Newspaper Editors Consultative Committee, 23 October 
1940. 
642  UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, n.d; UWH, Box 279, B.I. 30, Memorandum 
Relating to the Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa, October 1939; Marx, ‘Deal Listeners in 
South Africa’, pp. 148-172; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 134-135; Jowett and 
O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 241; G. Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 
(Harper and Row, New York and London, 1968), p. 65. 
643  CGS (W), Box 197, 42/1, Radio in Relation to Military Propaganda, Werdmuller to Wakefield, 21 
April 1944; See also Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, p. 65; Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and 
Persuasion, pp. 241-243. 
644  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, Generals Smuts’s Appeals to the Public for Funds for Propaganda, 28 
September 1939; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 25 January 1941; 
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The SABC had organised its radio transmissions into “A”, for English programmes and “B” 
for Afrikaans programmes.645 The broadcast messages were designed to arouse emotions and 
to break down the attraction to Nazi ideals disseminated through Zeesen broadcast and Nazi 
agents. For blacks, through the advice of the voluntary and short-lived Bantu News Service 
Committee (BNSC)646, the NAD arranged for the daily broadcast of “authentic” war news by 
means of telephone lines connected to loudspeakers.647 The NAD co-operated with the 
department of post and telegraph, and the SABC for the broadcast of this news service. The 
areas covered by the broadcast were mainly urban centres of Johannesburg, Cape Town, 
Durban and Pietermaritzburg.648 (See details below) 
 
Radio was exploited as a powerful means for the public to hear senior government officials 
and military officers in the country making earnest appeals for military service.649 
Government officials also made speeches at public gatherings and those speeches were 
recorded for radio broadcasting.650 In addition, the newspapers, too, covered such meetings 
and reproduced the speeches in their publications, either for comments or, in the case of the 
opposition, mostly for criticism.651 Smuts was often requested to make personalised messages 
                                                                                                                                                        
UWH, Box 239, Economic Consequences for South Africa of a Nazi Victory, by DMI (Ic), 14 October 
1941, pp. 1-8. 
645  SABC, Annual Report, 139-1940; Report of Commission of Enquiry, SABC, p. 5; SABC, Annual 
Report, 1940, pp. 5-9. 
646  NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcast to Natives (War News), Meeting of Provisional Committee in 
Regard to News Service and Enemy Propaganda held in the Office of the Chief Native Commissioner, 
Witwatersrand, 11 June 1940. The Bantu News Service Committee (BNSC) voluntarily constituted 
itself as a committee to deal with the news services and counter-propaganda among blacks, mainly in 
the Witwatersrand area. It was chaired by the Witwatersrand Chief Native Commissioner, Major H.S. 
Cooke, assisted by Graham Ballenden, director of the municipal native affairs department, H.N. 
Wellbeloved from the chamber of mines, Audrey Richards from the University of the Witwatersrand’s 
department of Bantu Studies, as well as the newspaper men, George Heard and B.G. Paver. See also 
NASAP, Archives of Native Commissioner Johannesburg (KJB), Box 496, N9/13/3, Minutes of the 
Meeting of the Bantu News Service Committee held at the Office of the Director of Native Labour, 11 
July 1940. 
647  NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcast to Natives (War News), Meeting of Provisional Committee in 
Regard to News Service and Enemy Propaganda, 11 June 1940; See also NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 
511/400, Report of the Conference on Enemy Propaganda in Office of the Director of Native Labour, 5 
June 1940; SABC, Annual Report, 1940, p. 8. 
648  NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, Senator E.H. Brookes to Senator C.F. 
Clarkson, 20 June 1940; NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, D.L. Smit to 
E.H. Brookes, 24 June 1940; NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Telephone Broadcasting to Natives, D.L. 
Smit to postmaster-general, 29 June 1940; National Archives of South Africa, Cape Town (NASAC), 
Archives of the Chief Commissioner Easter Cape (CCK), vol. 16, Propaganda and Publicity, D.L. Smit 
to R. Malcolmson, n.d; SABC, Annual Report, 1940, pp. 8-11. 
649  See SABC, Annual Reports, 1939-1945. 
650  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 303/1, General Smuts’ Speech at Bloemfontein, 3 November 1939. 
651  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, 
Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939; UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Statements 
Regarding the War Issue, 1940-1943. 
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to loyal movements and organisations in support of their various endeavours related to 
religion or the war effort.652 Some of the movements encouraged Smuts to continue and 
increase the “selling points” for the war in order to advance publicity for recruiting.653 
Encouragement and goodwill messages in addition to addressing meetings played an 
important role in the sphere of personal approach. Thus, broadcasting and personal appeals 
were utilised in complementary manner for publicity and propaganda. 
 
From 1940 to early 1941, through the BOI, government officials addressed specific subjects 
related to their respective departments. Also, prominent individuals loyal to the government 
were invited to give talks regarding South Africa’s reason for participating in the war from 
the perspectives of their fields of expertise.654 Another approach was for government 
officials, after being briefed through the press summaries supplied by the BOI, to prepare 
statements to refute or clarify press statements relating to their departments as background to 
the news for radio broadcast. Wilson, the BOI’s director, was also responsible for refuting the 
claims made by Zeesen’s nightly broadcast. The purpose was to combat and discredit Zeesen 
propaganda. This approach was abandoned in late 1940, when prominent citizens were used 
to explain government policy, and the time slot in the SABC was changed to from 7: 15 pm 
to 7: 45 pm.655 The BOI, in co-operation with the SABC, facilitated the broadcast for counter-
propaganda and for the mobilisation of the society for the war. 
 
From the beginning of the war and through most of 1940, the government was mostly on the 
defensive. Wilson was expected to put out broadcast every evening, refuting the Zeesen 
statements and providing “accurate” information about the government policy.656 The SABC 
                                                 
652  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, General Smuts’s Message to the People, September 1939; Smuts Papers, 
A1, vol. 299, Smuts’s Personal Greetings to the South Western Echo, 27 September 1939; Smuts 
Papers, A1, vol. 299, Christmas Message of Brotherhood and Comradeship to The Memorable Order of 
the Tin Hats (M.O.T.H), 3 November 1939. 
653  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, Christmas Message of Brotherhood and Comradeship to The Memorable 
Order of the Tin Hats (M.O.T.H), 3 November 1939. 
654  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Bureau of Information Memorandum to the South African Press, 1 August 1940; 
SABC, Annual Report, 1940, p. 12; UWH, Box 273, B.I. 25, Broadcast by ‘Panel Speakers’, 21 June 
1941. Among the speakers were academics and government experts in other fields. Academic 
departments included French Studies, Geology, African Studies, Psychology, Social Science, 
Commerce, Music, Law, Zoology, History, Fine Arts, Geography and Agricultural Science. 
655  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 
1940; UWH, Box 91, MS 71, Radio Broadcasting, Wilson to Collyer, 11 January 1941; UWH, Box 91, 
MS 71, Radio Broadcasting, Beukes to Collyer, 30 April 1941; PP, Box 63, PU 6/16, Reorganisation of 
Bureau of Information, 14 July 1941. 
656  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 
1939; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.4, Notes of the Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee on 
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also recorded Zeesen transmissions and supplied the BOI with transcripts.657 These 
transcripts were then examined to expose misleading aspects of the Zeesn transmissions. The 
BOI, then, obtained statements from the government or military authorities, also quoted 
sources from Allied and neutral territories, and produced counter-propaganda information for 
radio broadcast to ridicule and discredit Zeesen information.658 In some cases, Zeesen made 
claims that the Germans were receiving secret information from South Africa. The BOI, after 
examining the transcripts from the SABC, would liaise with the military and naval authorities 
to disprove those claims.659 Statements from the official broadcast, including those 
inaccuracies from Zeesen transmissions were reproduced in the newspapers to benefit those 
who might have missed or misunderstood the broadcast messages. 
 
Through the SABC radio broadcast, Wilson regularly emphasised to the public how South 
Africa avoided the Nazi danger through the government’s adoption of the war policy and by 
associating with the Commonwealth of Nations.660 Fear appeals were employed for justifying 
the Union government’s decision. For instance, there were broadcast about the widespread 
Nazi plot to sabotage South Africa’s vital industrial organisation and the influence these had 
on the “shirt” movements which advocated revolution against the state.661 To the loyalists, it 
was stated that government had in its possession a list of members of the Nazi organisations 
in the Union’s principal towns and cities.662 It implied that the government was aware of the 
Nazi threat and was taking steps to contain the damaging effects to public morale. The 
broadcast of this nature continued every night until the reorganisation of the BOI in 
                                                                                                                                                        
Publicity, 5 October 1939; ZB, WR 65/9/41-WR 65/9/43, Broadcast from Enemy Radio Station, 1941-
1945; PP, vols. 1-31, Zeesen Broadcast, 1940-1945. 
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Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939. Von Strahl produced numerous reports of the Nazi 
activities in South Africa, however, the information was known to the interior minister, Lawrence, who 
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December 1940, where the focus shifted to positive propaganda663, thus taking the initiative 
from Zeesen and proactively promoting the cause of the government. Zeesen announcers 
continued with disparaging remarks, attacking every issue to support government opponents 
throughout the war.664 
 
As a result of the recommendations of the National Advisory Committee on Government 
Publicity in 1940, the BOI’s broadcasting activities were reorganised. The BOI’s staff was 
expanded and new roles were allocated. P. Beukes and M. Uys Krige dedicated their efforts 
to the Afrikaans programmes and worked with D. Dornell, as director of broadcasting and 
Captain N. Sutherland, a radio liaison attached to the director-general war supplies (for 
publicity on industrial capacity for war production).665 As discussed above, prominent 
individuals and experts were brought on board to address specific topics to the public.666 The 
subjects addressed in those broadcast included military achievements, economic power of 
Allied countries including South Africa, the conditions in Germany and the Axis powers as 
well as the resistance in the territories occupied by Germany.667 These arrangements were 
carried out throughout the war and were designed to inspire the public, and to preserve their 
morale. 
 
Smuts also made urgent appeals to the South African public through radio broadcast and 
personally addressed meetings. In a message to ‘fellow South Africans’ in September 1939, 
he explained the nature of the threat South Africa was confronted with: 
 
In this war Britain fights a life and death struggle against the domination of the world by 
force, against the Nazi policy of demands on other nations accompanied by threats of force. 
This policy threatens the liberty and independence of all small nations, South Africa included 
                                                 
663  PP, Box 63, PU 6/3, Bureau of Information, Hand Written note, DMO and I to DMI (Ic), 23 December 
1943. 
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65/9/41-WR 65/9/43, Broadcast from Enemy Radio Station, 1941-1945; SANDFA, PP, vols. 1-31, 
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665  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 
1940; UWH, Box 91, MS 71, Radio Broadcasting, Wilson to Collyer, 11 January 1941; UWH, Box 91, 
MS 71, Radio Broadcasting, Beukes to Collyer, 30 April 1941; PP, Box 63, PU 6/16, Reorganisation of 
Bureau of Information, 14 July 1941. 
666  UWH, Box 91, MS 71, Radio Broadcasting, Wilson to Collyer, 11 January 1941; PP, Box 63, PU 6/16, 
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… our people have taken their place besides Britain and France in the ranks of those who 
resist the rule of force.668 
 
While on the other side, Smuts remarked about the impact of Zeesen propaganda and the 
need to marshal military and non-military resources to counter its negative influences: 
 
But our countrymen think otherwise … opportunity is being taken to revive and accentuate 
the racial antagonisms of the past. And we are being subjected to an incessant deadly 
propaganda from abroad. These opinions and influences must be dealt with by forces of 
another kind … and will fight mischievous misrepresentation ‘propaganda’, and the sowing 
of discontent and hatred inside our country.669 
 
Smuts, thus, appealed for united effort in a struggle against the Nazi threat and for counter-
propaganda: 
 
Our young men will be rolling up in their thousands to form the forces which will compose 
our army of defence … they will make their contribution for the rule of right and freedom and 
justice here and in the world … In this struggle on the home front active measures will need 
to be taken to collect and disseminate truthful information and to keep the public continually 
and accurately informed and wisely guided … a large fighting publicity fund will be 
necessary to finance a nation-wide campaign for the above objects, to support the 
Government in giving full effect to the policy approved by the Parliament, to deal with 
propaganda from abroad and misrepresentation at home, by clear statement of truth, to 
prevent the real issue before the country from being clouded by racial animosities and to 
promote mutual understanding between all sections of our people.670 
 
The central theme in this message was “unity” of effort against the threat to the ideals of 
freedom, independence and justice posed by German activities. It was a message directed at 
the anti-war resistors and objectors, elucidating that Nazi Germany was not going to promote 
the interests of South Africa, but was aggressively pursuing domination by force or the threat 
of force. The decision of the Union parliament to enter the war was a defensive effort ‘against 
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the rule of force’ represented by Nazi Germany and the fight for the preservation of the 
rights, freedoms and justice as represented by Britain. South Africa was thus participating in 
a ‘defensive war’ to protect her own interest. In October 1939, prominent government 
loyalists such as Sir James Rose-Innes, Brigadier General H.N.W. Botha, Colonel Sir W. 
Dalrymple and Sir Charles Smith, reproduced Smuts’s message in the Rand Daily Mail, and 
made an appeal for contributions to ‘buy security and happiness’ for the country and the 
children.671 The notion of victimhood and the safety of the country became common features 
of the national appeals. There was a promise of security against the feared threat of Nazism 
and thus, the population needed to make sacrifices. 
 
In his first public meeting in Bloemfontein, Smuts again emphasised that South Africa was at 
the cross-roads where she had to choose “friends” for future relations in a “dangerous world”, 
particularly between the Commonwealth of Nations or Nazi Germany, and she chose the 
former as it guaranteed future democracy and freedom.672 He boldly stated:  
 
If Germany wins, then not only England but South Africa as well is lost. We will first become 
a Nazi country, and then our independence is lost.673  
 
Smuts tied the success of Britain to the protection of South Africa’s freedom and 
independence. The central theme was that Britain represented the desired political and moral 
justice, as opposed to Nazi Germany which promoted tyranny and oppression. Thus, German 
victory should be feared because of the negative ramifications it would have for the South 
African nation. The speech was published in a booklet form by the UUTS. In the last page of 
that booklet, publishers added a picture of Smuts with the following message in bold words: 
‘He is Saving South Africa. What are YOU Doing’.674 This was actually the main idea behind 
Smuts’s broadcast and speeches at the beginning of the war. He pointed out aspects of Nazi 
Germany’s “injustices”, from the invasion of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Sudetenland, and 
Poland, and besought the society to contribute towards a “national effort” to save the country 
from being the next victim.675 Nazi Germany was regarded as a force of destruction against 
                                                 
671  ‘A Call for Union Unity for Freedom, Truth and Democracy’, Rand Daily Mail, 14 October 1939. 
672  Smuts Papers, vol. A1, 303/1, General Smuts’s Speech at Bloemfontein, 3 November 1939. This 
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smaller and weaker nations. In contrast, Britain stood for justice and for protection of the 
weaker and powerless nations such as South Africa.  
 
In a subsequent message in February 1940, Smuts lamented the existing internal divisions in 
South Africa as largely a result of Nazi propaganda and the effect it would have on the 
country’s capacity to resist: 
 
We are up against another very serious drawback and danger, and that is the systematic 
propaganda that is now being used as a weapon against the people of this country …there 
has been an intense and systematic effort at undermining the people by propaganda in South 
Africa. That propaganda took different forms – sometimes opposition, to or even persecution 
of, this or that section of the community … there has been this effort to demoralise public 
opinion, to debauch South Africa, to undermine it in way that has been most successful in 
other countries … the day may come, with our powers of resistance so undermined and we 
are weakened internally, that all attempts at active defence on our part would be in vain.676 
 
He followed-up this concern by calling for an end to anti-Semitism and advocated unity and 
co-operation between Afrikaans and English speakers. Through the unity campaign, he was 
striving for uniting the people and not to have ‘two nations in this country’, but a ‘South 
African nation’.677 The ‘nation’ referred to in this message was in terms of Afrikaans and 
English speakers and not the “non-whites”. In these messages, an appeal was made for 
“national unity” and the recognition that South Africa was fighting a righteous war – a “just 
war”. It was a patriotic call to defend the liberties, to reverse the influence of the anti-
government propagandists and sympathisers so as to create space for the people to ‘enjoy 
security and continued political peace’.678 After the German invasion of Holland, Belgium 
and Luxembourg in mid-1940 (the smaller and weaker nations), fear appeals against Nazi 
Germany became dominant. Smuts pointed out that those events ‘have shattered all doubts’ 
and those nations were ‘like us [South Africa], fighting for their lives … for the right to be 
                                                 
676  Lawrence Papers, B 640, E3.7. Address by The General Rt. Hon. J.C. Smuts on the Union Unity Fund, 
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free … for the common cause of civilisation against the forces of darkness and barbarity’.679 
The war was presented as a contest between good and evil, and that South Africa was 
fighting on the side of good against the evil enemies, Nazi Germany and her allies. Smuts 
also emphasised how the invaded countries, together with Poland, Norway and France, were 
caught unprepared due to the disorganisation that was caused by Nazi propaganda. A similar 
observation was made by a government supporter who warned that Germans used 
broadcasting to speed-up confusion and panic in Holland, Belgium and Norway, in order to 
invade successfully.680 Smuts, as a result, made a strong appeal for military service: 
 
To all able-bodied sons of South Africa, the call has come to make their stand in the line of 
resistance to the forces of tyranny and oppression, to fight in defence of all those liberties 
which we hold dearer that life itself, to fight and conquer. And to that call, the youth and 
manhood of South Africa is responding nobly … thousands are leaving security, ease and 
comfort, to face discomfort, hardship, wound and even death itself for the cause…681 
 
The idea of war as a “defensive struggle” was reiterated to bring out a sense of victimhood 
against the “evil forces” of darkness which threatened the freedom enjoyed by the South 
African people. It was meant to stir public emotions and to project people’s anger against 
Nazi Germany. The call was about sacrifice, honour and duty to safeguard the liberties and 
heritage which were under attack by dangerous enemies. Either for work in the supply of war 
material and in essential services on the home-front, or for service in the frontlines, the fear 
appeals were employed consistently for people “to combat the danger”.682 
 
In one broadcast in June 1941, a staff officer of the directorate of the coast and anti-aircraft 
artillery in South Africa, made a strong appeal for men between 35 and 55 years to enlist in 
the coast artillery.683 As an old soldier who fought in the Great War and left the service in 
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peacetime, he explained that unlike before, it was not a war fought ‘at comfortable distances’ 
in the trenches, it was a ‘total war’.684 The staff officer gave a warning about Nazi Germans: 
 
Hitler had bred a generation of ruthless fanatical fighters – even the youngest of them trained 
to mow down with their Tommy guns every living thing – even women and children – even 
animals. Against such an enemy we’ve got to do our bit in some form or another or be snuffed 
out.685  
 
It was a warning against complacency and an appeal for the relevant age groups to enlist for 
service ‘to ensure security’ or ‘die a slave’ to Hitler. 686 Brigadier General H.D. Pienaar, 
officer commanding the 1st South African Brigade in North Africa, also made an appeal in a 
recorded broadcast from the Derna area in Libya, warning against Japan’s entry into the war 
and thus presenting a real threat to the Union’s security from the Indian Ocean. He stressed 
the need to bury petty political differences and to mount a collective effort to defend ‘the 
integrity and priceless liberty’ of the country.687 Employers were also urged to assist the 
government by granting allowances to dependents of men in military service. 
 
In a morale-boosting effort, Pienaar remarked that he was not calling for help as the desert 
was ‘littered with the debris’ of what was once the mighty German army under General 
Erwin Rommel with his Afrika Korps.688 The claim was that, although Allied forces were 
winning, dangers were still lurking. The society was called upon to add more numbers of the 
able-bodied men to complete the success and to combat the new threat – Japan. Van 
Ryneveld and Smuts also consistently broadcast Christmas, New Year as well as 
congratulatory messages to the Union troops in the field and in the country, as well as to 
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those in military hospitals.689 These messages were broadcast in both English and 
Afrikaans.690 
 
In May 1940, the South African Women’s Auxiliary Army Services (WAAS) was 
established.691 Due to the increasing need for manpower692, Smuts made a strong appeal for 
women to support men in the war effort.693 The general theme of messages to women was 
about releasing men for the frontline, whilst taking over men’s tasks in the industries at 
home.694 Members of the WAAS were drawn from the pre-existing voluntary women’s 
organisation called the South African Women’s Auxiliary Service (SAWAS), which assisted 
the troops with a range of services such as providing refreshments, entertainment and 
hospitality.695 The SAWAS, operating under the DOD for better co-ordination of women’s 
war-related tasks, was headed by Mrs J.J. Pienaar as the principal commandant (until 
September 1940) and Mrs Edith O’Connor as her assistant.696 
 
With the increasing manpower requirements to assist the UDF, some members of the 
SAWAS became the first recruits of the WAAS and also assisted in further recruitment 
efforts for other services. Colonel Werdmuller, director of recruiting and Major (Mrs) A.H. 
Lugtenburg, officer commanding the WAAS, also personally addressed meetings to stimulate 
interest in the work of the WAAS to secure recruits for military service and war 
production.697 At the recruiting meeting in Pretoria, Lugtenburg expressed disappointment at 
some women for failing to heed the call and urged them to realise that their services would be 
                                                 
689  CGS (War), Box 199, VI, 42/5, Broadcast of Christmas and New Year to UDF by Van Ryneveld, 21 
November 1941; CGS (War), Box 199, VI, 42/5, Broadcast Message by Field Marshall Smuts to all 
Officers and Men in Military Hospitals, 24 December 1941. 
690  CGS (War), Box 199, VI, 42/5, Broadcast of Christmas and New Year to UDF by Van Ryneveld, 21 
November 1941; CGS (War), Box 199, VI, 42/5, Broadcast Message by Field Marshall Smuts to all 
Officers and Men in Military Hospitals, 24 December 1941. 
691  UWH, Box 261, B.I. 17, Women and the War, 6 July 1943. 
692  See Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, Chapter 5, Chronic Shortage of White Men, pp. 72-
83. 
693  For details on the military service by women in South Africa during the Second World War, see S. 
Chetty, ‘Gender Under Fire: Interrogating War in South Africa, 1939-1945’ (Unpublished Master of 
Arts thesis, Historical Studies, University of Natal, Durban, December 2001). 
694  UWH, Box 261, B.I. 17, Women and the War, 6 July 1943; SANDFA, UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, 
‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General Staff Officer on the Staff of 
the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941. 
695  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 18, 54, 63. Other services included staffing 
canteens, arranging accommodation for troops on transit or leave or visiting, recruitment of women, 
and as drivers for convoys. 
696  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 63. 
697  ‘Women Recruits’, The Star, 21 August 1940. 
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for duty to themselves and to their children.698 Recruiting rallies were held throughout the 
country and addressed by government officials such as Reitz and Smuts’s wife, S.M (Isie) 
Smuts, often referred to as Ouma Smuts.699 Isie Smuts was the head of the South African 
Gifts and Comforts Organisation, which was established in 1940 under the authority of Mrs 
J.J. Pienaar, until 29 July 1940.700 The Gifts and Comforts Organisation catered for the 
physical and mental well-being of servicemen by organising and supplying them with what 
was called “glory bags”.701 These bags contained an assortment of items such as toothpaste, 
toothbrush, pair of socks, handkerchief, pencil, writing paper and others.702 Isie Smuts 
attended women’s meetings and recruiting rallies to make personal appeals to women who 
could not enlist in the military, to join and support the Gifts and Comforts Organisation. 
During those rallies, women were encouraged to proudly engage in support roles in order to 
release men for military service in the North and to do their bit in other areas related to the 
war effort.703 Skills training and opportunities in the male-dominated industries were also 
emphasised for women to join up. 
 
In one radio broadcast by Mrs P.M. Anderson in September 1941, commandant of Command 
14 (one of the women’s units), it was indicated that the military demands for machinery and 
technical equipment created new opportunities for women to work in munitions and 
engineering areas, unlike previously where they worked in sweets, biscuits and soap works or 
as packers and checkers in warehouses.704 Through propaganda, government was creating an 
impression that the country was initiating social change to the existing norms pertaining to 
women. That change was through women’s participation in hitherto socially unacceptable 
roles. In the recruiting broadcast for the coast and anti-aircraft artillery, the directorate made 
this change explicit:  
 
Artillery needs a number of women between the ages of 22 and 32, of good education 
(especially mathematics) for training … we don’t want these women as clerks or drivers – we 
                                                 
698  ‘Disappointing Response by Women in Pretoria’, Rand Daily Mail, 30 August 1940. 
699  ‘Women War Workers Rally’, Cape Argus, 26 March 1941. 
700  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 65. 
701  See Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 287-292; ‘Comforts for our Boys up North’, 
Cape Times, 25 March 1941. 
702  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 287-292; ‘Comforts for our Boys up North’, Cape 
Times, 25 March 1941. 
703  ‘To Release Men for Fighting’, Cape Times, 13 March 1942; ‘500 Women Attend Rally’, Rand Daily 
Mail, 21 April 1942. 
704  UWH, Box 261, B.I. 17, Women and Industry, Broadcast Talk by P.M. Anderson, Commandant of 
Command 14, 17 September 1941. 
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want them as fighting men … not actually serving the guns, but manipulating the intricate 
range-finders and other delicate instruments.705  
 
Chetty contends that as much as women were implored to participate in new activities in the 
military and industrial production, their roles were still perceived to be an extension of their 
domestic roles as caregivers and “supporters” of men who were on the frontlines.706 War had 
brought about an important social development for women, albeit largely for white and 
middle-class. However, as much as propaganda assisted in playing up these new activities, 
the changes were not revolutionary as they still perpetuated the pre-existing gender 
stereotypes in the perceptions of women in South Africa.707 Words such as “mothers”, 
“partners”, “wives”, “your husbands” or “your relatives”, which featured in many propaganda 
messages, served as examples of the gender perceptions about women. 
 
Nonetheless, it could be stated that an important aspect of radio broadcast and recruitment 
meetings, was that female voices were added to encourage support. It was equally a useful 
propaganda tactic to have a male military officer stressing that women were not required to 
perform “lowly tasks”, for example, as drivers, but to be in the war front manipulating heavy 
weapons.708 Most importantly, women were urged to take up new opportunities offered by 
the military demands that may facilitate personal development for future employment in the 
male-dominated economic sectors.709 Inherent in war propaganda towards women was the 
message for them to prepare for the changed post-war social and economic environment in 
which they would be effective participants.710  
 
Radio increased in value, particularly to the white audience, due to war propaganda. This 
much was illustrated by the increase in the number of radio licences since the outbreak of the 
war. According to the SABC’s annual reports, the number of effective listeners’ licences had 
                                                 
705  UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General 
Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941. 
706  Chetty, ‘Gender Under Fire’, pp. 61-63. 
707  Ibid., p. 63. 
708  UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General 
Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941. 
709  SUWH, Box 261, B.I. 17, Women and Industry, Broadcast Talk by P.M. Anderson, Commandant of 
Command 14, 17 September 1941; UKZN, Malherbe Papers, File 143/1, KCM 56992 (18), 
Opportunity Calls: Women of South Africa, Lt J. Malherbe, 7 November 1941. 
710  UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General 
Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941; Malherbe 
Papers, File 143/1, KCM 56992 (18), Opportunity Calls: Women of South Africa, Lt J. Malherbe, 7 
November 1941. 
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increased from 212, 914 in 1938 to 249, 199 by 31 December 1939. The comparative 
statistics since 1936 showed a continuous increase, from 161, 767 to 180, 227 in 1937, and 
about 60, 219 licences were issued in the eight months on 1939 alone.711 By 1945, the 
number of effective radio licences stood at 365, 244.712 The SABC declared that the 
importance of broadcast service increased as a result of the war.713 It also meant more 
revenue for the corporation. 
 
From 1940 onwards, the SABC expanded its operations by establishing a mobile recording 
unit under a multi-lingual journalist, Bruce Anderson (also English commentator), assisted by 
Johan Lamprecht (engineer and Afrikaans commentator), Jimmy Chapman and Roland 
Sinclair, both engineers.714 The aim was to enlarge reporting with direct actuality material. 
The mobile recording unit accompanied the UDF to East Africa, North Africa and to Europe. 
As the pace of the war increased, the SABC also increased its war-related programmes for the 
public, which also included messages between troops and relatives as well as entertainment 
items.715 Thus, radio became a significant instrument which brought war to the homes of the 
South African public and also helped in the government’s recruitment efforts. 
 
Due to technical deficiencies, the SABC’s recordings from East Africa, however, delayed for 
days before transmission to the Union. In 1941, after the mobile recording unit moved to 
Egypt, the South Africans could listen to recordings of events within hours as a result of the 
support of the BBC and the Egyptian State Broadcasting.716 Technically, the situation 
remained largely the same until September 1944, when the South African corps of signals 
built a powerful transmitter to enable direct transmissions of the SABC to the Union.717 It 
was a significant development since the SABC could then compete with the BBC effectively 
for the South African listenership. Through such efforts, the SABC expressed pride in being 
                                                 
711  SABC, Annual Report, Statistics of Listeners’ Licences, 1939, p. 24. 
712  See SABC, Annual Report, Statistics of Listeners’ Licences, 1939-1945. 
713  SABC, Annual Report, Statistics of Listeners’ Licences, 1939, p. 24. 
714  SABC, Annual Report, 1940, p. 12; SABC, Annual Report, 1941, p. 6. See also SABC, T 86/989-1999, 
Interview with James McClurg, Wartime Superintendent of News and Talks, by Christopher Dingle, 
May 1988. 
715  SABC, Annual Report, 1940, pp. 12-13; SABC, Annual Report, 1941, pp. 6-8; SABC, Annual Report, 
1942, pp. 7-8. 
716  SABC, Annual Report, 1941, pp. 6-8; NASAP, Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: 
Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942. 
717  UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, Cursory Survey of the South African Public Relations, 30 November 
1944, by Maj J. Strydom, p. 41; PP, Box 41, Memorandum on Possible Radio Transmission to Union, 
Capt D. Erwin to DMI (Ic), 6 June 1944; SABC, Annual Report, 1944, p. 5. 
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able to bring the war closer to the South African public.718 However, that public was mainly 
the white audience. When the idea of providing radio broadcast services to blacks was 
considered in June 1940, it was for entirely different objectives. 
 
From 8 July 1940, black South Africans were subjected to a torrent of propaganda through 
the introduction of radio broadcast to them in vernacular.719 But, the initial focus of 
government campaign was on combating subversive propaganda among black 
communities.720 Since war began, the NAD received numerous reports about the Nazi and the 
communist propaganda from the magistrates, police, military intelligence and from members 
of the public.721 The NAD instructed the magistrates and native commissioners to hold 
regular monthly meetings with chiefs, local headmen and communities to provide authentic 
and reliable news.722 A system of propaganda through radio broadcasting was regarded as a 
new improvement for informing a largely non-literate people.723 The rationale for providing 
news broadcast services to blacks was as follows: 
 
Enemy propaganda was causing Government great concern … recent events in other 
countries have shown that even supposedly loyal subjects may have pro-Nazi leanings. 
Malicious rumours spread rapidly through the Union … Statements such as “the Germans 
                                                 
718  SABC, T 86/989-1999, Interview with James McClurg, Wartime Superintendent of News and Talks, 
by Christopher Dingle, May 1988; SABC, Annual Report, 1944, p. 5. 
719  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, Lowe to Smit, 5 July 1940; NTS, Box 9629, 
vol. 2, 511/400, Report of the Conference on Enemy Propaganda in Office of the Director of Native 
Labour, 5 June 1940; CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Telephone Broadcasting to Natives, D.L. Smit to R.M. 
Craig, Cape Province, 20 August 1940; SABC, Annual Report, 1940, p. 8. 
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1940; KJB, Box 497, N9/13/3, Enemy Propaganda: Dissemination of Authentic News, , issued by D.L. 
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721  NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 505/400 – 511/400, Subversive Propaganda among Natives, 1939 -1942; GG, 
Box 1572, 50/1629, Effects of German Propaganda on the Minds of Natives, A. Cele to the Governor 
General, 7 November 1939; NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Native Subversive Propaganda, DDMI to 
Secretary for Native Affairs, 24 July 1940; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Propaganda among Natives, 
Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1942. 
722  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939; NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, 
Report of the Conference on Enemy Propaganda, 5 June 1940; NASAC, Archives of the Magistrate 
Somerset West (1/SSW), Box 88, N1/9/2, Native Unrest and Propaganda, Agitations and Troublesome 
Persons, Native Affairs Commissioner to all Magistrates in the Cape Province, 4 June 1940. 
723  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News 
Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. Richards, 17 August 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting to 
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NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, War News for Natives, Smit to Richards, 27 September 1940. 
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will win the war”, “You will have an easier time after the war under German rule” were 
being freely preached among Natives.724 
 
Part of the concern was that the influence was also instigated by the communists to facilitate 
black agitation against the government.725 The acting Chief Native Commissioner of 
Witwatersrand, E.A. Kernick, made the following recommendation: 
 
In order to combat enemy and other subversive propaganda among Natives and generally to 
prevent unrest among them during the war, the Government is considering a plan to link up 
every location, compound, mine compound, hostel and other centre where large numbers of 
Natives congregate at the Reef, by means of landlines, and to broadcast authentic news and 
propaganda daily by telephone and loudspeakers at an appropriate hour from the central 
broadcast station in Johannesburg.726 
 
Thus, the SABC co-ordinated efforts with the post office officials to connect loudspeakers to 
central receivers in order to transmit radio programmes into public spaces.727 The reason for 
the broadcast via the landlines was given by NAD’s D.L. Smit as follows:  
 
The Government was unfavourable to the system of wireless broadcasting generally. There 
was always the danger that the enemy could radiate on the same wave-length and defeat our 
object. The Government felt that the Natives at their homes were not unduly disturbed over 
the war and were carrying on very quietly.728 
 
Major Caprara, director of the SABC, also indicated that ‘it would not be possible to have a 
special wave-length for broadcasting to natives’.729 Hence consideration was given to provide 
                                                 
724  KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Report of the Conference on Enemy Propaganda, 5 June 1940; See also NTS, 
Box 9653, 520/400/9, Communist Literature, ‘Freedom is Being Murdered’, pamphlet attached to 
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Russia. 
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See also announcements about the proposed scheme by newspapers, ‘Broadcast for Natives’, The Star, 
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727  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, Lowe to Smit, 5 July 1940; NTS, Box 9629, 
vol. 2, 511/400, Report of the Conference on Enemy Propaganda, 5 June 1940; CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, 
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the Director of Native Labour, Johannesburg, 27 June 1940. 
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broadcasting service by means of telephones, as an experiment in the Witwatersrand. 
However, the NAD considered it imperative that the news service should be extended to 
other major cities in the Union.730 The NAD, in Pretoria, prepared about two-pages of news 
bulletins supplied free of charge by SAPA, then telephoned to Johannesburg, and telegraphed 
to the various centres for broadcasting.731 The date of the transmission was fixed for Sunday 
evening, 7 July 1940, between seven and eight o’clock.732 
 
The telephone broadcast service was inaugurated by Reitz, in order for the black audience to 
‘hear his living voice’ and for the interpreters to ‘convey what he says’.733 The actual relaying 
of the news commenced on Monday, 8 July 1940, and it was reported to have been 
successful, except that ‘a great many points of diffusion had not been adequately 
equipped’.734 J.M. Brink, Chief Native Commissioner of Johannesburg, reported that only 
sixty-eight points of the original envisaged 150 points have been ‘connected up and were 
running’, that ‘interpretation and speaking were very satisfactory, reception in most cases had 
been good’.735 However, there were some problems. There was a delay in receiving approved 
news from Pretoria, shortage of equipment and about half of the available equipment were 
not serviceable. As a result, it was suggested to ‘commandeer all Public Address Systems in 
the Union and to interdict the selling of any such equipment without authority’.736 It was 
resolved to secure the services of the directorate of war supplies for assistance in obtaining 
the required equipment. 
                                                 
730  NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, D.L. Smit to Senator E.H. Brookes, 24 
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From the government’s side, the official in charge of the programmes and the news was Carl 
Faye, the linguist and broadcast officer in the NAD.737 Initially, Bennet Ngwabeni (replaced 
by Charles Matlapora (Matloporo) in other records - from January 1941), regarded as a ‘well-
educated and competent linguist’, was appointed on 8 July 1940 as a part-time interpreter to 
translate the broadcast material to isiXhosa and Sesotho languages.738 The actual ‘speaker of 
the broadcast’ was Walter Mangcipu, a court interpreter in the office of the native 
commissioner in Johannesburg, whose ‘voice, diction and elocution’ had been tested and 
found to be suitable for radio announcements.739 Other black announcers such as Charles 
Mpanza740 and Edward Masinga741 (both for Natal-Zululand), Thomas Nkosinkulu742 (Xhosa 
in Cape Province) and later Andrew Moyake (Xhosa)743, were all employed to deliver the 
daily broadcast in the predominant black languages spoken in the country – isiZulu, isiXhosa 
Sesotho and Setswana (Charles Matlapora and Sam Moloyane).744 
 
Though the purpose of using black interpreters was to make the information understandable 
to the audience745, it was yet another propaganda ploy to influence blacks to identify with the 
war, and to eliminate any resistance that might develop as a result of using an English or 
Afrikaans announcer. To ensure that the listeners were there to hear the broadcast, the 
authorities issued instructions to the employers, compound managers and superintendents to 
facilitate the congregation of blacks at the diffusion points from 7:00 pm to 7:30 pm each 
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evening (at that time including Saturdays and Sundays).746 The compound managers and 
superintendents were also required to operate the telephone switches as per instructions of the 
telephone department, as well as to amplify or clarify any point, and to reply to questions 
emanating from the listeners.747 They also had to monitor and observe reactions of blacks to 
the broadcast and to report accordingly. 
 
At mine compounds around Johannesburg and at black locations in various urban centres, 
daily war news, current events and recorded speeches were broadcast via telephone lines and 
then loudspeakers.748 The initial content was mainly news bulletins which were translated 
from English. The inaugural news were delivered by Reitz, who conveyed the message of 
appreciation and the gave an overview of the purpose of the broadcast: 
 
These announcements are issued to enable you to hear the news about the war. This news 
service is a token of our goodwill towards you. It is meant to let you know what is happening 
in the war which involves so many people in order that you may have news upon which you 
can rely, and not led astray by other stories, namely, rumours … a device of the Germans. 
Beware of rumours and adhere to the news you hear through these broadcast.749  
 
The main focus of the government officials was to combat subversive propaganda among 
blacks, especially to contain the spread of rumours. On 27 July 1940, the Chief Native 
Commissioner of Pietermaritzburg, H.C. Lugg, used the telephone system to address the Zulu 
audience in their language, and submitted the transcript to the Secretary for Native Affairs 
(Smit), with pride in the manner in which his message was used ‘to strike at a cord which 
would appeal to the emotions and instil the Natives with a little confidence’.750 He was 
referring to his utilisation of the Zulu figure of speech and praise poetry (calling himself a 
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King’s praiser or iMbongi in Zulu language).751 In that address, Lugg praised the broadcast 
service, which was critical as many blacks were ‘handicapped’ because many were 
uneducated, were reliant on reading Ilanga Lase Natal paper or listening to explanations 
offered by the native commissioners, and unlike whites, could not read the available English 
newspapers. 752 He continued to state that due to the blacks’ inability to read newspapers, they 
were ‘troubled by wild rumours and lies’.753 Lugg invoked Shaka’s greatness and praised the 
traditions of the Zulu kingship to criticise the Germans as ‘kingless people’, whilst likening 
the Zulu royal heritage with that of Britain’s King George VI. Thus, the Zulus were to remain 
loyal to the British king with ‘royal blood’ and ‘long royal lineage’ against the ‘upstarts’ of 
Germany.754 In his address, due to the need to “touch” Zulu emotions, Lugg conveniently 
neglected to mention the destruction of the Zulu society by the British during the nineteenth 
century. The general tone of the address still reflected the racial categorisation of the South 
African society and the paternalistic inclination which presented Britain as the main centre 
which should be supported or else the whole world would collapse.755 
 
As the broadcast service continued, there was a loss of interests in “pure news” and changes 
were implemented later with the provision of musical items, songs, background information 
to the news such as ‘geographic situation of the belligerents … and their relationship to and 
distance from the Union’.756 A selection of popular songs in isiZulu and Sesotho were used, 
                                                 
751  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, 
in Zulu by means of the Telephone and Loudspeakers to the Natives of Pietermaritzburg and Durban, 
27 July 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting to Natives, 27 July 1940, H.C. Lugg to Smit, 1 
August 1940. 
752  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, 
27 July 1940. See the original Zulu version of Lugg’s speech, “Ukukuluma kukaNtabazabantu 
waseNatali nakwaZulu Ekuluma noZulu ose Mgungundlovu naseTekwini ngoCingo loMoya”, NTS, 
9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, 27 
July 1940. 
753  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, 27 
July 1940. 
754  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, 27 
July 1940. 
755  In Lugg’s parable, he used the expression ‘when that house falls, the sun will fall with it’, see NTS, 
9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, 27 July 
1940. 
756  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News 
Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. Richards, 17 August 1940, pp. 1-7; KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, 
Subversive Propaganda among Natives, G. Ballenden to J.M. Brink, 8 August 1940. See also the 
proposed popular Zulu and Sotho songs, KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Popular Native Records, Acting 
Native Commissioner to SABC, 9 July 1940. 
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however, these were insufficient to cater for the demand in the respective languages.757 The 
song, “Nkosi Sinkelela iAfrika” was the concluding item at the end of broadcast.758 The 
broadcast, however, did not produce the desired results. Disappointing reports about loss of 
interest in broadcast services and low attendance figures at broadcast centres were 
submitted.759 
 
The first main report came from Dr Audrey Richards, the original member of the BNSC. She 
undertook an inquiry into the news venture to determine the quality of the transmission and to 
assess the reactions of the black listeners. The report was based on the respondents from only 
three municipal compounds around the Witwatersrand: Wemmer Barracks compound, Van 
Beek Street compound and City Deep compound.760 About forty-seven questions were 
presented to the respondents and the results, though insufficient to draw valid conclusions 
and to make generalisations, were able to provide insight into the perceptions of blacks 
regarding the war. 
 
According to Richards’s report, attendance of the broadcast were disappointing, with about 
150-300 persons in attendance at Wemmer Barracks, contrary to the possible 3000.761 It was 
a similar situation at other locations. The difficulties for those who attended the broadcast 
were not related to lack of comprehension, but to lack factual details such as the causes of the 
war, the geographical position of the European or other African countries, the cultural 
characteristics of the different people living in those countries, e.g. Kenya or Rumania, as 
well as the relations between Great Britian and South Africa or what the word “empire” 
actually implied.762 What was required, therefore, was not merely the presentation of news, 
but also the delivery of commentary and explanations. From the questions, the investigators 
also ascertained that blacks were more interested in the implications of the stated events, for 
                                                 
757  KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Popular Native Records, Acting Native Commissioner to SABC, 9 July 1940; 
NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Report on Line Broadcasting for Natives, by Hugh Tracy, Lugg to Smit, 20 
September 1940. 
758  KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Broadcast of War News Bulletins to Natives, Lowe to Caprara, 13 November 
1940. 
759  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News 
Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. Richards, 17 August 1940, pp. 1-7; KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, 
Subversive Propaganda among Natives, G. Ballenden to J.M. Brink, 8 August 1940; NTS, 9653, 
520/400/9, Report on Line Broadcasting for Natives, by H. Tracy, Lugg to Smit, 20 September 1940. 
760  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News 
Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. Richards, 17 August 1940, pp. 1-7. 
761  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News 
Service, p. 3. 
762  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News 
Service, p. 4. 
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example, if the bombing or torpedo of a ship took place nearer to South Africa or how those 
events impacted on them.763 The report also revealed that some blacks were suspicious of 
government intentions. Conscious of the prevailing socio-political conditions, some stated in 
private that, ‘they knew the Government would not be giving them news without some 
ulterior motive … they believed the institution of the service was designed to prevent blacks 
from getting the full truth’.764 
 
According to the report, it was difficult for the broadcast to cater for different classes of 
blacks, literate and illiterate, as both require differentiated presentations, alternating between 
details on daily basis and consolidated weekly summaries.765 The report was given to the 
Secretary for Native Affairs (Smit), whose response was as follows: 
 
One difficulty about the whole business is that the Natives are generally apathetic in so far as 
the war was concerned, and this particularly applied to the uncivilised Native. We have made 
every effort to meet the position by the distribution throughout the country of thousands of 
weekly bulletins and their publication in all the Bantu newspapers, and the Native 
Commissioners were asked to hold regular meetings to explain the news to the multitude. I 
am told that generally throughout the Reserves the tribal Natives do not bother much about 
the war. We started the dissemination of news through loudspeakers and these are not having 
the results anticipated. The department cannot do more … I do not think the big campaign 
throughout the urban areas will have much effect.766 
 
Two months later, in September 1940, another report by Hugh Tracy from Natal (an SABC 
branch manager at Durban studio), reflected the same views contained in the Richards report. 
It also argued that ‘the Natives cannot be expected to take active interest in the war as they 
believe it primarily concerns white races’.767 The report also questioned the hypocrisy of the 
Union government, which gave lip-service to the ideals of democracy while refusing 
democracy to the black society. The German propaganda, on the other hand, touched the 
                                                 
763  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News 
Service, p. 5. 
764  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News 
Service, p. 5. 
765  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News 
Service, pp. 6-7; See also commentary to the Richards report, NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting to 
Natives, by M. Janisch, 4 September 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, War News for Natives, Smit to 
Richards, 27 September 1940. 
766  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, War News for Natives, Smit to A.I. Richards, 21 August 1940. 
767  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Report on Line Broadcasting for Natives, by Hugh Tracy, Lugg to Smit, 20 
September 1940. 
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‘Achilles heel of South African racialism’ by promising improved living conditions for 
blacks.768 Thus, ‘apathy to the war, and to the war news’ should not have been surprising 
because blacks were hardly allowed to consider themselves “South Africans”.769 The report 
suggested that the government must reinforce positive loyalty through, for example, promises 
of higher wages, not negative loyalty of obedience to authority. In addition, improvements in 
the programmes such as the provision of entertainment and educational topics or musical 
items, were suggested as the tonic to stimulate interest and thus increase black listenership.770 
 
Several reports echoing similar sentiments, particularly the lack of variety in the broadcast 
programmes which led to poor attendances and low listenership, were submitted from various 
centres across the country from 1940 - 1941.771 In one report, the need for “human voice” 
delivered in person at meetings, was more preferable to blacks. They needed personal 
interface to have opportunities for asking questions, rather than to have one-way speeches 
coming from “intsinbi” (a piece of metal).772 In another report, few adults went to the 
broadcast centres, of whom many were children who made noise during broadcast, thus 
defeating the objective.773 
 
In September 1942, the first wireless broadcast was introduced by the SABC.774 The wireless 
broadcast was conducted in English and Afrikaans, then translators followed in Sesotho for 
the Transvaal and OFS, isiXhosa for the Cape Provinces and isiZulu for Natal, on Tuesday, 
Thursday and Saturday (excluding Sunday and public holidays).775 The wireless broadcast 
                                                 
768  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Report on Line Broadcasting for Natives, by H. Tracy, Lugg to Smit, 20 
September 1940. 
769  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Report on Line Broadcasting for Natives, by H. Tracy, Lugg to Smit, 20 
September 1940. 
770  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Report on Line Broadcasting for Natives, by H. Tracy, Lugg to Smit, 20 
September 1940. 
771  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Extracts from Reports received on the Native Broadcast, n.d; NASAP, NTS, 
9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting, Lowe to Smit, 11 September 1940; CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Wireless 
Broadcasting of News, Chief Native Commissioner, King Williamstown to Secretary for Native 
Affairs, 25 April 1941. 
772  ‘War News for the Bantu’, The Star, 7 August 1940. 
773  CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Wireless Broadcasting of News, Town Clerk of King Williamstown to Chief 
Native Commissioner, 8 April 1941. 
774  NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, National Broadcast for Natives (From Studios of the SABC), 29 
September 1942; SABC, 1/63 (42) Dap, Audio Clip, by Announcer: Harcourt Collet, First Broadcast to 
Natives, 29 September 1942; SABC, Annual Report, 1942, p. 7. 
775  NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, National Broadcast for Natives (From Studios of the SABC), 29 
September 1942; SABC, 1/63 (42) Dap, Audio Clip, by Announcer: Harcourt Collet, First Broadcast to 
Natives, 29 September 1942; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Broadcast for Natives, Smit to Caprara, 16 
November 1942; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Broadcast for Natives, Smit to L. Fouché (as SABC 
chairman of the board of governors) , n.d. 
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was in the mornings between 9: 45 and 10: 15, and thus complemented the evening 
transmissions via landlines. Throughout the war, wireless broadcast were used to popularise 
the war in the minds of blacks, praising the use of the “Orange Flash”, the rapid military 
mobilisation of the UDF, dramatizing military operations in the war theatre, especially the 
activities of the 6th South African Armoured Division.776 The announcer during the first 
broadcast, Harcourt Collet, made a request to wireless owners to allow blacks to listen to the 
news and entertainment as well as general talks.777 
 
Despite increased broadcast services via both landline and wireless, there were still low levels 
of responses from blacks. In many parts of the country, most people did not have access to 
wireless sets and had limited broadcast centres778, inconvenience of time schedules779, 
shortage of technical equipment780, shortage of batteries where there was no electricity781, or 
simply, refusal by wireless owners to allow blacks to listen.782 Along similar lines of 
Richards’ report on black interest in broadcasting services during 1940, a Johannesburg-
based independent body called the Broadcast Sub-Committee of the South African Institute 
of Race Relations (SAIRR), under the signature of H. Kuper, B.W. Vilakazi and E.O.J. 
Westphal, academics of the University of the Witwatersrand, produced another report on the 
                                                 
776  SABC, 30/54-58 (45), The Orange Flash: A Chronicle of South Africa’s Contribution to the Second 
World War, 7 May 1945; SABC, Annual Report, 1939-1945. 
777  SABC, 1/63 (42) Audio Clip, by Announcer: Harcourt Collet, First Broadcast to Natives, 29 September 
1942. 
778  NTS, Box 9654, 520/400/9, Broadcast for Natives: Short Report, Native Commissioner, Taung to 
Acting Chief Native Commissioner, Pretoria, 20 January 1943; CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Wireless 
Broadcasting of News, Acting Magistrate, Sterkspruit to Chief Native Commissioner, 20 January 1943. 
779  KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Daily Broadcast of News, Manager, Wemmer Compound to Acting Native 
Commissioner, Johannesburg, 1 September 1942; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Broadcast for Natives: 
Short Report, Native Commissioner of Utrecht to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 30 
December 1942; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Broadcast for Natives: Short Report, Native 
Commissioner, Nqutu to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 5 January 1942; NTS, Box 
9655, 520/400/ 13, Summary of Replies Received from Native Commissioners-Natal, as on 28 
December 1942, Acting Chief Native Commissioner, Natal to Secretary for Native Affairs,14 January 
1943. 
780  NTS, Box 9654, 520/400/9, Broadcast to Natives, Magistrate, Bloemfontein to Secretary for Native 
Affairs, 3 May 1944; NTS, Box 9654, 520/400/9, War News Broadcast, Announcer, Sam Moloyane to 
Native Commissioner, Bloemfontein, 1 June 1944. 
781  NTS, Box 9654, 520/400/9, War News: Broadcasting to Natives, Acting Native Commissioner, 
Potgietersrus to Secretary for Native Affairs, 21 January 1943. 
782  NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Summary of Replies Received from Native Commissioners-Natal, as on 
28 December 1942, Acting Chief Native Commissioner, Natal to Secretary for Native Affairs,14 
January 1943; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Broadcast for Natives: Short Report, Acting Assistant 
Native Commissioner, Estcourt to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 12 January 1943; 
NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Broadcast for Natives: Short Report, Native Commissioner, Newcastle to 
Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 6 January 1943; CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Wireless 
Broadcasting of News, Acting Magistrate, Sterkspruit to Chief Native Commissioner, 20 January 1943. 
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same issue in March 1943.783 Their investigation was based on the information “gleaned” 
from three black target groups around Johannesburg: the literate (educated), the semi-literate 
(chauffer, waiters) and the completely illiterate (gardener, domestic servant who could 
neither read nor write in any language). The report stated that, with regard to the broadcast 
services to blacks, the main technical problem was that, about ninety-eight percent of them in 
the Transvaal and in OFS ‘did not own or have access to radio sets’.784 The rural-based 
blacks were worse-off as their areas were undeveloped and had no electricity. The urban-
based group also had similar problems of the lack electrical wiring in their townships. Of the 
seventy-three thousand blacks living in the four large townships around Johannesburg, only 
about ten people in each township, mainly the traders, owned radio sets.785 Therefore, lack of 
access to radio sets, mainly due to unaffordability, was a huge short-coming in terms of 
broadcasting efforts. The report went on to note with interest that when one (unidentified) 
private company offered ‘to establish a means of reception at each [black] home for which 
the occupants, if they wished to tune in, would pay 6d per month in the slot’, it was rejected 
by many whites who believed that it would ‘teach the natives wrong ideas’.786 
 
Another problem was that black people, moreover, were opposed to the use of loudspeakers 
to listen to the broadcast.  They reasoned that the transmission was often poor, and it was also 
not worth their effort to ‘walk long distances, stand in the open, in dust or rain’, for about 
thirty minutes and listen to ‘someone else talking [about] things’ that they did not even 
understand properly’.787 The targeted potential listeners were often tired after work and 
wanted to rest at home. The report also criticised the content of the broadcast programmes. It 
indicated that many blacks, though they were perceived by the authorities as semi-literate and 
illiterate, they were still intelligent and could ‘see through fairy tales and lies’.788 Blacks were 
aware of the prevailing world crisis and they knew that they were implicated in the war in 
which they were ‘invited to participate’. Despite the appeals of ‘music and forklore’, at that 
                                                 
783  NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 
March 1943, pp. 1-5. 
784  NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 
March 1943, p. 2. 
785  NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 
March 1943, p. 2. 
786  NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 
March 1943, p. 2. 
787  NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 
March 1943, p. 2. 
788  NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 
March 1943, p. 3. 
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time, they were not interested in the repetition of their traditions and culture. They were 
interested in the ‘political events, war news, labour movements and the Atlantic Charter for 
Africa’.789 After realising that such topics were not part of the content, and that the main 
motive was to encourage recruiting, blacks simply stayed away because the programmes 
‘were uninteresting and the announcer often used crude propaganda.’790 One respondent who 
was semi-literate, even discouraged the potential recruits by saying that if they joined the 
military, they would still be in the ‘army long after the war [was] over’ and also that the 
promises ‘were wind and the stories fables’.791 
 
In response, the authorities, just as they did with the Richards’s report, were indifferent. R. 
Erasmus of the BOI made notes to Smit, and stated that the report was out of date as the 
changes in programming had taken place as of 19 June 1942.792 Furthermore, it was 
considered that ‘it would have dangerous repercussions to start talking to Africans on radio 
about the Atlantic Charter and politics’.793 Such task, according to Erasmus, was a ‘delicate 
privilege of the Departments and the Government’.794 Radio broadcast to blacks were 
actually the government’s wartime measure intended to combat subversive activities among 
them. Hence any criticisms and suggestions were hardly considered.795 
 
By 1943, radio broadcast to blacks remained largely unaltered in terms of the technical 
quality and programme contents. Many blacks lost interest and stopped listening. Several 
native commissioners even recommended that the services be discontinued as they no longer 
served any purpose.796 By 1944 and 1945, with the winding down of hostilities, the broadcast 
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793  NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Concerning Native Broadcast, R. Erasmus to Smit, 23 September 1943. 
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796  NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Broadcast for Natives: Short Report, Acting Assistant Native 
Commissioner, Estcourt to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 12 January 1943; NTS, Box 
9655, 520/400/ 13, Broadcast for Natives: Short Report, Native Commissioner, Newcastle to Chief 
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services were no longer viable.797 In general, the use of radio broadcast for propaganda 
among blacks had proven ineffective. However, until the last official broadcast on 13 October 
1945, the authorities were happy about the “valuable development for blacks” with regard to 
the novelty of radio broadcasting, especially due to what they considered to be a high rate of 
illiteracy among blacks.798 
 
After the war, broadcast services to blacks were carried out by the SABC, though they were 
limited.799 As far as military recruitment was concerned, radio was useful in supplementing 
the efforts of the recruiting agents. But, it was not the chief government instrument to realise 
that objective. The authorities focused more on the exploitation of personal appeals made by 
various leaders and chiefs at various gatherings.800 
 
The native commissioners, magistrates, local chiefs and headmen as well as the returning 
NMC members were requested to assist in the government’s recruitment efforts.801 NMC 
members on leave were required to use their influence and persuasion to secure black 
recruits.802 As war progressed, the urgent need for recruits increased, especially after the 
Allied military defeat at Tobruk, Libya in June 1942. The authorities ordered some NMC 
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799  SABC, T73/200-201, Interview with K.E. Masinga, First Zulu Announcer of SABC, Durban Studios, 5 
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members from the Middle-East to assist in recruiting and propaganda among blacks.803 One 
of them was Sergeant Reuben Baloyi (Moloi or Maloyi in other records), an NMC member 
taken as a prisoner of war after the fall of Tobruk, who then escaped from that (POW) camp 
at Mersa-Mantru on 3 August 1942. For his courage and determination, Sergeant Baloyi was 
awarded Military Medal.804 Reputable black soldiers such as Baloyi were useful in 
government propaganda efforts. For example, some of those black soldiers who could speak 
English, Afrikaans, Zulu and Sesotho, also accompanied mobile film vans to various black 
areas in the Union for recruitment and propaganda purposes.805 However, ‘this method’, 
explains Grundlingh, ‘was not wholly successful’ because some NMC members who 
regretted enlisting for military service discouraged other blacks from joining up.806 This 
undermined government propaganda efforts for recruitment and resulted in fewer members of 
the black community joining the military. 
 
Recruitment appeals were also undertaken by organising large meetings. In Bloemfontein, the 
military and government officials addressed an open air gathering of about 8000 blacks in 
March 1942.807 There were isiXhosa and Sesotho interpreters who conveyed the messages to 
the crowd. Though the meeting was well attended, common concerns among blacks related to 
the bearing of arms, financial incentives and the support of dependents after the war. They 
were not impressed with the message that if they joined the military, they will be “well-fed 
and well-clothed”.808 Similar concerns over pay and bearing arms were expressed during 
subsequent recruitment meetings at Kimberley and at Green Point locations. These meetings 
were poorly attended and some blacks were even afraid of entering the hall in Kimberley.809 
Other meetings of a similar nature were held in Natal, Zululand, Transkei and Transvaal. 
Payment and the bearing arms remained the foremost deterrent for the recruitment of 
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809  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Report on Recruiting Meeting at Bloemfontein Location, 
Kimberley and Green Point Location, 30 March to 1 April 1942. 
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blacks.810 The authorities, however, persisted with recruitment propaganda campaign among 
blacks by engaging in personal contact as it provided better opportunities for interaction than 
radio, which was employed more towards the white communities. 
 
A new dimension in radio broadcast was added with the clandestine operations of the 
UUTS’s Mystery Radio Freedom811 and another anti-government radio called Mystery 
Radio.812 Their names obviously suggested secrecy and the anonymity of the announcers. The 
Mystery Radio Freedom broadcast pro-war and pro-government messages which invoked the 
Christian values of the Afrikaners.813 In a similar fashion as Zeesen, the announcers 
employed name-calling and labelling techniques towards the anti-government and pro-Nazi 
elements. For instance, people such as Oswald Pirow were called ‘traitors, Quislings, Hitler’s 
Henchmen and enemy of free South Africa’.814 Broadcasters also praised the Union’s 
decision to enter the war and exalted the UDF troops about their military efforts in defence of 
freedom. The Mystery Radio Freedom, therefore, added to the government’s counter-
propaganda measures against the Zeesen broadcast. 
 
The Mystery Radio, on the other hand, broadcast anti-government messages in Afrikaans 
every Sunday afternoon.815 Through mechanical devices, the SABC recorded the messages 
and forwarded them to the intelligence authorities to analyse and prepare counter-
propaganda. The broadcast waged anti-Smuts and anti-British campaigns, using history to 
drive home a sense of marginalisation, dispossession and repression of the Afrikaners by the 
British. For example, constant references to the Anglo-Boer War concentration camps sought 
to mobilise anti-British sentiment among the Afrikaner populace and to urge action against 
the government.816 As with Zeesen, the broadcast of the Mystery Radio also emphasised the 
futility of the Union’s military effort against the powerful German army which possessed 
advanced weapons. In addition, Afrikaners were urged to resist and rid the country of Smuts, 
                                                 
810  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting NEAS, OC, 3rd Battalion NMC Woltemade, Cape 
Town to DNEAS, 15 April 1942; SANDFA, DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Native 
Military Corps, Magistrate Qumbu to Chief Magistrate, Umtata, 26 September 1942. 
811  UUTS, T.C. Robertson Papers, A 2102, Ae 5.1, Broadcasting, 8 October 1941. 
812  UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Reports, vol. 2, Mystery Radio Transmissions, 
Translations and Transcripts, July to August 1942. 
813  UUTS, T.C. Robertson Papers, A 2102, Ae 5.1, Broadcasting, 8 October 1941. 
814  UUTS, T.C. Robertson Papers, A 2102, Ae 5.1, Broadcasting, 8 October 1941. 
815  UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Reports, vol. 2, Mystery Radio Transmissions, 
Translations and Transcripts, July to August 1942. 
816  UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Reports, vol. 2, Mystery Radio Transmissions, 26 July 
1942. 
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the Jews and also the Communists who were mainly accused of instigating the call for equal 
rights for blacks.817 The messages were feeding on the existing social tensions, discontent and 
dissensions relating to white poverty and racial prejudices to inflame public opinion against 
the Smuts government.818 
 
The loss of about 10 722 UDF members during Rommel’s defeat of the Allies at Tobruk in 
June 1942 compounded matters for the Union authorities.819 It was a national disaster. 
According to the survey conducted by the Union’s chief censor, many South Africans 
expressed ‘disappointment and heartache’ at the losses and criticised the government for the 
ineffective running of the war.820 For the opposition, the Tobruk disaster was a justification of 
their objections to the war policy. Government supporters urged for immediate counter-
action. For example, R. Oliver of Roodepoort, wrote to one relative soldier serving in the 21st 
Field Battery, Durban, that ‘this is not the time to hold inquest or enquiry, but to get stuck in 
at them boots and all, and knock hell through all the Rommels and the Nazis ever made’.821 
Consequently, the authorities reacted. They undertook a variety of recruitment drives, with 
radio as one of the chief instruments (except for blacks). Smuts launched a recruitment 
campaign through radio broadcast, appealing for 7 000 men to replace the losses.822 The 
slogan became known as ‘Avenge Tobruk’ and was launched through the military 
recruitment officers.823 The military authorities also launched publicity campaigns for the 
field artillery, corps of signals, tank corps and infantry from October 1942. The recordings of 
the achievements of these units were broadcast to South Africa.824 Other recruiting drives 
included personal contacts with employers, attending local meetings, interacting with women 
as wives, mothers or relatives of men on active service, and the use of stories of enthusiasm, 
                                                 
817  UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Reports, vol. 2, Mystery Radio Transmissions, 26 July 
1942. 
818  UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Reports, vol. 2, Mystery Radio Transmissions, July to 
August 1942. 
819  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 148-150, 158-160. 
820  Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44 (E), Memorandum Regarding Public Reaction to the Fall of Tobruk 
and Mersa Mantruh, 7 July 1942. 
821  Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44 (E), “Critical” Censorship letter dated 28 June 1942, Memorandum 
Regarding Public Reaction to the Fall of Tobruk and Mersa Mantruh, 7 July 1942. 
822  CGS (War), Box 207, VI 45/5, Tobruk, 27 June 1942. 
823  CGS (War), Box 207, VI 45/5, ‘Avenge Tobruk’ Recruiting Drive, Director of Recruiting to all 
Recruiting Officers, 29 June 1942. 
824  Army Intelligence, Box 20, I.20. (A), Recruiting Publicity Campaign, Deputy Chief of Staff to General 
Officer Administration, UDF, Middle East, 17 October 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 20, I.20. (A), 
Broadcast by Major-General Dan Pienaar, 20 November 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 20, I.20. (A), 
Training for the Guns, Broadcast by 2nd Lt H.T Hoernle of South African Artillery, 10 December 1942. 
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sacrifices and personal stories of recruits to inspire the public.825 The post-Tobruk 
recruitment campaign yielded positive results within a few months. In January 1943, it was 
reported that 12 000 recruits were obtained, exceeding the requirement of 10 000.826 
 
Still, the use of radio for publicity and propaganda was not without problems. The main 
shortcomings were the shortage of military radio observers, inadequate and obsolete technical 
equipment, delayed transmissions to the Union and the military’s competition with the SABC 
personnel for recording devices.827 The latter aspect prompted the DMI officers to write 
strong letters of complaints to the CGS and the Prime Minister.828 In comparison to America, 
England and Australia, radio in South Africa was inadequately utilised for publicity and 
propaganda efforts to sustain interest in the war.829 In addition, another cause of concern was 
the under-exploitation of Afrikaans language for propaganda. Afrikaans-speaking public 
regularly tuned into Zeesen for overseas news about the war and their opinion was moulded 
in that context.830 Dr Malherbe also complained about the limited utilisation of Afrikaans in 
radio service. He remarked that it was in fact the Afrikaans public that needed to be 
influenced the most or risk losing that audience to the anti-war elements.831 Despite these 
problems, radio remained an integral part of government publicity and propaganda efforts 
throughout the war. It was supplemented by the press and also the films, which added a visual 
dimension to propaganda drives. Zeesen radio, on the other hand, went off air in April 1945, 
when the Allied troops captured Germany’s Koenigswusterhausen, the site of its broadcast 
station.832 
 
                                                 
825  CGS (War), Box 207, VI 45/5, ‘Avenge Tobruk’ Recruiting Drive, Director of Recruiting to all 
Recruiting Officers, 29 June 1942. 
826  AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2, Proposed Establishment, Sub-Section Director of Military Intelligence, 14 
January 1943. 
827  Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (104), Lindsay to Malherbe, 24 June 1944; Malherbe Papers, 
File 432/7, KCM 56974 (553), Malherbe to Esselen, 16 October 1944;, Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, 
KCM 56974 (134), A.R. Delius to Malherbe, 28 November 1944. 
828  Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (104), Lindsay to Malherbe, 24 June 1944; Malherbe Papers, 
File 432/7, KCM 56974 (553), Malherbe to Esselen, 16 October 1944. 
829  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/1, Radio in Relation to Military Propaganda, Werdmuller to Wakefield, 21 
April 1944. 
830  Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (534), R.F.A. Hoernlé to J.A. Davenport (BBC), 6 May 
1941. This could also explain the increase in radio licences from the SABC Annual Reports, 1939-
1945. 
831  Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (544), Recognition of the Afrikaans Element in Propaganda, 
Malherbe to Wilson, 14 February 1941. 
832  PP, Box 31, Zeesen Broadcast, Afrikaans Transmission Discontinued, 19 April 1945; Zeesen 
Broadcast, WR 65/9/43, vol. 30, 1945; ‘Zeesen Down to One Wavelength’, Rand Daily Mail, 10 April 
1945; ‘Salient Reduced’, The Star, 29 April 1945; ‘Air Conditioning’, Sunday Times, 29 April 1945. 
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THE PRESS 
 
Unlike radio, the press constituted the largest component of the publicity and propaganda 
media because of its diversity, range, visual impact and reach. For instance, it comprised of 
multiple forms that included newspaper articles, magazines and periodicals, pamphlets, 
posters, pictures, photographs, booklets and newsletters. Although radio had the advantage of 
ignoring national boundaries, transcending illiteracy barriers and having wider broadcast 
coverage to many people at the same time, the press had enduring capacity. Newspapers, for 
example, could be read more than once, be passed on to others or saved for future reference. 
Printed news and advertisements complemented the instantaneous or recorded voice 
messages and appeals over the radio, but remained “permanent” for continued reference and 
for posterity, if well preserved. However, neither radio nor the press, was exclusively 
preferred over the other. There were overlaps in these media platforms for the Union’s 
publicity and propaganda campaigns. During the war, newspapers entered the fray by 
organising news and framing the war in a campaign of words to win the war of ideas so as to 
either incite popular support for intervention or, for the anti-war movements, to promote the 
neutrality policy. 
 
The Union government did not enjoy monopoly of the press. The freedom and independence 
of the press afforded opportunities for the anti-government factions to contest the publicity 
and propaganda space to advance their cause. The anti-government press was predominantly 
Afrikaans, and the pro-government press was predominantly English, though there were a 
few Afrikaans papers which supported the government.833 The English press, though, enjoyed 
the highest wartime circulation in the Union than the Afrikaans press.834 This could partly be 
a result of the educated black readers, mainly in urban areas, who mostly preferred English 
                                                 
833  Die Volkstem (Transvaal), Die Suiderstem (Western Cape), Ons Land (Eastern Cape), Die Volk 
(Transvaal) and Die Vrystater (OFS) were some of the pro-government Afrikaans newspapers. The 
Afrikaans papers for the government opposition were Die Vaderland (Transvaal), Die Transvaler 
(Transvaal), Die Burger (Western Cape), Die Oosterlig (Eastern Cape) and Die Volksblad (OFS). 
834  Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, pp. 107-108. According to the report by Henry McNulty, the United 
Press Association correspondent in the Union, by March 1943, the major English newspapers were led 
by The Sunday Times with 80 000 circulation, followed by The Star with 65 000 and Cape Times with 
40 000. The top Afrikaans paper was Die Vaderland with 25 000 circulation (its weekly country edition 
had 26 000), followed by Die Transvaler with 17 000 (with 2 500 for its country edition), and lastly 
Die Burger which had 10 000 circulation. 
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papers.835 It could thus be argued that the government enjoyed more coverage in the press. 
Though, as Dr Malherbe argued, English speakers were the least preferred audience because 
the group of anti-government factions with Nazi sympathies came from the Afrikaners, who 
had to be swayed towards the government.836 
 
At the start of hostilities, there was no rigid system of censorship imposed on the press.837 
The government and the majority of the newspaper editors concluded a Voluntary Censorship 
Agreement to prevent the inadvertent publication of information that could aid the enemy.838 
But, not all newspapers were signatories to that agreement. They were Die Transvaler, 
Forward and the Guardian.839 Discretionary submission of military-related material for 
censorship and the non-committal attitude of the non-signatories to the Voluntary Censorship 
Agreement presented problems for the Union authorities. During the war, both the English 
and Afrikaans papers embarked on internal propaganda warfare. In the process, information 
that would otherwise have been censored ended up in the publications. The anti-government 
papers were particularly culpable in some of the cases. It was to be expected, since 
propaganda warfare in the non-loyal Afrikaans papers took the form of an anti-government 
posture. Criticisms were levelled at the war policy, condemning and ridiculing government 
information initiatives, amplifying military difficulties and promoting the racialised and 
ethnic-based political mobilisations and militant protests of the opposition movements. These 
papers adopted what could be branded a “disparaging approach” against the government 
during the war and consistently featured articles that promoted the anti-war and the 
exclusivist Afrikaner nationalistic causes. 
 
                                                 
835  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News 
Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. Richards, 17 August 1940, pp. 1-7; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, 
Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 March 1942. 
836  Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (544), Recognition of the Afrikaans Element in Propaganda, 
Malherbe to Wilson, 14 February 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), 
Memorandum on Films for Publicity and Propaganda, 1941. (only year). 
837  Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 4, Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee, 5 October 1939; CGS (War), 
Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press 
Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940. 
838  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Report on the Control of Military Information issues to the Public through 
the Press, Newsreels, Broadcast, etc, DDMI’s Reply to Controller of Censorship, 16 April 1942; CGS 
(War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press 
Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4/, Report of Meeting of 
Newspaper Editors Consultative Committee in Pretoria, 23 October 1940. 
839  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Press Censorship, Kreft to Wilson, 25 March 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 
432/7, KCM 56974 (94), Relationship between Military Authorities and the Press, DMI to Deputy 
Chief of Staff (DCS), 29 March 1943. 
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The Union security officials and pro-government publicity agencies (e.g. UUTS) reported 
many negative statements emanating from the major anti-government papers: Die Transvaler, 
Die Vaderland and Die Burger, reflecting their anti-government attitude. On 17 November 
1939, Die Transvaler and Die Vaderland reported that the children’s toys for that year were 
in the form of soldiers, tanks, submarines and warships.840 This was an attempt to inflame 
public opinion against the government for an unwarranted exposure of children to violence as 
a result of the war policy. Die Burger, in September 1939, published Advocate J.G. 
Strydom’s speech in Pretoria, accusing Smuts of being a British Imperialist whose salvation 
would be to leave England and to address the Jewish question, the distinction between 
Europeans and non-Europeans, the poor-white question and to pursue a Republican ideal.841 
Likewise, Die Vaderland attacked the government’s use of radio broadcast and described the 
information officer as ‘little Adolph Wilson’ who would appear in a musical as ‘His Master’s 
Voice’.842 In an instigation to destabilise the mine workers, one government report described 
Smuts as ‘the man who shot you down like dogs in 1922 is again at the head of affairs’, and 
the mine workers were urged to withdraw their buying power (estimated at 14 million pounds 
per annum) and support alternative Afrikaner economic movements such as the 
Reddingsdaadbond (Rescue Action League/Salvation Bond).843 
 
As war progressed, attacks on the government’s war policy intensified. Initial German 
military successes in Europe gave heart to government opponents who grew bolder in their 
anti-war statements. A.J. Werth, of the opposition, reportedly indicated that Smuts was 
mistaken to believe that Britain would win and he would be a hero, instead, the possibility 
was that Germany would emerge victorious.844 In a leader page of Die Burger, the 
government’s war policy was regarded as futile and the only ray of light came from the re-
union of the Afrikaners. The paper also criticised the actions of the government for 
confiscating rifles as an illegal act and ‘the greatest scandal in the General [Smuts]’s 
career’.845 On the front page of Die Transvaler, it was reported that the Dutch Reformed 
Church Synod requested Smuts to make peace with Germany and quoted a statement that ‘the 
                                                 
840  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 25 November 1939. 
841  Wits, Ossewabrandwag Records, A 726, A15, Opposition Press Reports, Die Burger, 27 September 
1939. 
842  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939. 
843  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939. 
844  Wits, Ossewabrandwag Records, A 726, A15, Opposition Press Reports, Die Burger, 5 July 1940. 
845  UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Attacks on Government, Die Burger, 4 September 1940. 
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people feel that the country’s participation in the war has affected their conscience’.846 The 
paper also criticised the dismissal of some soldiers for their refusal to sign the Africa Oath, 
and also highlighted the poor conditions and bad food at the some military camps.847 In a 
political meeting covered by a pro-government paper, Die Volkstem, it was reported that Dr 
W. du P. Erlank stated in Pretoria that if a rebellion took place and failed, it would not be a 
tragedy, but, it would be a tragedy if no protest against the prevailing conditions was 
undertaken.848 Erlank then reflected on the plight of the Afrikaners, from historical incidents 
of Slagtersnek to the concentration camps of the Anglo-Boer War, and concluded that 
retribution would follow the bitter struggle of the Afrikaners.849 (Compare also with related 
incidents like the suppression of the 1914 rebellion and the 1922 mine workers’ strike in 
other sources). 
 
The papers were advancing the exclusive Afrikaner nationalistic cause and supported the 
dissenting opinion against the war policy. They also heightened the racialised ethnic-based 
opposition politics through the anti-British, anti-Jewish and anti-Black features. For instance, 
the participation of blacks in a “white man’s war” was opposed vehemently, particularly at 
the question of them carrying firearms, something the military authorities and some political 
leaders, such as Reitz, considered necessary.850 Arming blacks was portrayed as a ‘national 
security threat’ by the opposition papers and the Nationalists.851 The government was at pains 
to refute the opposition claims and to rationalise the suggestions for arming blacks.852 
Defeatism (based on the assumption of German victory over Britain)853, racialised ethnic-
based cultural and social politics of identity were the hallmarks of the opposition papers. The 
English papers, in contrast, assumed the pro-government angle and presented articles in the 
                                                 
846  UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Attacks on Government, Die Transvaler, 21 September 1940. 
847  UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Attacks on Government, Die Transvaler, 21 September 1940. 
848  UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Attacks on Government, Die Volkstem, 11 September 1940. 
849  UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Attacks on Government, Die Volkstem, 11 September 1940. 
850  NMC, Box 22; NAS 4/26/15, Arming of Non-Europeans, DNEAS to Adjutant General, 20 May 1941; 
Grundlignh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, pp. 18-27; D. Shackleton, ‘South Africa and 
the High Commission Territories during the Second World War: Politics and Policies Affecting War 
Mobilization’, Scientia Militaria, 30 (2), 2000, p. 241; Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century, 
pp. 121-126. 
851  ‘Die Gevaar is Binne’, Die Transvaler, 6 May 1941; ‘Proteste teen Wapening vir Nie-Blankes’, Die 
Transvaler, 1 April 1942; ‘Nie-Blankes Opgelei met Vuurwapens’, Die Transvaler, 8 April 1942. 
852  ‘Nie-Blankes word nie vir Krygsdiens Bewapen nie’, Die Suiderstem, 10 April 1942; ‘Nie-Blankes in 
Landverdediging’, Die Volkstem, 12 March 1942; ‘Wat Smuts Gesê Het’, Die Volkstem, 31 March 
1942. 
853  Afrikaner Nationalist leaders such as Dr Malan, Paul Sauer, Eric Louw and Strydom persistently stated 
in various speeches that Britain would lose the war and the Union must sever ties and negotiate with 
the seemingly victorious Germany. Wits, Ossewabrandwag Records, A 726, A15, Opposition Press 
Reports. 
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most positive light or in criticism of the anti-war activists. However, there were occasions 
where the government was under criticism, albeit for different reasons than the opposition 
papers. 
 
The Natal Mercury in December 1941 criticised the military authorities for lack of equipment 
such as anti-air guns, rifles, grenades, aircraft as well as the lack of trained personnel to 
secure vital installations.854 During the previous year, the Sunday Express was also accused 
of a similar case of reporting on the lack of ammunition.855 More criticisms of the military 
continued in the following war years. In April 1942, the Sunday Times published an open 
letter to the Chief Paymaster, which complained about the troops who, as result of payment 
delays to their dependents, had court orders issued against them for defaulting on 
payments.856 In the same year, Forward, which supported the Labour Party, a partner in 
Smuts’s United Party, published a critical article complaining about the ‘uneasiness’ 
regarding the lack of social and economic improvements promised by Smuts.857 It was 
responding to the other pro-government papers that criticised Walter Madeley, the Labour 
Party leader about expressing dissatisfactions within the United Party. The Natal Witness also 
accused Madeley of socialist opinions and criticised the United Party leaders for arrogating to 
themselves the prerogative of portraying the war as the United Party’s war and not South 
Africa’s war.858 
 
Examples of the weaknesses in the existing system of self-censorship included the 
publication of casualties, publishing interviews by returning soldiers on leave or in hospitals 
and general rumours about the welfare of the soldiers after the war.859 Despite the 
unhappiness of the authorities, action was limited to mere appeals to newspapers to co-
operate with the BOI with regard to publication of articles that would impact on public 
morale.860 It was however, not the general practice to cover negative aspects of wartime 
government policies and activities. Primarily, the English and loyalist Afrikaans papers 
                                                 
854  CGS (War), Box 199, 42/5, Leading Article in “Natal Mercury”, DDMI to CGS, 17 December 1941. 
855  ‘Brass Hats have a Lot to Learn’, Sunday Express, 18 February 1940. 
856  ‘Open Letter to the Chief Paymaster’, Sunday Times, 22 April 1942. 
857  ‘The Press Creates Political a Crisis’, Forward, 20 November 1942. 
858  ‘Madeley Speech’, The Natal Witness, 24 November 1942. 
859  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Blaine to Editor of “Cape Times”, 14 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 
42/4, Colonel R.D. Pilkington Jordan to Adjutant General, 28 November 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 
42/4, Lawrence to Blaine, 22 December 1941; CGS (W), Box 197, 42/4, Theron to CGS, 1 May 1942; 
Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (94), Relationship between Military Authorities and the 
Press, DMI to Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), 29 March 1943. 
860  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Wilson to Prime Minister, 15 June 1944. 
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provided ample coverage in support of the war effort.861 Criticism emanating from this 
section of the press could be branded as a “constructive approach” as the papers essentially 
implored the government for improvement and efficiency in the war effort. To a larger extent, 
the English papers played a major role in framing the war in a positive light and in exposing 
the subversive activities of the anti-war elements. Also, they assisted in moulding public 
opinion towards supporting the war by featuring recruitment advertisements, press statements 
for appeals and the reasons for intervention in the war, military publicity and in the morale-
building efforts of positive war-related news items, e.g. Allied military successes. The official 
agency for such publicity and propaganda efforts was the BOI in co-operation with the DMI 
(Ic).862  
 
The primary aim of the BOI was to improve the morale of the South African public as well as 
to discourage and counter-act the subversive propaganda among civilians.863 The BOI was 
also the only channel through which all information relating to the policy and activities of the 
DOD would be supplied.864 For practical reasons, though, local military commands were 
authorised to maintain direct contact with the press to deal with matters of local interest.865 
To preserve the morale within the UDF, propaganda and publicity was conducted through the 
DMI (Ic).866 There were no independent newspapers which had war correspondents with the 
UDF in the field. It was only the BOI and SAPA representatives who supplied war news and 
photographic pictures regarding UDF activities in the field to the press in South Africa and 
                                                 
861  ‘War Declared’, Sunday Times, 3 September 1939; ‘Suid-Afrika se Beslissing’, Die Volkstem, 8 May 
1945; ‘The Mad Dog of Europe’, Sunday Times, 3 September 1939; ‘Military Ready to Defend South 
African Borders’, Sunday Express, 3 September 1939; ‘Nazism will be Destroyed’, Sunday Express, 3 
September 1939. 
862  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 
1940; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; CGS 
(War), Box 197, VI 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press 
Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940. 
863  PP, Box 63, 6/9/5, Report on the Relations between the Bureau of Information and Military 
Intelligence, 13 January 1941; SANDFA, CGS (War), Box 197, 42/3, Director of Information’s Reply 
to General Theron, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943. 
864  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Memorandum to the South African Press, 1 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 
42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, 
Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940. 
865  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Memorandum to the South African Press, 1 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 
42/4, Instruction to all Military Commands by the Director General of  Operations, 29 July 1940. 
866  PP, Box 63, 6/9/5, Report on the Relations between the Bureau of Information and Military 
Intelligence, 13 January 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/3, Director of Information’s Reply to General 
Theron, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943. 
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abroad.867 The BOI also supported the defence recruitment campaigns such as the military 
exhibitions, parades and public demonstrations through the newspaper coverage of those 
activities.868 
 
The most significant approach in relation to the engineering of pro-government propaganda 
was to ascertain the prevailing trends in the country. To this end, the BOI’s press section 
surveyed about twenty daily newspapers for emerging distresses, objections or grievances 
and partisan trends, then produced a report for government officials to refute allegations and 
to provide explanatory statements.869 In the same manner, the DMI (Ic) produced what was 
called ‘Highlights from the Opposition Press’, which was a summary of the anti-government 
papers, mostly translated from Afrikaans, for use by the UDF officials and the Allied military 
officials who did not speak or understand Afrikaans.870 To prepare answers from the 
opposition questions in parliament as well as to determine the level of support for the 
government, the UUTS also followed a similar approach of producing summaries of both the 
pro- and anti-government papers.871 These press summaries were crucial in reflecting the ebb 
and flow of national sentiments in the Union. Also, the government and military authorities 
had an opportunity to prepare and issue statements for information and to make appeals to the 
public for support. The pro-government papers were particularly vital in publishing the 
official press statements and interviews from government officials. Those statements were 
mostly released through the BOI in co-operation with SAPA, which in turn supplied them to 
the newspapers. Other press features were obtained through covering the speeches or 
activities of the government and military officials. 
 
Smuts, in particular, issued many press statements in which he rationalised the entry of South 
Africa into the war against Germany. He declared that the Union parliament had exercised its 
constitutional mandate to decide on intervention in the war, as advised by him, and that it was 
to preserve the country’s freedom and independence against the systematic expansion of Nazi 
                                                 
867  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/3, Director of Information’s Reply to General Theron, Wilson to Theron, 11 
May 1943; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Report on Military Publicity and Propaganda by Assistant Director 
of Public Relations, General Officer Administration, UDF Middle East Force, 22 February 1944. 
868  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May August 1942. 
869  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 
1940; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942. 
870  Malherbe Papers, File 444/5, KCM 56975 (76-78), Highlights from the Opposition Press, 1941-1944, 
by Capt (Mrs) Malherbe, 25 April 1944. 
871  UUTS, Robertson Papers, A 2102, B 20.3, Press Reports 260-382, 1941-1944. 
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Germany by force.872 Like other small European countries, South Africa needed to be 
protected against Nazi domination and oppression. Appeals were made to evoke public 
sympathies and solidarity in support of the Union leaders’ resolve to fight. Smuts also 
attempted to moderate negative perceptions about the British Empire. He argued that the old 
British Empire ended with the Anglo-Boer War because South Africa’s self-governing 
institutions and its sovereignty in the world were retained afterwards. Instead, there was the 
British Commonwealth of Nations which he described as ‘Britain plus the free 
Dominions’.873 And so, South Africa was involved in equal “partnership” with Britain and 
not coercively “conscripted” by the “Empire” to participate in the war. Still, the central theme 
in propaganda rhetoric was that Britain epitomised liberal traditions, democratic values and 
freedom which small nations like South Africa enjoyed. In contrast, Nazism embodied 
tyranny, domination and oppression which were opposed by the Allied forces. 
 
‘The truth is’, remarked Smuts in one of his press interviews in 1942, ‘the Germans have 
already lost the war … they have not only organised Europe for themselves, they have 
organised the whole world against themselves … the Allies have today more fighting men 
than the Axis, and they can produce more’.874 It was one of his bandwagon arguments, as in 
many speeches and broadcast by other leaders875, that Smuts portrayed Germany as a 
dangerous threat, but, she was confronted by the “whole world”. Since “every nation” was on 
board, it would be unthinkable for the public to believe that Germany could emerge 
triumphant. Notions of national “defence” and “safety” were prominently employed in 
propaganda rhetoric to promote the war policy. Smuts made the most of these virtue words to 
mobilise public sympathies and support. In 1943, during the Union elections dubbed the 
‘Soldier’s Vote’876, because they took place in the middle of the war, he incorporated those 
virtue words in one of his speeches: 
 
A vote against the war policy is a vote against South Africa, against the security of our 
country which we are pledged loyally to death ... the country is in mortal danger … we should 
                                                 
872  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, General Smuts’s Message to the People, 1939, (no date, only year). 
873  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 298/2, The British Colonial Empire, 15 February 1942. 
874  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, Interviews given by Smuts, 1942, (no date, only year). 
875  Jowett and O’Donnel, Propaganda and Persuasion, pp. 226-228. 
876  UP Archives, Central Head Office, General Elections and Provincial Elections, Military Election 
Matters, June-October 1943; ‘South Africa’s Most Momentous General Elections: Duty to Army and 
Nation’, The Star, 3 July 1943; ‘Smuts Prepares S.A. for Swift Election Campaign’, Rand Daily Mail, 
17 May 1943; ‘Climax of Elections Campaign: “War to the End” Will be Smuts’s Call’, Rand Daily 
Mail, 5 July 1943; See also Tothill, The 1943 Elections, p. 225. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
151 
 
follow only one call ... to unite behind the country’s defence policy … to defend her and keep 
her safe for the future.877 
 
Smuts’s speeches also found their way into the international press. The Daily Telegraph 
reproduced his address to the United Kingdom Parliament in London during 1942, where he 
expressed the view that the Allies were embarking on the ‘offensive phase’ in the struggle 
between two contrasting systems and ideologies – democracy against totalitarianism.878 This 
speech, which was also broadcast over the radio, was covered in many papers and even 
listeners’ comments were published.879 It was one of the major propaganda scoops for Smuts 
as the speech also reflected thoughts on the kind of an international order desired. 
 
Union military officials also exploited the press to issue statements and to promote the 
country’s significance in the war. Van Ryneveld, expressing his views on home defence, 
indicated that South Africa played a key role in the overall strategic plan of the Allied war 
effort due to its ports. ‘The Union was no longer a port of call’, reckoned Van Ryneveld, ‘it 
was a very vital link both in the matter of production and distribution and in the allocation of 
its manpower for fighting forces’.880 It was a form of economic propaganda as he praised War 
Supplies for improved productive capacity which meant more job opportunities for potential 
recruits. The country mainly needed men and women for training. ‘Equipment would soon 
overtake us… but the best equipment in the hands of untrained men and women was useless’, 
argued Van Ryneveld.881 After his return from a six week trip to London 1943, Van Ryneveld 
issued a press statement expressing delight on discussing war financing with ‘big men’ of the 
British Treasury. He explained the centrality of manpower in the British war production and 
how that impacted on the heavy bombing blitz against Germany. It was vital for the Union to 
make its own army, air and naval manpower contribution to the war effort to secure an 
opportunity for claiming a share in the future of the world.882 
 
                                                 
877  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, An Appeal by the Prime Minister, n.d. 
878  ‘The Offensive Phase’, The Daily Telegraph, 21 October 1942. 
879  ‘Radio Reaction to Smuts Talk’, The New York Times, 22 October 1942; ‘Two Elder Statesmen’, St. 
Louis Star Times, 22 October 1942; ‘Great Offensive Nears’, Democrat and Chronicle, 22 October 
1942; ‘Observations: Jan Smuts, The Boer, Again Proves Himself a Great Statesman’, Star News, 26 
October 1942. 
880  CGS (War), Box 201, VI 42/8, General Van Ryneveld - Press Interview, 21 February 1942. 
881  CGS (War), Box 201, VI 42/8, General Van Ryneveld - Press Interview, 21 February 1942. 
882  CGS (War), Box 201, VI 42/8, Press Statement, 3 December 1943. 
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The DMI (Ic) also orchestrated press statements prepared by Lieutenant (later Captain) (Mrs) 
J.A. Malherbe, to promote the government’s war policy, to counter opposition propaganda 
and to explain the various aspects of the military and service conditions, especially in relation 
to women. In one press release, Malherbe criticised those who called for equal pay between 
men and women of similar ranks, without due consideration of the differences in actual 
wartime responsibilities and activities. She regarded it as selfish and ‘calculated opportunism’ 
if the equal pay argument did not take into account that most women’s voluntary activities 
included running canteens, transport and organising entertainment, even sewing and knitting 
as opposed to men fighting in the war zone.883 She also took a swipe at the anti-war elements 
for criticising the government’s consideration of arming blacks whilst they (government 
opponents) refused to fight. 884  
 
In another press article, Malherbe indicted the ‘defeatist attitude’ of some women who wrote 
whining and depressing letters to the serving menfolk which impacted on troop morale.885 
She was addressing the National Council of Women of South Africa in Johannesburg and 
requested them to assist the government ‘to frustrate the defeatist and whining talk’.886 In a 
counter-argument published in the Bloemfontein-based weekly magazine, The Outspan, the 
writer, Phyllis Juby, described the “whining letters” as a ‘healthy exchange of thoughts and 
feelings’ between partners.887 Malherbe, this time a captain, wrote to the editor of The 
Outspan, Gordon Makepeace, to challenge Phyllis Juby’s article as she (Malherbe) believed it 
was “undoing” the work of the military due to the ‘unconscious thoughtlessness’ of those 
“whining” letters which had damaging effect on the morale of the of troops.888 By October 
1942, Malherbe noted that her challenging article, ‘It’s not What we Write but How we Write 
that Matters’, was never published. However, she continued to use the press to publish 
articles or to translate English into Afrikaans some features that highlighted women’s actions 
                                                 
883  Malherbe Papers, File 44/110, KCM 56996 (16a), ‘Should Women Officers in the Army get the Same 
Pay as Men?’, 1940 (only year). 
884  ‘Is South Africa Ready’, Sunday Times, 12 April 1942. 
885  ‘War, Whine and Women’, The Forum, 25 April 1942; ‘Women who “Whine” in Wartime Indicted’, 
Rand Daily Mail, 11 April 1942. 
886  ‘War, Whine and Women’, The Forum, 25 April 1942; ‘Women who “Whine” in Wartime Indicted’, 
Rand Daily Mail, 11 April 1942. 
887  ‘Should Women Write Freely to their Menfolk’, The Outspan, 31 July 1942. 
888  Malherbe Papers, File 44/110, KCM 56974, (857), Capt. J.A. Malherbe to Gordon Makepeace, 12 
August 1942. 
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that could strengthen morale on the home-front such as avoiding rumours, gossiping, wastage 
and despondency.889 
 
Apart from featuring official press statements, pro-government papers were also vital in 
promoting the government’s war policy and in vilifying the opposition’s activities through 
negative propaganda. As the European security situation worsened, Bob Connolly, the Rand 
Daily Mail and Sunday Express cartoonist, published satirical depictions of the Nazi danger 
accompanied by political manipulations as well as South Africa’s position at that time. In one 
cartoon in the Rand Daily Mail, the Nationalists who were advocating for the Union’s 
neutrality, are presented as flying a dark unstable Nazi aircraft, whilst the United Party 
leaders were flying in a white aircraft pointing towards the South African unity.890 In the 
Sunday Express, a Czech man is depicted with his one hand tied to a pole, while Hitler looks 
on, with the caption, ‘Nazi Allegiance’.891 The Union parliament’s decision to enter the war 
was reflected in the Rand Daily Mail as a single road, ‘Die Pad van Suid Afrika’ (The Path of 
South Africa), splitting into a fork.892 The message represented the internal divisions and the 
leaders taking opposite directions: Hertzog as following the dark path (non-belligerence, 
German sympathy) and Smuts following the path of light in support of the Allies. Cartoons of 
such nature, name-calling and labelling increased rapidly in the pro-government press as soon 
as war broke out. (See illustrations 9-11) 
 
Immediately after the British declaration of war against Germany, pro-war papers urged the 
government to follow suit. Animal-like archetypal terms such as ‘the mad dog’, were soon 
projected on Hitler893, and Nazism was branded an evil system that needed to be 
eliminated.894 The Forum publication was instrumental in producing dedicated features 
explaining Hitler’s aims and the impact of Nazism on the less suspicious groups. In its 
features, an anti-Nazi group called the Board of the German African Party (Non-Nazi), 
presented the case against Nazism and indicated that many South Africans did not 
sufficiently appreciate the precise objectives of Herr Hitler. References were made to sections 
of Hitler’s book, Mein Kampf, illustrating the nature of the Nazi doctrine as that of ‘fire and 
                                                 
889  Malherbe Papers, File 44/110, KCM 56974, (858), Women and the Home-Front, Capt Malherbe to Piet 
Beukes (The BOI), 19 June 1942. 
890  ‘Getting Nowhere Fast in the Political Air Race’, Rand Daily Mail, 26 June 1939. 
891  ‘Cartoon News’, Sunday Express, 23 July 1939. 
892  ‘The Fork in the Road’, Rand Daily Mail, 6 September 1939. 
893  ‘The Mad Dog of Europe’, Sunday Times, 3 September 1939. 
894  ‘Nazism will be Destroyed’, Sunday Express, 3 September 1939. 
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sword’, with the ultimate aim of world domination.895 Through The Forum, the South African 
public was “educated” about the danger and duplicitous nature of Hitler’s promises of peace 
whilst preparing for the destruction of the targeted country. For example, Hitler did not 
honour any of the treaties of peace he promised or signed with some European countries such 
as France. ‘We wish to address the following to the Afrikaners’, stated the paper, ‘many of 
you, especially the followers of Dr. Malan and his policy, believe that  Hitler will be the 
saviour of the Afrikaners … only misled or indifferent people can expect liberty from 
Hitler.’896 The annexation of Austria, the Czechoslovakia and Sudetenland were used as 
examples to confirm that Hitler should not be trusted. Interestingly, it was in February 1940 
when The Forum published a feature that illustrated how Hitler promised France peace for 
twenty-five years while, on the other side, he was preparing for her destruction, and by June 
1940, France had fallen to the German blitzkrieg which had swept her along with the Lower 
Countries of Europe.897 
 
Negative propaganda designed to reduce the appeals of Nazi doctrine became increasingly 
evident in the pro-government papers. Warnings against “slavery”, loss of the political and 
personal “liberties” under Nazism and Hitler’s “false promises” were frequently featured. 
Early in 1939, the Cape Argus published a speech by former Nazi clergyman, Pastor W. 
Luckhoff, at the University of Cape Town, warning about German plans to offer the 
Afrikaners a Republic, but only consisting of Basotholand, small portions of OFS and Natal, 
and yet the country remaining under Nazi protection.898 Nazi sympathisers, the ‘indifferent 
Afrikaners’, were warned that aligning with Germany held the danger of exchanging the 
Union Jack for ‘bondage and denigration of the Afrikaans people to helots and slaves of the 
Hitler-System’.899 Another approach to mobilise the anti-Nazi sentiment, was to use extracts 
from Nazi publications to illustrate the negative portrayal and prejudices of the Germans 
against the Union Afrikaners. For example, in G.A. Gedat’s book, Was Wird Aus Diesem 
Afrika? (What will Become of This Africa?), it was indicated that: 
 
The Boers have missed their hour of destiny … settling as pioneers on huge farms, they began 
to degenerate, few of them appreciated the value of education for their children. The blacks 
                                                 
895  ‘Hitler’s Doctrine of Fire and Sword’, The Forum, 27 January 1940. 
896  ‘If Hitlerism is Not Halted’, The Forum, 3 February 1940. 
897  ‘If Hitlerism is Not Halted’, The Forum, 3 February 1940. 
898  ‘Hitler’s Plans for Union, Warning by Former Nazi Pastor’, Cape Argus, 23 March 1939. 
899  ‘If Hitlerism is Not Halted’, The Forum, 3 February 1940. 
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were compelled by them to do hard work and this encouraged pre-existing tendency to 
laziness and they degenerated into poor Whites.900  
 
Such kinds of the Germans’ negative depiction of the Afrikaners became frequent features of 
anti-Nazi campaigns. It was particularly the Jewish Board of Deputies and the UUTS who 
used extracts from captured German documents to publish news features or bulletins that 
reflected the prejudiced Nazi portrayals of the Afrikaners and the plots to annex South 
Africa.901 This tactic of depicting Nazism negatively served dual purposes. Firstly, the 
government’s war policy was rationalised as a struggle against a “ruthless” and tyrannical 
adversary – Hitler’s Nazism; secondly, through name-calling and labelling, it served to 
negatively stigmatise the opposition movements which sympathised with Nazi Germany. The 
effect would thus be the swinging of positive public opinion towards the government and the 
rejection of the opposition’s policies. 
 
The opposition had also been employing similar name-calling and labelling technique which 
was predicated on associations with the British Empire since the beginning of the war.902 The 
main government opposition, Malan’s HNP, persistently apportioned blame on Smuts for 
creating internal divisions and distress by supporting Britain. Hence they waged the “peace” 
and “stop the war” campaigns, some of which through satirical cartoons.903 In turn, to wrestle 
the propaganda initiative from the opposition, government authorities collated the carefully 
selected anti-war extracts from the anti-government press, parliamentary debates and 
speeches, and produced circulars and bulletins which presented the opposition movements 
and leaders in unfavourable light.904 For example, the HNP’s rejection of the English-
Afrikaans equality, negative statements about the soldiers and the republican plans were 
                                                 
900  UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, German Ambitions in Africa, Extracts from G.A. Gedat, Was Wird Aus 
Diesem Afrika?, n.d. 
901  Alexander Papers, BC160, List IV, File 24, ‘What the Nazis Think of the Afrikaners’ in a 
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against Nazism during the war. 
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published to expose the racialised and exclusivist policies of the opposition.905 The relations 
between the HNP and the OB as well as the statements about the wish for German victory 
were also published to illustrate the negative attitudes towards the Union servicemen and the 
opposition’s association with the Nazis. Malan’s supporters were referred to as the 
‘‘Malanazis’, and the HNP was referred to as a ‘Nazinale Party’, to project a negative 
connotation that would elicit rejection by the South African public.906 In this regard, the 
public would realise that the future of the country lay with supporting Smuts and the war 
policy.907 
 
Through negative propaganda, the government was able to attribute the country’s distresses 
towards the Nazi interferences in the domestic affairs to create internal dissensions and 
instability.908 The effect was that the opposition was then left with the task to find alternative 
areas other than the war policy to fight the government. It was found to be on the racial 
front.909 The government, though, needed to secure a healthy public opinion towards its own 
war policy. This was attempted through a combination of the newspaper advertisements, 
newsletters, posters and magazines. These were exploited for waging recruitment drives, 
military demonstrations and economic propaganda campaigns. Whilst the pro-government 
newspapers played a useful role in exposing the potential dangers such as the Fifth Column 
and rumour mongering910, their crucial significance lay in the publicity given to recruitment 
initiatives. The BOI arranged with friendly newspapers to publish information about the 
recruitment calls, up-coming military demonstrations and the war pictures. Explanations 
about the nature and purpose of the military events were also provided. The newspapers were 
                                                 
905  UP Archives, Intelligence Reports, Nationalist Party Policy: A Series of Extracts from the Speeches of 
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September 1942; UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Statements on the War Issue and the Election, 
1940-1943. 
909  After 1943, when German forces were on the retreat, the HNP embarked on intensified campaigns to 
secure the exclusive socio-economic and political rights of Afrikaners against other racial groups, 
especially blacks. The ideology of Apartheid was developed during the war. 
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supplemented by the production of newsletters, bulletins and magazines that promoted the 
UDF units. 
 
Early in the war, the authorities organised various press-related activities to obtain military 
volunteers. In February 1940, the DOD published a recruitment booklet titled ‘The Union at 
War: How to Join Forces’, and elaborated on the need for military training of the able-bodied 
men of military age. The booklet contained information about all the available units in which 
interested persons could enlist for full-time or part-time military service. The information in 
the booklet mainly served to create awareness about the available military units such as the 
infantry, artillery, technical services, engineering, signals and medical corps, in which 
eligible members of the public could serve.911 An important piece of information to induce 
interest was about the rate of pay for men employed on full-time basis. An unmarried 
private’s pay was approximately ten pounds a month in the first year, which increased 
annually.912 If married, the pay would include family, ration and lodging allowances, in 
accordance with the number of children he had. The pay was higher for other ranks. It was a 
vital incentive for those who were unskilled and without decent job prospects at the time. 
Joining the military held out the prospects of personal development which would be useful 
after war. Until May 1940, the focus of recruitment for military service was still mainly on 
white men and not on women. 
 
After the formation of WAAS in May 1940, volunteers between the ages of 18-40 were 
required for active service for the duration of the war, either in the Union or anywhere in 
Africa.913 Recruiting meetings and rallies were organised and personally addressed by 
eminent personalities such as Werdmuller, Reitz and Isie Smuts, to stimulate interest and to 
obtain recruits for service.914 Advertisements were published in the newspapers to alert the 
public about the rallies and strong appeals were made towards women to enlist, often with 
poor responses.915 
 
                                                 
911  The Union at War: How to Join Forces, DOD, Cape Town, 1 February 1940. 
912  The Union at War: How to Join Forces, DOD, Cape Town, 1 February 1940, pp. 13-14. 
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1941. 
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The military authorities also organised recruiting marches and tours conducted by WAAS and 
publicised in the newspapers. In March 1941, WAAS members marched through Cape Town 
in a major recruiting rally. The Cape Times heaped praise on those women for ‘standing by 
the men’ and their willingness to ‘make sacrifices for freedom and [for] defence of South 
Africa, their country and their home’.916 Rallies were supplemented with WAAS tours 
organised throughout the Union’s towns and rural districts to bring the military closer to the 
public and to facilitate recruitment. During the tours, newspapers were provided with draft 
articles by the military authorities via the BOI to alert and to publicise the events.917 Urgent 
calls for more women recruits to join the ranks of army and the air force were posted in 
newspapers, with information about the available avenues for enlistment, and propaganda 
leaflets were distributed to the crowds.918 The role of press was to maximise exposure and to 
create anticipation and excitement before the military tours reached the towns. Usually, the 
profiles of the leading figures who accompanied the tours were published to enhance the 
status and significance of the events. 919 
 
Despite the rallies and tours, recruitment drives did not seem to have the desired effect. 
Malherbe of DMI (Ic), after her recruiting tour of the Transvaal, reported that women lacked 
knowledge about opportunities offered and the service conditions. Rumours about the moral 
misbehaviour of Army women, bad facilities and conditions in the barracks, lack of spiritual 
opportunities and being “sent North”, were spread in the country districts, thus militating 
against recruitment.920 The report focused more on the rural districts because the large pool 
for potential recruits were predominantly Afrikaans-speakers – the targeted audience who 
needed to be converted towards the government’s war policy. The lack of sufficient 
information was blamed on the BOI for supplying seventy-eight rural newspapers with 
broadcast talks or stale news that led editors to ignore the BOI’s material.921 This explains the 
urgency with which the military authorities organised personal contacts at meetings and 
attempted house to house visits in some districts of the Transvaal to make strong appeals for 
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more recruits.922 In one appeal, Werdmuller invoked historical memories of the Voortrekker 
women who fought alongside their menfolk and subsequently called for women to assist the 
Springboks who needed to be nearer the frontlines.923 By 1942, the calls became more 
desperate due to the worsening military situation for the Allied forces and the threat of Japan 
in the Indian Ocean. Newspapers abounded with articles appealing for recruits and the 
authorities offering explanations about the available opportunities, pay rates, promotions and 
skills development.924 However, recruitment of women progressed slowly.925 
 
The press also played an important role in giving publicity to the military demonstrations and 
the exhibitions of the country’s industrial production. From October 1940, the military 
authorities organised various recruiting tours of mobile columns (Steel Commando), war 
supplies demonstration tour (War Trains) and Air Commando displays.926 Together with the 
BOI, the military authorities organised the press and the SABC for publicity of those 
demonstrations. The Star published articles explaining the nature and purpose of the Steel 
Commando – to showcase all units of the UDF, and also delineated the route map of the 
mobile tour.927 The Cape Argus did the same with the War Trains. It reported that the main 
purpose of the exhibitions was for the South African public to take pride in the country’s own 
productive capacity and praised the factory workers as home-front fighters playing a critical 
role in the war.928 The BOI drafted articles for the newspapers to cover the activities and 
movements of the mobile columns. Newspaper editors were requested to publish the prepared 
articles only when the military tours entered the local area. Pictures of the various military 
equipment were published in the recruiting pamphlets that accompanied the tours.929 The 
newspapers also covered the actual tours and provided glowing reports about the significance 
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928  ‘War Train Tour of the Union’, Cape Argus, 14 March 1941. 
929  UWH, Box 277, B.I. 29, ‘See the War Train’, Recruiting Pamphlet, 1941 (only year); UWH, Box 277, 
B.I. 29, ‘See for Yourself the Home-Front’s Mighty War Effort’, Recruiting Pamphlet, 1941 (only 
year). 
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of the military displays and the need for recruits. 930 Colonel Werdmuller was in charge of the 
tours and utilised the opportunity to address the public for recruiting purposes, including 
blacks, who actually did fall within his scope of recruitment.931 
 
To supplement the recruitment tours and military displays, the DMI (Ic) facilitated the 
publication of articles about the various UDF units in the field. Information about the tank 
corps, artillery, signallers and infantry as well as their training centres in the Union was 
prepared for the BOI to distribute to the press. The articles served to educate the public about 
the significance and role of each unit in the army, and how eligible members could develop 
and enhance their skills at the available training depots.932 Examples of how those units 
performed in military campaigns in Abyssinia, Libya and Egypt were also offered for the 
purpose of highlighting their significance and enhancing the reputation of the relevant 
regiments.933 Smuts wrote a dedicated publication called the Sidi Rezegh and its Call, 
reflecting on the encounters of the 5th South African Brigade which suffered heavy losses 
against the Germans and Italians.934 As in previous speeches, he described the war as a 
contest between ‘the total forces of evil and aggression in mass attack on the united forces of 
freedom – Germany, Italy and Japan against the British Commonwealth of Nations, Russia 
and America’.935 On this basis, he made renewed calls for recruits to fill the depleted ranks. 
The publication contained pictures of the troops engaged in their routine work and others 
cheerfully playing in social scenes. The UDF’s film and photographic unit, operating in the 
North from 1943, played an important role of producing thousands of photos per month for 
military publicity and propaganda.936 The unit, despite lacking sufficient skilled personnel 
comparable to, for example Britain, America and Australia937, was instrumental in supplying 
the newspapers with the visual depiction of the UDF troops in various war settings. The 
                                                 
930  ‘Men Needed for the Home-Front: Objects of the War Trains Tour of the Union’, Cape Argus, 29 
March 1941. 
931  ‘Natives Join in Welcome to Mobile Column’, Rand Daily Mail, 14 November 1940. 
932  Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (A), Recruiting Publicity Campaign, November-December 1942. 
933  Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (A), The Home of Guns, 17 November 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 
20, I. 20 (A), To The Last Round, 17 November 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (A), The 
Private Soldier at Work: The New Springbok Infantry, 17 November 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 20, 
I. 20 (A), Preparing for the Offensive: The South African Tank Corps, 9 November 1942. 
934  UWH, Box 240, B.I. 2, Sidi Rezegh and its Call, December 1942. 
935  UWH, Box 240, B.I. 2, Sidi Rezegh and its Call, December 1942, p. 10. 
936  PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, A Brief History of SAPR Film and Photo Unit, May 1945. 
937  PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944; PP, 
Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, South African Public Relations Film and Photographic Unit, Italy, April 1945. 
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photos mainly depicted soldiers in social scenarios and also reflected the ruined cities after 
military operations.938 
 
Black press was also instrumental in stimulating war enthusiasm within the black 
communities. The government identified a list of black newspapers circulating in the Union 
to publish various articles about NEAS. The NAD contracted the head of Bantu Press, B.F.G. 
Paver, to promote the war among black communities through articles in the eight black 
newspapers and the Secretary for Native Affairs’ Weekly News Bulletin.939 The articles dealt 
with life in military camps, recruitment, the various phases of training, special parades and 
demonstrations, award ceremonies, arrivals and receptions of casualties, as well as general 
interest news.940 The military authorities conducted a “Soldiers Friend Column”941 in all 
black newspapers, where questions were invited from the black civilians and soldiers on 
matters pertaining to experiences of difficulties, pensions, employment, medical categories, 
allotments, financial relief, re-employment and other military-related issues.942 In addition, 
the eminent NMC members, their achievements and activities were published in the “Gossip 
Column” sections of the black newspapers.943 Major Frank Brownlee, former Judge President 
of Native Appeal Court for the Transvaal and Natal, was instrumental in drafting the articles 
                                                 
938  ‘Suid Afrikaners Aan and Agter Front’, Die Vaderland, 19 August 1944. 
939  DNEAS Group 2, Box 10, NAS, 3/21 K, DNEAS to DCS (DMI), 13 February 1943; NMC, Box 11, 
NAS, 3/21, Report on Publicity and Propaganda, 20 August 1942; See various versions of Black Press 
in J.C. Amstrong (ed.), The Black Press in South Africa and Lesotho: A Descriptive Bibliographical 
Guide to African, Coloured and Indian newspapers, newsletters and magazines, 1836-1976, (G.K. Hall 
and Co, Boston Massachusetts, 1979). The newspapers referred to here are Bantu World 
(Johannesburg), Umteteli wa Bantu (Johannesburg), Imvo Zabantsundu (Johannesburg), Ilanga lase 
Natal (Durban), Um-Afrika (Marianhill), Umthunywa (Umtata), Mochochonono (Maseru), Morongoa 
oa Morena (Palmerton), Indaba Zovuyo (Palmerton), and also the Secretary for Native Affairs’ Weekly 
News Bulletin. 
940  NMC, Box 11, NAS, 3/21, Report on Publicity and Propaganda, 20 August 1942; ‘Africans: Your 
Country Needs You’, Recruiting Cartoon, The Bantu World, 12 September 1942; ‘Parade Ground’, 
Cartoon, The Bantu World, 26 September 1942. 
941  NMC, Box 16, NAS, 3/21/D, “Soldiers’ Friend”, Bantu Press: Questions and Answers, Bantu Press 
Secretary to Mockford, 20 July 1942; NMC, Box 16, NAS, 3/21/D, Soldiers’ Friend Column, DNEAS 
to the Editor, Bantu Press, 24 May 1943. 
942  Box 11, NAS, 3/21, Report on Publicity and Propaganda, 20 August 1942; NMC, Box 16, NAS, 
3/21/D, Questions by NMC members and Replies by DNEAS, DNEAS to Secretary, Bantu Press, 3 
December 1942; NMC, Box 16, NAS, 3/21/D, Questions by NMC member, Sgt D.R. Mokoa, 
Secretary, Bantu Press to DNEAS, 13 April 1943; NMC, Box 16, NAS, 3/21/D, Soldiers’ Friend 
Column, DNEAS to the Editor, Bantu Press, 24 May 1943. 
943  NMC, Box 14, NAS 3/21/A, Further Dramatic Escape from Tobruk, Reuben Moloi, by DNEAS for 
press publication, October 1942; NMC, Box 14, NAS 3/21/A, More Honours for Cape Corps and 
Native Military Corps, by DNEAS for publication in the press, at the request of the Secretary to the 
Minister of Native Affairs, 8 February 1944. 
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for the publicity of the NMC and also prepared leaflets in black languages to combat Nazi 
propaganda among blacks.944 
 
The BOI, together with the NAD, also translated an English and Afrikaans newsletter called 
News of the War into black languages.945 The News of the War contained information about 
the military operations, military successes and pictures of the NEAS engaged in the various 
activities as well as the awarding of medals.946 The purpose of the News of the War was ‘to 
keep Africans well informed about the war’ and to promote black identification with the 
war.947 It was a “hard sell” approach with the immediate objectives of cultivating black 
enthusiasm in the war by showcasing the military achievements and contributions of the 
black servicemen. Another approach was concerned with combating the growth of subversive 
German propaganda among blacks.948 The government employed negative propaganda to 
nurture the anti-German sentiment. Newspapers published articles reflecting the atrocious 
German colonial record in SWA and Tanganyika, and also how the Nazis were treating the 
inhabitants of the occupied European countries since the war started.949 Propaganda was 
crafted to induce fear and to dissuade the public, both black and white, from advocating Nazi 
victory as that would result in adverse consequences for the nation. (See illustrations 12-15) 
 
The South African Services’ official news magazine, The Nongqai, added to the growing list 
of publications which promoted military publicity and propaganda. First published in the 
Pretoria offices of the Union’s commissioner of police in 1913 as a monthly regimental 
journal, it contained articles, stories, anecdotes, pictures and sketches on the security services, 
i.e. the military, the police and the prison officials.950 Though it declared that ‘politics and 
argument’ had no place in the magazine, it could not escape the promotion of war propaganda 
as it was committed to the publication of articles, stories and pictures of the South African 
forces. The Nongqai had an exclusive section called ‘Defence Headquarters’, which was 
                                                 
944  UWH, Box 240, B.I. 2, South Africa at War – Military Matters, 18 June 1942; ‘Natives told about Nazi 
“White Ants”’ , Rand Daily Mail, 4 June 1940. 
945  HEN, Box 2190, 432/1/12, Weekly Newsletter, Bureau of Information, 19 March 1944. 
946  News of the War, Bureau of Information, 1941-1945. 
947  HEN, Box 2190, 432/1/12, Weekly Newsletter, Bureau of Information, 19 March 1944. 
948  NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Native Subversive Propaganda, DDMI to Secretary for Native 
Affairs, 24 July 1940; ‘Natives Promised Golden Age, Insidious Campaign by Pro-Nazis’, Rand Daily 
Mail, 24 July 1940; ‘Spread of Nazi Propaganda’, The Star, 10 August 1940; NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 
511/400, Alleged Enemy Propaganda – Transkei and Ciskei, Houghton Gray to Smuts, 4 March 1942. 
949  ‘Life under Germans’, The Star, 21 September 1940; ‘Hitler, the Satan of Today’, The Star, 29 April 
1941; SANDFA, UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Native Africans’ Opinion of Nazi Germany, 14 December 
1940. 
950  ‘Editorial’, The Nongqai, Pretoria, November 1913. 
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dedicated to matters of a military nature.951 As war progressed, the magazine assisted the 
government in the recruitment campaigns. Through its advertisement supplement, it carried 
information in English and Afrikaans, regarding the procedures to be used by the public to 
join the various units of the UDF on full-time or part-time basis.952 
 
From August 1940, after the departure of the UDF troops for deployment in the North, The 
Nongqai created a dedicated section called ‘Going Up North: Union Troops on the Move’, 
which dealt with the news from the troops serving in East and North Africa. Each monthly 
issue was dedicated to a particular branch of military service or war activity, both on the 
home-front and outside South Africa. The stories and articles of servicemen and UDF units 
were also accompanied by photographic pictures for illustrative purposes. Also, through The 
Nongqai, the stories of the many “obscure” units of the UDF such as the salt convoys and the 
despatch riders or even the story of an equipment officer of the entertainment unit, were told, 
explaining their unglamorous but arduous tasks, in order to illustrate their significance in 
support of the war effort.953 What The Nongqai did was to provide an extensive coverage of 
the various aspects of the war and to construct heroic images of the South Africa armed 
forces for the purpose of enhancing their popularity and for generating interest in the war 
effort. 
 
Throughout the war, The Nongqai maintained its loyalty by promoting the war policy, 
spreading editorial messages of sacrifice and unity in both English and Afrikaans, publishing 
Christmas greetings from General Smuts, devoting articles relating to individual members in 
the war effort, the various roles of UDF units, personal stories and profiles of servicemen, 
war-related cartoons and sketches, defence weapons and manoeuvres, anecdotes and 
interviews.954 The “V for Victory” propaganda symbol and the South African version of it 
was also popularised in the magazine.955 This symbol was promoted by the BBC during 1941 
to rally support for an unwavering determination of the Allied forces and resistance 
                                                 
951  ‘Defence Headquarters’, The Nongqai, October 1939. 
952  ‘The Union at War: How to Join the Forces’, The Nongqai, June 1940; ‘To the Men and Women of 
South Africa, Your Country Needs You Now’, The Nongqai, June 1941; ‘The Call for Recruits: An 
Exclusive Interview with Colonel G.C.G. Werdmuller’, The Nongqai, November 1941. 
953  ‘U.D.F. Salt Convoys Across the Desert’, The Nongqai, November 1944; ‘Couriers in Modern 
Warfare’, The Nongqai, November 1944; ‘Equipping the U.D.F. Entertainment Units’, The Nongqai, 
April 1945; ‘No. 1 N.M.C. Concert Party’, The Nongqai, April 1945. 
954  See volumes of The Nongqai, 1939-1945. 
955  ‘Emblematical of South Africa’, The Nongqai, August-December 1941; ‘V for Victory’, The Nongqai 
October 1942; See volumes of The Nongqai, 1939-1945. 
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movements of occupied Europe to fight for victory against the Axis powers.956 Even though 
The Nongqai played its part in wartime propaganda, as a mouthpiece to promote the South 
African armed forces, it suffered a major shortcoming like the rest of the mainstream press – 
the lack of troop photographs in military action.957 (See illustrations 16-23) 
 
Another magazine with a dedicated effort of promoting the government’s war policy was 
Libertas, published in Johannesburg by the UUTS. The first issue of this illustrated 
propaganda magazine appeared in December 1940.958 Libertas was a 96-page pictorial 
magazine designed along similar lines as Life and the Picture Post magazines of the United 
States and Britain respectively.959 The UUTS, which had undertaken to wage a militant 
propaganda campaign, designed the magazine for the sole purpose of publicising the Union’s 
war effort. Its major emphasis, just like The Nongqai, was on popularising military service 
and the work of the participants in the war. To this end, Libertas ran a series of picture 
biographies of the ‘South African Heroes’ in the armed forces and their various activities in 
service of the nation during the war.960 By 1943, in order to increase circulation and to arouse 
further interest in the magazine, the policy of Libertas had changed from only popularising 
military service and the Union’s war effort, to deal constructively with the social and 
economic issues through its pictures.961 As the main pro-government propaganda vehicle, the 
UUTS also decided to enhance the magazine’s appeal by converting it into a National Trust, 
whereby it would serve to promote the preservation of the Union’s natural and animal 
resources and the promotion of national unity after the war.962 
 
The London-based Royal United Service Institution (RUSI) published a journal dedicated to 
the promotion of naval and military science and literature. The RUSI journal was published 
quarterly and made available to the members of RUSI in any part of the world.963 During the 
war, the South African political and military events were published regularly under the 
“notes” sections of the Navy, Army and Air Force. The significant role of RUSI journal was 
                                                 
956  ‘British Open “V” Nerve War: Churchill Spurs Resistance’, The New York Times, 20 July 1941. 
957  See copies of The Nongqai, 1940-1945. 
958  ‘Libertas - A Great Success’, Torch Sparks, No. 7, A pamphlet communicating UUTS information to 
officials and members, 13 January 1941. 
959  CGS (War), Box 199, 42/5, Robertson to CGS, 11 December 1940. 
960  ‘A Day in the life of a Woman Transport Driver’ (J.A. Malherbe), Libertas, vol. 1, no.2, January 1941; 
See copies of The Nongqai, 1940-1945. 
961  UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942 - 30 June 1943. 
962  UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942 - 30 June 1943. 
963  Journal: Royal United Service Institution (RUSI), May 1939. This journal was published in January, 
April, July and October of every year. 
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to publish professional articles of educational value – useful lessons about war, and also 
provided the space for brief notes on military news about the various members of the 
Commonwealth of Nations such as South Africa, Canada, Australia and India.964 Because it 
catered for many countries, the RUSI journal played a limited role in South Africa’s war 
propaganda effort. 
 
There were also numerous other publications of multiple variety that proliferated in the 
Union. The “V for Victory” propaganda sign was presented in large posters and also in small 
pocket-sized publications, depicting Hitler being overwhelmed with the “V” sign 
everywhere.965 Smuts also popularised the “V for Victory” in booklet, and explained that the 
‘in South Africa the V stands not only for victory, but also for Freedom – Vryheid’.966 The 
public was urged to adopt the sign as a national watchword in a determined struggle for 
victory and freedom. Another publication called Flash, published in Pietermaritzburg during 
the war, had a “V” sign on its logo, and dedicated its content to ridiculing the anti-
government elements. In 1944, Flash had a full page of a large “V” sign advertisement which 
had pictures of SAWAS members inside it with a caption, ‘We Salute the Queens’, in an 
effort to honour the role women were playing in the Union’s struggle for victory.967 
Publications of a similar nature flooded the country and greatly contributed to the 
government’s propaganda effort on the home-front in terms of boosting morale and 
popularising the services of the South African forces in the war.968 (See illustrations 24-27) 
 
Posters also served as another media for publicity and propaganda in the promotion of the 
Union’s the war effort on the home-front. The BOI commissioned commercial artists and 
advertising contractors for the design and production of war-related propaganda posters.969 
Posters were mainly used for recruitment purposes, issuing careless talk warnings, and 
vilifying the Nazis and the anti-war elements. The posters were displayed at prominent places 
                                                 
964  See volumes of Journal: Royal United Service Institution (RUSI), 1939-1945; ‘Some Factors Affecting 
Military Morale’, RUSI, August 1942; ‘Propaganda in War’, RUSI, February 1943. 
965  ‘V for Victory Posters’, Ditsong: The South African Museum of Military History, Johannesburg. 
966  ‘V for Victory and Freedom’, Malherbe Papers, File 443/3, KCM 56975 (41i), General J.C. Smuts, 22 
July 1941. Vryheid is an Afrikaans translation for Freedom, 
967  ‘We Salute the Queens’, Flash – Dawn of Victory Cavalcade Edition, 27 June 1944. 
968  See Four Enemies by the Goodwill Council, Vanguard to Victory by Conrad Norton and Uys Krige, 
(General Smuts) Investing in Friendship by London-based Hodder and Stoughton publishers, They 
Answered the Call by the Jewish Board of Deputies, and the various other propaganda publications in 
Afrikaans and English from the USA. 
969  AG (War), Box 6, 168/2/7/8, Establishment SAINC (V) – War Artist, 1 September 1943; ‘SA War 
Artists’, The Nongqai, October 1942; NASAP, Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: 
Present Activities, 21 May 1942. 
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such as post offices, railway stations, police stations, shops, establishments, defence 
recruiting facilities as well as on trains and buses.970  
 
For propaganda among blacks, the posters were printed in Sesotho for the Transvaal 
population, isiZulu for Natal and isiXhosa for the Cape, Ciskei and Transkei.971 The posters 
were displayed at native commissioners’ offices, black drinking places (native beer halls), on 
buses for black commuters and in cinemas for black patrons.972 These were supplemented 
with thousands of recruitment appeals in English and a relevant black language according to 
the area, and containing pictures of the black chiefs.973 Posters were simplified to convey the 
relevant message through the pictures and with limited words, such as, ‘Manpower for 
Airpower’, (Afrikaans) ‘Steeds Getrou Op Die Pad van Suid Afrika: 1838, 1899, 1941’ and 
‘Recruits Wanted-South African Medical Services’.974 
 
The war artists were also instrumental in crafting recruitment posters for the NMC. For 
example, in one poster, an NMC soldier in military outfit (without an assegai) was depicted 
calling on others in Sesotho, isiXhosa and isiZulu languages to “Wake up (Vukani) and Join” 
because the enemy was planning a ‘Nazi Africa’.975 These kinds of messages were regularly 
used to heighten the fear of a Nazi victory in order to persuade people to join up. The works 
of the war artists who recorded concrete impressions of the war involving South Africa were 
significant in complementing the posters. (See illustrations 28-32) 
 
Official South African war artists, chiefly Captain Neville Lewis, Lieutenant Geoffrey Long 
and Lieutenant Francois Krige, were required to produce paintings in colour or etchings for 
                                                 
970  Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20, PR 23/4/2, Recruiting Drives, 10 September 1940; Smuts Papers, A1, 
vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942. 
971  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Activities, DNEAS Lieutenant to Lt Col Mockford, 5 
November 1942. 
972  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Activities, DNEAS Lieutenant to Lt Col Mockford, 5 
November 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, List of Bus Owners, Secretary in the Office of 
Local Transportation Board to DNEAS, 20 November 1942. 
973  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Printing of Appeals by Native Chiefs, DNEAS to Government 
Printer, Pretoria, 23 December 1942; NMC, Box 15, NAS 3/21/C, NMC, Speeches and Appeals, Chiefs 
S.W. Makaula (Baca), R. Sibasa (Venda), A. Moiloa (Lehurutse, Tswana), S. Mampuru (Nebo, Pedi), 
H. Mangope (Lehurutse, Tswana), M. Buthelezi (Zulu), J.K. Mankurwane (Batlhaping, Tswana), C. 
Mopeli (Wietzishoek, Sotho), W.K. Manthe (Taung, Tswana), B. Sigcau (Pondo), J. Moshesh (Sotho), 
S.H. Lehana (Botlokoa – Mt Fletcher, Sotho), J. Moepi (Pedi), M. Zulu (Melthoth, Natal), G. 
Mbulaheni (Zoutpansberg, Venda), L. Ngcobo, (Natal, Zulu). 
974  ‘Posters in South Africa’, The Nongqai, November 1941. 
975  NMC, Box 14, 3/21/A, Propaganda and Press Matters, NMC Recruiting Poster, “Vukani”, n.d. 
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pictorial portrayal of the country’s war effort for propaganda and for historical records.976 
Official war artists were part of the DMI under Dr Malherbe which facilitated the control of 
the war art, publication of reproductions and also organised exhibitions.977 The war artists 
produced various paintings and water colour drawings depicting war scenes (e.g. Tobruk in 
1942), military hardware, portraits of military personnel, in the shelters, in convoys, in the 
navy and war production.978 War artists portrayed a version of the reality of war, which the 
South African still photographers were not able to produce. The paintings were mostly 
exhibited in several places and then preserved for historical records once their value had 
diminished.979 After the war, there were about 313 artworks produced by the UDF official 
war artists and other private persons and the South African War Museum had 583 war art 
copies in its possession.980 (See figs. 4-11) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Radio and the press were critical to the Union government’s propaganda effort during the 
war. However, both had different stregnths and weakness. Radio was valuable for reaching a 
wider public at the same time, even the non-literate public, but the government did not 
exercise complete control over the scope of, and content of what was transmitted. Until late 
in the war, technical deficiencies hampered direct and instant transmissions to the Union, thus 
impacting on radio’s effectiveness in the governmnet’s propaganda effort. The content was 
also not accepted by whole communities, especially black South Africans. The press, on the 
other hand, had by far, greater reach, scope and visual impact. However, it was mainly 
accessible to literate people, and was more open to contestations by various groups, including 
government opponents. The government also had no control over the newspaper editors, who 
had the sole monopoly over the contents. The editors volunteered to observe censorship 
regulations, but breached them on many occasions, especially the opposition movements 
                                                 
976  AG (War), Box 6, 168/2/7/8, Establishment SAINC (V) – War Artist, 1 September 1943; SANDFA, 
AG (3), Box 2A, 51/1, Catalogue of SA War Art, 1939-1945, by DCGS (DMI), 21 August 1947; ‘SA 
War Artists’, The Nongqai, October 1942. 
977  AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2, Establishment DMI-DCS Section, Organisational Chart, 13 July 1943. 
978  AG (3), Box 2A, 51/1, Catalogue of SA War Art, 1939-1945, by DCGS (DMI), 21 August 1947; AG 
(War), Box 6, 168/2/7/8, Establishment SAINC (V) – War Artist, 1 September 1943; ‘SA War Artists’, 
The Nongqai, October 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 440/2, KCM 56974 (648), The First Exhibition 
South African War Art: Illustrated Souvenir Edition, October 1941. 
979  ‘SA War Artists’, The Nongqai, October 1942, ‘Germany in Ruins: Geoffrey Long’s Paintings’, The 
Star, 19 November 1945. 
980  AG (3), Box 2A, 51/1, Catalogue of SA War Art, 1939-1945, by DCGS (DMI), 21 August 1947. The 
latest number of artistic works from the SA Military Museum is about a thousand.  
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which, unlike the government, had their own newspaper publications. The government, to 
some extent, had control over the news content of the UDF activities in the war zone as these 
were channelled through the BOI and SAPA. Another advantage was drawn from the posters 
and artworks produced by authorised war artists and government-contracted advertising 
companies. 
 
Despite these shortcomings, radio and the press proved to be valuable instruments in the 
conduct of propaganda operations, especially because of their reach and accessibility. They 
were also much cheaper, as compared to the other platforms which were also exploited to 
advance the Union government’s propaganda campaign: films, newsreels and military 
demonstrations. These platforms offered more visual impact due to motion presentations and, 
in the case of military displays, live action. However, as will be shown in the next chapter, 
their high technical and financial requirements presented difficulties to the Union authorities. 
Hence their role remained supplementary to radio and the press. The next chapter will 
examine these other platforms and their value in detail, in the context of South Africa’s war 
propaganda on the home-front. 
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Illustration 9: Rand Daily Mail, 26 Jun 1939  Illustration 10: Rand Daily Mail, 6 Sep 1939 
  
Illustration 11: Sunday Express, 23 July 1939  Illustration 12: Bantu World, 12 Sep 1942 
  
Illustration 13: Bantu World, 12 Sep 1942  Illustration 14: Bantu World, 12 Sep 1942 
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Illustration 15: News of the War, Military Archives, UWH, vol. 263 
  
Illustration 16: The Nongqai, Jun 1940  Illustration 17: The Nongqai, Nov 1941 
  
Illustration 18: The Nongqai, Sep 1940  Illustration 19: The Nongqai, Sep 1940 
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Illustration 20: The Nongqai, Jan 1941  Illustration 21: The Nongqai, Nov 1940 
 
 
Illustration 22: The Nongqai  Dec 1942 
 
Illustration 23: The Nongqai, Oct 1939 
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Illustration 24: Victory Symbol to Scare Adolf Hitler, Ditsong Museum of Military 
History, Johannesburg 
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Illustration 25: The Nongqai, Nov 1941  Illustration 26: Flash, Jun 1944 
 
Illustration 27: V for Victory, EG Malherbe Collectios, vol. 443/3 
 
Illustration 28, Vukani, NMC Recruitment, Military Archives, NMC, vol. 14 
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Illustration 29, Careless Talk Warning Posters, Ditsong Museum of Military History, Johannesburg 
  
Illustration 30: Anti-Fascist and Anti-Hitler Propaganda: Military Archives, War Diaries, vol. 533. These posters 
were produced for the UDF troops too. 
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Illustration 31: War for Freedom and Peace Propaganda, Military Archives, War Diaries, vol. 534. 
  
Illustration 32: Economic Propaganda: NMC Earnings: Military Archives, War Diaries, vol. 534. 
     
Fig. 4: Col E.T. Stubbs, DNEAS, War Art No. 1279 Fig. 5: NMC Soldier, War Art No. 1815 
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Fig. 6: NMC, Stretcher Bearer, War Art No. 1816 Fig. 7: NMC, Making Beer, War Art No. 1780 
  
Fig. 8: Dead Germans, War Art No. 1618   Fig. 9: CC, EL Haseiat, War Art No. 1569 
  
Fig. 10: Casualties W. Desert, War Art No, 1619 Fig. 11: Reading Night, War Art No, 1721 
Figures 4-11: War Art, Ditsong Museum of Military History, Johannesburg 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
HOME-FRONT PROPAGANDA: FILMS, NEWSREELS AND MILITARY 
DISPLAYS 
 
In order to arouse and sustain public enthusiasm in the war as well as to facilitate recruiting, 
the Union authorities exploited the novelty of films and newsreels to conduct war 
propaganda. From the military side, arrangements were also made for undertaking mobile 
recruiting tours and for staging military displays to the public throughout the country. These 
activities were designed to inpire the public through live action and to showcase the Union’s 
military capacity for the purpose of boosting public morale and to support recruitment efforts. 
This chapter analyses these various programmes as additional avenues exploited by the Union 
government to secure home-front support during the war. It will firstly examine the 
production and exhibition films and newsreels as well as the value they added to the Union’s 
war propaganda effort. Thereafter, the chapter will deal with the organisation of military 
tours and demonstrations as well as the impact these had on recruitment. 
 
FILMS AND NEWSREELS 
 
To start with, it is useful to provide some background about the origin and development of 
the film industry in South Africa, so as to create context for the role they (films – newsreels) 
played in war propaganda. By the outbreak of the war, the film industry has been developed 
for forty-five years in South Africa. Following the mineral revolution in the Union, from the 
discoveries of diamond in Kimberley (1869) and gold in the Reef (1886), the film industry 
emerged ten years later.981 As early as 1895, mobile bioscopes had reached the Johannesburg 
mining fields and continued until the establishment of the African Film Productions in 1910 
by the New York (USA) immigrant, Isadore William Schlesinger.982 Schlesinger consolidated 
the national production, distribution and exhibition under the African Consolidated Films and 
the African Consolidated Theatres.983 
                                                 
981  See T. Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895-1940, 
(Howard Timmins, Cape Town, 1972); K. Tomaselli, Encountering Modernity: Twentieth Century 
South African Cinema, (Rozenburg Publishers/Unisa Press, Amsterdam and Pretoria, 2006). 
982  K. Tuomi, ‘The South African Feature Film Industry: A Comparative Analysis’, Social Dynamics, vol. 
32, no. 2, 2006, pp. 81-110. 
983  Ibid., p. 89. 
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In 1913, Schlesinger’s African Films company founded the The African Mirror, which 
became an important vehicle for producing war news in motion pictures to the public during 
the war.984 Apart from African Films, other film companies such as the United Artists, Union 
Films, Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer and 20th Century Fox, entered the South African market, 
especially in the 1930s.985 Because of their entertainment value and mental distraction, films 
came to play a significant role with regard to propaganda campaigns to generate support for 
the Union’s war policy. Out of the immediate wartime propaganda necessity and convenience 
of the available film resources and capacity, the Union’s DMI (Ic) and the BOI exploited the 
cinema for popular mobilisation of the society. Thus, the BOI brokered arrangements for 
collaborative efforts with the existing film bodies to wage the country’s propaganda 
campaign.986 The military, on the hand, went on to develop in-house film production 
capability to cater for the instruction and training needs of the UDF. 
 
Military authorities acknowledged the role of modern film as one of the most important 
aspect of wartime propaganda.987 However, it was also South Africa’s weakest link in the 
whole propaganda system. Part of the reason was the initial focus on training and 
instructional films. These were supplied by the British war office in mid-1940.988 In 
December of the same year the UDF Film Unit under Major Weaver was established for 
producing and circulating military instructional and general interest films.989 Until mid-1942, 
this Film Unit mainly concentrated on the production and circulation of films to various 
training centres and camps in the Union. By June, it had veered into publicity by producing a 
                                                 
984  M.P. Botha, ‘South African Cinema: 110 Years of South African Cinema’ (Part 1), Kinema, Spring 
2006, (http://www.kinema.uwaterloo.ca/article.php), accessed on 19 November 2012. 
985  Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895-1940, (1972); 
Tomaselli, Encountering Modernity: Twentieth Century South African Cinema, (2006); Botha, ‘South 
African Cinema: 110 Years of South African Cinema’ (Part 1), Kinema, 2006, 
(http://www.kinema.uwaterloo.ca/article.php), accessed on 19 November 2012. 
986  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942; ‘The South 
African Bureau of Information: The First Exclusive Interview with the Director, A.N. Wilson’, The 
Nongqai, June 1942. 
987  AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/4, Deputy Chief of Staff to Director of Military Intelligence, 5 October 
1942; PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 
1942; AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 
1943. 
988  AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment-Director of Intelligence, Subsection, Film Production 
Unit, 24 December 1942. 
989  PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Establishment – Film Production Unit, Weaver to Malherbe, 16 September 
1942; AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 
1943; PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 
1942. 
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recruiting film for women.990 British and American films were still imported and distributed 
through the BOI.  
 
When the UDF troops were deployed in the North, there was mainly one cinematographer, 
Lieutenant Frank Dixon (who resigned in January 1941 and was replaced by Merl la Voy) 
and one still photographer, Lieutenant S.A.D. Keartland, both working for the BOI, to cover 
the activities of the South African forces in the field.991 Although the military had its own 
film unit, the BOI’s film section, with the assistance of a film critic and part-time film advisor 
to the BOI’s director, Thelma Gutsche992, had maintained monopoly over the production, 
circulation and exhibition of films in the Union throughout the war, which was a source of 
constant friction and weakness in terms of conducting effective war propaganda through 
films.993 Attempts to remedy the situation were undertaken during the post-Tobruk 
recruitment drive. As a result of the need for better co-ordination of film propaganda 
activities, proposals were approved by Lawrence and Van Ryneveld to incorporate the BOI’s 
film section into the UDF Film Unit.994 However, the proposals were partially implemented 
as the BOI still maintained control over the film aspect of war propaganda. A measure of 
relief was achieved with the establishment of the film and photographic unit under Captain 
F.N. Clayton in 1943, as a sub-section of the South African public relations (SAPR) based in 
North Africa/Middle East (and later moved to Italy).995 
 
Clayton was a cinematographer, and was assisted by Lieutenant D. Abraham and Lieutenant 
J.W. Nicholls for still photography.996 These were the only two staff members who performed 
the two tasks of taking shots of the UDF troops in the field. A third member, a cine operator 
                                                 
990  PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Military Film Unit, Malherbe to Director of Military Training (DMT), 29 June 
1942. 
991  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information – Representatives in the Field, DMI 
(Ic) to DDMI, 29 October 1940; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Memorandum, Bureau of Information: 
Proposed Reorganisation, 14 July 1941.  
992  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Memorandum, Bureau of Information: Proposed Reorganisation, 14 July 1941; 
Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (532b), Correspondence, Thelma Gutshe to Dr Malherbe, 29 
January 1941 and 14 March 1942. 
993  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the Relationship between the Bureau of Information and the UDF, 
Discussion with Mr A.N.Wilson, Report by Capt I. Baries of Ic Film Unit, 6 January 1941; PP, Box 63, 
PU 6/9/4, Notes, Final Military Publicity Campaign, DMI (Ic) Press Liaison Staff, 14 January 1944; 
PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Memorandum on Military Publicity and Propaganda, R.N. Lindsay (ADPR) to 
DMI, 22 February 1944. 
994  PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Expansion of Defence Film Unit to Incorporate Film Section of Bureau of 
Information, DDMI to DCS, 16 July 1942. 
995  PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944; PP, 
Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Official Photographs, Wakefield to Theron, 7 December 1944. 
996  PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944. 
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named Sergeant J.H. Middleton, was ill and could not offer any assistance.997 These 
arrangements, however, remained inadequate to cover the entire activities of the UDF during 
the war. 
 
In January 1944, the press liaison staff of the DMI (Ic)’s assessment report on war 
propaganda filming for UDF was very blunt: ‘present film coverage is inadequate and poor 
… [it] is due to the lack of cameramen with the South African forces’.998 In the following 
month, the assistant director of public relations (ADPR) in the North, Major (later lieutenant 
colonel) R.N. Lindsay wrote in his memorandum to the DMI (Dr Malherbe) that ‘the film 
aspect of publicity is without doubt the weakest part of the organisation’.999 The staff 
shortage limited the work of film production and circulation, however, some successes were 
recorded. Thousands of reels and photographs were produced and distributed to the Union 
and to the UK.1000 In 1944, the entire UDF Film Unit had handled and circulated about 
56 000 16 mm (short standard for travelling) and 35 mm films (international cinema 
standard) for military training, recruitment and for general publicity.1001  
 
A large proportion of film production and circulation during the war was handled by the BOI. 
By 1942, the BOI had organised with major film companies like the African Films, Union 
Films and Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer, for the production and exhibition of war propaganda films 
to the public.1002 The BOI also deployed its photographer and cinematographer as war 
correspondents who accompanied the UDF in the North to film their activities.1003 The films 
were then handled in the Union by the BOI through contracted film companies and were 
shown in cinemas throughout the Union. The BOI’s films were also distributed to the 
                                                 
997  PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944. 
998  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Notes, Final Military Publicity Campaign, DMI (Ic) Press Liaison Staff, 14 
January 1944. 
999  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Memorandum on Military Publicity and Propaganda, R.N. Lindsay (ADPR) to 
DMI, 22 February 1944. 
1000  PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, May 1945. 
1001  PP, Box 40, PR 1/2/2, South African Public Relations Film and Photo Unit (SAPR), Liaison, Publicity 
and Results, Memorandum for Colonel Campbell-Ross, 27 July 1944; ‘Military Movies’, The Nongqai, 
December 1944. 
1002  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (542), Memorandum on The Utilisation of Film Resources 
in Furthering the War Effort on a National Scale, 30 June 1942. 
1003  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942;, PP, Box 63, 
PU 6/9/4, Attachment of Bureau of Information Representatives to 1st South African Division, Wilson 
to DMI, 13 January 1941. 
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Commonwealth and America.1004 Despite their tumultuous relationship, the BOI and the DMI 
(Ic), in collaboration with the SABC and the UUTS, played a key role in integrating films 
within the broader propaganda system to facilitate the stimulation of a nation-wide interest in 
the Union’s war effort. Films, newsreels and even slides were produced and circulated in the 
cinemas and at many exhibition centres in the country. 
 
In collaboration with the DMI (Ic), the BOI arranged for the production of various war 
propaganda films. One of the first films produced by the African Films in 1940 was called 
Fighters in the Veld, with commentary in both English and Afrikaans, for exhibition 
throughout the country.1005 Because of the apparent laxity and slow recruitment progress 
when war began, the film was designed to mobilise public awareness and support for the war. 
Fighters in the Veld reflected the “backveld” origin of the troops, mainly the Afrikaners, who 
were historically pastoralists and were responding to a call by the Union leaders to defend 
their freedom.1006 The film depicted the development of men from civilian life, disorganised 
and relaxed, to a disciplined posture of military men. A conventional cliché of portraying a 
civilian man as ignorant and weak, and after joining the army, developed into a disciplined, 
focused and “real” man, was employed in the film. The film, reflecting the prevailing 
stereotypes of the social status of women, also portrayed women knitting and sewing 
garments for the troops, fulfilling their support role as care-givers.1007 
 
Fighters in the Veld also showed military vehicles moving into communities, including black 
areas, to portray the army as part of the nation, not a separate caste. It was a gesture of 
friendship as well as to showcase the country’s military might to combat subversive 
propaganda among blacks, which had magnified the power of the German army. From 
civilian occupations to military service, the Fighters in the Veld showed the UDF soldier with 
high levels of efficiency and co-ordination, effective in manoeuvres, a well-developed sense 
of speed in gun-handling and very fit. In the messages, phrases like “defend freedom” and 
“national honour” were frequently used.1008 Smuts was exalted as a “man of action” who was 
                                                 
1004  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942; PP, Box 63, 
PU 6/9/4, Attachment of Bureau of Information Representatives to 1st South African Division, Wilson 
to DMI, 13 January 1941.  
1005  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 1940. 
1006  The South African Film, Video and Sound Archives (SAFVSA), Pretoria, Fighters in the Veld, FA 
2525, 1940. 
1007  Fighters in the Veld, FA 2525, part 1. 
1008  Fighters in the Veld, FA 2525, part 1. 
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leading South Africa against the “Nazi threat and tyranny”. 1009 Religious values were 
invoked in the film where the UDF troops were depicted as “crusaders of the cross”, 
representing enlightened forces.1010 Fighters in the Veld basically reflected what was “good” 
and “desirable” about military service that people should not fear to join, and the worth of the 
cause for which they were fighting.1011 
 
For the recruitment of blacks, DNEAS arranged with the BOI to produce the main silent film 
called Ayihlome, which was also done by African Films in 1942.1012 Films had in recent 
decades played a significant role in the recruitment of blacks for South Africa’s gold 
mines.1013 In the 1920s, organisations such as the Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) and 
the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) (later The Employment Bureau of 
Africa (TEBA)) utilised mobile cinemas as part of the black labour-recruitment system for 
the mines.1014 In addition to the recruitment of black labour, films were also used for what 
was called ‘health and safety propaganda’ campaign, to promote workers’ health and to 
reduce the risk of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) among blacks as a result of the 
miners’ fraternisation with prostitutes.1015 Reynolds argues that it was typical of the 
propaganda films, which were also used in colonial Africa, to promote western products (e.g. 
medicine) and for “improving the lives” (e.g. civilisation) of blacks.1016 
 
For military recruitment, similarly with Fighters in the Veld, the central theme in the film, 
Ayihlome, was the promotion of the value of serving in the military in order to develop 
personal skills which would be relevant after the war.1017 There was also emphasis on the 
critical need of defending the values of democracy and liberty threated by the forces of evil 
                                                 
1009  Fighters in the Veld, FA 2525, part 1. 
1010  Fighters in the Veld, FA 2524, part 2. 
1011  Fighters in the Veld, FA 2524, part 2. 
1012  SANDFA, DNEAS, Group 2, NMC, Box 11, NAS 3/21, Recruiting Film, Lt Col H.S. Mockford 
(DNEAS) to Maj T.E Leifeldt (Native Commissioner), 7 July 1942. 
1013  G. Reynolds, ‘“From Red Blanket to Civilisation’: Propaganda and Recruitment Films for South 
Africa’s Gold Mines, 1920-1940’, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 33, no. 1, March 2007, pp. 
133-152. 
1014  Reynolds, From Red Blanket to Civilisation, pp. 133-135. 
1015  A. Jeeves, ‘The State, the Cinema, and Health Propaganda for Africans in Pre-Apartheid South Africa, 
1932-1948’, South African Historical Journal, vol. 48, no. 1, May 2003, pp. 109-129. 
1016  Reynolds, ‘From Red Blanket to Civilisation’, pp. 134-137. 
1017  SAFVSA, Ayihlome, A 302, 1942. See also B. Ibhawoh, ‘Second World War Propaganda, Imperial 
Idealism and Anti-Colonial Nationalism in British West Africa’, Nordic Journal of Africa Studies, vol. 
16, no. 2, 2007, pp. 221-243; R. Smyth, ‘War Propaganda during the Second World War in Northern 
Rhodesia’, African Affairs, vol. 83, no. 332, July 1984, pp. 345-358. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
183 
 
represented by Nazi Germany.1018 As with the rest of colonial Africa, references to the 
protection of freedom and democracy had limited appeal to blacks due to the prevalent racial 
policies of discrimination across the continent.1019 Blacks have often wandered about the 
hypocrisy of fighting for freedom in Europe, yet subjected to racial oppression at home: 
 
Most Africans feel and declare that they have not only nothing to fight for, but nothing to fight 
with. Even many of those who had volunteered and answered the call became disillusioned 
when they discovered the unsatisfactory, humiliating, discriminating conditions they have to 
serve under.1020 
 
In Ayihlome, blacks were portrayed as living in a timeless void without advancement and 
development regardless of the prevailing changes brought about by modernity. The 
stereotypes of projecting blacks in primordial context were apparent. The film started with a 
traditional Zulu war dance, as this nation was historically assumed for its martial prowess.1021 
Black soldiers in the film were portrayed wearing modern uniforms, but still carrying the 
traditional assegais.1022 It implied that blacks were still living in the nineteenth century, even 
though they had been exposed to modernity during the mining revolution.1023 In fact, blacks 
knew and used firearms in their military resistance during the colonial wars of conquest as far 
back as the mid-1800s. Perhaps, as Grundlingh puts it, the film producers believed that black 
loyalty could be aroused with their portrayal in a nineteenth century traditional military 
context.1024 The radio speech by the Chief Native Commissioner in Pietermaritzburg, Lugg, 
in July 1940, alluding to the Zulu military tradition, was typical of that view. That perspective 
implied that, despite the advances in technology and urbanisation, blacks were impervious to 
military modernity. 
 
                                                 
1018  SAFVSA, Ayihlome, A 302, 1942. 
1019  Ibhawoh, ‘Second World War Propaganda, Imperial Idealism and Anti-Colonial Nationalism in British 
West Africa’, Nordic Journal of Africa Studies, vol. 16, no. 2, 2007, pp. 221-243; R. Smyth, ‘War 
Propaganda during the Second World War in Northern Rhodesia’, African Affairs, vol. 83, no. 332, 
July 1984, pp. 345-358. 
1020  ‘Report of a Deputation from the ANC to the Deputy Prime Minister on by A.B. Xuma , 4 March 
1942’, in T. Karis and G.M. Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of 
African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964, vol. 2, (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 
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1021  Ayihlome, A 302, 1942; Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Black’, pp. 72-78; Regarding 
the contextualisation of films into African cultures, see also Reynolds, ‘From Red Blanket to 
Civilisation’, pp. 139-140. 
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1024  Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, p. 56. 
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Because of the financial constraints for DNEAS, the film was silent and commentators were 
used for interpretation.1025 A special commentary was delivered in English and translated in 
black languages according to the preferences of the region.1026 There were also copies of 
Ayihlome which had an Afrikaans commentary.1027 It therefore required the training of black 
translators to accompany recruiting officers during exhibitions and tours.1028 In a similar 
fashion as Fighters in the Veld, the film depicted blacks transforming from their relaxed rural 
background to becoming disciplined and “genuine” soldiers.1029 It showed blacks in training 
for their tasks in the army, for example, driving lessons, cobbling and sewing, which were 
learned in the military.1030 
 
Thus, enlisting for military service ensured that black men acquired skills which were 
necessary for them to look after themselves after the war. As an economic incentive, 
Ayihlome also showed troops drawing their salaries and their dependents getting 
allowances.1031 This was designed to incentivise potential recruits about the benefits of 
military service and how they would improve their socio-economic conditions. The film 
generally reflected the “nice” part of military service, but not the hardships which were 
actually experienced by many blacks in the army and produced resentments.1032 The film 
scenarios were shot at the various NMC training centres in the Union: Driefontein, 
Welgedacht, Rietfontein XI, Palmietkuil and Spaarwater, and the actors were drawn from 
                                                 
1025  NMC, Box 15, NAS 3/21, Native Recruiting Film, Mockford to E.D. Dawson, 6 March 1942; DNEAS, 
Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Film, Ayihlome, December 1942. 
1026  DNEAS, Group 2, NMC, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Film- Ayihlome, DNEAS to Manager of 
African Theatres Limited, 21 December 1942. 
1027  Ayihlome, A 302, 1942. 
1028  NMC, Box 5, NAS.3/4/20/1, Native Military Corps Recruiting: Progress Report for period 10/1/43 to 
23/1/43. 
1029  Ayihlome, A 302, 1942; NMC, Box 15, NAS 3/21, Native Recruiting Film, Scenario Script, English, 23 
February 1942; NMC, Box 13, NAS 3/21, Film Script: ‘Mayihlome Impi Madoda’, (Zulu language), 
Officer in Charge, Native Recruiting, Natal and Zululand, 5 March 1943; Grundlingh, ‘The 
Participation of South African Blacks’, p. 56. 
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1031  Ayihlome, A 302; See also Reynolds, From Red Blanket to Civilisation, p. 141. 
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some blacks who supplied their names as having some experience in the amateur theatres 
and/or films.1033 
 
The production of films and their scenarios were influenced by K.A. Maxwell, public 
relations officer of the Tea Market Expansion Bureau, a corporate body for commercial 
publicity representing the tea growers throughout the world. The films were then modified 
after consultations with the film producers and the military authorities.1034 According to 
Maxwell, the main themes of the films were ‘loyalty to the king, security of the home and 
peace time use of the training received in the army’, and not to create the ‘heroes or 
heroines’.1035 Maxwell’s views were related to another film, Uyafuneka, which focused on 
the leaders, Smuts, the coronation of the British king and queen in London and the still 
pictures of heroic African kings such as Shaka, Dingaan, Dinizulu, Dalindyebo and Hintsa 
and other great chieftains.1036 The other two themes on home security and peacetime 
application of the acquired skills from the army were closely adhered to in Ayihlome.1037 For 
sheer novelty and entertainment, many blacks attended the film exhibitions in local theatres, 
eating halls, beer halls and reserves throughout the war.1038 The black recruitment films were 
all shown across the country by means of the ten mobile cinema vans which the Tea Market 
Expansion Bureau had donated to the DNEAS after war broke out.1039 
 
However, in these recruitment films, for example, Ayihlome, producers were out of step with 
the reality of black life and their aspirations about the war. They wanted to be armed like 
their white counter-parts in the UDF and the end of colour discrimination.1040 Furthermore, 
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what blacks ultimately desired was equality of military service, democratic freedoms and 
social justice.1041 It was demeaning to blacks for the authorities and the film producers to 
insinuate that carrying an assegai would evoke their traditional warrior valour and they would 
then flock to the military.1042 Against modern weapons, an assegai was obviously useless.1043 
Blacks saw a role for themselves in the war as armed soldiers serving the country, not what 
was portrayed in the films. Though the films were attended regularly, they did not improve 
the recruitment of blacks.1044 
 
The DMI (Ic) and the BOI facilitated the production and circulation of many other war-
related films. Among others were Springboks Trek North, Call to Arms, Road to Victory, 
Sinews of War, Technical Training, Air Commando and With Smuts in Africa.1045 Along with 
training films, the DMI (Ic) also produced a number of information and recruitment films 
reflecting the various aspects of the military activities and the war effort, e.g. assault practice, 
engineers destroying bridges, map reading, NEAS camp life, Indian and Malay corps, Morse 
tests, NEAS medical corps, advanced flying instruction, theory of coastal gunnery, She is 
South Africa (WADC recruiting) and others.1046 Some of the films were produced for 
recruitment into specific branches of UDF units, e.g. Ubique by Union Films and Over to You 
by African Films, for artillery and signallers.1047 Others were specifically directed at women. 
For women, the emphasis, as indicated above, was for them to take their place beside men. In 
one film, women’s responsibilities were shown to have evolved from the nineteenth century 
Victorian portrait, of rearing a family, to a modern twentieth century Miss South Africa 
                                                                                                                                                        
be Armed’, Cape Times, 6 March 1942; ‘No Colour Bar Request: Demand for Arming Non-
Europeans’, Cape Argus, 19 March 1942. 
1041  Xuma Papers, Box C, AD 843, Minutes of the Annual Conference of the African National Congress 
Conference, Bloemfontein, 15-17 December 1940; Xuma Papers, Box 0, Military Matters, 14.1 – 14.8, 
African Military Service, n.d; ‘Report of a Deputation from the ANC to the Deputy Prime Minister on 
by A.B. Xuma , 4 March 1942’, Karis and G.M. Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge, p 188; 
‘Which Way Congress’, Inkululeko, no. 11, December 1941. 
1042  NMC, Box 12, NAS 3/21, Native Recruiting Film, Maxwell to Gutsche, 7 May 1942. 
1043  NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News 
Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. Richards, 17 August 1940, pp. 1-7; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, 
Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 March 1942, pp. 1-6. For details 
on African resistance to colonial conquest, See B. Vandervorts, Wars of Imperial Conquest: 1830-1914 
(Routledge, London and New York, 1998). It should also be noted that blacks have also participated in 
the First World War where they witnessed modern military weapons in action. 
1044  Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, p. 56. 
1045  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942; ‘The South 
African Bureau of Information: The First Exclusive Interview with the Director, A.N. Wilson’, The 
Nongqai, June 1942. 
1046  PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Production Report – UDF Film Unit, April 1941 to September 1942. 
1047  Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (D), PR 23/18/1, Recruiting – Films, 24 February 1943. 
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figure who decided to wear khaki (military uniform) in order to fight for the family.1048 The 
film then showed all aspects of military service for women such as weapon manufacturing, 
packing parachutes, medical areas, signalling operating range finders and searchlights as well 
as making food and clothing for the troops.1049 
 
Newsreels were useful and effective means of facilitating war propaganda. As a result of the 
difficulties associated with the production of films depicting troops in action, newsreels were 
useful substitutes for propaganda in South Africa.1050 The African Mirror played a major role 
in this regard. Throughout wartime, the African Mirror took up a pro-government angle and 
produced short newsreels on the various aspects of South Africa’s involvement in the war. 
From 1939-1945, newsreels of the African Mirror depicted UDF troops engaged in their 
military activities, both in the Union and in the North. The activities included searching and 
removing landmines, driving military vehicles, gun operations and war production work.1051 
The African Mirror collaborated with the BOI and the SABC to produce many of the scenes 
that focused on recruiting drives such as military parades and the appeals calling for 
enlistment in various towns across the Union, as well as the military success in the field.1052 
In one of the newsreels, Hitler and the Italian Fascist leader, Benito Mussolini, were 
described as a pair of “blood-stained gangsters” who lied to world and perpetrated hatred and 
prejudice.1053 Their speeches were translated and some of their gestures reproduced in 
satirical manner to illustrate their “foolishness”.1054 In addition to the African Mirror, the 
Union authorities also imported The March of Time series from America. The March of Time 
was a popular newsreel series which produced the re-enactments and dramatic portrayal of 
                                                 
1048  Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (D), PR 23/18/5, Recruiting – Films, “More Women” Filmlet, 1943 
(only year). 
1049  Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (D), PR 23/18/5, Recruiting – Films, “More Women” Filmlet, 1943 
(only year). 
1050  Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 20 (N), PR 23/13, Publicity and Propaganda as Applied to Recruiting, 
Lindsay to Werdmuller, 5 November 1945. 
1051  SAFVSA, African Mirror, vol. 9, no. 25, FA 2333, Transvaal Scottish, Benoni, December 1939; 
African Mirror, vol. 9, no. 20, FA 2323, Recruiting Parade in Grahamstown, November 1939; African 
Mirror, vol. 10, no. 155, A 3210, Defenders of Africa, June 1942; African Mirror, vol. 10, no. 209, FA 
5505, Call to Arms, June 1943; African Mirror, vol.11, no. 238, FA 1174, SA Troops in El Alamein, 
July 1942; African Mirror, vol. 11, no. 307, FA 5430, Surrender of the City, May 1945. 
1052  African Mirror, no. 13, FA 14150, SABC, With Our Men in the North, n.d.; African Mirror, vol. 9-10, 
1939-1943. 
1053  African Mirror, vol. 11, no. 306, FA 5969, Crime Doesn’t Pay, May 1945. 
1054  African Mirror, vol. 11, no. 306, FA 5969, Crime Doesn’t Pay, May 1945. 
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fact, education and entertainment.1055 Its value was more in its concealed approach in 
depicting war propaganda. 
 
Exhibitions of the films and newsreels were organised by the BOI on behalf of the 
government. The BOI negotiated and administered agreements with film companies for the 
production and exhibition of the films and newsreel material taken by its cinematographers 
and those imported from the British ministry of information.1056 The main film companies 
utilised by the BOI and the DMI (Ic) were African Films, Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer and United 
Artists.1057 These companies agreed to circulate and exhibit the UDF films in their respective 
theatres. These exhibitions were for white South Africa audiences. DNEAS organised with 
managers of non-European theatres for the exhibition of Ayihlome and other black films in 
1942.1058 But, not all non-European theatres could assist DNEAS though. One theatre in 
particular, the Central Palace Cinema in Kimberley, indicated that they only catered for 
‘Chinese, Indians and Coloureds’.1059 A Gaiety Cinema in Stellenbosch also turned down the 
request for screening Ayihlome as Africans in that area never attended the non-European 
performances.1060 Yet, many other cinemas in the Union accepted the request to assist the 
military authorities. Apart from using theatres, the BOI also organised with two touring 
companies, Parker’s Travelling Talkie Tours and the Tea Market Expansion Bureau, to use 
their mobile cinema vans for exhibitions of propaganda films in rural districts of the 
country.1061 
 
For the Afrikaans audience, the BOI arranged to provide the monthly film programme of 
thirty-minutes to Parker’s Travelling Talkie Tours for the exhibition of Afrikaans-
commentated films and newsreels in four targeted rural areas covered by their mobile cinema 
                                                 
1055  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Memorandum on Films for Publicity and 
Propaganda, 1941. (only year). 
1056  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942; Malherbe 
Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (542), Memorandum on The Utilisation of Film Resources in 
Furthering the War Effort on a National Scale, 30 June 1942. 
1057  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (555), Weaver to Malherbe, 15 November 1944. 
1058  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Film- Ayihlome, DNEAS to Manager of African 
Theatres Limited, 21 December 1942. 
1059  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Film- Ayihlome, Manager of Central Palace Cinema 
to DNEAS, 2 December 1942. 
1060  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Native Military Corps, Manager Gaiety Cinema to 
DNEAS, 14 December 1942. 
1061  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942; Gutsche, The 
History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures, pp. 370-372. 
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vans.1062 The programme material was selected from the British Ministry of Information, 
African Mirror, War Pictorial News and the shots taken by the BOI’s own 
cinematographer.1063 Mobile cinema exhibitions in black communities were conducted 
through the services of the Tea Market Expansion Bureau. The BOI arranged for talkie vans 
of the Tea Market Expansion Bureau for the exhibition of the 16 mm black recruiting 
films.1064 The use of the mobile cinema vans ensured that war propaganda could reach a 
wider audience, particularly in the remote countryside, who would otherwise not have been 
able to access the regular cinemas. 
 
The UUTS, which was dedicated to the promotion of the government’s war policy, also 
exploited the mobile cinema vans to get into rural districts of the Union for the exhibition of 
its own Afrikaans propaganda films: Noordwaarts1065, Trekgees, Springbokke Storm and 
Onthou Japan.1066 Three mobile cinema vans equipped with 16 mm film projectors and 
generators travelled throughout the country to screen war-related propaganda films. The 
cinema vans were accompanied by the UUTS organiser who gave a speech to the audience at 
each show, sometimes resulting in verbal altercations with members of the audience.1067 The 
UUTS shows were taken to the remote Afrikaans-dominated areas of the country in order to 
mobilise public sentiment and support of the war. According to the reports of the UUTS, its 
film shows were often well attended, especially Noordwaarts, with Uys Krige’s wife, Lydia 
Lindeque starring, which was estimated to have been viewed by over 200, 000 people a 
year.1068 
 
There was a great need to penetrate the white Afrikaans audience since the majority of 
government opponents were white Afrikaans-speakers – an important political constituency 
and source of potential recruits. This aspect was highlighted by Dr Malherbe in his criticism 
of the BOI. He lamented the fact that, though the majority of the white Union population 
                                                 
1062  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942; DNEAS, 
Group 2, Box 11, NAS 3/21, 16 mm film – A Five Cup Matter, DNEAS to The Commissioner of Tea 
Market Expansion Bureau, 17 June 1942. 
1063  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942. 
1064  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 11, NAS 3/21, 16 mm film – A Five Cup Matter, DNEAS to The 
Commissioner of Tea Market Expansion Bureau, 17 June 1942; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The 
Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942. 
1065  UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942-30 June 1943; Gutsche, The 
History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures, p. 371; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, 32. 
1066  UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942-30 June 1943. 
1067  UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942-30 June 1943. 
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including the UDF was Afrikaners, the Afrikaans language was not well represented in 
propaganda. In his criticism, Dr Malherbe argued that ‘not a single pro-Government 
propaganda newsreel with Afrikaans commentary has been screened’ and the opposition 
exploited that fact as an anti-war weapon by reasoning that ‘all the films dealing with the war 
are English. Let them fight the war themselves’.1069 He also noted that the atmosphere in 
cinemas was “un-Afrikaans” due to the many scenes in the films with the Union Jack 
displayed and also with the singing of ‘God Save the King’ at the end of the show. Afrikaners 
who supported the war were required to be given prominence in propaganda media, though 
the use of the phrase “loyal Afrikaners” was to be avoided because, in the South African 
context, it easily connoted loyalty to Britain, thus playing into the hands of the anti-war 
activists.1070 
 
Dr Malherbe’s concerns were a response to the growing Afrikaner opposition cinema which 
was perpetuated by the Reddingsdaabond (Salvation Bond). This movement had already 
started with the establishment of the Volksbioskope (VOBI) (Afrikaner People’s Cinema) in 
1939 and the Reddingsdaabond Amateur Rolprent Organisasie (RARO) (Salvation Bond 
Amateur Film Organisation) in 1940. 1071 VOBI and RARO film companies were both aimed 
at promoting Afrikaner culture through cinema, and produced exclusive Afrikaans newsreels 
that were shown in a circuit of 500 towns and smaller areas in the country districts by mobile 
projecting units.1072 Thus competition to entice the Afrikaans audience was high during the 
war. Hence the BOI’s increasing use of the mobile cinema vans to deliver war propaganda in 
Afrikaans to rural communities. From 1942, the BOI also began to re-edit English material 
into Afrikaans commentaries and to persuade the newsreel-producing companies to introduce 
Afrikaans into their newsreels.1073 To promote a South African atmosphere in the cinema, the 
British Coat of Arms was replaced by the Union Coat of Arms during the singing on the 
national anthem.1074  
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Although generally criticised for inexpert production and the over-dependence on the 
commercial film companies that monopolised the industry1075, films and newsreels 
nonetheless played a significant role in generating popular appeal for the war, particularly as 
some of the films had South Africa actors in them.1076 They also hand an impact on the non-
literate people who benefited from the mobile cinema vans that travelled throughout the 
Union. The films also played an additional role of complementing the military recruitment 
tours and demonstrations. The military demonstrations added the “live” dimension to the 
propaganda spectacle and as such, enhanced the value of the films which were also shown in 
the evenings during the displays. 
 
MILITARY TOURS AND DISPLAYS 
 
Concurrent with the cinema, radio broadcast and press advertisements, the Union authorities 
organised tours of the military mobile recruiting columns across the country. For proper 
control and co-ordination, the director of recruiting, Werdmuller, was charged with the 
responsibility of arranging with mayors, magistrates, police commandants and provincial 
commandants of SAWAS in the relevant towns and districts to ensure the smooth running of 
the mobile recruiting tours.1077 The programme of the tours featured military parades, 
displays of various units, broadcast speeches from mobile vans, recruiting meetings, 
distribution of propaganda material and where feasible, attendance of social events like 
sports, meat-grill in the evenings (Braaivleis-aande), camp-fire concerts and church 
parades.1078 Tours also varied according to the perceived requirements in terms of gender and 
race: for white male recruits, for women recruits and for non-whites.1079 Maximum publicity 
was ensured by arranging with the press, the SABC and the cine cameramen to cover the 
events on daily basis. The BOI was instrumental in facilitating these publicity 
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arrangements.1080 The foremost objectives of the military mobile tours were to popularise the 
Union’s armed forces, to instigate public interest in the war and to maximise recruiting. 
 
The defence mobile recruiting column called the Steel Commando, took place from 1 
November to 10 December 1940.1081 It started from Pretoria and travelled through the various 
towns and villages of the Transvaal, OFS, Eastern (Cape) Province, Cape Midlands, Western 
(Cape) Province and returned to Johannesburg via the Northern Cape.1082 The military force 
of the Steel Commando consisted of 600 men with 120 vehicles, including the detachments 
of infantry, engineers, machine-guns, signallers, medical ambulances, artillery, armoured cars 
and technical services along with the 180 men of the Special Services Brigade and the 80-
member orchestra band for entertainment and ceremonial performances.1083 The intended 
purpose of the Steel Commando tour was to enable the South African public to view the 
typical examples of the Union’s modern mobile forces and to demonstrate the progress made 
since the outbreak of the war. The Steel Commando drew huge enthusiastic crowds from 
towns and surrounding districts and lavish hospitality was extended by small villages to the 
column.1084 Large numbers of blacks in some districts also came to view the proceedings. 
Werdmuller took the opportunity to make appeals for recruits. He also addressed thousands 
of blacks who came to view the Steel Commando and told them that ‘there would soon be 
openings for their services’.1085 Both the English and Afrikaans languages were used in the 
recruiting speeches made to the public.1086 At the end of the tour in December, the 
proceedings of the Steel Commando were concluded with an address by Smuts who also took 
the general salute in Johannesburg.1087 
 
Another tour called the Defence-Railways-War Supplies Demonstration Tour or War Trains, 
was organised from Johannesburg on 22 March 1941, travelling through all the provinces of 
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the Union and returned to Pretoria on 7 May 1941.1088 The two War Trains traversed the 
Union and their tour was extended to the three northern territories, namely, Southern 
Rhodesia (modern Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (modern Zambia) and Belgian Congo 
(modern Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly known as Zaire), from 12 May to 5 
June 1941.1089 
 
The primary object of the tour was to demonstrate to the public what the war supplies 
directorate has been doing to secure the home-front with the purely South African material 
and labour to meet the requirements.1090 It was mainly a public morale-boosting exercise but 
the trained recruiting officers also accompanied the trains to advise potential volunteers on 
how their services could best be utilised in the war effort. The BOI also produced articles to 
publicise the tour in the newspapers and heaped praises on the capacity of the country to 
maintain high-levels of production with her own resources and personnel.1091 Newspaper 
editors were requested to publish prepared articles only when the military tours entered the 
local area. Pictures of the War Trains exhibiting artillery, armoured fighting vehicles, 
ammunition, equipment, uniforms, food supplies and life-size models of uniformed men and 
women of the services were published in recruiting pamphlets that accompanied the 
trains.1092 Moreover, men were urged to volunteer for training and to ensure adequate 
production of quality supplies.1093 The War Trains tour took eleven weeks and successfully 
visited hundreds of towns where huge crowds came to view the trains and the war 
materials.1094 
 
The situation was similar with the Air Commando tour in July 1941, which presented to the 
public air displays, firing demonstrations, drill displays by Women Auxiliary Air Force 
                                                 
1088  AG (3), Box 344, 154/203/10, Defence-Railways-War Supplies Demonstration Tour: “War Trains”, 
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(WAAF) and demonstrations of the armoured fighting vehicles.1095 Arrangements were also 
made with the Union Films to produce a 35 mm film depicting the varied activities of the Air 
Force to be shown at throughout the circuits of the 20th Century United Artist across the 
Union.1096 The displays of the Air Commando were spectacular; however, the end-product of 
the film production was of poor quality. The Air Commando film was merely a series of 
newsreel shots strung together into a whole without any coherence.1097 Nonetheless, military 
demonstrations of the Steel Commando, the War Trains and the Air Commando proved to be 
the most practical and effective propaganda mechanisms which popularised the military to 
the public. Apart from the recruitment objectives, the military tours and exhibitions also 
served the economic propaganda agenda. The country’s industrial capacity, economic assets 
and productive power were crucial propaganda weapons as they demonstrated the potential 
for self-sustainability and the prospects for the post-war national development. 
 
SAWAS also organised a recruiting train tour from Cape Town to Johannesburg consisting of 
150 women under Mrs C. Newton-Thompson, deputy commandant of Command 13, in April 
1941.1098 The train was decorated with recruiting messages, equipped with loudspeakers, 
carried a full band and the SAWAS exchanged greetings and handed out propaganda leaflets 
at towns and villages where the train passed through.1099 Another recruitment tour, with 
higher publicity in the newspapers, was undertaken in October 1941. It was a major SAWAS 
nation-wide recruitment tour under the leadership of the senior SAWAS officers. The tours 
were divided into the Cape tour, OFS and Natal tour and the Transvaal tour. The Cape tour 
was undertaken by Major Hansie Pollak, SAWAS second in command and economics 
lecturer at Wits University. Major M.E. Coetzee, the wife of the editor of Die Volkstem, C.S. 
Coetzee and former president of the South African National Council of Women was in charge 
of the OFS and Natal tours. For the Transvaal, the two tours were organised under Major J.F. 
Jordaan, first Provincial Commandant of SAWAS and then Lieutenant Malherbe, the DMI 
(Ic) officer and wife of Dr E.G. Malherbe.1100 The profiles of these senior officers were 
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published in the newspapers to reflect their status in the social and business life. It was 
designed to demonstrate the critical nature of the prevailing conditions that saw high profile 
women with eminent social standing trading their comfortable civilian lives to serve in 
defence of the country. 
 
In January 1941, the military authorities established the Youth Training Brigade for young 
boys who left school but were still too immature to enlist for military service. By May, the 
unit had 1691 personnel including officers.1101 To stimulate interest and recruiting for the 
Youth Training Brigade, a train tour was organised to travel from Potchefstroom, through 
twenty-seven towns in the Western Transvaal, Griqualand West, North-Western Cape, 
Eastern and Northern Transvaal from 20 September to 21 October 1941.1102 At various 
towns, the Youth Brigade contingent was welcomed by the mayor and assistance was offered 
by the municipal authorities, the police and members of SAWAS for hospitality. The 
programme of the tour consisted of the Guard of Honour and the band marching through 
streets. In the late afternoon, the contingent engaged in physical training displays and retreat 
ceremony. The officer commanding of the brigade then addressed the public through 
loudspeakers, explaining the objects of the Youth Training Brigade – physical and mental 
training as well as developing relevant skills for civilian life.1103 The Youth Brigade was 
aimed at preparing the youth for enlistment in the fighting forces when they had matured. It 
was the tour’s aim to advertise the Youth Training Brigade and to prepare the public for 
further recruiting appeals to support the war effort. The tour also attracted large crowds and 
many enjoyed the band. However, in terms of recruiting into the Youth Brigade, only thirty-
nine boys enlisted. It was a low return, though that was not indicated as the primary aim.1104 
 
In May 1942, Lieutenant Colonel E.P. Hartshorn, the chief press liaison officer with the 
South African forces in Egypt, embarked on a recruiting tour of the Union aboard a Boston 
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Bomber aircraft from the North.1105 Hartshorn was a veteran of the First World War where he 
lost his left arm whilst holding a defective hand grenade in a raiding expedition in the 
Dardanelles campaign against the Turks1106 The general officer administration, Theron, 
recommended to the CGS that Hartshorn to fly from Lybia to undertake a recruitment tour of 
South Africa to deliver the message ‘direct from troops in the frontline’ in English and by 
Captain J.H. Visser in Afrikaans.1107 The messages were printed on a leaflet shaped like an 
aircraft bomb and showered into towns which did not have suitable airbases for propaganda 
purposes.1108 (See Illustration 33) 
 
The tour took place from 4 to 29 May 1942 and the BOI organised publicity for it. However, 
Hartshorn was criticised for the manner in which he delivered his speeches. He urged the 
‘women to get stuck into those muddy tripe-hounds, the self-made keymen, the one-man 
businessmen and those who are dodging and hiding in the part-time units’.1109 The use of 
crude language and labelling people as “dodgers” whilst many were in fact supporting the 
war effort as war workers, civil servants, serving in food production and in the general 
maintenance of essential services was unappreciated.1110 The press, the public and the DMI 
(Ic) (as the tour was not organised by them) were critical of Hartshorn’s vigorous speech. His 
rhetoric was considered bad for recruiting propaganda and the stinging appellations in the 
language were uninspiring in terms of public relations exercise for the government.1111 
 
Recruitment meetings organised for blacks also involved military parades and bands. The 
approach was to organise recruiting meetings at various centres in the Union and arrange for 
the local NMC units to perform military displays. During the recruiting meeting in 
Bloemfontein in March-April 1942, members of the 7th battalion NMC performed a guard of 
honour and marched behind the Cape Corps band through the streets from Bloemfontein 
station to the black residential area.1112 It was the same procedure with the Kimberley 
detachment of the 7th battalion NMC involved in the guard of honour to entertain the public. 
                                                 
1105  UWH, Box 274, B.I. 26, Recruiting: Lt.-Col. E.P. Hartshorn, GOA, UDF (MEF) to CGS, 9 April 1942. 
1106  UWH, Box 274, B.I. 26, Col Hartshorn’s Tour, May 1942. 
1107  UWH, Box 274, B.I. 26, Col Hartshorn’s Tour, May 1942. 
1108  UWH, Box 274, B.I. 26, Col Hartshorn’s Tour, May 1942. 
1109  Army Intelligence, Box 21, PR 23/17, Lt.-Col. E.P. Hartshorn’s Tour, Ic to DDMI, 18 May 1942. 
1110  Army Intelligence, Box 21, PR 23/17, Cutting from “Daily Dispatch”, East London, 7 May 1942. 
1111  Army Intelligence, Box 21, PR 23/17, Cutting from “Daily Dispatch”, East London, 7 May 1942; 
Army Intelligence, Box 21, PR 23/17, Lt.-Col. E.P. Hartshorn’s Tour, Ic to DDMI, 18 May 1942. 
1112  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Report on Recruiting Meeting at Bloemfontein Location, 
Kimberley and Green Point Location, 30 March to 1 April 1942. 
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In Natal and Zululand, recruiting meetings were more elaborate with the slaughter of two 
cows and drinks provided to the audience whilst the members of the local 2nd battalion NMC 
gave a display.1113 Regular trading and social events such as cattle sales and shows were 
attended by the military recruiting officers who also presented propaganda among blacks.1114 
A physical training display, an official march and a concert party in the evening conducted by 
the NMC were organised in Alexander Township for recruitment purposes.1115 An NMC 
Choir was also organised at this meeting to sing the “iNkosi Sinkelela iAfrica”.1116 At all 
these meetings, black NMC members were utilised as interpreters as the speeches were often 
delivered by white magistrates in English.  
 
Military tours and displays had a substantial propaganda impact on the viewing public as 
many of them were often well attended. Unlike the press, radio, films and posters, they 
offered personalised interaction which appealed to the public. In most cases, more recruits 
were obtained during and immediately after the tours.1117 But, it was a strenuous and 
expensive propaganda activity that required enormous amounts of resources for a successful 
execution. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has shown how the Union authorities exploited films, newsreels and military 
displays to mobilise the different sectors of the South African public to support the war 
policy. However, it proved to be a difficult task. The high production and maintenance costs 
of films and military displays especially, militated against their advantage in the visual and 
motion impact. The films also produced criticisms due to limited local productions and the 
predominance of English over the Afrikaans language, thus perpetuating the ‘Afrikaner-
British’ nationalistic contest. The situation was, to some extent, alleviated by the UUTS 
which produced Afrikaans films and exhibited them in the Union’s remote countryside. Still, 
the government had limited control over the quality, content and exhibitions as the film 
                                                 
1113  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Tour, Natal and Zululand, OC 2nd Battalion NMC to 
DNEAS, 23 May 1942. 
1114  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting-Zululand, Area Commandant, Welgedacht to 
DNEAS, 23 May 1942. 
1115  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, H.S. Mockford to the Director, SABC, 21 November 1942. 
1116  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, H.S. Mockford to the Director, SABC, 21 November 1942. The 
song was part of the music in the Ayihlome film. 
1117  CGS (War), Box 210, VIII, 45/8, Analysis of Recruiting Figures, Diagrams and Graphs, 1941-1945. 
See the soaring figures of 1941-1942, which declined from 1943-1945. 
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companies were independent and needed to satisfy their business interests first. The 
government, therefore, could not fully optimise their utilisation for war propaganda. The 
military, at least, had modest internal capability, though shortage of well-qualified technical 
personnel was a problem. Propaganda films, also, had little appeal to blacks as the content 
was irrelevant to their socio-economic and political aspirations. Film shows were attended for 
purely entertainment. Hence, by 1944, the authorities concluded that films were the weakest 
link in the Union’s propaganda system.  
 
The military mobile recruiting columns and demonstrations achieved some success in the 
publicity and propaganda machinery of the government. The BOI ensured that they were well 
publicised, and, as a result, the attendance was satisfactory. The military authories maximised 
the opportunities for direct interaction with the public by attending social events. These 
enhanced public awareness and popularity of the military. More recruits were thus obtained 
through those the military tours, as the recruiting figures revealed.1118 
 
However, despite the exploitation of the various media channels to stimulate interest in the 
war, the UDF experienced chronic shortage of manpower throughout the war. Also, the 
different platforms perpetuated the racial or gender stereotypes, hence they were at times 
rejected. Given the spectre of violence and the subversive activities when war broke out, the 
government’s publicity and propaganda efforts on the home-front were marginally effective. 
It was very difficult to forge a “united nation” during the war, especially given the depth and 
intensity of the racial divisions, and the diverse interests of the South African population. 
Similar challenges were also experienced within the UDF, and the officials were at pains to 
eliminate divisions, to foster “unity” within the military force and to preserve morale so as to 
ensure the effective prosecution of the war effort. The next two chapters, dealing with the 
UDF’s internal propaganda operations, will illustrate these aspects. 
                                                 
1118  CGS (War), Box 210, VIII, 45/8, Analysis of Recruiting Figures, Diagrams and Graphs, 1941-1945. 
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Illustration 33: Leaflet, Message from the North, Lt Col Hartshorn’s Tour, Military Archives, UWH, vol. 
274 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
UNION DEFENCE FORCE’S INTERNAL PROPAGANDA: EDUCATION AND 
TRAINING SERVICES 
 
Despite the Union government’s adoption of the volunteer system for military service, the 
loyalty, motivation and commitment of the UDF members could not be automatically 
expected. Following the decision to enter the war in support of Britain, disconcerting reports 
about the anti-government activities and the exhibitions of disloyalty within the military 
forces were submitted to the authorities.1119 Those reports reflected the deeply embedded 
political discords, the impact of the Nazi propaganda plus the growing manifestations of the 
Nazi-inspired political extremism in the country.1120 The major concerns were the political 
and military implications on the subject of the troops’ loyalty, morale and the war effort.1121 
The challenge for the military authorities, therefore, as pointed out in the secret memorandum 
of the DMI (Ic), was ‘to help ensure the security of our own forces by consolidating and 
increasing their morale, so as to stimulate them to pitch where the fullest use is made of all 
their resources … to safeguard the security by launching effective counter-propaganda’.1122  
 
To this end, numerous memoranda about the organisation of propaganda projects and the 
suggested schemes for implementation among the UDF troops were considered.1123 However, 
                                                 
1119  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum, Security of Own Forces, n.d; CGS, (War), Box 197, file 
42/2, Extracts and Intercepts, Foreign Papers and Broadcast, 27 September 1940; Malherbe Papers, File 
444/7, KCM 56975 (89), Subversive Activities in the Union, (Obstructing the War Effort), J.A. 
Malherbe (Ic), 4 June 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 444/7, KCM 56975 (87-100), Secret Military 
Intelligence Reports on the Ossewabrandwag, c1940-5. 
1120  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 246, Smuts to A.B. Gillett, 13 September 1939; JUS, Box 1506, 1/62/39, 
Complaint against Christo Kriel, 13 September 1939; Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 183, Internal 
Security, 30 May 1940; CGS, War, Box 223, 49/1, Van Ryneveld to Mercier, Winburg, Bloemfontein, 
17 January 1940; Malherbe Papers, File 444/7, KCM 56975 (89), Subversive Activities in the Union, 
Obstructing the War Effort, J.A. Malherbe (Ic), 4 June 1941; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi 
Activities in the Union of South Africa Before and During the War, December 1945; UWH, Box 265, 
B.I. 20, Secret Internal Security, Weekly Intelligence Reports, 1939-1940. 
1121  JUS, Box 1506, 1/62/39, European War, 1939, Defence Rifle Association, Confidential Report of the 
Magistrate, J.G. de Vries, 10 October 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence 
Summaries, 17 November 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 16 
December 1939; UWH, Box 265, Intelligence Summary, 5 January 1940; Malherbe Papers, File 444/7, 
KCM 56975 (89), Subversive Activities in the Union, (Obstructing the War Effort), J.A. Malherbe (Ic), 
4 June 1941. 
1122  PP, Box 57, PR 3/4, Memorandum on the Scope and Work of (DMI) I.C.(iii), the Propaganda Branch 
of Military Intelligence, by Lt J.E. Sacks, Kreft to Wakefield, 6 August 1940. 
1123  PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among Our Troops, G.S.O.2 (Ic) to D.G.O (for DDMI), 8 
November 1940; PP, Box 63, PU 6/3, Army Publicity and Propaganda, DMI (Ic) to DDMI, 27 
November 1940; PP, Box 59, PR 7/2/1, Military Counter-Propaganda on the Home-Front, Ic to DDMI, 
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as the authorities were to find out in the course of the war, it was not merely the subversive 
activities that impacted on troop morale and disinclinations, there were other factors of 
organisational and administrative nature, military policies as well as training and service 
conditions which produced the discontent and apathy within the Union’s forces.1124 
 
This chapter analyses the conception and institutional responses by the Union government 
and military authorities to wrestle with the question of disaffections and morale within the 
UDF. The discussion will commence with a brief reflection on some of the pertinent 
problems such as the undercurrents of disloyalty and disaffections resulting from subversive 
activities, military administration and service conditions which impacted on troop morale. 
Then, it outlines the processes and initiatives, particularly the education and training aspects, 
which were contrived for mental stimulation, to raise and shape the political consciousness of 
the troops and to combat monotony during leisure times. This chapter will also illustrate the 
prevailing ideological paradigms and the ways the military authorities delineated the content 
and objectives of propaganda for the troops. Lastly, it will also reflect on the notions about 
the future socio-political order in the South Africa society. 
 
SUBVERSION, ANTIPATHY AND DISQUIETS WITHIN THE UDF 
 
The prevailing political dissensions in South Africa, mostly as a result of the different right-
oriented Afrikaner nationalistic movements’ opposition to the government’s war policy, 
correspondingly produced antagonisms within the military forces. Military intelligence and 
censorship reports reflected a sense of apathy and disgruntlement, especially among some 
white Afrikaans-speaking UDF members, which was attributed to the anti-war activism and 
hyper-nationalistic tendencies associated with Malan’s HNP and the radical OB.1125 For 
example, in November 1939, Thwaites (then DMI) wrote to Lieutenant General Andries 
Brink (C-in-C, Burger Commandos), and warned him that some loyal officers of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
n.d; PP, Box 59, PR 7/2/1, Suggested Measures for Countering Subversive Propaganda in South Africa, 
by Lt J.E. Sacks (Ic), 17 September 1940; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Organisation: Propaganda Projects. 
Draft of Proposed Circular to O’s C, n.d; UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army 
Education Services, 30 September 1945. 
1124  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army 
at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; SANDFA, Archives of the Quartermaster 
General (QMG), Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943;, DNEAS Group 
2, Box 20, NAS 3/42, Treatment and General Welfare of Members of Non-Europeans of NMC 
Battalions and Units, 3 July 1940 – 28 August 1944. 
1125  Army Intelligence, Box 21, CE 2/2, Propaganda Calculated to Disturb the Relations of M.F.F., General 
Staff, Intelligence to DDMI, 27 August 1940. 
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Thabanchu Commando (DRA unit in the OFS) reported to the intelligence officials ‘that 50% 
of their men were not loyal to the Government’.1126 With regard to another DRA unit, the 
Dordrecht Commando (Queenstown-Eastern Cape), Thwaites suggested that it should be 
disbanded because of the ‘unsatisfactory reports on account of the unreliability of the 
majority of its officers’.1127 In a letter to Smuts’s military secretary (Collyer), the DMI also 
identified a number of the DRA officers in the Transvaal, OFS and Eastern Cape, whose 
‘varying degrees of conduct was prejudicial to good order and military discipline’.1128 
 
Many officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in various units of the permanent 
force (PF), the ACF and the DRA were reportedly pro-Nationalist, pro-Nazi and pro-OB and 
expressed hostilities towards the government, some even declared their intentions ‘to rebel or 
assist the enemy in the event of military activity.’1129 Consequently, in one response, Brink, 
cautioned all commandants regarding the DRA’s appointment of officers. He warned the 
potential officers that, although individuals were free to hold any political views, it was 
imperative that members abide by and be prepared to carry out the Union’s war policy.1130 
Some of the more unreliable UDF officers such as A. Spies, F.G.T Radloff and H. Anderson 
(even J.C.C. Laas and J.F.J. van Rensburg) were dismissed from military service or placed on 
reserve.1131 These men became active members of the radical OB which was then growing in 
intensity as a ‘focal point of anti-Government activity’.1132 
 
The intelligence reports continued to present an unfavourable depiction of the growing threat 
of subversion within the military forces as well as obstructions to the recruitment process.1133 
                                                 
1126  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Col Thwaites to Lt Gen (Andries) Brink, 17 November 1939. 
1127  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Col Thwaites to Lt Gen (Andries) Brink, 17 November 1939. 
1128  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, DMI to Military Secretary to Prime Minister, 14 November 1939. 
1129  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum, Security of Own Forces, n.d; See also UWH, Box 265, B.I. 
20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939; JUS, Box 1506, 1/62/39, European 
War, 1939. Defence Rifle Association, Confidential Report of the Magistrate, J.G. de Vries, 10 October 
1939. 
1130  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 143, D.R.A’s: Appointment of Officers, Commander-in-Chief, Burger 
Commandos to all Commandants, 30 November 1939. 
1131 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 83, Interview with Dr. J.F.J. van Rensburg, Kommandant-General of the 
Ossewabrandwag, 5 June 1944; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 24; Visser, OB: 
Traitors or Patriots?, pp. 13-14; Marx, Oxwagon Sentinel, pp. 332-333; 345-346. 
1132  UWH, Box 264, B.I. 20, Military Intelligence Summaries, 29 June 1940. 
1133  CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940; NASAP, 
JUS, Box 1506, file 1/62/39, C.H. Poppe to the Chief Control Officer, Queenstown, 1 November 1939; 
UWH, Box 265, BI 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939; UWH, Box 265, 
B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, 
Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 8 December 1939; Army Intelligence, Box 46, I. 40, Weekly 
Censorship Summaries, 25 February 1941. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
203 
 
According to Blaine, some of the problems in the UDF were cultivated by some ex-members 
of the Hertzog government who ‘were deliberately and without restraint attempting to 
undermine the morale of South Africa’s future army’.1134 Blaine indicated that ‘the small 
Permanent Force included a large number of susceptible soldiers encouraged from outside [to 
challenge the legal limits of where they should serve]… and was riddled with Ossewa-
Brandwag organisation’.1135 On this point, military intelligence reported that the OB has been 
successful in permeating the government institutions including most units of the UDF.1136 In 
addition, the recruitment process was also being inhibited by ‘a subtle and undermining 
influence - campaign against recruiting’.1137 
 
The political situation in South Africa had become volatile and the security conditions were 
deteriorating. During mobilisation and soon after the first UDF contingent left for East Africa 
in mid-1940, the country increasingly experienced the anti-war militancy and violence that 
included bomb outrages1138, sabotage1139, riots1140 and assaults on the Union soldiers.1141 With 
                                                 
1134  CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940, p. 2. 
1135  CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940, p. 2. 
1136  UWH, Box 264, B.I. 20, Military Intelligence Summaries, 29 June 1940; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 
169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 25 January 1941. 
1137  CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940, p. 4. 
1138  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 22 June 1940; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence 
Summaries, 31 August 1940; ‘Bomb Damage to 17 Shops’, Rand Daily Mail, 22 July 1940; 
‘Explosives Seized on the Reef’, The Star, 27 July 1940; ‘Nine Explosions within a Month’, Rand 
Daily Mail, 1 August 1940; ‘The Dynamite Outrages’, The Star, 20 August 1940; ‘Court Inquiry into 
Explosions’, Rand Daily Mail, 28 August 1940; ‘Explosion at Police Barracks’, Rand Daily Mail, 11 
September 1940; ‘Delayed-Action Bomb’, Rand Daily Mail, 29 September 1940. The Rand Daily Mail 
newspaper reported that in one month alone, from 10 August to 10 September 1940, there have been 
fifteen bomb explosions in Bloemfontein, Rand Daily Mail, 11 September 1940. 
1139  Sabotage and bomb outrages persisted until 1943, after a wave of police raids and arrests of suspects, 
mainly members of the OB’s Stormjaers. See Army Intelligence, Box 24, Intelligence Summaries, 7 
February 1942; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 18 February 1942; 
CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 11 August 1943; Visser, OB: Traitors 
or Patriots?, pp. 100-106, 107-111; ‘Sabotage in Rand Arms Factory’, Rand Daily Mail, 21 October 
1941; ‘Incidents in Free Sate Towns’, Rand Daily Mail, 19 December 1941; ‘Explosion at Police 
Barracks’, 11 September 1941; ‘Sabotage Plot in TVL’, Cape Argus, 29 January 1942; ‘Death Penalty 
on Bomb Saboteurs’, Cape Times, 30 January 1942;Sabotage Gang Arrests’, Cape Times, 31 January 
1942; ‘Incendiary Bombs in Pretoria’, Cape Argus, 11 February 1942; ‘Dynamiters were Organised’, 
Rand Daily Mail, 25 May 1942; ‘Men Charged with Malicious Injury to Property’, Rand Daily Mail, 
29 May 1942; ‘Woman and Four Men Detained’, Rand Daily Mail, 30 May 1942; ‘More Defence 
Evidence in Explosion Trial’, The Star, 8 July 1942; ‘Attempt to Burn Down Court’, The Star, 16 
February 1943; ‘U.P. Branch Offices Burned Down’, Rand Daily Mail, 16 June 1943; ‘Gallon Drums 
of Petrol in Train Fire’, Rand Daily Mail, 16 July 1943. 
1140  CGS (War), Box 47, 12/4, Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Disturbances at Potchefstroom 
University College, 10 October 1940; CGS (War), Box 47, 12/4, Report of the Commission of Inquiry: 
Johannesburg Disturbances, Jan-Feb 1941, 19 March 1941; ‘Stone Them to Death’, Cape Argus, 28 
January 1941; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 10 February 1941. 
1141  Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/16, Censorship Summary, 3 December 1940; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 
20, Intelligence Summaries, 20 January 1940; ‘Brutal Attack on Soldier’, Cape Argus, 16 September 
1940; CGS (War), Box 47, 12/5, Friction Between Civilians and Soldiers, W.M. Hare, Magistrate, 
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regard to the last aspect, Visser indicates that during 1940 in the Transvaal province alone, 
there were about seventy-nine ‘cases of assault on soldiers reported to the police for 
investigation … many were certainly unreported.’1142 These assaults on soldiers were carried 
out by ‘bearded men’ who were associated with the OB because, since its formation, most 
members wore beards ‘as proclamation of either they belonged to the Ossewa Brandwag or 
were otherwise against the Government and its war policy’.1143 In other cases, soldiers were 
sometimes ill-disciplined. For instance, in the south-western districts of the Cape and also in 
the Transvaal, the soldiers were accused of ‘disorderly conduct’ and ‘attacks on civilians’.1144 
Consequently, on the question of civil-military relations, it was not an ideal situation whereby 
the military was involved in physical confrontations in the Union whilst it was also subjected 
to “ridicule” from some of the government opponents in time of war. Government supporters 
were, in addition, perturbed by the spate of the anti-war activism and the assault on 
soldiers.1145 In apparent disbelief, an intelligence officer quoted the Rand Daily Mail’s report 
during September 1940, and was critical of the government’s tolerance of the anti-war 
elements and their actions: 
 
There can be no doubt that the public is becoming gravely disturbed by the increasing 
number of assaults on soldiers. Cases of the kind are reported almost every day from many 
parts of the country, and it can fairly be assumed that many others take place, but not 
reported. In Potchefstroom, these crimes came to a sudden end when the soldiers wrecked 
the University College. But the method of retaliation, though undoubtedly effective, is 
undesirable for many reasons … other means must be found. One is that severe punishment 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ermelo, to Chief Control Officer, 10 September 1940; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence 
Summaries, 21 September 1940; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 25 
January 1941. 
1142  Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots?, p. 35. 
1143  CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 25 January 1941; Visser, OB: Traitors 
or Patriots?, p. 35. 
1144  CGS (War), Box 47, 12/5, Friction Between Civilians and Soldiers, Piet Retief, Magistrate of Piet 
Retief (WM Hare) to Control Officer of Ermelo (for Chief Control Officer, Pretoria), 2 September 
1940; CGS (War), Box 47, 12/5, Disorderly Conduct of Soldiers in Oudtshoorn, HW Robertson 
(Magistrate Oudtshoorn) to J.H. Basson (for Chief Control Officer), 1 November 1940; CGS (War), 
Box 47, 12/5, Relations Between Officers and Men of the Royal Air Force at Oudtshoorn, George and 
Local Communities, Lenton to Van Ryneveld, 9 December 1940; CGS (War), Box 47, 12/4, Report of 
the Commission of Inquiry: Disturbances at Potchefstroom University College, 10 October 1940; CGS, 
Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 10 February 1941; CGS (War), Box 47, 12/4, 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Johannesburg Disturbances, Jan-Feb 1941, 19 March 1941. 
1145  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 247, L. Thawckawry? to Smuts, 24 July 1940; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, 
Intelligence Summaries, 31 August 1940; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 21 
September 1940; Malherbe Papers, File 445/3, KCM 56975 (194), The Afrikaner Broederbond, 
updated report by Capt. Janie A. Malherbe, 29 March 1944; Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E5. 83, 
Interview with Dr. J.F.J. van Rensburg, Kommandant-General of the Ossewabrandwag, 5 June 1944. 
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should be inflicted when attackers are caught. A week or two ago, a man charged with 
assaulting a soldier in Pretoria was allowed to sign an admission of guilt, and pay six 
pounds, in expiation of his offence. That is a ridiculous penalty. Imprisonment without the 
option of a fine should be imposed in every case, and, if corporal punishment were inflicted, it 
might help put a stop to this type of violence.1146 
 
Another government supporter, Jack N. Berman of Johannesburg, wrote to Van Ryneveld in 
May 1941, condemning the HNP for instigating half a million ‘Europeans’ to oppose the war 
effort ‘in every way … these people, in this democratic country, are called “Nationalists?”… 
in other countries, they would be styled, more simply, traitors and, under War conditions, 
dealt with as such’.1147 Among the soldiers, on the same token, there was a feeling that they 
were fighting for the country where some sections of the population “did not appreciate 
them” and that their loved ones were threatened by the anti-war elements.1148 
 
Because the country was unprepared for the war, adequate response measures to deal with 
security problems in the Union and in the UDF were still lacking.1149 With regard to military 
formations and within the military units, practical steps to counter subversive activities were 
limited to issuing broad statements which were not fully clarified and without detailed 
procedures.1150 Martin and Orpen proclaim that when the war broke out, the Union defence 
headquarters did not have ‘properly conceived plan for the defence of South Africa or for its 
participation in any kind of war’.1151 This also implied the limited capacity to fight against the 
subversive activities in the Union and within the armed forces. It took months for the 
authorities to develop and put in place a series of war measures and proclamations in 
place.1152 In the meantime, the UDF, as a military institution and instrument of national 
                                                 
1146  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 21 September 1940. Quotation from the Rand Daily 
Mail, no exact date. 
1147  CGS (War), Box 197, VI, 42/3, J.W. Berman to Van Ryneveld, 23 May 1941. 
1148  Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/16, Censorship Summary, 3 December 1940; War Diaries (WD) vol. 
1, Box 296, Military Censorship Summary, East Africa Force Headquarters, 20 February 1941. 
1149  Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 183, Internal Security, 30 May 1940; NASAP, Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 
143, Draft Memorandum on Internal Security, Lawrence to Smuts, 12 June 1940; Martin and Orpen, 
South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 26; Furlong, Allies at War?, p. 16. 
1150  AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/A1, Memorandum on Duties of Command Intelligence Officers, Military 
Intelligence and Security of the Forces, 26 March 1940; AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/A1, Command 
Intelligence Officers Carrying Out Functions of SA Police, Brig Gen Wakefield to DGO, 12 August 
1940. 
1151  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 26. See Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 143, Draft 
Memorandum on Internal Security, Lawrence to Smuts, 12 June 1940. 
1152  These measures, including the National Security Code, are discussed in Chapter 3 of this study. 
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defence and security, was under strain due to the undermining activities of the anti-war 
elements. 
 
Campaigning against recruitment and the undermining of the war effort was a daunting 
challenge for the military authorities. Within months of mobilisation in 1940, the press and 
the censorship officers were reporting that rumours were circulating in the Union about the 
heavy troop casualties and the daily burials of the men suffering from diseases.1153 From 
April to August 1940, the military security branch (Ib) reported that 127 troops were 
discharged from the UDF in connection with the subversive activities and endangering the 
forces.1154 In March 1941, it was reported that there were increasing attempts to undermine 
the morale of the troops in the North through anonymous letters containing ‘false rumours 
about sickness, death and infidelity among soldiers and their families’.1155 One demoralising 
extract in a letter from the 2nd South African Air Force Base Training and Reinforcement 
Deport in East Africa read: 
 
But I will tell you what I read in a letter from someone who calls himself “Interested Friend”. 
You are unfaithful and have met someone on the sly. You wish that I was dead or would die 
from fever. Dearest, how can you write of your love burning for me, how can I understand 
this? Is this my reward for my clean conduct and is there no such thing as God’s mercy? Must 
I pay to the utmost and is the only way to torture my heart?1156 
 
Another extract from an anonymous letter received by a soldier in the 15th Field Ambulance 
in East Africa read: 
 
I write [because] we are said for you, you so far away and things go so bad here by your 
house. Your wife make[s] merry with so many soldiers [back in the Union], she say[s] she 
[is] happy to send you away far and out of way so that she can flirt easy. When you [were] at 
Premier [Mine], you go away on Sunday evening so when [the] train pull[s] away … 1 2 3 
                                                 
1153  Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, General Staff, Intelligence to DDMI, DHQ, 27 August 1940; 
War Diaries (WD) vol 1, Box 296, Morale of Troops, General Staff Intelligence, Chief Field Censor, 
East Africa Force Headquarters to Officers Commanding, All South African Units, 24 March 1941; 
‘The Rumour-Monger Menace’, EP Herald, 22 May 1940; ‘False Reports Spread’, The Star, 26 
November 1940; ‘False Reports on Casualties’, The Star, 21 November 1941. 
1154  CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/6, Internal Security, 1 September 1940. 
1155  Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (861), Anonymous Letters to Soldiers and their Relatives, 
Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to Director of Information (Bureau), 15 March 1941. 
1156  War Diaries (WD) vol 1, Box 296, Military Censorship Summary, East Africa Force Headquarters, 20 
February 1941. 
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she catch[es] a soldier and they go and stay at Belgrave Hotel till late at night. Everyone 
knows how bad your wife is you fool … you give food to children not your own.1157 
 
Military authorities, concerned about the effect of the letters on the state of mind and morale 
of troops, attempted to counter these rumours with a press article submitted through the BOI, 
with the intention of exposing the matter as subversion by creating wider publicity in the 
newspapers and on the radio.1158 For reassurance, it asserted that ‘the senders of these foul 
letters will find their efforts foiled by the fact that authorities are immediately taking steps to 
expose the matter by openly drawing the attention of all ranks of the troops to the staleness of 
the methods used and the motive underlying them’.1159 The public was informed that families 
and relatives of soldiers would be notified officially of their circumstances.1160 Furthermore, 
the chief field censor, East Africa Force, requested the censorship officers in the UDF units in 
South Africa ‘to keep a close watch on all correspondence’ to determine the victims of those 
rumours and to report to DMI (Ib), the security sub-section of military intelligence, to deal 
with the matter.1161  
 
In South Africa, there was a small committee consisting of the controller of censorship, 
SAWAS and DMI (Ic), which came together to determine measures for combating the 
‘alarmist and defeatist rumours’ in the country.1162 SAWAS undertook to establish social 
clubs throughout the Union for the soldiers’ families and friends at which the question of 
rumours could be exposed through frank discussions.1163 Through those discussions, the 
military authorities believed that the ‘rumours cannot flourish where there is 
enlightenment’.1164 Thus, information was critical to counter the spread of rumours about the 
troops. 
                                                 
1157  War Diaries (WD) vol 1, Box 296, Military Censorship Summary, East Africa Force Headquarters, 20 
February 1941. 
1158  Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (861), Article, Anonymous Letters to Soldiers and their 
Relatives, 15 March 1941. 
1159  Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (861), Article, Anonymous Letters to Soldiers and their 
Relatives, 15 March 1941. 
1160  Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (861), Article, Anonymous Letters to Soldiers and their 
Relatives, 15 March 1941; ‘False Reports on Casualties’, The Star, 21 November 1941. 
1161  War Diaries (WD) vol. 1, Box 296, Morale of Troops, General Staff Intelligence, Chief Field Censor, 
East Africa Force Headquarters to Officers Commanding, All South African Units, 24 March 1941. 
1162  Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (860), False Reports Spread Among Soldiers and their 
Relatives, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to CGS, 31 March 1941. 
1163  Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (865), Social Clubs for Soldiers Families, Circular to all 
SAWAS Branch Commandants, 6 March 1941. 
1164  Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (860), False Reports Spread Among Soldiers and their 
Relatives, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to CGS, 31 March 1941. 
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It was however, not only the external forces that undermined the morale of Union forces. 
There were other internal factors that the troops persistently complained about throughout the 
war. Some of the problems related to the military policy or government policy and the 
applications thereof.1165 Other problems were associated with military life, service conditions 
and concerns about the post-war situation.1166 It was particularly the government and military 
policies that had profound impact of the negativity towards the conditions of service for UDF 
volunteers of lower ranks, especially when they applied to the black volunteers. Colour bar 
and discriminatory practices pertaining to the service conditions of black troops in the UDF 
created discontent and resentment among blacks. The concerns related to their treatment and 
welfare including pay, promotional opportunities and, chiefly, the discrepancies of military 
ranks in relation to white troops.1167 
 
Black volunteers generally joined the military due to economic considerations rather than 
political concerns. Still, they were politically conscious and often resisted disadvantageous 
practices based on racial grounds.1168 As Grundlingh explains, unlike in the British and 
French armies, black troops in the UDF could never become officers, irrespective of their 
educational background, experience, knowledge and skills.1169 By virtue of being black, the 
highest military rank that could be attained was that of a sergeant (and staff sergeant in 1942 
after the interventions of the native representative councillors in parliament).1170 Even such a 
                                                 
1165  Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 13 March 1941; Army Intelligence, 
Box 46, CE 2/15, Low Level of Morale on the Home Front, 24 February 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 
441/10, KCM 56974 (864), Memorandum on Army Morale and Propaganda, by DMI (Ic), March 1943. 
1166  Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 13 March 1941; Army Intelligence, 
Box 46, CE 2/15, Low Level of Morale on the Home Front, 24 February 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 
441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by 
Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 
August 1943. 
1167  DNEAS Group 2, Box 7, NAS 3/6, Native Military Corps, Conditions of Service, 6 July 1940 – 11 
September 1945; DNEAS Group 2, Box 20, NAS 3/42, Treatment and General Welfare of Members of 
None-Europeans of NMC Battalions and Units, 3 July 1940 – 28 August 1944; CGS (War), Box 130, 
32/13, 1644, Relations Between Europeans and Non-Europeans in the UDF, May 1941 – January 1942. 
1168  DNEAS Group 2, Box 7, NAS 4/6 8/6, War Measures Act no. 5, 23 January 1942; DNEAS Group 2, 
Box 25, NMC, NAS 3/36/7, NMC Morale and Behaviour, 24 January 1944. 
1169  Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, pp. 111-114. 
1170  See CGS (War), Box 131, 32/23, Memorandum on NEAS, by Parliamentary Representatives of  
Natives: Senator H.C. Malcomess, Margaret Ballinger, Donald B. Molteno and G.K. Hemming, 17 
September 1940; NMC, Box 12, NAS 3/21, Reader’s Questions to the Editor of Native Newspaper: 
‘Umteteli wa Bantu’, Question No. 25, What is the Highest Rank of Native? Answer, Sergeant, A.B. 
O’Brien, Secretary, Native Printing and Publishing Company to DNEAS, 20 October 1941. 
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rank was still subordinated to a white soldier of any rank.1171 Military authorities were 
conscious of the impact of discriminatory practices on black troops and attempted to 
introduce measures that would facilitate the development and preservation of their morale.1172 
However, their efforts were constrained by the prevailing political circumstances that 
focussed on minimising the white antagonism, particularly from the anti-war factions in the 
country. The lack of equal opportunities and the discriminatory practices accounted for the 
persistent disgruntlements and resentments among the black troops. 
 
Among all UDF troops, frustrations set in as a result of inactivity due to an ‘astronomical 
shortage of kit and equipment’1173, also due to monotony of camp life1174 as well as the 
performance of repetitive dull routines by men who had completed their training but kept 
“indefinitely” in base camps.1175 On the UDF’s shortage of equipment, Martin and Orpen 
clearly capture the distressing situation: 
 
To say South Africa was unprepared for the war is no exaggeration … it was not only the 
fault of a political Cabinet or Minister of Defence, or even of a parsimonious Minister of 
Finance who refused to allocate funds for armaments … no ‘shopping list’ was at hand to 
guide any authority appointed to obtain for the Defence Department what it required to fulfil 
its responsibilities … so, the politically divided country was faced not with simply going 
ahead with the realization of well-laid plans, but with the creation of a virtually new army, 
air force and navy from scratch.1176 
 
It was inevitable that inactive troops would be bored and frustrated, resulting in the decline of 
morale. Further dissatisfactions among troops emanated from the general military 
administration and policies. Because of the internal political divisions, the government 
introduced the Africa Oath policy on 7 February 1940 and required volunteers ‘to serve 
                                                 
1171  DNEAS Group 2, Box 7, NAS 4/6 8/6, War Measures Act no. 5, 23 January 1942; Grundlingh, The 
Participation of South African Blacks in the Second World War, pp. 111-114. 
1172  DNEAS Group 2, Box 20, NAS 3/42/1, Lt Col Mockford to OC Boschpoort NMC Camp, 3 July 1942. 
1173  Shortage of equipment was a result of many years of neglect. See N. Orpen, East African and 
Abyssinian Campaigns: South African Forces World War II, vol. 1 (Purnell, Cape Town and 
Johannesburg, 1968), p. 3. 
1174  Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 13 March 1941. 
1175  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army 
at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942. 
1176  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 26. 
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anywhere in Africa’.1177 Many soldiers refused to sign the Oath on the grounds that they were 
only prepared to defend the Union within its borders.1178 The introduction and 
implementation of the Africa Oath (1940) and later the General Service Oath (Service 
Anywhere in the World, January 1943), caused dissatisfactions among soldiers regarding the 
differences in the treatment of those who signed and those who did not.1179 Those who signed 
the oaths (and even served outside South Africa) generally received better treatment, 
although, there were some grievances.1180 Those who declined to sign the oaths, declared 
Visser, were viewed with derision and described as ‘parade ground soldiers with no guts’.1181 
Although the issue of signing oaths elicited controversies and bitterness within the white 
society and the military, there were other organisational problems that produced 
dissatisfactions among the soldiers. 
 
During the early months of the war, when UDF mobilisation was taking shape, volunteers 
became frustrated due to the delays in processing the troops, lack of accommodation at 
training camps, diseases at overcrowded camps (Natal Mounted Rifles at Ladysmith), lack of 
training material and lack of action.1182 G.E. Visser writes that due to the lack of 
accommodation, the warning order on 8 July 1940 for the fulltime service of the volunteers of 
the Middellaandse Regiment at Graff Reinet, Eastern (Cape) Province Command, for 22 July, 
was cancelled twice.1183 It created a social dilemma because some of those volunteers, on the 
basis of the first warning order, had left their civilian employment for fulltime military 
service and thus, had no income when the order was cancelled. The situation was desperate 
                                                 
1177  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 58; Orpen, East African and Abyssinian Campaigns, 
p. 6; Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots?, p. 31. 
1178  Orpen, East African and Abyssinian Campaigns, p. 6; Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots?, p. 31. 
1179  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 223-225; Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots?, p. 31. 
1180  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 223-225; See also a consolidated report on army 
morale, Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (864), Memorandum on Army Morale and 
Propaganda, by DMI (Ic), March 1943; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 
August 1943. 
1181  Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots?, p. 31. 
1182  G.E. Visser, ‘Die Geskiedenis van die Middellaandse Regiment, 1934-1943’ (Unpublished Master of 
Arts Thesis, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1983), p. 71; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, 
vol. 7, pp. 49-50; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 46. There was no sufficient accommodation during 
the inter-war years. Instructions were soon issued to build new training camps at Kimberley, 
Ladysmith, Oudtshoorn, Queenstown, Premier Mine and Potchefstroom. 
1183  The first cancelled date was for 22 July 1940, the next one was for 29 July. It was also changed to 
August 1940, when mainly those who were in a desperate situation of being jobless, were 
accommodated in Bloemfontein, then to Premier Mine in Pretoria. G.E. Visser, ‘Die Geskiedenis van 
die Middellaandse Regiment, 1934-1943’ (Unpublished MA Thesis, University of South Africa, 
Pretoria, 1983), pp. 71-72. 
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and the military authorities, on a limited scale, called up those whose circumstances were 
dire, if they could prove it, for fulltime service.1184 
 
Another point of frustration related to camp life. Soldiers in base camps, mainly in the Union, 
were dissatisfied with remaining in camps for longer periods when they had actually enlisted 
for active service. They declared that they were ‘either forgotten’ or that their immediate 
superiors refused to dispense with their services because of being “too” competent.1185 Some 
troops in the Natal Mounted Rifles (NMR) at Andalusia were so dissatisfied that they signed 
petitions about their grievances pertaining to ‘inaction at camps’ and questioning the ‘delays 
to go North’.1186 One soldier of the Pretoria Highlanders wrote to his wife complaining about 
stagnation in military camps: 
 
We class ourselves as night watchmen, as we rarely do anything else and are unable to 
visualise any better prospect. I have considered every possible way of working a transfer … I 
am of the opinion that I would be more use back at work as I’d be saving S.A.R money and 
would be learning my job instead of stagnating here … I never imagined I would one day be 
on the same level as the old men who guard the picks and shovels of road gangs at night.1187 
 
Military discipline and petty offences such as drunkenness, selling military equipment and 
leaving camps without passes also became a problem.1188 Military courts handled 
approximately 1500 cases at Premier Mine alone every month, creating congestions in the 
military judicial system and immobilising officers and men for protracted periods of time.1189 
Likewise, there was anxiety regarding the increasing number of desertions and the discharges 
which, according Malherbe, were ‘exceedingly high’ at about ‘500 monthly’ on the records 
of the dispersal depots.1190 Those discharges were attributed to the dissatisfactions, as 
Malherbe raised a question with regard to ‘persons who have had clean records for a year or 
                                                 
1184  G.E. Visser, ‘Die Geskiedenis van die Middellaandse Regiment’, pp. 71-72. 
1185  Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 13 March 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 
441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by 
Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942. 
1186  Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 23 July 1941. 
1187  Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 19 July 1941. 
1188  Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 19 July 1941. 
1189  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army 
at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942. 
1190  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army 
at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942. 
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18 months and suddenly go berserk’.1191 Malherbe cautioned that the ‘dissatisfied soldiers 
had nothing good to say about the army, and consciously or unconsciously assist in 
slandering it’.1192 It was thus critical that their distresses and legitimate concerns be resolved 
expeditiously or risk losing them to the anti-war factions which exploited military service 
conditions to wage anti-government propaganda.1193 Moreover, there were troops who, in the 
censorship reports, were described as the ‘never-do-wells’ or ‘constant-grumblers’ and ‘base-
wallowers’ who caused tensions which affected morale within camps.1194 
 
Tensions at the higher military hierarchy also complicated matters. There was what Kerr, 
with reference to Van Ryneveld’s leadership style, describes as ‘dictatorship’ by ‘the fountain 
of all decisions’ in the UDF- the CGS, who was in constant collision with the main 
accounting officer of the DOD - Defence Secretary Blaine.1195 The clash of the two main 
figures in the higher military establishment created complications in the decision-making 
process as there were sometimes ‘conflicting orders and instructions from formations, 
commands and DHQ sections’.1196 It is on this basis that the administrative and policy-related 
matters presented difficulties and impacted on troop morale. Hence, by 1943, an unsigned 
hand-written note commenting on the DMI (Ic)’s ‘Memorandum on Army Morale’, 
highlighted the point that ‘it is very difficult for propaganda to overcome the effects of 
policies which take no account of morale … what is essential is that those who can speak 
with authority on morale should be consulted when policies are drawn up’.1197 The DMI (Ic), 
therefore, had to contend with this tricky aspect of policy and military administration when 
the schemes for sustaining troop morale were developed and implemented from late 1940 and 
early 1941 until the end of the war. 
 
                                                 
1191  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army 
at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942. 
1192  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army 
at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942. 
1193  PP, Box 59, PR 7/2/1, Military Counter-Propaganda on the Home-Front, Ic to DDMI, n.d; UWH, Box 
276, B.I. 28, Opposition Attacks on Government, 1940-1945; ‘Fifth Column Still Attempting to Hinder 
S.A.’s War Effort’, Rand Daily Mail, 15 November 1941; ‘Danger of Rumour Mongering’, Rand Daily 
Mail, 3 January 1942; ‘Rumours about C3 Soldiers Refuted’, Rand Daily Mail, 9 June 1943. 
1194  Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 23 July 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 
441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by 
Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942. 
1195  Martin and Orpen, ‘Foreword’, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. V. 
1196  Martin and Orpen, ‘Foreword’, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 26. 
1197  Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (864), Notes on Memorandum on Army Morale and 
Propaganda, unsigned comments, n.d. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
213 
 
In addition to the policy-related problems, lack of variety in the activities at base camps 
produced boredom and the troops began to contemplate their prospects after the war. After 
enlistment and being in camps without much to do, some of the troops took the initiatives of 
establishing discussion groups to articulate their concerns regarding the post-war socio-
economic visions.1198 The government and military authorities were not oblivious to the 
distresses and restlessness of the troops. But, the question of the troops debating about the 
social and economic conditions of the post-war society, in a volatile political environment of 
the Nazi-perpetuated extremism, produced anxieties among the Union officials.1199 The 
concerns of the Union officials pertained to the potential subversion of the UDF, the 
development of untenable demands by the soldiers and the Nazi-inspired political extremism 
which could possibly result in the creation of an alternative ‘post-war fascist or Soldiers’ 
Party.1200 The loyalty of the largely white Afrikaans-speaking members of the UDF to the 
government and the war policy needed to be secured. As a result, within the Union military 
forces, the authorities instituted various measures throughout the war to combat the 
subversive influences, to eliminate camp monotony and to sustain the morale of the troops.  
 
In broad terms, the measures which were instituted included education and training, 
entertainment and recreational facilities for the troops. Educational services involved lectures 
and talks as well as reading material for mental stimulation. This will be examined in the next 
section. As far as entertainment and recreation, these will be dealt with in the next chapter on 
social welfare services. However, it should be noted that due to the unprepared state of the 
military, the preoccupation with mobilisation and the financial considerations, there was 
initial reluctance to introduce propaganda for the troops.1201 After several letters and 
memoranda from the DMI (Ic) and from white liberal supporters of Smuts with regard to the 
introduction of counter-measures against subversive activities, as well as the need to 
                                                 
1198  Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (37), The Springbok Legion, by Vic Clapham, 12 January 
1974, pp. 1-8; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 46-48. 
1199  PP, Box 56, PR 5/1/1 Propaganda Intelligence Summary Nos.1-2; 19-26 August 1940; M. Cardo, 
“‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’: White South African Loyalism and the Army Education Services 
(AES) during the Second World War’, South African Historical Journal, vol. 46, no. 1, May 2002, pp. 
141-174; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 48. 
1200  PP, Box 56, PR 2/2, Memorandum on Propaganda in Military Units, DDMI to SO3 (Ic (ii), Advance 
Headquarters, 9 June 1941, PP, Box 57, PR 3/4/1, Memorandum on the Scope and Work of I.C.(iii), 
the Propaganda Branch of Military Intelligence, Lt JE Sacks, 6 August 1940; Roos, Ordinary 
Springboks, p. 49; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 215-217. 
1201  AG, Group 3, Box 6, Notes on Meetings of Authority Committee, 1940-1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 
42/1, War Propaganda, DDMI to CGS, 26 September 1940; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History 
of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945; Dr Malherbe also expressed the challenges he 
encountered with the Finance Minister, Hofmeyr, who was strict with finances to facilitate the delivery 
of political propaganda. See Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 219-220. 
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inculcate the appreciation of liberal democracy among troops, the institution of propaganda 
schemes within the UDF was authorised in 1941.1202 
 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
 
At the start of the war, as with the unprepared state of the military force, South Africa had no 
policy or an organised propaganda system.1203 However, there was “theorising” about 
propaganda, its technical aspects, its significance in the preservation of morale and its 
capacity to undermine the morale of the enemy, which the DMI (Ic) and civilian experts 
produced.1204 In November 1940, during a meeting of the National Advisory Council on 
Publicity and Propaganda (where the military was not represented), the question of having an 
organisation ‘working on specialist propaganda inside the Army’ was raised by the director 
of the UUTS, Robertson.1205 The Interior Minister, Lawrence, mistakenly replied that 
publicity and propaganda was the function of the BOI (which assisted the military in the 
recruitment publicity and propaganda). Furthermore, Lawrence continued that, as far as he 
knew, the military was not supposed to have such a propaganda structure. To this point, 
Robertson contended that ‘the army should … every modern army on the Continent has such 
a welfare establishment which deals with propaganda and such matters within the army’.1206  
 
The point here was that inter-agency rivalry was rife in the government’s propaganda 
machine. For example, during the above-mentioned meeting, the fact that there was a special 
                                                 
1202  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/1, War Propaganda, Thwaites to CGS, 13 April 1940; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, 
Organisation: Propaganda Projects. Draft of Proposed Circular to O’s C, n.d.; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, 
Propaganda Among Our Troops, G.S.O.2 (Ic) to D.G.O (for DDMI), 8 November 1940; Marquard 
Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Education the Troops in the Political, Social and Economic 
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Propaganda, Lt J.E. Sacks, 25 July 1940; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Memorandum on a Planned Propaganda 
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Fourth Defence Service, by A.J. Mackenzie, n.d.; UUTS, A1883, 14, Lecture by Pastor Luckoff, 16 
December 1940. Lecture passed on to the DMI (Ic) for wider publicity; UUTS, A1883, 14, The 
Psychological Approach to Propaganda, by Dr S. Biesheuvel, December 1940; ‘Lecture Calls for New 
Vision in S.A. Propaganda’, Rand Daily Mail, 18 August 1940. 
1205  PP, Box 63, PU 6/3, Army Publicity and Propaganda, DMI (Ic) to DDMI, 27 November 1940. 
1206  PP, Box 63, PU 6/3, Army Publicity and Propaganda, DMI (Ic) to DDMI, 27 November 1940. 
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branch of military intelligence (the DMI (Ic)) dealing military publicity and propaganda 
within the UDF was not even mentioned. It was surprising, according to the DMI (Ic), that 
Wilson (the BOI’s director), who knew and interacted with the military propaganda branch 
(DMI (Ic)), sat in that meeting and failed to correct Lawrence’s mistaken statement.1207 This 
might be attributed to the prevailing contestations between the DMI (Ic) and the BOI. Many 
of the earlier activities of the DMI (Ic), on which reports were generated, related more to the 
publicity and propaganda towards the South African public (for a positive public opinion and 
for recruitment), hence the clashes they encountered with the BOI.1208 In a hand-written 
comment on the report, the DDMI replied to the Ic’s concern that ‘we should just go ahead 
with our propaganda work and keep careful files of our effort.’1209 
 
Because of the “alarming” censorship reports concerning the restlessness of the troops during 
the second half of 1940, the necessity for the formal institution of propaganda within the 
UDF increased. The DMI (Ic) submitted memoranda1210 to the higher military authorities 
regarding the need to improve the morale of the troops. In November 1940, Major D.A.W. 
Ruck of DMI (Ic) wrote to the director general of operations (for DDMI), indicating the 
imperative of instituting constructive propaganda among the UDF troops because of 
censorship reports that revealed disaffections among some of the Afrikaans – speaking troops 
which was attributed to boredom.1211 To alleviate the problem, he suggested propaganda 
interventions which included the provision of lecturer services and talks, the issuing of army 
newspapers to the troops and the utilisation of mobile cinema for both entertainment and 
instructional value.1212 
 
                                                 
1207  PP, Box 63, PU 6/3, Army Publicity and Propaganda, DMI (Ic) to DDMI, 27 November 1940. 
1208  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Memorandum on the Plan for Press and Information Division, 3 April 
1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instruction to all Military Commands by the Chief of the General 
Staff, 6 April 1940; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present 
Activities, 23 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Reply of the UDF Quartermaster General and 
the Director General Operations to the Director of Information, 28 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 
42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, 
Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940. 
1209  PP, Box 63, PU 6/3, Army Publicity and Propaganda, DMI (Ic) to DDMI, 27 November 1940. 
1210  PP, Box 57, PR 3/4, Memorandum on the Scope and Work of (DMI) I.C.(iii), the Propaganda Branch 
of Military Intelligence, by Lt J.E. Sacks, Kreft to Wakefield, 6 August 1940; PP, Box 59, PR 7/2/1, 
Suggested Measures for Countering Subversive Propaganda in South Africa, by Lt J.E. Sacks (Ic), 17 
September 1940; PP, Box 57, PR 3/1, Propaganda: Its Power as a Weapon of War, by Capt R.L. Robb, 
Intelligence and Security Officer, 2 September 1941. 
1211  PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among Our Troops, G.S.O.2 (Ic) to D.G.O (for DDMI), 8 
November 1940. 
1212  PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among Our Troops, G.S.O.2 (Ic) to D.G.O (for DDMI), 8 
November 1940. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
216 
 
In January 1941, the DMI (Ic) submitted a draft letter to the DDMI requesting to give effect 
to the propaganda requirement in the UDF by appointing welfare (propaganda) officers at 
military units to ‘build troop morale, the keenness of men and to instil a strong sense of 
comradeship and devotion to duty in the early stages of the war’.1213 It was proposed that 
officers commanding the military units were to appoint ‘Welfare (Propaganda) Officers’ with 
the rank of a captain, for the purpose of dealing with matters of education, entertainment and 
recreation for the troops.1214 The proposed functions of the welfare (propaganda) officer were 
varied: 
 
a. Providing instructional handbooks and facilitate lessons in propaganda technique. 
b. Facilitating lecture services by officers and men who have participated in previous 
campaigns to share their experiences for inspirational purposes. 
c. Encouraging loyalist English and Afrikaans literature in the military camps. 
d. Ensuring the installation of radio receiving sets in officers and men’s messes with 
special microphone equipment for facilitating announcements and lectures. 
e. Making arrangements for distributing the news, pamphlets and literature in camps. 
f. Organising entertainment such as camp concerts, camp songs, sports and also for 
arranging special services to advice troops with personal problems.1215  
 
Closer co-operation between the welfare (propaganda) officer and the unit intelligence 
officer, who also served as censor officer, was fundamental in expediting the passing of 
useful information on the views and feelings of the troops, thus maintaining alertness and to 
facilitate the implementation of the relevant antidotes in cases of disaffections. The welfare 
(propaganda) officer would liaise with the DDMI (specifically the Ic section) for the 
submission of weekly reports to the DHQ (DDMI) and to receive special instructional and 
propaganda material for distribution in the units.1216 Though the proposals were clearly 
designed for the UDF troops, the DMI (Ic)’s activities at the beginning of the war (also 
throughout the war for that matter due to the concerns for military security), persistently 
                                                 
1213  PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Appointment of Welfare (Propaganda) Officer in Every Unit, Draft Letter to Os. C 
Units, Ic to DDMI, 2 January 1941. 
1214  PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Appointment of Welfare (Propaganda) Officer in Every Unit, Draft Letter to Os. C 
Units, Ic to DDMI, 2 January 1941. The draft letter was an attempt to give detail to the previous 
suggestions from the Ic regarding the implementation of propaganda to the troops. However, the type 
of personnel to perform those functions was not clarified. 
1215  PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Organisation: Propaganda Projects. Draft of Proposed Circular to O’s C, n.d. 
1216  PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Organisation: Propaganda Projects. Draft of Proposed Circular to O’s C, n.d. 
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clashed with those of the BOI as the former also dealt with the publicity of the UDF activities 
towards the public – the domain of Wilson.1217  
 
As indicated above, it took more than a year for the military authorities to give official 
sanction for the introduction of propaganda among the troops. Despite the various letters and 
memoranda from the DMI (Ic),1218 the military authorities relented to the submission from an 
unofficial committee led by a University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) academic – Professor 
R.F.A (Alfred) Hoernlé, an influential professor of philosophy and liberal supporter of 
Smuts.1219 On 10 September 1940, the unofficial committee held a meeting at Wits in 
Johannesburg to deliberate on the ways and means of assisting the DOD by delivering the 
educational services to the South African soldiers.1220 From this meeting, Hoernlé submitted 
the proposed scheme to Smuts on 19 September 1940. The Hoernlé scheme proposed an 
institution of an educational service for the UDF troops (mainly white) on the basis of the 
following rationale: 
 
a. UDF members should know what they were fighting for, not only what they were 
fighting against. To explain the reasons why South Africa was engaged in a war 
and thus developing their political consciousness with regard to the cause they 
were fighting for. 
                                                 
1217  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for 
Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the 
Relationship between the Bureau of Information and the UDF, 13 January 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 
42/4, Report on the Control of Military Information issues to the Public, DDMI’s Reply to Controller 
of Censorship, 16 April 1942. 
1218  This might have been due to the misunderstandings regarding the different roles of the Bureau of 
Information and the military intelligence section dealing with publicity and propaganda. See CGS 
(War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press 
Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940;, PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the 
Relationship between the Bureau of Information and the UDF, 13 January 1941; PP, Box 57, PR 3/1, 
Points to be Considered in the Organisation of Any Propaganda and Publicity, Ic to DDMI, 4 August 
1941. 
1219  It could be that the letter was submitted to Smuts, especially by an authoritative liberal figure and 
influential critic of Hertzog during the inter-war years, Prof Reinhold Friedrich Alfred (RFA) Hoernlé 
(1880-1943). See ‘The Basis of Trusteeship by Field Marshal J.C. Smuts’, New Africa Pamphlet, South 
African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, January 1942; W. Sweet, R.F.A. Hoernlé and 
Idealist Liberalism in South Africa, South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2010, pp. 
178-194; J.H. Hofmeyr, ‘R.F. Alfred Hoernlé: A Tribute’, Common Sense, August 1943, pp. 12-13; 
A.H. Murray, ‘Thinker and Fighter: A Memoir’, Common Sense, August 1943, pp. 13-14; D.D.T. 
Jabavu, ‘Champion of the Oppressed’, Common Sense, August 1943, p. 15; ‘Prof Hoernlé Dead: 
Brilliant Academic Career’, The Star, 21 July 1943. 
1220  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945; ‘Prof 
Hoernlé Dead: Brilliant Academic Career’, The Star, 21 July 1943. 
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b. The need to stimulate thinking and to sustain the intellectual interest of soldiers in 
social life. 
c. The provision of assistance to those soldiers whose educational careers had been 
interrupted by the war. 
d. To afford opportunities to engage in discussions and to debate problematic issues 
of relevance and interest to soldiers as well as to combat boredom. 
e. At the later stage, to facilitate the provision of services for soldiers in preparation 
for their re-entry into the civilian life.1221 
 
The proposed educational service was intended to be conducted by a panel of civilian 
lecturers without any financial benefits for them.1222 Topics to be addressed by the 
educational service included the illumination of the background, causes and ideological 
underpinnings of the war, economic and social implications, nationalism, principles of 
democracy, press and propaganda, race relations, population problems, non-Europeans, post-
war reconstruction and international order.1223 Smuts was interested in the scheme and passed 
it on to his CGS, Van Ryneveld, which was then deliberated further between the director 
general training and operations, Major General George Brink and Hofmeyr in October 
1940.1224 
 
In the meantime, Leo Marquard, an instructor at the South African Military College, and his 
wife, Mrs Nell (N.J.) Marquard, who was involved in welfare activities, proposed an 
alternative scheme for political education in the UDF troops.1225 Unlike the Hoernlé’s 
scheme, the Marquards’ proposal advocated training a corps of about fifty military officers, 
                                                 
1221  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 1. 
1222  AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Provision of Educational Services to the Troops, Director General of 
Training and Operations to the Adjutant General, 27 February 1941. 
1223  AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A.I.C: Educational Course (784 G), 18 March 1941-18 April 1941, 
South African Military College, 18 March 1941; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Educational Course 
(784 G), Malherbe to the Adjutant General, 11 March 1941; UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army 
Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, p. 4; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Information 
Officer Course – 1419.G, 21 October 1943 – 14 November 1943, History of Army Education Services, 
30 September 1945; Union of South Africa, DOD, Army Education Handbook, General Staff, Defence 
Headquarters, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1943, pp. 5-159. 
1224  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 2. 
1225  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, pp. 141-174; R. de Villiers, ‘Leo Marquard: A Memoir’, 
Reality: A Journal of Liberal and Radical Opinion, vol. 10, no. 3, May 1978, pp. 4-5; D. Welsh, ‘A 
Tribute to Leo Marquard’, Reality, vol. 10, no. 3, May 1978, pp. 5-6. Leo Marquard, a liberal and an 
Oxford University graduate, was the founder of the National Union of South African Students 
(NUSAS) in 1924 and the co-founder of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) in 
1929. 
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not civilians, as political instructors to deliver the lectures to the UDF troops.1226 The 
Marquards’ proposal was submitted to Dr Malherbe, who was also involved in the proposals 
generated by Professor Hoernlé.1227 Subsequently, on 1 November 1940, Dr Malherbe 
rephrased the letter from the Marquards and submitted it as a memorandum titled ‘Education 
the Troops in the Political, Social and Economic Reasons for Our being at War’, to Colonel 
H.T. Newman (DDMI) and Colonel H.B. Klopper (then director of infantry and armoured 
fighting vehicle training).1228 
 
The Marquard memorandum explained the necessity for propaganda and set out the intended 
objectives and methods of instituting what became the Army Education Services (AES).1229 
The AES would serve to create awareness among the UDF troops about the Union’s cultural, 
political and economic assets to be preserved – through their sacrifices.1230 Dr Malherbe 
believed that the suggested scheme of the Marquards would appeal to the military authorities 
from an organisational perspective.1231 The main objective of the rephrased Malherbe-
Marquard scheme was to strengthen troop morale and to ‘improve the fighting force against 
Nazism’.1232 The memorandum emphasised that the AES should not be treated as an 
“auxiliary” activity, but as an integral part of military training and educational development: 
 
The scheme of instruction must not receive stepfatherly treatment. It must not be looked upon 
by the military authorities as some new-fangled idea (born of civilian cranks) which, if 
                                                 
1226  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops in the Political, Social and 
Economic Reasons for Our being at War (A Suggested Scheme), 31 October 1940; Marquard Papers, 
BC 587, D3.1, E.G.M. Malherbe to L. Marquard, 1 November 1940. 
1227  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.1, E.G.M. Malherbe to L. Marquard, 1 November 1940; Marquard 
Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 2; Malherbe, 
Never a Dull Moment, p. 215; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 148. 
1228  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940; Marquard 
Papers, BC 587, D3.1, E.G.M. Malherbe to L. Marquard, 1 November 1940. 
1229  UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; AG (3) 
Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Organisation and Establishment: Army Education Services (V), Circular to All 
Heads of Sections, 17 July 1942; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.1, E.G.M. Malherbe to L. Marquard, 1 
November 1940; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 
1940; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945; 
Army Education Handbook, 1943, pp. 5-159. 
1230  UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; AG (3) 
Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Educational Course (784 G), Malherbe to the Adjutant General, 11 March 1941; 
Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940; Army 
Education Handbook, 1943, pp. 5-159; ‘Education for the Army’, Cape Times, 24 February 1941; 
Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 215; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 51-54. 
1231  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.1, E.G.M. Malherbe to L. Marquard, 1 November 1940. 
1232  UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; AG (3) 
Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Educational Course (784 G), Malherbe to the Adjutant General, 11 March 1941; 
Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 1; 
Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 215; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 149. 
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backed by a sufficiently authoritative source, must be given a corner of the programme. 
Instruction must somehow be made part and parcel of the whole scheme of training a 
democratic army to fight Fascism. It is as much a weapon as a Bren Gun – as the Germans 
and Italians realise very clearly. We want an army not of mercenaries but of soldiers – 
soldiers who are imbued with a powerful ideal. The scheme of instruction will, therefore, have 
to be carefully integrated with the present scheme of training.1233 
 
Combining education with propaganda would expand the knowledge and also enhance the 
mental stimulation of the soldier. The DMI (Ic)’s draft proposal for the appointment of 
welfare (propaganda) officers in military camps and training establishments also emphasised 
this point of combining educational service and propaganda: 
 
The institution of a special service via the Welfare (Propaganda) Officer to men … on one 
side would be instructional articles (map reading, directing finding by stars, hints for 
distance finding, etc) and on the other side [would be] a matter of a propagandist character 
(war aims, encouragement of comradeship, etc).1234 
 
It was a difficult task to convince high military officers regarding the imperative of such an 
educational scheme.1235 Nevertheless, they needed to be persuaded since it was deemed 
essential to integrate political education with military training to enhance the prospects of 
winning the war ‘in anything but purely military sense’.1236 To pursue the goal of political 
education, careful consideration was required for the selection of appropriate personnel.1237  
 
The objective of the Malherbe-Marquard scheme was to have personnel who should, ‘as far 
as humanly possible be people in the army and not civilians’, to conduct political education. 
Young men who had undergone military training and possessed the required military 
attributes such as discipline, had to be ‘hand-picked’ for the special type of training for the 
purpose of co-ordinating ‘democratic training [political education] with military training 
                                                 
1233  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 1. 
1234  PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Appointment of Welfare (Propaganda) Officer in Every Unit, Draft Letter to Os. C 
Units, Ic to DDMI, 2 January 1941. 
1235  See comments of the establishment of AES, AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Provision of Educational 
Services to the Troops, Director General of Training and Operations to the Adjutant General, 27 
February 1941. 
1236  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 1. 
1237  UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; AG (3) 
Box 207, 154/51/50/5, M.F.F. Educational Corps, Director General of Training and Operations to CGS, 
n.d; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, SA Educational Corps, Director General of Training and Operations 
to Adjutant General, 22 February 1941. 
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[squad drills, company drills, weapons training and military law]’.1238 Such training of the 
political instructors was envisaged to take two to three months at a time and their selection to 
the course was on the basis of their educational background, ability and they had to be ‘in 
sympathy with the Government’s war policy’.1239 After undergoing political education, these 
specially selected officers, still working as combatants, were to speak with authority to 
military men, were to provide the ‘main diet’ of the educational programme to at least twenty 
troops in camps and on active service and were to live among the troops, not to come in 
occasionally to deliver an ‘odd lecture’.1240 
 
Still, as Cardo shows, there was to be closer cooperation between the military and civilian 
aspects of the education scheme. The civilian experts in their respective fields would be 
selected to provide lectures to the selected nucleus of political instructors and to inspire 
interest in those specialised educational areas.1241 The suggested education scheme further 
envisaged a curriculum that included the following topics: 
 
a. Explanations of Fascism and Nazism. 
b. The weaknesses and strengths of the Democratic institutions. 
c. The Democratic tradition and the underlying principles. 
d. The economics of Fascism. 
e. How progress can be achieved under the democratic system without the brutality of 
revolutionary and of Gestapo – methods 
f. Propaganda methods and how to combat them.1242 
 
The main objectives of the syllabus of the envisaged political education were twofold: ‘to 
equip soldiers to defend democracy and to equip citizen-soldiers to build a better democracy 
                                                 
1238  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 2. 
1239  UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; Marquard 
Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 3. 
1240  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, pp. 2-3; 
WD, vol.1, Box 292, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officers, Broadcast Talk by Major 
E.G. Malherbe, 14 June 1941. 
1241  AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Provision of Educational Services to the Troops, Director General of 
Training and Operations to the Adjutant General, 27 February 1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, 
Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 2; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, 
p. 149. 
1242  AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A.I.C: Educational Course (784 G), 18 March 1941-18 April 1941, 
South African Military College, 18 March 1941; UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education 
Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on 
Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 3. 
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once the threat of Fascism has been removed’.1243 The advantage of the AES was that even 
after the war, the “politically-trained” officers and men would ‘act as a powerful and salutary 
leaven amongst their own folks when they get home in the different parts of South 
Africa’.1244 Dr Malherbe, conscious of the prevailing political sensitivities in the country, 
emphasised that ‘special attention should be paid to the needs of the Afrikaans-speaking 
troops’ as well as to ensure that most of those political education officers were themselves 
proficient in Afrikaans.1245 It was imperative for Dr Malherbe to assuage the political 
sensitivities of the Afrikaans-speakers to eliminate the risk of what Cardo refers to as ‘volkish 
Afrikaner nationalism’ that could jeopardise the English-Afrikaans relations and adversely 
impact on morale.1246 
 
The Minister of Education and Finance, Hofmeyr, was at first reluctant about the Malherbe-
Marquard scheme.1247 As deliberations on that scheme were taking place within the 
government and the high-ranking military officials, experimentation with the Hoernlé scheme 
was allowed (by defence and Hofmeyr) to proceed in the Pretoria (at Waterkloof, Lyttleton 
and at the Military College-Voortrekker Hoogte/Roberts’ Heights) and at the Sonderwater-
Premier Mine areas.1248 This experimentation scheme involved a series of four lectures 
dealing with the general subjects such as the genesis of the war1249, the rise of dictators and 
how they acquire and employ their power1250 and democracy as a government method versus 
                                                 
1243  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 3. 
1244  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 3; See 
also details in the AES Bulletin, UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, 
Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4. 
1245  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 4. See 
also Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 149. 
1246  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, pp. 149-150; See also Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 
56974 (539), Memorandum on Concerted Propaganda Campaign, Ic (iii) to DMI (Ic), n.d; Malherbe 
Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 1941; 
Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (544), Recognition of the Afrikaans Element in Propaganda, 
9 February 1941. The latter memorandum was also issued to the CGS (War), Box 197, 42/1, 
Propaganda, dated 14 February 1941), and to Prof Hoernlé of Wits University, (Hoernlé Papers, AD 
1623, Ab 2, Correspondence, dated 9 February 1941). 
1247  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 3. 
Hofmeyr remarked in the notes on the memorandum that the time was not yet ripe to introduce such a 
scheme. 
1248  PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among our Troops, Reply by Director Military Operations and 
Intelligence, to General Staff Officer, East Africa Force HQ, 29 November 1940; AG (3) Box 207, 
154/51/50/5, M.F.F. Educational Corps, Director General of Training and Operations to CGS, n.d; 
Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 2; 
Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, pp. 149-150; ‘Prof Hoernlé Dead: Brilliant Academic Career’, 
The Star, 21 July 1943. 
1249  Hoernlé Papers, AD 1623, C 2/4, Lecture 1: How the War Began, Draft, n.d. 
1250  Hoernlé Papers, AD 1623, C 2/4, Lecture 2, Dictatorships, Draft, n.d. 
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dictatorship.1251 On 11 February 1941, the Malherbe-Marquard scheme was eventually 
approved by Van Ryneveld, for adoption within the UDF intelligence section (as IM - for 
morale), with Dr Malherbe in charge as an education officer.1252 
 
The Hoernlé scheme was then instituted in the ACF in the Transvaal and also extended to the 
OFS, Natal, Eastern and Western Cape.1253 A panel of local civilian lecturers were organised 
at the nearby base camps under Major E. Eybers (Bloemfontein), Major S.H. Skaife (Cape 
Town), Major J. Smeath-Thomas (Grahamstown), Major O.J.P. Oxley (Pietermaritzburg) and 
Major J.Y.T Greig (Hoernlé’s successor after his death in 1943, who also organised lecturers 
at the Witwatersrand, Premier Mine and Potchefstroom).1254 Hoernlé, with the military rank 
of lieutenant colonel, drew most of the lecturing staff and material from the Universities of 
the Witwatersrand and Pretoria.1255 Within the UDF, the training course for the political 
education instructors under the Malherbe-Marquad scheme commenced on 18 March 
1941.1256 The AES thus came into existence and had a dual purpose: firstly to sustain the 
morale and fighting efficiency of the troops to defeat Nazism; linked to the first aim, it served 
                                                 
1251  Hoernlé Papers, AD 1623, C 2/4, Lecture 3, Democracy, Draft, n.d; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse 
Imperialism’, p. 150. See also AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A.I.C: Educational Course (784 G), 18 
March 1941-18 April 1941, South African Military College, 18 March 1941; UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, 
The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4. 
1252  AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Establishment S.A. Educational Corps, DGTO to AG, 10 February 
1941; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, AES Approval Letter, CGS to DGTO, 17 February 1941; 
Malherbe Papers, File 432/1, KCM 56974 (11-14), Recruitment, Identification and Discharge Record 
relating to Dr E.G. Malherbe, Volunteer’s Identity Book for Use on Discharge; Marquard Papers, BC 
587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945 - Significant Dates in the History 
of Army Education Scheme; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 105; Malherbe, Never a 
Dull Moment, p. 215. See previous chapters. 
1253  AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, AES Approval Letter, CGS to DGTO, 17 February 1941; AG (3) Box 
207, 154/51/50/5, M.F.F. Educational Corps, Director General of Training and Operations to CGS, n.d; 
Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945; PP, Box 
39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among our Troops, Reply by Director Military Operations and Intelligence, 
to General Staff Officer, East Africa Force HQ, 29 November 1940; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at 
War, vol. 7, p. 105. 
1254  AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, M.F.F. Educational Corps, Director General of Training and Operations 
to CGS, n.d; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Provision of Educational Services to the Troops, Director 
General of Training and Operations to the Adjutant General, 27 February 1941; Marquard Papers, BC 
587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 12; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse 
Imperialism’, p. 150. 
1255  AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, M.F.F. Educational Corps, Director General of Training and Operations 
to CGS, n.d; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Provision of Educational Services to the Troops, Director 
General of Training and Operations to the Adjutant General, 27 February 1941. 
1256  AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Educational Course (784 G), Malherbe to the Adjutant General, 11 
March 1941; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A.I.C: Educational Course (784 G), 18 March 1941-18 
April 1941, South African Military College, 18 March 1941; UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army 
Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; WD, vol.1, Box 292, 194/3, The Training and 
Work of Education Officers, Broadcast Talk by Major E.G. Malherbe, 14 June 1941; Marquard Papers, 
BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 3. 
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to give shape and expression to the sometimes inarticulate and vague ideals and beliefs with 
regard to what the war was fought for, e.g. democratic way of life as opposed to Nazism.1257  
 
As a critical requirement, the political education instructors had to be specially selected and 
trained prior to being entrusted with that type of work.1258 To this end, Dr Malherbe and 
Marquard went to Cairo, Egypt to conduct the selection process among the troops in the war 
zone.1259 The first training course commenced with thirty-eight candidates on the nominal 
roll.1260 All the trainees were hand-picked men brought to Pretoria from the war zone, Egypt, 
for the AES course at the South African Military College, Voortrekker Hoogte (formerly 
Roberts’ Heights), one of the UDF’s military commands, training and mobilisation centre.1261 
After four weeks of training, a written test and practical examination, thirty out of the original 
thirty-eight qualified with commissioned ranks as ‘Education Officers’, and others remained 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs).1262 However, the military bureaucracy1263 only gave 
approval on 13 May 1940, for the establishment of ten captains and twenty lieutenants of the 
AES, resorting under the umbrella of the SAIC.1264 Most of the newly qualified education 
officers had various university qualifications. 
 
                                                 
1257  Army Education Handbook, pp. 5-6; Union of South Africa, DOD, Military Propaganda Handbook 
No. 1, General Staff, Defence Headquarters, Government Printer, Pretoria January 1941, pp. 1-14. See 
also UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4. 
1258  AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Educational Lectures’ Course, Circular to All Heads of Sections, 29 
January 1941, DGTO to AG; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A. Educational Corps, DGTO to AG, 22 
February 1941. 
1259  Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 215-217. 
1260  WD, vol.1, Box 292, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officers, Broadcast Talk by Major 
E.G. Malherbe, 14 June 1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 
30 September 1945, p. 3; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 151. 
1261  AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Educational Course (784 G), Malherbe to the Adjutant General, 11 
March 1941; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A.I.C: Educational Course (784 G), 18 March 1941-18 
April 1941, South African Military College, 18 March 1941; UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army 
Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of 
Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 3; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 217; Cardo, 
‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 151; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 52. 
1262  UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; WD, 
vol.1, Box 292, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officers, Broadcast Talk by Major E.G. 
Malherbe, 14 June 1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 
September 1945, p. 3; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 217; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, 
p. 151; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 52. 
1263  Cardo erroneously states that it was the Attorney General who authorised plans for military 
establishment for the AES. It was actually the Adjutant General, abbreviated as A.G., and it does not 
mean the Attorney General. 
1264  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 3; 
Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 151. 
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In June 1941, Dr Malherbe gave a broadcast talk in East Africa, explaining the role and 
purpose of the education officers as well as inviting applications for another course envisaged 
to take place in August 1940. During that talk, he indicated that six of those successful 
candidates from the 18 March to 18 April 1941 course held doctoral degrees, fifteen held 
master’s degrees, others were chartered accountants, advocates, agricultural expects and 
university lecturers.1265 The general purpose of the education officers, as explained by Dr 
Malherbe, was the following: 
 
a. To provide systematic instruction to the troops and officers on topics dealing with 
the issues of the war and post-war reconstruction and adjustment. The lectures 
were designed for forty to forty-five troops at a time to facilitate effective 
deliberations. Attendance was compulsory for everyone in the unit. 
b. To organise facilities for activities of a general educational nature in the men’s 
spare time. This was designed to keep the men in touch with their interest and 
hobbies, to enhance mental stimulation and to combat boredom whilst the troops 
were waiting. Classes were voluntary and included instruction a variety of 
subjects such as languages, geography, law, accountancy and commercial 
subjects. 
c. To maintain links with other recreational services provided by other agencies such 
as the UDF Film Unit or to cooperate with the Young Men’s Christian 
Association (YMCA) and chaplains for morale stimulation. Each brigade officers 
was supposed to have a van with reference library and a 16 mm film projector for 
showing the sound films.1266 
 
The focus and emphasis in the AES was apparent in the topics that were covered in the 
curriculum of the training course. Expert instruction was conducted by ‘practical men of 
affairs as well as outstanding academics’.1267 The topics covered in the first and subsequent 
training courses were of economic, social, cultural-political and internal military-relations 
nature, with national and international focus. To facilitate healthier interactions within the 
                                                 
1265  WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major 
(Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 217. 
1266  WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major 
(Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941. See also Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education 
Services, 30 September 1945, Appendix F, UDF Army Education Scheme: Duties of Information 
(Education) Officers, pp. 1-2. 
1267  Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 218. 
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military organisation, lectures by members of the Military College covered relations of the 
educational officer to other officers, his adjustment to military conditions and the relations to 
intelligence and security work.1268 The UDF film unit OC, Weaver, lectured on the functions, 
use and maintenance of film projectors.1269 To improve an understanding of economic 
matters, Dr H.J. van der Byl and Dr H.J. van Eck lectured on the industrial development of 
South Africa; Professor H. Leppan dealt with the agricultural resources; Dr T.W. Osborn 
handled food and nutrition; Dr F. Meyer focused on the iron and steel production; Dr W.J. 
Busschau and Dr S. Haughton taught on the mining industry; Dr J.E. Holloway was 
responsible for finance and taxation lectures; and Prof H. Frankel drew comparisons of the 
economic systems under various political regimes, i.e. Fascism, Nazism and Communism.1270 
Lectures on social matters included Dr F. Biljon who focused on economic production and 
income distribution; Dr S. Biesheuvel attended to the psychological aspects of propaganda; 
Professor I.D. MacCrone handled social interaction and relations; and Dr Z.K. Mathews, J.D. 
Rheinalt-Jones and Reverand S. Thema gave analysis on the race relations and ‘native 
matters’.1271 
 
Concerning the ideological aspects of the war and the cultural-political issues, lectures were 
given by Hoernlé on the concepts and implications of Nazism, Fascism, Communism and 
Democracy; Professor T. Haarhoff, Professor M.C. Botha and Professor C.M. van den 
                                                 
1268  WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major 
(Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; See also UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army 
Education Services, 30 September 1945, Appendix D, Information Officer Course; Cardo, ‘Fighting a 
Worse Imperialism’, p. 151. 
1269  UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; AG (3) 
Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A.I.C: Educational Course (784 G), 18 March 1941-18 April 1941, South 
African Military College, 18 March 1941; WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of 
Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; Malherbe, Never a Dull 
Moment, p. 218. 
1270  UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; AG (3) 
Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A.I.C: Educational Course (784 G), 18 March 1941-18 April 1941, South 
African Military College, 18 March 1941; WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of 
Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; Malherbe, Never a Dull 
Moment, p. 218; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, pp. 151-154. 
1271  See Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, 
Appendix D, Information Officer Course. Leo Marquard also presented lectures on the subject of 
‘Native Problems’ and how to educate the white South Africa opinion on the development of Africans 
for economic productivity, not on moral issues, human rights, injustices and unfairness. Marquard 
believed that the moral questions to evoke pity were feeble and evaporated quickly. He instead 
emphasised to the trainees that they needed to concentrate more on economics. Marquard Papers, BC 
587, D3.7, Methods of Lecturing on Native Problem, n.d. (note on the document suggests the date of 
1943?). See also Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 154. 
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Heever dealt with the promotion of the ‘South Africanism’1272 notion by explaining the 
English-Afrikaans cultural heritage, relations and cooperation for the common purpose.1273 
Professor Leo Fouché, a historian, addressed the notion and ideals of democracy with its 
associated freedoms of thought and speech, with specific reference to historical process of 
“democracy” during the old South African republics.1274 Fouché, together with Hoernlé and 
Dr Malherbe were the chief examiners at the AES training course.1275 Another historian, 
Professor J. Agar-Hamilton, also gave lectures on the origins of the war.1276 Dr Malherbe and 
Leo Marquard presented lectures on how the education officers could deliver the facts and 
provoke discussions among the audience.1277 Dr Malherbe also dealt with the exposition and 
clarification of the so-called ‘-ism’ in political systems, referring to Socialism, Fascism, 
Nazism, Communism, New Idealism and the South African Democracy.1278 
 
Some members of the UUTS’s lecturing staff at the School of Propaganda and Political 
Education in Johannesburg, also provided expertise as AES course instructors. They included 
Advocate Saron, Dr Sonnabend and Pastor Luckhoff.1279 Most of the AES lecturers such as 
Fouché, Hoernlé, Haarhoff, MacCrone and Biesheuvel, were also part of the UUTS lecturing 
                                                 
1272  The notion of ‘South Africanism’ was mainly centred on a national effort to construct a South African 
national identity based on English-Afrikaans cooperation. Dr Malherbe and Leo Marquard often 
referred to that subject in their writings and teaching throughout the war period. See WD, Box 292, vol. 
1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 
1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.5, Education for Better South African Citizenship, Draft 
Memorandum, 4 August 1942; E.G. Malherbe, ‘Education for South Africanism: Teaching 
Cooperation in Our Schools’, Common Sense, May 1941; E.G. Malherbe, ‘Nasionale Samewerking’, 
Suid Afrika, ‘n Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Volk, March 1942; The ‘South Africanism’ notion is 
also at the centre of the argument by Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, pp.  141-174; Roos, 
Ordinary Springboks, pp. 48-56. 
1273  WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major 
(Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 152; Malherbe, Never a Dull 
Moment, p. 218. 
1274  WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major 
(Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; See Prof Fouché’s draft lecture to the UUTS which was also presented to 
the AES candidates. UUTS, A1883, 14, Programme and Lectures for the School of Propaganda and 
Political Education, 9 December 1940; UUTS, A1883, 14, The Voortrekker’s Struggle for Freedom, by 
Leo Fouché, 16 December 1940. 
1275  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 5-6. 
1276  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 151. 
1277  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 7-9; 
Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.7, Methods of Lecturing on Native Problem, n.d. (note on the document 
suggests the date of 1943?); Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 218. 
1278  Malherbe Papers, File 432/9, KCM 56974 (145), Solution by –ISMs, Some Political Definitions, 
handwritten lecture notes by E.G. Malherbe, n.d.; A document containing similar definitions of the –
isms, was sent to the UUTS by Wilson of the BOI. See UUTS, A1883, 2, The Various Forms of 
Government Explained, Wilson to Robertson, 13 March 1940; See also Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse 
Imperialism’, p. 152. 
1279  WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major 
(Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; UUTS, A1883, 14, Programme and Lectures for the School of 
Propaganda and Political Education, 9 December 1940. 
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staff.1280 There was thus effective cooperation between the two main propaganda structures in 
the Union. As the training courses progressed and expanded, some of the previously qualified 
and experienced education officers provided assistance in the AES as tutors and 
examiners.1281 The first group of the qualified education officers sailed to the North with the 
troops on a ship from Durban in June 1941.1282 The education officers were divided into two 
groups: fourteen of them under Marquard were attached to the 1st South African Division in 
Egypt and the other fifteen under Captain J.J. Malherbe were attached to the 2nd South 
African Division which went to Egypt after a few weeks.1283 While on the ship to the North, 
the fourteen education officers delivered a full lecture programme and were bombarded with 
questions. According to Marquard, the lectures were ‘on the whole, well received’.1284 
Lectures continued in the field at Mersa Mantru where the 1st Division was holding the area 
and at El Alamein, where the 2nd Division was based. The education officers, who were 
nervous about being perceived as “softies” by the troops in field, were welcomed as part of 
the routine, and shared the discomfort of the war zone such as nightly bombing raids, sand-
riddled food and drinks.1285 
 
The lectures themselves were regarded as a distraction from the military rigours such as 
digging. Desert conditions were difficult. Generally, there was a lack of lecturing facilities 
such as blackboards, paper and visual aids. It took ‘scrounging’ by the education officers to 
acquire material that could be utilised for lecturing, to find vehicles and accommodation. In 
some cases, lectures were conducted on sand. Education officers did not wait at rear areas for 
lectures. They followed the troops ‘in trenches, manning Ack Ack sites, or digging’.1286 
                                                 
1280  See UUTS, A1883, 14, Programme and Lectures for the School of Propaganda and Political Education, 
9 December 1940. 
1281  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 5-6; 
Malherbe Papers, File 441/7/3, KCM 57008 (113), Should We Bury Democracy, lecture by W. 
Dashwood, c1940-1943; Malherbe Papers, File 441/7/3, KCM 57008 (112), What does Nazism Mean?, 
lecture by A. Lennox-Short, c1940-1943; Malherbe Papers, File 441/7/3, KCM 57008 (114), Germany 
and Italy under Wartime Conditions, talk by V.M. Pinkley, n.d. 
1282  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure A, Impressions of Early Difficulties and Experiences, p. 
1; WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major 
(Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941. 
1283  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 3; WD, 
Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) 
Malherbe, 14 June 1941. 
1284  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure A, Impressions of Early Difficulties and Experiences, p. 
1. 
1285  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure A, Impressions of Early Difficulties and Experiences, p. 
1. 
1286  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure A, Impressions of Early Difficulties and Experiences, p. 
2. 
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While in Egypt, the original term of the ‘education officers’ was replaced by ‘information 
officers’ (IOs) in July 1940, at the suggestion of Brink, general officer commanding (GOC) 
1st South African Division.1287 He requested an alternative to the term ‘education’ as he 
feared the troops might not like that word because it would ‘remind them of school’.1288 
Official instructions regarding the usage of the term, ‘information officers’ (IOs), were 
communicated in June 1942.1289 
 
Whilst in the field, IOs performed many tasks. However, the main goal of IOs in the AES 
was political education – emphasis on ‘political training in democracy’.1290 The 
organisational principle was that an IO would be attached to a unit of about one thousand 
men.1291 A brigade would have a brigade IO with a rank of a captain and there would also be 
a divisional IO who was in charge of coordinating the information effort for the division. For 
lecturing purposes, it was determined that a platoon size group of about forty members was 
adequate for greater engagement and each man would have at least one lecture per week.1292 
 
However, owing to the demands of active service, attendance of lectures was sporadic. There 
was also ambivalence from OCs who doubted the value of education within the military and 
were concerned about the potential decline in discipline. Thus, due to the fact that the AES 
enjoyed official backing from the highest levels in the Union’s military hierarchy, those OCs 
cooperated with the IOs out of loyalty. Between June 1941 and November 1941, the AES 
operated successfully as it was a quieter period in the North, thus allowed for effective 
lecturing. As Marquard asserts, the whole concept of the AES ‘was “sold” to all the 
ranks’.1293 When the Sidi Resegh campaign began in November 1941, Brink and Major 
General I.P. de Villiers (GOC, 2nd SA Division), requested all IOs to move forward with the 
                                                 
1287  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 6; 
Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 151. 
1288  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p.6; 
Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 217. 
1289  AG, (3), Box 286, 154/189/21/3, Reorganisation in the DCS Section, 9 June 1942. 
1290  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 7. See 
also Army Education Handbook, p. 5; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 52-53. 
1291  AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/10, Army Education Services (V), Memorandum on Establishment of 
Information Officers, 10 July 1942. There were sometimes larger numbers of 1500-2000 at Air School 
for example or there would be 500-600 at an armoured unit. 
1292  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 7. 
1293  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure A, Impressions of Early Difficulties and Experiences, p. 
2; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 153; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 219-220. 
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troops to ‘make themselves useful in any capacity’.1294 There, and in subsequent campaigns, 
the IOs performed various functions, for example, as intelligence officers, as liaison officers, 
as navigators for convoys, as platoon commanders and, when the opportunity arose, dealt 
with educational work.1295 
 
In broad terms, the content of the IOs lectures with the troops included discussions on the 
political, social and economic questions, with emphasis on the post-war adjustments, debates 
about troops as citizens and not as soldiers, issues of family and later informational sessions 
about leisure time utilisation.1296 The IOs were provided with facts and statistics from the 
AES headquarters in Pretoria, and from 1942, were supplied with a ‘Bulletin’ as a 
communication channel and also as a platform for news, information and material for 
instruction.1297 A consolidated Army Education Handbook which also incorporated the 
various bulletins was provided and updated from 1942.1298 (See illustration 34) 
 
Marquard indicates that initially, lectures were oriented towards being ‘extensive than 
intensive’ and focused more on being ‘anti-fascist’ instead of ‘pro-democracy’.1299 In 
subsequent years, the AES expanded and developed better, focusing on intensive work and 
emphasising more on the notions of democracy and its dynamics.1300 The IOs were required 
to remain impartial and objective, to encourage objective thinking and critical evaluation of 
facts among the troops, to combat groundless suspicions, rumours and subversive 
propaganda, to cultivate tolerance towards opposing views, to avoid advocacy of institutions 
and public criticism of official government policy, rather, provide facts about those aspects 
and leave the evaluations to the audience.1301 The main aim was ‘to train troops politically … 
                                                 
1294  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure A, Impressions of Early Difficulties and Experiences, p. 
2; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 153. 
1295  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure A, Impressions of Early Difficulties and Experiences, p. 
2; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 153. 
1296  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Appendix F, U.D.F. Army Education Scheme: Duties of Information 
(Education) Officers, p. 1; See also WD, vol. 2, Box 532, UDF Stationary and Publications Depot, 
Middle East Reports, 1941-1945; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 52-53. 
1297  AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/10, Army Education Services (V), Duties of Information (Education) 
Officers, Army Education HQ, 14 July 1942; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Appendix F, U.D.F. 
Army Education Scheme: Duties of Information (Education) Officers, p. 1. 
1298  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 9. See 
Army Education Handbook, 1943; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 220-223; Cardo, ‘Fighting a 
Worse Imperialism’, p. 154. 
1299  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 7. 
1300  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 7. 
1301  Army Education Handbook, pp. 6-10; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education 
Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 9-11; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Appendix F, U.D.F. Army 
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for an attitude of the mind that bases action on thought’.1302 The emphasis of the lecturers 
was on pursuing “truth” as the ‘best propaganda’, and enhancing the capacity of the troops to 
recognise and discredit propaganda of lies.1303 
 
Since the IOs also worked as intelligence officers, their trained background and knowledge of 
world affairs placed them in an enviable position in comparison to other regular intelligence 
officers.1304 Through access to censorship letters, the IOs could estimate the morale of the 
troops, warn the OCs accordingly or, if possible, lessen their frustrations by explaining the 
reasons why something was happening, for example, reasons for shortages or delays of 
material.1305 It was often difficult for IOs to provide remedies if the problems were associated 
with policy grievances and sometimes their suggestions were misconstrued as criticisms of 
departments or sections.1306 
 
Nonetheless, there were other advantages. The AES, through Dr Malherbe as DMI, had direct 
access to the higher echelons of government and military power. While on one hand he had to 
contend with military security in the Union, he was also obligated to ensure the maintenance 
of troop morale in field and in the Union.1307 Hence at times, Smuts intervened in support of 
Dr Malherbe and the AES activities that were considered “progressive and innovative”.1308 
Another advantage was that the IOs interacted with all ranks and that enabled them to 
estimate troop morale, thus keeping the authorities ‘informed of the feelings and opinions in 
                                                                                                                                                        
Education Scheme: Duties of Information (Education) Officers, p. 1; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse 
Imperialism’, p. 154. 
1302  Army Education Handbook, p. 9. 
1303  Army Education Handbook, pp. 6, 9; UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army 
Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 9-11. 
1304  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 10-11; 
Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 222. 
1305  AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/10, Army Education Services (V), Duties of Information (Education) 
Officers, Army Education HQ, 14 July 1942; UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army 
Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 11. 
1306  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army 
at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, 
Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education 
Services, 30 September 1945, p. 10-11; Army Education Handbook, pp. 6-10. 
1307  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army 
at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 
(864), Memorandum on Army Morale and Propaganda, March 1943; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 
91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943. 
1308  For examples where Dr Malherbe secured the intervention of Smuts, see Malherbe, Never a Dull 
Moment, pp. 220, 225, 252. 
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the Army’.1309 According to Dr Malherbe, the IOs ‘became the intimate right-hand men of the 
commanding officers’.1310 
 
A further development of the AES included the rise of voluntary discussion clubs and 
“parliaments” where soldiers debated issues and expressed their opinions on pertinent issues 
pertaining to the war, political or social conditions.1311 These “soldiers’ parliaments”, were 
fictitious “democratic institutions” with “opposing political parties” that provided an outlet 
for projecting the soldiers’ perspectives.1312 It was a welcome distraction and the soldiers Up 
North felt that they at least had access to some form of ‘direct democratic participation 
afforded by the parliament’.1313 In the Union, however, sometimes the “soldiers’ parliaments” 
were misinterpreted by the military authorities on the grounds of contravening the military 
disciplinary code and Smuts had to intervene as he understood that it was ‘good for the 
morale of his boys’.1314 The IOs ran the discussion clubs as facilitators and chairs, and also 
organised information and reading rooms for the troops.1315 They also organised and 
maintained library facilities in the Union and in the field, controlled the information rooms 
(or tents), and provided educational material such as books, periodicals, pamphlets, current 
events pictures, maps and charts.1316 In addition, the IOs organised exercises that included the 
establishment of ‘commissions of enquiry’ to investigate social or economic problems, or 
special interest groups such as farmers who concentrated on farming-related challenges and 
developments.1317 These ensured that every opportunity was utilised to enhance the 
educational development of the soldiers, to create awareness about the civic obligations, and, 
to sustain their political, social and economic consciousness along with adding value to their 
experience during their military service. 
 
                                                 
1309  AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/10, Army Education Services (V), Memorandum on Establishment of 
Information Officers, 10 July 1942. 
1310  Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 222. 
1311  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 8-9; 
Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 223-225. 
1312  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 8-9; 
Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 223-225. 
1313  Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 56. 
1314  Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 225. 
1315  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 8-9. 
1316  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 8-9. 
The reading material were organised in libraries ran by the IOs and were stocked with various reading 
material secured through the various structures such as the DMI (Ic), the UUTS, Jewish Board of 
Deputies, Toc H (Talbot House), YMCA, Union Defence Force Institute (UDFI), and some came 
through the education and propaganda departments in USA, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. 
1317  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 155. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
233 
 
At the beginning, the AES comprised of white male soldiers as political education instructors, 
except the inclusion of Z.K. Mathews and S. Thema in 1942 to lecture to the trainees on race 
issues and ‘native problems’. The situation changed as a result of the need to extend the 
educational services to women who served in the military. This was attempted in March 1942 
when seven women attended the third AES training course at the Military College, five from 
the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) and two from the Women’s Auxiliary Army 
Services (WAAS).1318 Although all of them qualified as IOs, they could not be placed on the 
AES establishment as there was no provision for that purpose. These women returned to their 
units. In June 1942, negotiations within the higher military HQ of the WAAF and WAAS 
took place. It was thus decided that the special needs of women could be catered for if 
women combined both social welfare services with education for citizenship since women 
were considered to be ‘less politically mature than men … and inclined to approach problems 
from a personal aspect’.1319 
 
During August-September 1942, a combined welfare and information course took place at 
No. 100 Air School at Voortrekker Hoogte (Pretoria), for the WAAF, the WAAS and for 
some educationally qualified civilians.1320 It was a joint training effort between the 
department of social welfare which handled the welfare section of the course and the AES for 
political instruction. The curriculum of the course included topics such as ‘legal status of 
women’, ‘women in industry’, ‘the history of the women’s movement’.1321 The professional 
background of the forty course members varied, and included ‘an advocate, a journalist, a 
librarian, a child welfare worker, a farmer’s wife, and several of the teaching profession’.1322 
Out of the group, twenty six qualified and were appointed to work at various units throughout 
the Union. They were referred to as welfare – information officers (WIOs) and performed 
                                                 
1318  UWH, Box 162, Narep, Unfo 16, Units and Formations: History of WAAS Welfare (Information 
Service), 1940-1946, pp. 1-8; UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare 
Information – WAAS, p.1; UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure C, Welfare Information 
– WAAF, 1. 
1319  UWH, Box 162, Narep, Unfo 16, Units and Formations: History of WAAS Welfare (Information 
Service), 1940-1946, pp. 1-8; UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare 
Information – WAAS, p. 1. 
1320  UWH, Box 162, Narep, Unfo 16, Units and Formations: History of WAAS Welfare (Information 
Service), 1940-1946, pp. 1-8; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare Information – 
WAAS, p. 1; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure C, Welfare Information – WAAF, p. 1. 
1321  UWH, Box 162, Narep, Unfo 16, Units and Formations: History of WAAS Welfare (Information 
Service), 1940-1946, pp. 1-8; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare Information – 
WAAS, p. 1. 
1322  UWH, Box 162, Narep, Unfo 16, Units and Formations: History of WAAS Welfare (Information 
Service), 1940-1946, pp. 1-8; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare Information – 
WAAS, p. 1. 
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similar information work as their male counterparts: lecturing, arranging discussion clubs, 
managing libraries, publishing news bulletins, inspiring formal education, encouraging 
handicraft work as well as the social-welfare services such as family or work-related 
problems.1323 The WIOs were not on the AES establishment, but on the WAAF and WAAS 
establishments with a liaison officer operating as a link with the AES, and the latter also 
provided support by providing literature on political aspects. 
 
The value of training WIOs was recognised during the 1943 Elections when women ‘voted 
with great care, having been thoroughly prepared by information lectures’.1324 However, 
Marquard also claims that, though party programmes were discussed during the elections, the 
IOs ‘never lent themselves to doing propaganda for any one of the three political parties that 
constituted the Government’.1325 Cardo argues that while the soldiers used their ‘newly 
acquired political knowledge and democratic process into action by voting’, Malan and his 
HNP believed that the IOs were not neutral and were accused of being the agents of the 
UP.1326 Suffice to indicate that it would be difficult to sustain the argument for the 
“impartiality” of the IOs as, through their “educational and informational sessions” about the 
elections, the thinking of the troops would have been manipulated to lean towards supporting 
UP as the governing party, which pursued the war policy, especially as it was during the 
middle of the war in 1943.1327 
 
Subsequent courses for WIOs could not be conducted exclusively and the demand for more 
officers was addressed by putting the new candidates through the AES training course at the 
Military College. By 1944, interest in social and political questions had been entrenched, and 
the reading habits in camps were inculcated through the maximum use of the detachment 
libraries.1328 At this time, the Refresher Courses were being presented at Valhalla near 
Pretoria and some of the WIOs in 1945 attended the Demobilisation Course at the Pretoria 
                                                 
1323  UWH, Box 162, Narep, Unfo 16, Units and Formations: History of WAAS Welfare (Information 
Service), 1940-1946, pp. 1-8; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure C, Welfare Information – 
WAAF, pp. 2-3; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare Information – WAAS, p. 2. 
1324  UWH, Box 162, Narep, Unfo 16, Units and Formations: History of WAAS Welfare (Information 
Service), 1940-1946, pp. 1-8; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare Information – 
WAAS, p. 2. 
1325  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 10. 
1326  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 164. 
1327  See details in Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, pp. 274-332; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 222. 
1328  UWH, Box 162, Narep, Unfo 16, Units and Formations: History of WAAS Welfare (Information 
Service), 1940-1946, pp. 1-8; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare Information – 
WAAS, p. 2. 
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dispersal depot. From then, a number of WIOs were attached to the Demobilisation Corps as 
there they served as re-adjustment officers and dispersal officers.1329 To the AES, the value of 
information course was derived from the ‘political education’ and general consciousness 
about the national issues at stake which, to some extent, was a vital preparation for their 
civilian responsibilities as citizens.1330 
 
Officially, the AES was never extended to blacks. It was only in 1942 that attempts at formal 
training for attachment to the NMC were undertaken, however, the proposed scheme was 
rejected by DNEAS.1331 The main reason was that since war began, the NEAS director, 
Stubbs, regarded that area as his domain and preferred to organise NMC activities – 
recruitment, training and propaganda – from his office or work through the NAD.1332 
Lieutenant Colonel H.S. Mockford, assistant director of NEAS, expressed the views of his 
directorate regarding the organisation of propaganda for NMC: 
 
On 12 June 1942, during a meeting of various directorates interested in propaganda and 
subversive activities, it was decided that this Directorate should be responsible for the 
training of propaganda details and to arrange for a series of propaganda courses to be held 
and run by D.N.E.A.S., consisting of native soldiers nominated by various OsC. These courses 
were intended to train native details in discussing propaganda matter with native soldiers in 
camps in order to counter subversive activities … to impart the right information to the native 
soldiers so that, when they go on leave, they will be able to counter subversive talk in their 
district.1333 
 
The initial three week propaganda course for black soldiers started at Palmietkuil North 
Training Depot, Welgedacht in 1942, and other courses took place at Rietfontein XI, NMC 
                                                 
1329  UWH, Box 162, Narep, Unfo 16, Units and Formations: History of WAAS Welfare (Information 
Service), 1940-1946, pp. 1-8; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare Information – 
WAAS, p. 2; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure C, Welfare Information – WAAF, pp. 2-3. 
1330  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare Information – WAAS, p. 3; Marquard Papers, 
BC 587, D3.38, Annexure C, Welfare Information – WAAF, pp. 2-3; Marquard Papers, BC 587, 
D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 17. 
1331  NMC, Box 52, NAS 3/42, Report on Activities and Returns by Welfare Officers, Propaganda Section, 
October 1944, pp. 1-5; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 
September 1945, p. 19. 
1332  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 4, NAS 3/1/14, Mockford (for DNEAS) to OC, 1st Battalion, NMC, 31 May 
1941; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting in Natal-Zululand, Mockford to P.H. Lazarus, 
22 April 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, Native Details, 1942-1943. 
1333  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Courses, DNEAS to GOS, Inland Area, 27 February 
1943. 
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School, Springs in 1943.1334 The aim of the NEAS propaganda course differed with the AES. 
It was not for political education for “citizenship”, but was designed to justify the inclusion of 
blacks in the military and to counter subversive activities (mainly what was regarded as 
communistic talks) among blacks.1335 The specific objectives of the propaganda programme 
were outlined as follows: 
 
a. To give the Bantu soldier an idea of his purpose in the army, and how this war 
affects him as a native of South Africa. 
b. To combat the subversive activities propaganda in the NMC. 
c. To give native recruiters and idea of what sort of argument to put forward. 
d. To use intelligent native NCOs, who are chosen for character, for doing this kind 
of work and influence their own tribe. 
e. To enable them to appeal to his own people, unlike if a European was used for 
that purpose.1336 
 
Lieutenant R.E. Antel was in charge as a propaganda course commander. The course was 
conducted in English and repeated in Sesotho and isiZulu afterwards. The course content 
included the discussions about the various provinces from which NMC members came, who 
were the enemies and where they lived, how the enemies (Germany, Japan) treated their own 
subjects, how the enemies treated the conquered people, fifth column propaganda, why 
natives had to join the military and the conditions of service.1337 Discussions of a political 
nature, particularly those pertaining to the status of blacks in the Union were avoided. Such 
topics were deflected by pointing out that those subjects ‘were for the politicians and not for 
the army’, and that political discussions had a delaying effect, thus giving an advantage to the 
                                                 
1334  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, Native Details, Stubbs to OCs of NMC Units, 
21 August 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, Native Details, DNEAS to all 
OCs of NMC Units, 3 November 1943; NMC, Box 52, NAS 3/42, Report on Activities and Returns by 
Welfare Officers, Propaganda Section, October 1944, pp. 1-5. 
1335  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, Native Details, Stubbs to OCs of NMC Units, 
21 August 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. 
Antel, 26 September 1942. 
1336  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Programme of Propaganda Courses Given to Native Military Corps, 
n.d. 
1337  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Syllabus of Propaganda Course, 24 July 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, 
Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, Native Details, Stubbs to OCs of NMC Units, 21 August 1942; 
DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. Antel, 26 
September 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Programme of Propaganda Courses Given to 
Native Military Corps, n.d. 
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enemy.1338 One of the emphasis in the discussions was that the Axis victory over the Allies 
was not going to improve the conditions of blacks. The case of the Herero-Nama atrocities 
experienced at the hands of the Germans during the colonial wars of conquest in 1904-1907, 
was used to illustrate the futility of advocating for the German victory.1339 By the end of 
1943, about fifteen courses were held and the number of suitable candidates, i.e. intelligent, 
literate and of good character, at each course varied between fifteen and thirty.1340 The 
courses were conducted orally and there were no written examinations.1341 Each morning, 
candidates were encouraged to present the lectures to the fellow class mates in English, 
Sesotho or isiZulu on a subject derived from the previous lecture, and answered questions 
from the audience. This was meant to reinforce what was learnt and to practise responding to 
questions at their various camps after the completion of the course.1342 
 
The importance of the propaganda course was heavily emphasised and there was general 
satisfaction expressed in the reporting about the progress of the courses.1343 Since the 
DNEAS was running its own propaganda programme for different objectives, the AES was 
not satisfied as they felt the needs of the NMC were not catered for.1344 As a result, the IOs 
were instructed to provide informal instruction, for example, literacy classes, especially Up 
North, to blacks.1345 But, the arrangement was sporadic and eventually collapsed due to lack 
                                                 
1338  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. Antel, 26 
September 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Programme of Propaganda Courses Given to 
Native Military Corps, n.d. 
1339  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. Antel, 26 
September 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the Work Done, Propaganda 
Information, by Corporal Hornby Ngezana, C Company NMC, Wynberg; 30 November 1942. 
1340  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on Course No. 2, Lt Antel, November 1942; DNEAS, Group 
2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on Course No. 3, Antel, December 1942. 
1341  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Programme of Propaganda Courses Given to Native Military Corps, 
n.d.; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Student Propaganda Course, DNEAS to OC, PE Fortress 
Command, 6 November 1943. 
1342  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Programme of Propaganda Courses Given to Native Military Corps, 
n.d.; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the Work Done, Propaganda Information, by 
Corporal Hornby Ngezana, C Company NMC, Wynberg; 30 November 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 
10, 3/21/E, Student Propaganda Course, DNEAS to OC, PE Fortress Command, 6 November 1943 
1343  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. Antel, 26 
September 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the Work Done, Propaganda 
Information, by Corporal Hornby Ngezana, C Company NMC, Wynberg; 30 November 1942; 
DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Lt Antel to OC, NMC School, Rietfontein, 27 July 1943; DNEAS, 
Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, OC, Port Elizabeth Fortress Command to all Unit OsC in the Area, 13 
September 1943; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Courses, DNEAS to OsC, Area 
Commands, 29 October 1943. 
1344  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 19. 
1345  NMC, Box 52, NAS 3/42, Report on Activities and Returns by Welfare Officers, Propaganda Section, 
October 1944 (only month and year on report), pp. 1-5. 
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of co-operation from the army authorities.1346 However, mainly in the Union, several 
libraries, books, stationery material and even teachers trained for adult education were 
provided in various NMC camps.1347 In the Air Force units, both in the Union and outside, 
however, the information officers were able to provide educational services to blacks due to 
largely the co-operative spirit of the authorities in that service.1348 Marquard often asserted 
that the Air Force was more receptive to innovative ideas and were cooperative in educational 
efforts of the AES than in the Army.1349 In contrast with the NMC, the authorities allowed the 
AES to utilise the services of the IOs to the Cape Corps (CC) from December 1942 until 
August 1945. Even the CC NCOs were trained in the Information NCO courses and if 
qualified, were placed on the AES establishment. Unlike the sporadic efforts towards the 
NMC, the work of the AES among the CC entailed formal education and citizenship training. 
The total number of CC Information NCOs both in the Union and in the North varied, and at 
one time it was estimated at thirty-eight. They performed various tasks such as running 
libraries, encouraging reading and promoting discussion classes as well as dealing with 
formal education.1350 
 
Generally, the AES attempted to cooperate with various other agencies and organisations 
dealing with the welfare of the soldiers such as the Union Defence Force Institute (UDFI), 
the Red Cross, Ic Digest, Gifts and Comforts, Springbok Newspaper and the UDF Film Unit. 
However, cooperation with the BOI did not take place due to the prevailing contestations 
about publicity and propaganda jurisdiction with the DMI (Ic) and also that soldiers 
distrusted the BOI as a propaganda machine (an irony in this case).1351 Due to the 
involvement of civilians in lecturing to the troops, the AES had more liaison with the civil 
societies, but, occasionally also came under public criticism for various reasons, for instance, 
the Nationalist press called Dr Marlherbe ‘Die Propaganda Kolonel’ (Propaganda Colonel), 
                                                 
1346  NMC, Box 52, NAS 3/42, Report on Activities and Returns by Welfare Officers, Propaganda Section, 
October 1944, pp. 1-5; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 
September 1945, p. 19. 
1347  NMC, Box 52, NAS 3/42, Report on Activities and Returns by Welfare Officers, Propaganda Section, 
October 1944, pp. 1-5. 
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October 1944, pp. 1-5. 
1349  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 1-27; 
UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare Information – WAAS, pp. 1-3; UCT, 
Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure C, Welfare Information – WAAF, pp. 1-3. 
1350  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 20. 
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on the elections of 1943, or accused him of arranging ‘compulsory political lectures’.1352 The 
AES grew steadily, both in terms of the number of IOs trained and in terms of the content 
which was elaborated through publications. 
 
The IOs increased from the initial thirty in May 1941 to 152 officers, twenty other ranks and 
sixty-three NEAS NCOs by September 1945.1353 Nine IOs were taken as prisoner of war, 
three at Sidi Resegh and six at Tobruk.1354 Four of these IOs carried out educational work at 
the various POW camps in Europe.1355 But, these numbers were insufficient for the 250 000 
UDF members. On average, the soldiers actually attended one lecture per month rather than 
the original estimate of one lecture per week for every soldier in a group of forty.1356 In terms 
of content, along with the pursuit of the Anglo-Afrikaans national identity and mutual 
cooperation, the AES took up other national issues such as the socio-economic and political 
problems of non-Europeans. The plight of non-Europeans gained prominence through using 
black lecturers at training courses, through AES bulletins and booklets as well as by 
contributing articles in the various journals.1357 It was hoped that through raising 
consciousness among white soldiers with regard to the plight of non-Europeans, they would 
in turn further propagate the ideal of transforming the conditions of non-Europeans through 
education in order to contribute towards the economic development of the country.1358 
To ascertain the attitude of white troops towards various national issues, a survey called, 
‘What the Soldier Thinks’, was conducted among almost seven thousand white UDF 
members of all ranks inside and outside the Union in May 1944.1359 With regard to those 
topics specifically relating to blacks, the results of the survey revealed that 47% believed 
blacks ought to be given more opportunities slowly, but not the same opportunities as whites 
                                                 
1352  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 24-25; 
Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 252; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 173. 
1353  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 4. 
Malherbe puts the total number of IOs at 350 including NCOs, Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 
219. 
1354  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 4; 
Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 236-239. 
1355  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 11; 
Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 236-239. 
1356  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 173. 
1357  ‘Non-Europeans in South Africa’, Army Education Handbook, 1943, pp. 137-158; Cardo, ‘Fighting a 
Worse Imperialism’, pp. 164-166. 
1358  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.8, Natives in South Africa, 1943?; ‘Non-Europeans in South Africa’, 
Army Education Handbook, 1943, pp. 137-158. 
1359  Malherbe Papers, File 441/8, KCM 56974 (835), The AES Attitude Test: “What do You Think” (Wat 
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Pretoria, 1944; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 249-253. 
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(5% here), of getting any kind of job; 45% believed blacks ought to be given education of the 
same kind of Europeans, but those educational opportunities were to be slowly extended to 
them; and 42% believed blacks should be given more political rights than they had, but 
slowly.1360 It is on this basis that Roos argues that, although the AES was conceptualised on 
the liberal-democratic vision, it was still hamstrung by the ‘racialized practices and social 
assumptions of segregated colonial society’.1361 (See illustration 35) 
 
On the other hand, the AES instigated the production of white Anglo-Afrikaans national 
identity based on what Cardo refers to as the ‘principles of bilingualism and convergence of 
two streams’ (referring to the Anglo-Afrikaner combination and Afrikaner ethnic 
nationalism) - ‘with liberal-democratic ideals of active, rational, citizenship’.1362 It also 
entailed the development of a more liberal perspective with regard to the ‘role and status of 
blacks in South Africa’.1363 Despite the presence of the communist IOs, for instance, Brian 
Bunting, Roley Arenstein and Wolf Kodesh, the AES did not engender a ‘revolutionary’ 
fervour that challenged the ‘white hegemony’ in the Union, but highlighted a need for a 
gradual extension of ‘rights’ to non-Europeans.1364 
 
Nonetheless, the AES represented a concerted propaganda effort by the UDF to maintain 
troop morale, to rationalise the purpose of the Allied war effort, to develop consciousness 
about ‘national unity’ and to create awareness about the political, economic and social 
challenges in South Africa. However, because of its confinement to the military, its limited 
reach among the troops and the public suspicions later on, the liberal-oriented AES remained 
an ‘illusion’ that failed to extend into the post-war South Africa.1365 It worked for a short 
duration (within the military) as it was dictated by the war circumstances that created a ‘ready 
audience’ hoping for a new social order after the war. The AES was a short term measure 
which, as Malherbe noted to his friend, Professor Jac Rousseau of the University of 
Rhodesia, in January 1974, that it was a ‘“flea-bite” on the Army as a whole’, the main 
                                                 
1360  Malherbe Papers, File 441/8, KCM 56974 (835), The AES Attitude Test: “What do You Think” (Wat 
Dink Jy?), Results of Attitude Survey, n.d.; What the Soldier Thinks?, Booklet, pp. 23-30; Malherbe, 
Never a Dull Moment, pp. 249-253. Italics, own emphasis to indicate that the liberal views about the 
status of blacks were still coloured with notions of their inferiority. 
1361  Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 53-55. 
1362  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 174. 
1363  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 174. 
1364  UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.7, Methods on Lecturing on Native Problems, 1943, p. 3, 
paragraphs 9 and 10; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 53-55. 
1365  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 174. 
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impact being on the IOs themselves who had ‘a sense of involvement, a realisation of a 
responsibility’.1366 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Ultimately, it was not only sufficient for the government and military authorities to swell the 
ranks of the UDF for military service. An important consideration was to keep the volunteers 
motivated, loyal and committed to the Union’s war policy. It was also critical to combat 
subversive activities and to improve the morale of the troops. As soon as the mobilisation 
process was underway, reports of disgruntlements, disaffections and subversive activities 
began to multiply. Such negative reports threatened the internal stability of the UDF and 
authorities were anxious about the risks of the development of alternative perspectives to the 
Union, or at least the UP’s reforming outlook. Hence, Union authorities had to institute 
various strategies and measures to contend with the challenges and to counter those negative 
developments within the UDF. The AES became the most valuable mechanism in this regard. 
As the main propaganda project for troops, it was designed to systematically shape their 
political perspectives in order for them to reject the notions of fascism, Nazism and even 
communism, and to embrace a more liberal outlook in the context of what was referred to as 
‘South Africanism’. The AES mainly assisted in the rationalisation of the war effort and in 
the development of the socio-political and economic consciousness of the UDF troops. 
However, it was constrained by its limited ratio of IOs to troops, its failure to extend beyond 
the military and the war, as well as its failure to pose sustained challenge to white hegemony 
given South Africa’s segregated politics and society.1367 The main beneficiaries of AES were 
the IOs for the knowledge they had acquired through the political education school and 
intelligence services they rendered, which added value to their career development after the 
war.1368 
 
                                                 
1366  Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (11), Malherbe to J. Rousseau, 3 January 1974. Italics 
indicate that Malherbe emphasised that point in the letter to Prof Rousseau. On the achievements and 
careers of the IOs, see Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 217-219. 
1367  See the conclusions in Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 54-56; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, 
p. 174; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (11), Malherbe to J. Rousseau, 3 January 1974; 
Never a Dull Moment, pp. 217-219. 
1368  As confirmed in the development of manuscripts for books in 1974. See Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, 
KCM 57008 (11), Malherbe to J. Rousseau, 3 January 1974; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 
57008 (35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, pp. 1-14; 
Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (37), The Springbok Legion, by Vic Clapham, 12 January 
1974, pp. 1-8; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 217-219. 
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Apart from the “educational” efforts for mental stimulation and to eliminate boredom among 
troops, it was equally imperative to improve their physical, social and psychological well-
being. This was done through the provision of information services, social welfare, 
entertainment and recreational services for the troops in the Union and in the field. The next 
chapter will examine these programmes and the impact they had on the morale of the UDF 
members during the war. 
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Illustration 34: AES Handbook for IOs, EG Malherbe Collections, vol. 441/6, UKZN, Durban 
 
  
Illustration 35: What Soldiers Think: Attitude Survey, EG Malherbe Collections, vol. 441/8, UKZN, 
Durban 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
UNION DEFENCE FORCES’S INFORMATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
SERVICES 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the next concern for military authorities was to attend to 
the social welfare of troops, to keep them informed about their service conditions, as well as 
about the conditions at home and abroad. This chapter reflects on the various social welfare, 
entertainment and recreational services provided to the UDF troops during the war. Firstly, it 
considers the implementation of information services to the troops, which were mainly 
coordinated by women’s organisations in collaboration with the AES officers. Secondly, in 
examines the operations of organisations such as the Young Men’s Christian Association 
(YMCA)1369 and the Talbot House (Toc H)1370, which were integrated into the Union Defence 
Force Institute (UDFI)1371 during the war to provide for the social welfare of the troops in 
camps and in adjoining towns.1372 Furthermore, it will also examine the cooperation of the 
above-mentioned organisations with the DMI (Ic), for the orchestration of these 
entertainment and recreational activities for the UDF members on active service. 
 
                                                 
1369  Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) was originated by a draper worker in London in June 
1844, George Williams, who was concerned about the poor social and moral conditions of the 
urbanised young workers. YMCA became an instrument for promoting the moral values and 
Christianity, and thereafter expanded its work to include the provision of educational, recreational and 
social welfare facilities, programmes and services during the 19th and 20th century. During the two 
world wars, YMCA supported the troops by providing volunteers for medical support services, catering 
for prisoners of war, refugees or displaced persons, establishing huts and mobile canteens for food, 
refreshments, and for resting and recreation for soldiers. See UWH, Box 268, B.I. 22, YMCA and Toc 
H, Broadcast Talk by Reverend P.H.S. Sitters, 20 November 1941; ‘A Call from the Men of the Hour’, 
Y.M.C.A and Toc H War Fund Appeal, YMCH South African War Work Fund, Johannesburg, March 
1940. 
1370  Toc H or Talbot House, named after Lt Gilbert Talbot, a British soldier who died in July 1915 and 
brother of Neville Talbot, a senior British Army chaplain who provided ministerial services to the 
troops. Toc H was established in December 1915 by Neville Talbot’s subordinate chaplain, Reverend 
Phillip Thomas Byard (Tubby) Clayton, as a soldiers’ club for resting and recreational purposes at 
Poperinge town, Belgium. Toc H was short for TH and “Toc” meant “T” in the language of the military 
signallers. Toc H “homes” were built during the Second World War in urban centres adjacent to the 
military camps to cater for the social and recreational needs of the soldiers. See UWH, Box 268, B.I. 
22, YMCA and Toc H, Broadcast Talk by Reverend P.H.S. Sitters, 20 November 1941; ‘A Call from 
the Men of the Hour’, Y.M.C.A and Toc H War Fund Appeal, Toc H, Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 
March 1940. 
1371  For the origins and historical development of the Union Defence Force Institute (UDFI), see I.J. van 
der Waag, A History of the South African Defence Force Institute (SADFI), 1914-1990 (1 Military 
Printing Unit, SADF, Pretoria, 1991). 
1372  CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Memorandum of Interview with Sir Pierre 
van Ryneveld, Chief of the General Staff and Brigadier General J. Mitchel-Baker at Defence 
Headquarters, Pretoria, 23 July 1940. 
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INFORMATION SERVICES FOR TROOPS 
 
In July 1940, arrangements were made to establish a soldiers’ information bureau at Noord 
Street railway station, Johannesburg (no connection with the BOI).1373 Its purpose was to 
support the troops on leave by providing information and advice regarding transport, 
accommodation and hospitality facilities, particularly for those who came from other parts of 
the Union.1374 This bureau’s OC was Mrs T.B. Glanville, president of the Victoria League1375 
– the South African version of the British Empire’s ‘philanthropy’ and ‘propaganda’ 
organisation, whose members in South Africa were also part of the SAWAS.1376 She was 
assisted by Mrs W.M. Frames, who supervised the daily relays of women, even on weekends, 
and provided the necessary advice to soldiers. The information bureau expanded its 
operations in 1941. Apart from normal enquiries, arrangements were made for lifts, 
facilitating meetings between the soldiers and the hostesses of private recreational facilities, 
and arranging holiday facilities or visits to towns.1377  
 
Women’s organisations such the Victoria League and the Toc H League of Women Helpers 
(female version of Toc H)1378, also played a significant role in the provision of advisory and 
distress relieve services as well as assisting in the educational activities of the soldiers.1379 
The Victoria League supported the establishment and maintenance of educational facilities 
(reading rooms and libraries for soldiers’ clubs) and participated in the supply of books and 
magazines in a “Books for Troops Scheme” for the South African soldiers in the Union and 
in the field.1380 Services of this nature provided additional comfort to the soldiers and served 
                                                 
1373  ‘Information Bureau for Soldiers’, Rand Daily Mail, 12 July 1940. 
1374  ‘Information Bureau for Soldiers’, Rand Daily Mail, 12 July 1940. 
1375  For the history of the Victoria League, see Elizabeth L. Riedi, ‘Imperialist Women in Edwardian 
Britain: The Victoria League, 1899-1914’ (PhD Thesis, University of St. Andrews, 1998), pp. 32-33, 
151-173; E, Riedi, ‘Women, Gender, and The Promotion of Empire: The Victoria League, 1901-1914’, 
The Historical Journal, 45, 2002, pp. 569-599. 
1376  ‘Information Bureau for Soldiers’, Rand Daily Mail, 12 July 1940. 
1377  ‘Information Bureau for Soldiers’, The Star, 11 December 1941. 
1378  UWH, Box 268, B.I. 22, YMCA and Toc H, Broadcast Talk by Reverend P.H.S. Sitters, 20 November 
1941; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, Toc H League of Women Helpers, QMG Circular No. 38 of 1944, 
13 July 1944; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 293-295. 
1379  ‘Information Bureau for Soldiers’, The Star, 11 December 1941; Elizabeth L. Riedi, ‘Imperialist 
Women in Edwardian Britain’, pp. 151-153; A.L. Dick, ‘The Development of South African Libraries 
in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Cultural and Political Influences’, Department of Information Science, 
University of Pretoria, Pretoria, http://www.dissanet.com/ifla/pdf. No date (year) (accessed 26 March 
2013). 
1380  Dick, ‘The Development of South African Libraries’, http://www.dissanet.com/ifla/pdf; Marquard 
Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 16-17, 22; 
‘Circulating Library for Rand and Military Hospitals’, The Star, 23 February 1943; ‘S.A. Libraries 
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to strengthen their morale. Those efforts were also complementary to the AES’ political 
programme within the UDF.1381 Actually, the AES’ programme included a “comprehensive” 
information effort by generating publications, collaborating with other organisations in 
procuring and distributing reading material, also organising and maintaining library facilities 
in the Union and in the field.1382 This information effort was necessary and fundamental for 
the sustainability of the AES project because the publications provided the basis for the IOs’ 
lecturing material. It was also imperative to infuse deliberate political education with further 
reading after the lectures. Some of the IOs even indulged in the production of booklets, 
contributed articles or served as editors of publications which were distributed among the 
UDF troops.1383 
 
To maintain the interest of the soldiers, twenty to thirty page booklets such as South Africa’s 
Economic Resources, Population Problems, When We All Get Home and others, were 
published, and contained illustrations like maps, diagrams and cartoons.1384 Apart from the 
booklets, there were various news sheets produced by IOs in the various military units. Some 
of the news sheets were humorous and made fun of the Axis leaders, and also provided troops 
with journalistic flair an opportunity to express their writing talents or served as 
cartoonists.1385 Among the popular news sheets were El Bullsheet and P*E*P (Peace, 
Education and Progress), which contained reports on unit sporting actions, cartoons and fun 
write-ups like ridiculing the Axis powers, exalting the Allied leadership or remarking 
sarcastically about Smuts’ opponents in the Union as well as reflecting on South Africa’s 
social issues.1386 A service magazine called Clamp, was published by 22 Air School in 1942. 
                                                                                                                                                        
have Sent 600,000 Books’, Rand Daily Mail, 3 July 1943; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 
7, pp. 288-295. 
1381  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 22-23; 
Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 223. 
1382  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 8, 15-
17. 
1383  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 8; 
Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 223. 
1384  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 15-16; 
Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Appendix F, U.D.F. Army Education Scheme: Duties of Information 
(Education) Officers, p. 1. Some examples of AES publications include Unit Education Handbook, S.A. 
Government, Basic Economics and Useful Figures. See also Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 223. 
1385  Malherbe Papers, File 442/1, KCM 56974 (986a), ‘Himmler: Hangman of Europe’, draft copy for 
publication in El Bullsheet newssheet, n.d.; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 223-224; Cardo, 
‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 163. 
1386  Malherbe Papers, File 442/1, KCM 56974 (987), El Bullsheet, (Army newsletter), August 1943 – 
February 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 442/1, KCM 56974 (986b), P*E*P (Peace, Education and 
Progress), 2 July 1945. Some of the write-ups were also in Afrikaans; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse 
Imperialism’, p. 163; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 223-224. 
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During its one year anniversary in October 1943, the magazine affirmed its two-fold 
programme: to amuse and to arouse.1387 Thus, it articulated its policy ‘to serve the democratic 
cause’ by fighting ‘against the canker of fascism ... to crush prejudice, racial intolerance and 
national narrowness’.1388 Clamp took an ideological stand against the Axis or the South 
African version of fascism and carried articles that were in support of the government’s war 
policy.  
 
Another initiative came in 1943, when The Sable – a magazine for the 6th South African 
Armoured Division1389, was published. The Sable was as a medium of ‘artistic and literary’ 
expression for the troops in the division and the first to reproduce war art in colour.1390 In its 
first edition, opinion polls within the division, conducted by Professor H.J. Rosseau (lecturer 
at the AES political training course) to ascertain the attitude of the troops with regard to 
South Africa’s social, political and economic issues, were published. The preliminary results 
reflected the notions of a desire for closer Afrikaans-English cooperation and also the need to 
improve the educational levels of non-Europeans.1391 The magazine also carried articles on 
sports and various kinds of cartoons to make it more humorous. (See illustrations 38-40) 
 
In addition, there were other news sheets and journals that were published for the benefit of 
the soldiers. In 1941, the Springbok Legion, a sort of the ‘soldiers’ trade union’ for the ex-
servicemen of the war, was established.1392 It advocated the civil and economic rights of the 
volunteers.1393 It became industrious in its publications which informed the debates and 
                                                 
1387  ‘One Year Old’, Clamp, no. 9, October 1943, p. 9. 
1388  ‘One Year Old’, Clamp, no. 9, October 1943, p. 9. 
1389  The 6th SA Armoured Division became famous for achieving a military victory at the Battle of Celleno 
in June 1944, spearheading the British 8th Army and the American 5th Army’s offensive operation 
against the Germans. See J. Bourhill, Come Back to Portofino: Through Italy with the 6th South 
African Armoured Division (30 Degrees South, Johannesburg, 2011); E. Kleynhans, ‘The First South 
African Amoured Battle in Italy during the Second World War: The Battle of Celleno – 10 June 1944’, 
Scientia Militaria, vol. 40, no. 3, 2012, pp. 250-279; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, 
chapters 15 and 23. 
1390  ‘Editorial’, The Sable, August 1943. 
1391  ‘Let the People Speak’, The Sable, August 1943, pp. 6, 33. 
1392  ‘After the War, WHAT?’, The Springbok Legion, Newsletter, n.d., Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 
56974 (867); N. Roos, The Springbok and the Skunk: War Veterans and the Politics of Whiteness in 
South Africa during the 1940s and 1950s, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 35, no. 3, 2009, pp. 
643-661; See also historical details in J. O’Meara and A. Rudolph, (eds.), Springbok Legion: The 
History and Policy (Springbok Legion, Commercial Printing Co. (Pty.), Johannesburg, 1944). 
1393  ‘After the War, WHAT?’, The Springbok Legion, Newsletter, n.d; Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 
56974 (867); N. Roos, ‘The Springbok and the Skunk: War Veterans and the Politics of Whiteness in 
South Africa during the 1940s and 1950s’, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 35, no. 3, 2009, 
pp. 643-661; See also historical details in J. O’Meara and A. Rudolph, (eds.), Springbok Legion: The 
History and Policy (Springbok Legion, Commercial Printing Co. (Pty.), Johannesburg, 1944). 
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discussions among the troops regarding the post-war ‘square deal’ and economic security, 
thus sparking consternation within the military circles.1394 Claiming membership of 50 000, 
the Legion committed itself to supporting the troops with respect to twenty-one identified 
issues, for example, legal aid, housing projects, land re-settlement, pensions, pay and 
allowances, accommodation for soldier’s families, as well as jobs for unemployed ex-
soldiers.1395 What followed after its establishment was the production of a series of literature 
dedicated to those subjects.1396 
 
Apart from fighting for the rights of soldiers, the Legion also stated as its policy to ‘expose 
and fight any organisation, political party or group of individuals who support or tolerate 
Fascism in any of its manifold forms’.1397 It published literature that was designed to be anti-
racism and to promote racial tolerance among the various groups in South Africa.1398 Though, 
with its anti-fascist stance, the Legion seemed to be advancing the propaganda effort of the 
government, however, its objectives were perceived to be at odds with the liberal democratic 
principles advocated by the military authorities through the AES project.1399 Dr Malherbe and 
Lt Olivier’s memorandum on the attitude of the soldiers towards the ‘current affairs’ 
identified four ideological factions in the country regarding the nature of South Africa’s 
constitutional framework: liberal democrats; social democrats; socialists and communists; 
and a fascist group.1400 Most of the soldiers were classified under the social democrats 
because of their demands for state intervention to prevent the ‘capitalist self-interest’ and to 
ensure ‘economic security and right and justice’ for the ‘common man’.1401 The Legion 
                                                 
1394  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs: 
Colonel Malherbe’s Notes on Lt B.J. Olivier’s Memorandum (Our Soldiers and the Future) - Written at 
the Request of General Smuts, 5 August 1942. For elaboration on the vision of the post-war ‘social 
justice’ for the World War Two veterans, see Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 48-49. 
1395  ‘After the War, WHAT?’, The Springbok Legion, Newsletter, n.d; Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 
56974 (867); Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 48-49. 
1396  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (908), Our Soldiers and the Future, Memorandum by Lt 
B.J. Olivier, 5 August 1942; ‘Social Security for Ex-Volunteers’, The Springbok Legion, Newsletter, 
c1944; Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (870); ‘Land Settlement for Ex-Soldiers’, The 
Springbok Legion, Newsletter, c1944, Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (868). 
1397  ‘After the War, WHAT?’, The Springbok Legion, Newsletter, n.d; Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 
56974 (867). 
1398  See ‘Rasse – Samewerking in Suid-Afrika: Vier Suid - Afrikaners Praat – Engelsman, Afrikaner, Jood, 
Natureel’, The Springbok Legion, Newsletter, c1944, Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (869). 
1399  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs: 
Colonel Malherbe’s Notes on Lt B.J. Olivier’s Memorandum (Our Soldiers and the Future) - Written at 
the Request of General Smuts, 5 August 1942. 
1400  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs, 
5 August 1942. 
1401  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs, 
5 August 1942. 
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earned opprobrium for seemingly promoting ‘radicalism’ and ‘communistic leftist 
tendencies’ within the military, and it was feared such a tendency would ‘sweep the country 
like a flowing tide after the war is over’.1402 The AES’ democratic citizenship education was 
therefore, considered an alternative to the Legion’s leftist tendency by ensuring that soldiers 
‘maintain a political perspective in meeting the post-war adjustments’, and to ‘realise the 
significance of the fundamental principles of democracy’.1403 To this end, authorities 
augmented the AES lectures by mobilising an information effort through the literature 
publications and by maintaining an ‘Information Room’ (or tent)1404, by enabling the soldiers 
to ‘ventilate their views’ to the public through dedicated special pages in local papers, and by 
using the IOs and the Ic section for ‘responding through writing corrective information’ in the 
same pages.1405 The said papers identified for that purpose included The Forum, The 
Springbok, and Arthur Barlow’s Weekly.1406 
 
In addition, soldiers were provided with various reading material such as the British’s Oxford 
University Press (O.U.P) pamphlets, and periodicals such Libertas, Trek, Common Sense, 
World Press Review, War, Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA), a handful of government 
reports and Hansard copies as well as the DMI (Ic)’s Ic Digest.1407 By publishing the 
government reports such as the one by Dr H.J. van Eck1408, on the socio-economic conditions 
in the country, and the budget speech by Major Piet van der Byl, Minister without Portfolio 
and chairman of the civil re-employment board1409, it was aimed at publicising among the 
soldiers, the policy processes of the government in connection with the wages and the 
                                                 
1402  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs, 
5 August 1942; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 48-56. 
1403  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs, 
5 August 1942; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 48-56. 
1404  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 8, 15-
16; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, pp. 155, 163. 
1405  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs, 
5 August 1942. 
1406  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs, 
5 August 1942. 
1407  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 15-16; 
Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Appendix F, U.D.F. Army Education Scheme: Duties of Information 
(Education) Officers, p. 1; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, pp. 155, 163; Malherbe, Never a 
Dull Moment, p. 223. 
1408  Dr van Eck was a leading industrialist and economist who also gave lectures for the AES training 
course. He was also Chair of the South African Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission; 
Chair of the Social and Economic Planning Council in South Africa during the war. See Cardo, 
‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 165. 
1409  Civil Re-Employment Board Budget Speech, by Major Piet van der Byl, Minister without Portfolio and 
Chairman of Civil Re-employment Board, The Government Printer, Pretoria, 1942. 
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rehabilitation of the volunteers after the war.1410 It is also important to note that some of the 
AES publications drew heavily from the DMI’s ‘Economic Intelligence’ propaganda and 
counter-propaganda reports1411, and some of the international news and affairs material were 
acquired from the USA, the BBC, the British ABCA, as well as literature from Australia and 
New Zealand.1412 
 
The DMI produced a monthly publication, I.c. Digest from 1941-1945, which supplemented 
the AES by carrying varied articles of interest to the soldiers, ranging from morale, war 
production, pension policies, culture and identity, UDF salaries, food and famine, ‘native’ 
economic problems, demobilisation benefits and even warnings against Axis propaganda.1413 
(See illustrations 36-37) Furthermore, the whole UDF information effort was complemented 
by the local propaganda agencies such as the UUTS and the Jewish Board of Deputies, which 
agreed to supply copies of their publications to the military authorities for distribution among 
the troops from late 1940.1414 Arrangements were made with Robertson (of the UUTS) and 
Saron (of the Jewish Board of Deputies) to obtain 1000 copies of Die Volkstem, a loyalist 
Afrikaans newspaper, 1000 copies Common Sense, and a further 1000-2000 copies of another 
loyalist Afrikaans paper, Die Volk, for free distribution among UDF troops, especially to the 
Afrikaans speakers.1415 These papers, including a package of the Sunday Times newspaper, 
the Parade and the Middle East weekly publication, were distributed to the troops in the 
forward areas, to the lines of communication (L. of C.) troops, to the SAAF and the Royal 
                                                 
1410  See ‘South Africa in the Remaking’, Ic Digest, August 1942, pp 1-11; ‘A New Deal for Non-
Europeans’, Ic Digest, August 1942, pp. 24-27; ‘Post-War Africa’, Ic Digest, January 1943, pp. 1-5; 
‘Better Pay for U.D.F.’, Ic Digest, February-March-April 1943, entire edition dedicated to wages in the 
UDF. 
1411  See PP, Box 58, EC 17, Economic Propaganda: Subversive Activities, 1941-1945; PP, Box 57, EC 38, 
Economic Propaganda: Intelligence Summaries, 1941-1945; PP, Box 57, EC 6; Economic Comparison: 
Germany, Italy, Britain, USA, April 1941; PP, Box 57, EC 28, South Africa’s War Effort: Economic 
Material by DMI (Ic), 9 January 1942; ‘The Economic War’, Current Affairs, vol. 6, February 1942, 
issued by the Middle East Branch of Army Bureau Current Affairs (ABCA), GHQ, Middle East Force, 
pp. 4-12. 
1412  PP, Box 57, EC 6, Reuters: Economic Service, Commercial Bulletin, 7 January to 4 March 1942; 
Malherbe Papers, File 442/8/4, KCM 57008 (127-132), Great Britain: Army Education and Propaganda 
Handbooks; Malherbe Papers, File 442/9, KCM 56974 (1050-63), Great Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand Army Education and Propaganda Handbooks; Malherbe Papers, File 442/7, KCM 56974 
(1032-9), United States of America Army Education and Propaganda Handbooks; Marquard Papers, 
BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 8, 15-16; Malherbe, 
Never a Dull Moment, p. 223. Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, pp. 155, 165-166. 
1413  See copies of Ic Digest, 1941-1945, in Malherbe Papers, File 442/2, KCM 56974 (989-1021); 
Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 22; See 
also Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, 158. 
1414  PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Military Propaganda and Publicity, Ic to DMI, 6 December 1940. 
1415  PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Military Propaganda and Publicity, Ic to DMI, 6 December 1940. 
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Air Force (RAF), to hospitals and casualty clearing houses and to the local messes.1416 The 
distribution of the reading material was conducted by the Movement Control to Division HQ 
for the divisions, by Air Intelligence for the air force, by Welfare Officers for regular troops, 
by Kenyan Information Officers for hospitals and casualty clearing stations and by Force HQ 
Central Registry for the Nairobi messes.1417 The reading matter was not merely useful for 
information, but for morale and propaganda value.1418 
 
To ensure that the troops in the field were not exposed to what was considered to be harmful 
reading material, the South African military authorities applied the Kenyan censorship 
regulations which prohibited the importation of certain publications and, if papers were 
addressed directly to the recipient, they would be opened in the presence of the Unit OC’s 
appointed officer.1419 The prohibited publications from South Africa were Die Burger, Die 
Oosterlig, Die Traansvaler, Die Vaderland and Die Volksblad – all Afrikaans papers 
associated with the anti-war elements and, if found, they were immediately destroyed in the 
presence of the addressee.1420 To maintain alertness and military security, the DMI (Ic) and 
the AES also ensured a regular supply of security bulletins and pamphlets from the British 
Army and from the Union DHQ, and were accompanied by latest lecture material to the IOs 
who also doubled up as intelligence officers.1421 In addition to the pamphlets, bulletins, 
periodicals and magazines, another important information service for the troops was in the 
form of the UDF’s “home-grown” newspapers, firstly for Europeans in early 1941 and then 
for the NMC in late 1942.1422 
 
                                                 
1416  WD 1, Box 291, 2328, East Africa Force Intelligence Propaganda Summary, March 1941. 
1417  WD 1, Box 291, 2328, East Africa Force Intelligence Propaganda Summary, March 1941. 
1418  WD 1, Box 296, 1 SAD/G/102/B, Reading for Troops, General Staff (Ic), East Africa Force HQ to All 
Intelligence Officers and Unit Commanders, East Africa, 26 April 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, 
KCM 56974 (539), Concerted Propaganda Campaign, Ic (iii) to Ic, n.d. 
1419  WD 1, Box 296, 1 SAD/G/102/B, Censorship: Newspapers and Periodicals, General Staff Intelligence 
to All Officers Commanding Units, 6 November 1940. 
1420  WD 1, Box 296, 1 SAD/G/102/B, Censorship: Newspapers and Periodicals, General Staff Intelligence 
to All Officers Commanding Units, 6 November 1940. 
1421  Malherbe Papers, File 432/5, KCM 56974 (50-57), Military Intelligence Handbooks, Manuals of 
Intelligence in the Field, 1939-1940; WD 1, Box 296, 1 SAD/G/102/B, Military Propaganda 
Handbook, General Staff, DHQ, 1941; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/6, Outline of Security Lectures, 
Intelligence and Security, British Air Ministry, 1 December 1942. 
1422  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; Marquard 
Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 23; DNEAS, 
Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for Non-European Soldiers in the North and Madagascar, Blaine 
to Smit, 20 October 1942. 
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The question of newspapers for the troops was raised when the troops had left for the war 
theatre in November 1940. The ‘Army Newspaper’, as it was then contemplated, was 
envisaged to supplement papers from other propaganda agencies and the east African 
press.1423 The DHQ had also requested the BOI to supply daily 1500 word news service for 
troops in Kenya. On 1 February 1941, the South African directorate of army printing and 
stationary services (DAP and SS), using a mobile printing section, produced and published 
the EAForce News in Nairobi, Kenya, as a daily newspaper for the troops in east Africa.1424 
The news service for the paper was provided by the BOI in Pretoria through wireless and by 
the Kenya Information Officer.1425 Production of the paper was carried through to Abyssinia 
and then to Egypt. Because the mobile printing section remained in Kenya when troops were 
moved to Egypt, the BOI arranged to continue the publication under a different name, 
Springbok, which replaced the EAForce News, and became a weekly news sheet.1426 The BOI 
supplied 1600 words per week for the news service via wireless and the editor was P. 
Brennan, with J. Lessing seconded by the UDF as Afrikaans editor.1427 The first copy of the 
Springbok appeared on 23 October 1941 in Cairo.1428 (See Illustrations 41-42) 
 
Though the publication of the EAForce News was ‘enjoyed’ by the troops1429, it was however 
criticised because it was exclusively in English before its change to Springbok. 1430 Also, the 
UDF propaganda branch, the DMI (Ic) was not involved in the production of the paper.1431 
The paper was also slated for affording more coverage on the international news than on the 
                                                 
1423  PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among Our Troops, G.S.O.2 (Ic) to D.G.O (for DDMI), 8 
November 1940; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Military Propaganda and Publicity, Ic to DMI, 6 December 1940. 
1424  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; 
‘Introduction’, EAForce News, 1 February 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), 
Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 1941; WD 1, Box 291, 2328, East Africa Force 
Intelligence Propaganda Summary, March 1941. 
1425  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; 
‘Introduction’, EAForce News, 1 February 1941. 
1426  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Bureau of Information, Proposed Reorganisation, Wilson to Kreft, 14 July 1941. 
1427  PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Bureau of Information, Proposed Reorganisation, Wilson to Kreft, 14 July 1941; 
Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; Marquard 
Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 23. 
1428  UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, Cursory Survey of the South African Public Relations, 30 November 
1944, by Maj J. Strydom, pp. 30-31. 
1429  WD, vol. 1, Box 291, 2328, East Africa Force Intelligence Summary, 2 April 1941. 
1430  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 
1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 
23; See also CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Summary of Director of Information’s Reply to General 
Theron’s Proposals, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943. 
1431  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 
1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 
23; See also CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Summary of Director of Information’s Reply to General 
Theron’s Proposals, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943. 
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South African home-town items.1432 The situation was improved with the publication of the 
Springbok, with A.B. Hughes and J.C. Vlok responsible for writing English and Afrikaans 
articles respectively.1433 The AES also made use of the Springbok’s columns for educational 
matters and conducted opinion polls for the benefit of the editors.1434 The paper remained 
under the control of the BOI, which also claimed that it was not a propaganda sheet but a 
‘newspaper to give troops news about their country’.1435 Nonetheless, these papers, in 
addition to the pamphlets and periodicals from the DMI (Ic), provided an added value to the 
news and propaganda media for the South African troops up North. The news sheets were 
also available for the NMC members at the YMCA recreational places; however, a need for a 
dedicated newspaper for blacks in their own language was recognised.1436 
 
In mid-1942, proposals were sent via the Secretary for Native Affairs to the DMI and the 
Secretary for Defence regarding the need to produce and distribute a newspaper to the NMC 
members.1437 In October 1942, the defence authorities committee granted authority for the 
establishment of the newspaper for the NMC members in the Union, in the Middle East and 
in Madagascar.1438 The number of copies was to be 4000-6000 copies for the Union and 
Madagascar, and 3000 for the Middle East. Arrangements were made with B.G. Paver, head 
of the Bantu Press, for the production of the paper, called Ndlovu-Tlou, in two black 
languages, Sesotho1439 and isiXhosa1440, at the cost of forty pounds per week.1441 Soon after it 
came out in November 1942, Ndlovu-Tlou was heavily criticised by DNEAS for its poor 
                                                 
1432  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 
1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Summary of Director of Information’s Reply to General Theron’s 
Proposals, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943. 
1433  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942. 
1434  Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 23. 
1435  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Summary of Director of Information’s Reply to General Theron’s 
Proposals, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943. 
1436  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for NMC Details, DNEAS to OCs of NMC 
Formations, 3 November 1942. 
1437  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, NAS 3/21/K, Proposed Newspaper for Native Troops, DMI to Blaine, 6 
October 1942. 
1438  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for Non-European Soldiers in the North and 
Madagascar, Blaine to Smit, 20 October 1942. 
1439  ‘Tlou’, Sesotho language, Weekly no. 32, 2 September 1944. 
1440  ‘Ndlovu’, isiXhosa language, Weekly no. 32, 2 September 1944. 
1441  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for Non-European Soldiers in the North and 
Madagascar, Blaine to Smit, 20 October 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for 
Native Military Corps, DNEAS to OCs of NMC Units, 4 November 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 
3/21/K, Bantu Soldiers’ Newspaper: “Ndlovu-Tlou”, DNEAS to DCS, 4 January 1943; UWH, Box 
162, Narep Unfo 16, Cursory Survey of the South African Public Relations, 30 November 1944, by 
Maj J. Strydom, pp. 30-31; D.G. Friend, Non-European Army Services, in J. Keen (ed.), South Africa 
in World War Two: A Pictorial History (Human and Rousseau, Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1995), 
p. 163. 
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quality.1442 It was criticised for the lack of pictures and for containing fifty percent extracts 
from the Weekly News Bulletin (WNB) of the NAD as well as the other fifty percent 
reproduced from the other black newspapers.1443 The paper also lacked the ‘Editorial’ bearing 
on the war. Its news content was stale because the NMC members had already read other 
papers at the YMCA recreational huts where the Springbok and the WBN, containing the 
same news, were accessed or the news had been broadcast on the radio.1444 
 
The Ndlovu-Tlou also had an official government stamp of the NAD on the front page, thus 
appearing to be a Government Gazette, resulting in the lack of interest from the soldiers. It 
was further described as unattractive because it had only a few cross-heads and lacking the 
main heads, which then presented it as a blank wall. The NMC members were not impressed 
with their depictions carrying assegais or the news content about one chief with many cows 
and a large volume of milk.1445 What they wanted to see were political news, speeches of the 
ANC President, Dr A.B. Xuma, government decision pertaining to discriminatory policies 
and arrangements for post-war settlement and education, and the report of the Social and 
Economic Planning Council (the Van Eck Report). Furthermore, the NMC members 
preferred to read about the events such as disturbances, animal diseases or the costs of 
purchasing a cow.1446 The troops recommended to the authorities that they wished to see 
matters affecting them as soldiers such as pension rights, pay and allowances. The following 
year in 1943, improvements were reported in the comments from DNEAS, after discussions 
between DNEAS, NAD and the Bantu Press.1447 However, notwithstanding the criticisms, 
reports from the north indicated that the paper was read with great interest as if fulfilled the 
need for having a paper dedicated to black soldiers.1448 From its inception in 1942 to 1945, 
                                                 
1442  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Bantu Soldiers’ Newspaper: “Ndlovu-Tlou”, DNEAS to DCS, 4 
January 1943; NMC, Box 19, 3/21/K, Newspapers: NMC Details, “Ndlovu-Tlou”, DNEAS to AG, 30 
January 1943. 
1443  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Bantu Soldiers’ Newspaper: “Ndlovu-Tlou”, DNEAS to DCS, 4 
January 1943. 
1444  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for NMC Details, DNEAS to OCs of NMC 
Formations, 3 November 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, N.M.C. Publication: “iNdlovu”, 
UDF Amin HQ, MEF to DNEAS, 30 January 1943. 
1445  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for NMC Details, DNEAS to OCs of NMC 
Formations, 3 November 1942; Grundlingh, Black Participation in the Second World War, pp. 144-
146. 
1446  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Notes on Discussions Re Ndlovu held at Garawi, by Maj Rodseth 
(ADDNEAS) and B Olivier (Springbok, war correspondent), 30 January 1943. 
1447  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, N.M.C. Publication: “iNdlovu”, DNEAS to UDF Amin HQ, MEF 
to DNEAS, 13 February 1943; Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, p. 146. 
1448  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, N.M.C. Publication: “iNdlovu”, UDF Amin HQ, MEF to DNEAS, 
30 January 1943. See also NMC, Box 19, 3/21/K, N.M.C. Publication: “iNdlovu”, F. Rodseth (SA OI, 
UDF ME), to AG, 30 January 1943. 
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Ndlovu-Tlou was published and distributed to the troops through the unit commanders and 
helped in the morale among the black troops.1449 However, as far as the other NEAS units, 
the Cape Corps and the Indian Malay Corps were concerned, there was no newspaper for 
them.1450 The Ndlovu-Tlou was produced through the NAD and it was purely for the NMC 
members who read Sesotho or isiXhosa. For the CC newspapers, arrangements were made in 
January 1944 with the editors of The Sun and The Cape Standard newspapers in Cape Town 
to publish, at reduced rate, copies for the CC members.1451 The News of the War publication 
was also issued by the NAD and was meant for the NMC.1452 The IMC were to be serviced 
through the English newspapers as there was no special arrangement for them. (See 
illustrations 43-44) 
 
Another dimension of the UDF information services included the material for health 
education. For this purpose, the GOA Middle East HQ, Theron, instituted the UDF 
propaganda and publicity committee in December 1944.1453 The aim of the committee was to 
‘initiate, plan and direct publicity and propaganda schemes’.1454 The UDF’s visual instruction 
and propaganda (VIP) section, which originated in the Union under Sergeant Vic Clapham, a 
professional copywriter and visual education trainer with the AES at Premier Mine, was 
included in this committee and fell under the overall authority of the assistant director public 
relations (ADPR), Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay.1455 The institution of the UDF propaganda 
                                                 
1449  DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for NMC Details, DNEAS to OCs of NMC 
Formations, 3 November 1942; “Ndlovu-Tlou”, NMC Newspaper, 2 September 1944; DNEAS, Group 
2, Box 11, 3/21/K, NMC Newspaper: “Ndlovu-Tlou”, Victory Souvenir Publication, DNEAS to 
Secretary, Bantu Press, 8 May 1945; Ndlovu-Tlou, 12 May 1945. 
1450  NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/A, CC, Circular, Bantu Newspapers, Port Elizabeth Fortress HQ to All Units 
with NE Attachments, 19 November 1943; NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/A, CC, News of the War, 
Mockford to OC, 16 Field Co. SAEC, Port Elizabeth, 30 November 1943. 
1451  NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/A, CC, News of the War, Mockford to OC, 16 Field Co. SAEC, Port 
Elizabeth, 30 November 1943; NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/K, Newspaper for Cape Corps Details, 
DNEAS to Government Printer, 6 January 1944; NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/K, Reading Matter, DNEAS 
to OCs, 1st, 3rd, 5th and 6th CC Battalions, 18 January 1944. 
1452  NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/A, CC, Circular, Bantu Newspapers, Port Elizabeth Fortress HQ to All Units 
with NE Attachments, 19 November 1943; NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/A, CC, News of the War, 
Mockford to OC, 16 Field Co. SAEC, Port Elizabeth, 30 November 1943. 
1453  PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Establishment of Committee to Control and Coordinate Visual Instruction and 
Propaganda, Theron to All Heads of Sections, 31 December 1944; World War 2 War Diary, Vol. 2 
(WD 2), Box 533, War Diary for January 1945 in Respect of UDF Printing and Services in CMF and 
MEF, Report by Major P.T. van der Walt, Staff Officer, Printing and Stationary Services, CMF, 1 
February 1945. 
1454  PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Establishment of Committee to Control and Coordinate Visual Instruction and 
Propaganda, Theron to All Heads of Sections, 31 December 1944. 
1455  WD 2, Box 533, War Diary for January 1945 in Respect of UDF Printing and Services in Central 
Mediterranean Forces (CMF) and MEF, Report by Major P.T. van der Walt, Staff Officer, Printing and 
Stationary Services, CMF, 1 February 1945; PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Minutes of a Meeting of the UDF 
Publicity and Propaganda Committee held on 6 February 1945 at 14: 30 in the Office of the ADPR in 
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and publicity committee and the inclusion of the VIP section were regarded as ‘an important 
event’ since a ‘coordinated and properly planned propaganda schemes directed to the forces 
in the field’ would be conducted ‘by a section of the UDF’ in the Central Mediterranean 
Forces (CMF) in Italy.1456 It was to be a combined effort of the VIP section, the field 
newspaper Springbok and the use of radio which were considered essential in the ‘interest of 
morale, health, education and economy’.1457 
 
For effective publicity and propaganda scheme, the committee exploited the radio, posters, 
leaflets and the Springbok, to conduct publicity efforts on behalf on other UDF sections like 
medical services or the Air Force with regard to morale and security.1458 The VIP section in 
particular, was instrumental in the poster campaigns to combat malaria, venereal disease 
(VD), typhus and typhoid fever, which were rising within the South African forces in Italy 
due to the cessation of hostilities at that time.1459 Priority was given to campaigns to combat 
VD, typhus and typhoid which were reported to be endemic.1460 Despite severe restrictions – 
by military policing and through strict military regulations, VDs were a problem among 
troops due to occasions of social and sexual encounters at various establishments in north 
Africa and in Italy.1461 Poster and leaflet publications were supplemented with their inclusion 
in the Springbok news sheet and also with the relevant slogans over the radio (the Springbok 
Radio south of Rome).1462 The VIP produced various health promotion posters such as ‘Eat 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rome, Lt Col R.N. Lindsay, Chairperson; PP, Box 40, PR 1/2/2, South African Public Relations Film 
and Photo Unit (SAPR), Liaison, Publicity and Results, Memorandum for Colonel Campbell-Ross, 27 
July 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Story of the Visual Instruction and 
Propaganda Unit, World War II, by Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974. 
1456  WD 2, Box 533, War Diary for January 1945 in Respect of UDF Printing and Services in CMF and 
MEF, Report by Major P.T. van der Walt, Staff Officer, Printing and Stationary Services, CMF, 1 
February 1945. 
1457  WD 2, Box 533, War Diary for January 1945 in Respect of UDF Printing and Services in CMF and 
MEF, Report by Major P.T. van der Walt, Staff Officer, Printing and Stationary Services, CMF, 1 
February 1945. 
1458  WD 2, Box 533, Committee for Coordination and Conduct of Publicity and Propaganda Schemes to the 
UDF Forces, by P.T. van der Walt, SO (PSS), 17 January 1945; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 
57008 (35), Story of the Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, World War II, by Vic Clapham, 12 
January 1974, p. 7. 
1459  WD 2, Box 533, War Diary, March 1945, Printing and Stationary Services: UDF, CMF, MEF, Progress 
Report, van der Walt, 12 April 1945; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Story of the 
Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, World War II, by Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 7. 
1460  WD 2, Box 533, War Diary, March 1945, Printing and Stationary Services: UDF, CMF, MEF, Progress 
Report, van der Walt, 12 April 1945; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual 
Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 7. See also Roos, Ordinary 
Springboks, pp. 56-60. 
1461  Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic 
Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 7; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 56-60. 
1462  PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Minutes of a Meeting of the UDF Publicity and Propaganda Committee held on 6 
February 1945 at 14: 30 in the Office of the ADPR in Rome, Lt Col R.N. Lindsay, Chairperson; WD 2, 
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Only the Food, Fruit and Vegetables as supplied by the Army, Avoid Typhoid’, ‘Typhus, the 
Penalty of Sleeping in Unauthorised Places’, ‘Careless Drinking Causes Typhoid’, 
(Afrikaans) ‘Pas op Vir Die (VD) Bints, Vermy Siekte’/ Beware of VD, Avoid Sickness’, and 
‘VD, What’s Mine, is Yours’.1463 The posters also warned soldiers against visiting brothels 
and to stay clear of ‘pick-up’ girls for the sake of their partners back home.1464 Other posters 
were used for transport maintenance and conservation. Drivers were warned about the 
dangers of reckless driving and the need to ensure economy of sources.1465 
 
According to Clapham, the VIP spearheaded the Union campaigns for inducing the idea of 
health discipline, thrift and financial discipline for troops, aiding the AES’ educational 
programme and combating the ‘insidious political propaganda that Goebbels and his minions 
on the enemy side were constantly beaming to troops by radio, by rumour, by air-dropped 
leaflets’.1466 Anti-Hitler and anti-Fascist posters were thus published to combat the impact of 
German propaganda.1467 (See also illustration 30) The VIP used various visual materials to 
get their message across. Warnings against the health risks were presented in the form of a 
sixteen page booklet titled, ‘Disease, and Enemy Ally’ or posters, with colourful images to 
facilitate the promotion health discipline and to ensure that the troops would not miss 
anything, and thus would ‘not be incapacitated’ due to preventable illnesses.1468 Another 
important factor was the invocation of pride and the preservation of the image of the UDF as 
an organisation, especially with the words, ‘Never Forget you are a Citizen of South Africa 
                                                                                                                                                        
Box 533, War Diary, March 1945, Printing and Stationary Services: UDF, CMF, MEF, Progress 
Report, van der Walt, 12 April 1945; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual 
Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 8. 
1463  WD 2, Box 533, Specimens of Production, Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, March 1945; 
Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic 
Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 8. 
1464  ‘She wants you Back as YOU WERE’, Poster by Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and 
MEF, WD 2, Box 533, March 1945. 
1465  ‘Don’t Turn Muddy Corners into Bloody Corners, Slow Down on Curves’, Poster by Visual Instruction 
and Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, WD 2, Box 533, March 1945; ‘Don’t be a Jerk, “Starts” and 
“Stops” play up HELL with your Bus’, Poster by Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and 
MEF, WD 2, Box 533, March 1945; ‘If your Truck Could Speak, Blimey What a Driver!’, Poster by 
Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, WD 2, Box 533, March 1945. 
1466  Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic 
Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 8. 
1467  ‘Adolf Hitler built Third Reich on Race Hate and Religious Intolerance’, Poster by Visual Instruction 
and Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, WD 2, Box 534, April 1945; ‘Hate the Afrikaner, Hate the 
English, Hate the Jew, Hate the Indian, Hate the Bantu: The voice of the FASCIST’, Poster by Visual 
Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, WD 2, Box 534, April 1945. 
1468  WD 2, Box 533, Visual Instruction, Monthly Report, 1 February 1945; ‘Target for the Day, Avoid 
Sickness’, Poster by Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, WD 2, Box 533, April 
1945; ‘Tifus, Vriend van Vyand’, Poster by Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and 
MEF, WD 2, Box 533, April 1945. 
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and South Africa has a Good Name’.1469 Through the establishment of the UDF publicity and 
propaganda committee in 1944, the authorities ensured that they maintained control of the 
propaganda agenda and process in the field and, more importantly, that they ensured the 
maintenance of morale, discipline and vigilance especially when hostilities were slackening 
and the risk of misusing leisure time as a result of inactivity would increase.1470 (See 
illustrations 44-48) 
 
Through the posters and other publicity material, the UDF authorities exercised a measure of 
social control over the troops with respect to directing their moral behaviour, ‘by getting the 
soldier’s attention, stimulating interest and by directing his mind and action in a positive 
manner.1471 While the UDF propaganda programme was conducted to ensure ‘victory in the 
struggle for the minds of men’, it was also organised to promote the “enlightenment” of the 
troops ‘through education and information’ for ‘civilian life ahead’.1472 This was done 
through the utilisations of visual propaganda. Furthermore, the UDF authorities also 
organised additional recreational resources and entertainment programmes such as the radio, 
to create more variety and to try to ensure that in the end, the troops were kept informed, 
occupied, disciplined, free of negative influences and remained within the bounds of the 
military establishment. 
 
ENTERTAINMENT AND RECREATION SERVICES 
 
In late 1940, the UDF Entertainment Unit was established.1473 According to its OC, Major 
Myles E. Bourke1474, the UDF Entertainment Unit was ‘something new in the history of the 
                                                 
1469  WD 2, Box 533, Visual Instruction, Monthly Report, 1 February 1945; ‘Three Honours to Uphold: 
Your are a Springbok, Your are a Volunteer, You are a Man’, Poster by Visual Instruction and 
Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, WD 2, Box 533, March 1945. 
1470  Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 57. 
1471  Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic 
Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 7; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 60. 
1472  WD 2, Box 533, War Diary, April 1945, Printing and Stationary Services, Progress Report, 10 May 
1945; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic 
Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 8. 
1473  AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, War Establishment: Entertainment Unit, 15 November 1940; UWH, Box 
162, Narep Unfo 16, Units and Formations, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, by Cpl G. 
Haughton, 15 November 1941; For origins and historical details see H. Bantjés, ‘Die 
Vermaaklikheidsgroep van die Unie-Verdedigingsmag Gedurende die Tweede Wereldoorlog: n 
Historiese Ontleding’ (Unpublished master’s (MA) thesis, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, 1990), pp. 
20-22. 
1474  AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Appointment: Entertainment Unit, Wakefield to Mitchel-Baker, 7 January 
1941. 
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Union’ Army … there was nothing like it before’.1475 Officially, the unit was known as the 
19th Reserve Motor Transport Company1476, a name given in order to avoid public criticism 
and attacks from the opponents of the government.1477 The primary aim of the entertainment 
unit was to combat boredom and to improve the morale of the South African forces in the 
Union and also on active service in the field.1478 In an interview with The Nongqai, Major 
Bourke, the OC, expressed the significance of his Entertainment Unit: 
 
Our work is as essential as that of the Medical Services. We are not only setting out to give 
the troops a pleasant evening, but to restore to normality nerves that are over-strained. A 
man who is mentally sick, who is bored and depressed soon breaks down physically, and the 
war of nerves ‘would claim another victim, another casualty’, if some relieve and relaxation 
were not provided. We provide that relaxation and diversion!1479 
 
The establishment of the entertainment unit was a response to the dissatisfactions among the 
troops arising out of the frustrations due to prolonged periods of inactivity, dull and repetitive 
training routines, digging endless trenches and doing guard duties.1480 In the early stages of 
the mobilisation process, organised entertainment for the troops was non-existent. For 
example, in an attempt to break the monotony of camp-life, ‘natural comedians’ and 
‘enthusiastic amateurs’ amongst the troops took the initiative by voluntarily presenting 
impromptu concert displays during their spare time.1481 However, these voluntary entertainers 
                                                 
1475  ‘The Union Defence Force Entertainment Units’, The Nongqai, September 1941, p. 1181. See also a 
similar comment by Cpl Haughton, UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, Units and Formations, The Story 
of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, by Cpl G. Haughton, 15 November 1941, Introduction, p. 1. 
1476  AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Organisation and Establishment: 19th M.T. Company, AG to QMG, 17 
January 1941. 
1477  AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Entertainment of Troops, QMG to AG, 2 Januaru 1941; AG (9), Box 163, 
213/14/62, CGS letter to Chairman of Financial Authorities, F.C. Sturrock Committee, 9 January 1941; 
AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Organisation and Establishment: 19th M.T. Company, AG to QMG, 17 
January 1941; ‘The Union Defence Force Entertainment Units’, The Nongqai, September 1941, p. 
1181; Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 152. 
1478  UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment, 15 November 1941; AG (9), 
Box 163, 213/14/62, Memorandum on the Necessity for a Definite Establishment for Troop 
Entertainment in the Union of South Africa, by Maj Myles Bourke, 2 January 1941; AG (9), Box 163, 
213/14/62, Entertainment of Troops, QMG to AG, 2 Januaru 1941; ‘The Stuff to Give the Troops’, The 
Nongqai, September 1941, 1185; Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, pp. 21-22, 152. 
1479  ‘The Stuff to Give the Troops’, The Nongqai, September 1941, 1185. 
1480  UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, 15 November 1941; AG 
(9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Necessity for a Definite Establishment for Troop Entertainment, 2 January 
1941; AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Entertainment of Troops, QMG to AG, 2 Januaru 1941; Malherbe 
Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (37), The Springbok Legion, by Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 1; 
Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, pp. 14, 21; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 48, 57. 
1481  UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, 15 November 1941; AG 
(9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Memorandum on the Necessity for a Definite Establishment for Troop 
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could not satisfy the needs of the troops in isolated military camps. Hence, after the 
discussions of the adjutant general, Major General Len Beyers, the GOA Middle East HQ, 
Theron and the quartermaster general, Brigadier General Mitchel-Baker, approval was 
granted for an official organisation of the UDF Entertainment Unit on 1 November 1940, to 
provide ‘a tonic for the nerves’ and to serve as ‘an antidote to the 5th column activities’.1482 
 
The entertainment unit organised regular shows and concert tours performed by amateur 
artists throughout the Union from March 1941. The shows consisted of the ‘Amuseliers and 
Gipsies’ who performed musical displays, singing and dance steps, and the ‘Crazy Gangs’ 
which performed “mad” shows of tricks on stage.1483 There were also comedies, 
impersonations and others such as ‘Ballyhoos concert group’ and the ‘Bandoliers’ which 
presented various productions to the troops.1484 The entertainment unit also had the East 
African Force entertainment unit to cater for troops in east Africa, a South African 
entertainment quarter for north Africa and the middle east as well as for the Italian theatre.1485 
By 1945, the entertainment unit had about eighteen units which performed in various towns 
in the Union, also in Italy, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Gibraltar, Tunisia, Greece (only the 
Amuseliers), Kenya, Abyssinia, Uganda, Eritrea, and Somalia.1486 By March 1946, when the 
entertainment unit’s existence came to an end, it had presented about eight thousand shows to 
millions of soldiers.1487 
 
However, there were some criticisms. Some of the performances were criticised for leaning 
too much towards radio and films, thus losing the South African character. The entertainment 
                                                                                                                                                        
Entertainment, 2 January 1941; ‘The Stuff to Give the Troops’, The Nongqai, September 1941, 1185; 
Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 21. 
1482  UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, 15 November 1941; AG 
(9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Memorandum on the Necessity for a Definite Establishment for Troop 
Entertainment, 2 January 1941; AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Entertainment of Troops, QMG to AG, 2 
Januaru 1941; ‘The Union Defence Force Entertainment Units’, The Nongqai, September 1941, p. 
1181; Bantjés, Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep, pp. 22-23. 
1483  UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, 15 November 1941; 
UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, Programme: 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, 13 – 20 August 1941; ‘The 
Union Defence Force Entertainment Units’, The Nongqai, September 1941, p. 1181. 
1484  UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, 15 November 1941; 
UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, Programme: 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, 13 – 20 August 1941; 
Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 153; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 58. 
1485  Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 153. 
1486  ‘Equipping the UDF Entertainment Units’, The Nongqai, April 1945, p. 393; Bantjés, ‘Die 
Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 153; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 58. 
1487  Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 154. 
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unit performers were also English-speakers.1488 Other complaints related to the dubious jokes 
or, with regard to the conservative chaplains in Potchefstroom, the ‘sexual element’ due to 
the somewhat “nakedness” of female dancers.1489 However, on the contrary, Dr Malherbe, 
who was in the audience at Mersa Mantru in 1942, reacted by writing a congratulatory letter 
to Bourke. He enjoyed the performances and ‘got a kick out of seeing how much the boys 
enjoyed it’.1490 He appreciated the rendition of the Afrikaans items, for example, the 
‘Boereplaas’ (Boer Farm), which invoked nostalgia among troops, and the popularity of the 
girls’ items because many of the young men ‘had not clapped eyes on a woman for six 
months or more’.1491 
 
In response to Dr Malherbe’s letter of appreciation, Bourke indicated that UDF HQ was not 
offering him any encouragement at all. He also explained that it was difficult to perform 
shows in Afrikaans because he could not find Afrikaans-speaking artists because of ‘extreme 
political views’. In fact, those artists who performed the Afrikaans items were all English and 
had never spoken an Afrikaans word before. Some of them were even imported from 
England.1492 It was through the efforts of one Afrikaans singer, Jan van Zyl, who was used as 
an Afrikaans producer, that some of the popular renditions were in Afrikaans.1493 The 
entertainment unit was valued by Dr Malherbe, nevertheless, and similarly to the AES but 
‘from different angles’, as a significant morale-building effort.1494 Dr Malherbe appreciated 
the entertainment unit for doing ‘a fine work in the Army’.1495 (See figs. 13-16, 82) The VIP 
section of Clapham, also contributed significantly to the massive attendance of the 
entertainment unit’s shows by putting up various advertisements on the radio and through 
posters.1496 (See also illustrations 44-48) 
 
                                                 
1488  Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (64), Information Officer, UDF Admin HQ, MEF to 
Malherbe, 2 April 1942. 
1489  Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 125. 
1490  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942. The letter was 
reproduced in The Nongqai, June 1942, p. 676. 
1491  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942. 
1492  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Bourke to Malherbe, 25 April 1942. 
1493  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Bourke to Malherbe, 25 April 1942. 
1494  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942;  
1495  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 2 December 1942. 
1496  Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic 
Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 8; ‘The South African Entertainment Presents “Marie Ney”: 
Shakespeare’s Woman’, Poster by Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, WD 2, 
Box 533, March 1945; ‘The South Africa Forces Radio: Take Forwards the Springboks’, Poster by 
Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, WD 2, Box 533, April 1945. 
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Although the UDF entertainment unit was mainly designed for the entertainment of white 
volunteers, it did however, present some male-only shows to NEAS members.1497 As Roos 
has argued extensively in his book, the UDF authorities were always “vigilant” in ensuring 
that the ‘segregated character of the UDF’ was maintained through the prohibitions of ‘inter-
racial social’ associations between blacks and whites.1498 Thus, in terms of the ‘segregated 
racial and cultural logic’ of the South African society1499, white females would not perform 
for black soldiers. The UDF authorities had extended the implications of the ‘racial and 
cultural categories that organised the segregated society’ in South Africa, by ensuring that 
activities among troops were conducted in the manner that did not challenge or subvert those 
categories.1500 Consequently, NEAS members were given a “taste” of the shows and their 
response was often subdued. Dr Malherbe attributed their lukewarm response to the fact that 
‘it would seem bad taste and impolite to make any noise by clapping or cheering’.1501 
 
NEAS members also had their own concert groups that operated under the authority of 
Stubbs.1502 There was the No. 1 NMC Concert Party, as one of the four NEAS entertainment 
units (2 NMC and 2 CC units) to provide the recreation for the NEAS members in the Union 
and in the middle-east.1503 The NMC entertainment unit was established in 1944 under one 
Lieutenant Ballenger as the OC, and consisted of actors, singers, tap dancers, clowns, 
magicians and musicians.1504 The producer for the concert party was the well-known pianist, 
composer and musician in Johannesburg, Staff Sergeant Mark Radebe, assisted by the 
                                                 
1497  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942; Bantjés, ‘Die 
Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 154. 
1498  Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 60. 
1499  Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 57. 
1500  Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 57. 
1501  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942. 
1502  NMC, Box 52, NAS 3/42, Report on Activities and Returns by Welfare Officers, October 1944, pp. 1-
5; CGS (War), Box 131, 32/21, Notes on Discussion Held in QMG’s Offices Regarding Entertainment 
among Non-Europeans, 6 October 1943; AG (3), Box 1, 154/X/4, Non-European Entertainment Mid-
east, QMG to AG, 30 July 1943; AG (3), Box 1, 154/X/4, SA Entertainment Units: Tour No. 4 NMC 
Concert Party No. 2 Central Command, OC Central Command Bloemfontein to OC No.1 Remount 
Grazing Farm, Andalusia, 1 August 1944; AG (3), Box 1, 154/X/4, SA Entertainment Units, The No.2 
NMC Concert Party, DNEAS to OCs NMC Durban and Pietermaritzburg, 28 September 1944; NMC, 
Box 14, NAS 3/21, Propaganda and Press Matters: The No.1 NMC Concert Party, DNEAS to 
European and Non-European Newspapers, 31 January 1945; ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 154. 
1503  AG (3), Box 1, 154/X/4, Signal, Concert Units, Dechief to Unidef, 22 September 1943; NMC, Box 14, 
NAS 3/21, Propaganda and Press Matters: The No.1 NMC Concert Party, DNEAS to European and 
Non-European Newspapers, 31 January 1945, See article, ‘The No.1 NMC Concert Party’, The 
Nongqai, April 1945, p. 453. 
1504  NMC, Box 14, NAS 3/21, Propaganda and Press Matters: The No.1 NMC Concert Party, DNEAS to 
European and Non-European Newspapers, 31 January 1945; ‘The No.1 NMC Concert Party’, The 
Nongqai, April 1945, p. 453. 
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saxophonist and trumpeter, Sergeant Samuel Kgasi.1505 In addition, there were other 
entertainment groups such as the ‘NMC Brass Band’, ‘Africa Stars’ and ‘South Easters’ 
which performed regularly, even to whites who attended the shows, and were appreciated 
widely for talent and efficiency. 1506 There was also the No. 1 CC Band in Kimberley and No. 
2 CC Band in Piet Retief. Because the members of the No. 1 CC Band consisted of the 
coloured veterans of the First World War, they were not fit for service outside South Africa, 
thus a new No. 4 CC Band, consisting of elements of the No. 1, No.2 and ten available 
General Services troops, was organised.1507 Concert parties provided a variety of 
entertainment for the NEAS and other UDF members to combat boredom among troops. (See 
figs. 12 and 17-22) 
 
Besides the entertainment units, film shows also played a significant role in the escapism and 
mental distraction of the troops. The film entertainment services, conceived in 1940, were 
provided by the Mobile Cinema Unit1508, through the support of the UDF Film Unit1509, 
which also produced films to assist in propaganda efforts and to showcase aspects of the 
military activities and the war effort.1510 The mobile cinemas were particularly important both 
in the Union and afield because, while it was easier for troops in the in the rear areas and near 
                                                 
1505  NMC, Box 14, NAS 3/21, Propaganda and Press Matters: The No.1 NMC Concert Party, DNEAS to 
European and Non-European Newspapers, 31 January 1945; ‘The No.1 NMC Concert Party’, The 
Nongqai, April 1945, pp. 452-453. 
1506  NMC, Box 14, NAS 3/21, Propaganda and Press Matters: The No.1 NMC Concert Party, DNEAS to 
European and Non-European Newspapers, 31 January 1945; ‘The No.1 NMC Concert Party’, The 
Nongqai, April 1945, pp. 452-453; Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, p. 144. 
1507  AG (3), Box 1, 154/X/4, Signal, Concert Units, Dechief to Unidef, 22 September 1943; AG (3), Box 1, 
154/X/4, Authority to Organise 4th CC Band, Deputy Adjutant General (DAG) to DNEAS, 27 
September 1943; AG (3), Box 1, 154/X/4, CC Band No. 4, DNEAS to DAG, 19 November 1943. 
1508  UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress 
Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 
1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 
1944-1945; ‘Running a Mobile Cinema’, The Nongqai, January 1943; Van der Waag, History of 
SADFI, pp. 39, 49; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among Our Troops, G.S.O.2 (Ic) to D.G.O (for 
DDMI), 8 November 1940; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Military Propaganda and Publicity, Ic to DMI, 6 
December 1940. 
1509  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942; ‘The South 
African Bureau of Information: The First Exclusive Interview with the Director, A.N. Wilson’, The 
Nongqai, June 1942; PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 
December 1944; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Memorandum on Military Publicity and Propaganda, R.N. 
Lindsay (ADPR) to DMI, 22 February 1944; PP, Box 40, PR 1/2/2, South African Public Relations 
Film and Photo Unit (SAPR), Liaison, Publicity and Results, Memorandum for Colonel Campbell-
Ross, 27 July 1944; ‘Military Movies’, The Nongqai, December 1944; PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, 
Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, May 1945. 
1510  AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/4, Deputy Chief of Staff to Director of Military Intelligence, 5 October 
1942; PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 
1942; PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Production Report – UDF Film Unit, April 1941 to September 1942; AG 
(W), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 13 July 1943. 
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the towns to patronise cinema theatres, it was difficult for troops in the forwards areas of 
military operations or just in remote and isolated places.1511  
 
The UDFI (YMCA and Toc House) was the main provider of film services to the troops in 
east and north Africa, with eighty-three percent of cinema entertainment in the Western 
Desert.1512 The exhibitions were all “talkie” pictures, preceded by the African Mirror 
newsreels, then the main feature and some advertisements. Some of the popular film shows 
included ‘Deanna Durbin in That Certain Age, George Formby in Keep Your Seats Please 
and Bing Crosby in The Star Maker’.1513 The South African troops, including NEAS 
members as well as the New Zealanders, British, Polish, Free French and Indian troops, sat 
on sand and enjoyed two hours of film entertainment free of charge.1514 The mobile cinemas 
also extended their film shows once a week to hospitals and casualty clearing stations in 
order to lift the morale of the sick and wounded.1515 Cinema shows were provided to smaller 
audiences of thirty or to larger groups of up to 2000. By January 1942, about eight UDFI 
mobile cinemas had exhibited three hundred and seventy-seven shows to over 156 000 men 
in three months.1516 The mobile cinemas were nicknamed ‘Bioscope Boys’, and provided a 
                                                 
1511  NMC, Box 53, NMP 20/2, Entertainment of Troops: Cinema Shows, OC, Witwatersrand Command 
HQ to OCs, NMC and IMC, Witwatersrand Units, 3 October 1940; NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/F/1, 
Tours: Film Vans, Mobile Film Van Tour No. 53, 21 November 1944; NMC, Box 17, NAS 3/21/F/1, 
NMC: Tour Film Vans, DNEAS Film Vans Itinerary, Tour 64, 25 June 1945 and Tour 66, 30 July 
1945; ‘Running a Mobile Cinema’, The Nongqai, January 1943; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, pp. 
39, 49; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942; Smuts 
Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942. 
1512  UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress 
Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 
1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 
1944-1945; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, pp. 39-40, 49. 
1513  ‘Running a Mobile Cinema’, The Nongqai, January 1943. 
1514  UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress 
Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 
1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 
1944-1945; ‘Running a Mobile Cinema’, The Nongqai, January 1943; ‘The UDF Film Unit: How 
Movies are Used in the Defence Force to Speed Training and Build Morale’, The Nongqai, November 
1943, p. 1131; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, pp. 47-49. 
1515  UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress 
Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 
1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 
1944-1945; ‘Running a Mobile Cinema’, The Nongqai, January 1943; Grundlingh, The Participation of 
South African Blacks, p. 145. 
1516  DC, Group 2, Box 3888, vol. 3, Q 393/3, South African YMCA Work: Monthly Notes, October-
December 1941; DC, Group 2, Box 3888, vol. 3, Q 393/9, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East, 
Progress Reports, March 1942; DC, Group 2, Box 3888, vol. 3, Q 393/9, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), 
YMCA-Toc H National War Work Council Second Annual Conference, 8-9 May 1942; UWH, Box 
136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress Reports, 
1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 1941-1945 
‘Under the Red Triangle’, The Nongqai, January 1942, p. 3; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, p. 40. 
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vital mental diversion for the troops and enjoyed immense popularity particularly in the 
military bases at the isolated areas.1517 However, the maintenance of segregation between the 
racial groups, though desired by the authorities, was difficult due to the shortage of facilities. 
In some cases, for example at Carolina, near Barberton, whites and CC members shared a tent 
for a film show.1518 It remained a perpetual challenge to ensure the maintenance of segregated 
film shows or concert displays throughout the war. 
 
In addition to receiving news from South Africa and about other international events through 
the services newspapers, the BOI, in collaboration with the SABC, provided radio broadcast 
service to the troops in the north.1519 As indicated in the previous chapter, the BOI had 
arranged with the Egyptian State Broadcasting Company to broadcast special South African 
programmes at regular intervals from Cairo.1520 The broadcast included a weekly thirteen and 
half minutes of recorded greeting messages from the family members or relatives of the 
soldiers from South Africa.1521 The programme producer and announcer for the South 
African broadcast items was one Louis Knobel, on the staff of the SABC (Bruce Anderson 
was in overall command).1522 From 1940, arrangements were also made through the DDMI to 
supply wireless sets to the troops.1523 Radio services were expanded later during 1944 and 
1945. On 19 April 1944, the South African corps of signals established a radio unit under the 
SAPR, for direct transmission of war-related information to the Union.1524 It was a military 
(UDF) radio unit which operated through the beam service from the Allied Algiers Station to 
                                                 
1517  World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511; ‘Under the Red Triangle’, The Nongqai, January 1942, p. 
3; ‘Grundlingh, The Participation of South African Blacks’, p. 145. 
1518  NMC, Box 53, NMP 20/2, Director: YMCA Services in Non-European Military Camps to DNEAS, 21 
December 1941. 
1519  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 136, Home News supplied by the Bureau of Information, 1940; Smuts Papers, 
A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 
438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 1941; SABC, Annual 
Reports, 1939-1945. 
1520  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; SABC, 
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1521  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; CGS (War), 
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1944, by Maj J. Strydom, pp. 35, 41; NASAP, Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: 
Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942. 
1523  CGS (War), Box 199, 42/5, Bureau of Information to DDMI, 3 October 1940; ‘1,119 Radio Sets Sent 
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1524  PP, Box 41, Broadcasting: History of the Radio Unit, South African Public Relations, 19 April 1944 – 
1 February 1945. 
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the Union and it was for the first time since the war began that there was a ‘beam-direct 
relay’ to the country.1525 
 
The radio unit’s first experimental beam to South Africa was on 1 July 1944 via the Allied 
military station (Algiers), and subsequently via Rome, to Algiers, then to the Union on 7 July 
1944.1526 The first transmission was conducted by Captain Roger Bayldon, a journalist who 
was on the staff of the ADPR, mainly about war news and other military activities.1527 In his 
first broadcast, Bayldon stated that the purpose of that radio unit was ‘to take you [South 
Africans] to war’.1528 Other radio observers were Captain Cecil Williams, Captain Henry 
Joubert, Lieutenant C. Chosack, and Captain D. Erwin as the OC, radio sub-unit, SAPR.1529 
These radio unit observers were all part of the AES, and captains Bayldon and Joubert were 
operating with the public relations, handing material to SABC. The well-known and 
experienced journalists, Uys Krige and Lieutenant Jacques Malan were stationed with public 
relations in London and operating with the BBC.1530 The UDF radio unit, operating from 
Rome, was assisted by the Americans and the British with their technical equipment.1531 
Following the British and the American examples of having their own radio stations in their 
camps to carry military traffic back to their countries, and also the radio stations to their 
troops, the South African Forces Radio station was established in December 1944 in 
Rome.1532 It was an upgrade of the initial radio unit and was operated by Lieutenant C. 
Chosack and Lieutenant L. Rootenberg.1533 
 
                                                 
1525  PP, Box 41, Broadcasting: History of the Radio Unit, South African Public Relations, 19 April 1944 – 
1 February 1945. 
1526  PP, Box 41, Addendum to History of Radio Unit, 5 May 1945. 
1527  PP, Box 41, Addendum to History of Radio Unit, 5 May 1945; PP, Box 41, Broadcast: Military 
Observers, Broadcast No.1, Lt Bayldon, UDF RU, n.d. (presumably 1 July 1944). 
1528  PP, Box 41, Broadcast: Military Observers, Broadcast No.1, Lt Bayldon, UDF RU, n.d. (presumably 1 
July 1944). 
1529  PP, Box 41, Addendum to History of Radio Unit, 5 May 1945. 
1530  PP, Box 41, Addendum to History of Radio Unit, 5 May 1945. 
1531  PP, Box 41, Memorandum on Possible Radio Transmission to Union, Capt D. Erwin to DMI (Ic), 6 
June 1944. 
1532  PP, Box 41, Memorandum on Possible Radio Transmission to Union, Capt D. Erwin to DMI (Ic), 6 
June 1944; PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Establishment of Committee to Control and Coordinate Visual 
Instruction and Propaganda, Theron to All Heads of Sections, 31 December 1944. Vic Clapham 
referred to that Radio Service as Springbok Radio, see Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 
(35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 8. 
1533  PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Establishment of Committee to Control and Coordinate Visual Instruction and 
Propaganda, Theron to All Heads of Sections, 31 December 1944; CGS (War), Box 198, 42/5, Prime 
Minister’s Inaugural Broadcast Speech, Campbell-Ross to Lomberg, Chief of Radio Section, 27 
January 1945. 
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Changes regarding the radio station were already contemplated in August 1944 to serve the 
‘forces, from the forces to the forces – a South African forces programme to the South 
African forces everywhere and to the “home-front”’.1534 This military radio station started its 
experimental transmissions on 1 January 1945 and officially opened with an address to the 
troops by General Smuts on 1 February 1945, the birthday of the 6th SA Armoured 
Division.1535 It also became a useful publicity and propaganda medium for the UDF 
propaganda and publicity committee and the VIP Unit.1536 Members were encouraged to send 
in requests, to submit scripts or ideas and to compile and submit thirty minutes 
programmes.1537 With regard to the news, the radio focused on the news from home, sport, 
stock exchange prices and war news from other theatres.1538 Arrangements were also made to 
have records in English, Afrikaans and some in black languages from South Africa. About 1, 
250 were received by 30 January 1945, of which 800 were in English, 250 in Afrikaans, 100 
were in unspecified black languages and 50 were American.1539 Whatever its shortcomings, 
due to the direct and immediate broadcast service, the South African Forces Radio was a 
welcome alternative to the BBC broadcast or the previously delayed recordings of the SABC. 
 
                                                 
1534  PP, Box 41, Radio Presentation of Programmes of Radio Observers Unit, Erwin to Lindsay (ADPR), 
17 August 1944. 
1535  PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 17 
January 1945; PP, Box 41, News Service for SA Troops’ Broadcasting Station, DDMI to Deputy 
Director, Signals, 5 January 1945; PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Establishment of Committee to Control and 
Coordinate Visual Instruction and Propaganda, Theron to All Heads of Sections, 31 December 1944; 
CGS (War), Box 198, 42/5, Prime Minister’s Inaugural Broadcast Speech, Campbell-Ross to Lomberg, 
Chief of Radio Section, 27 January 1945; CGS (War), Box 198, 42/5, Prime Minister’s Inaugural 
Broadcast Speech, Dechief to Unidef, Main (UDF HQ Italy), 29 July 1945. 
1536  PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Establishment of Committee to Control and Coordinate Visual Instruction and 
Propaganda, Theron to All Heads of Sections, 31 December 1944; ‘The South African Forces Radio: 
Take Forwards the Springboks’, Poster by Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, 
WD 2, Box 533, April 1945; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual Instruction and 
Propaganda Unit, Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, pp. 7-8; WD 2, Box 533, War Diary for January 
1945 in Respect of UDF Printing and Services in CMF and MEF, Report by Major P.T. van der Walt, 
Staff Officer, Printing and Stationary Services, CMF, 1 February 1945. 
1537  PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 6 
February 1944, Attachment of South Africa Radio- Rome, Broadcasting Times; ‘Tune in to South 
African Forces Radio’, Poster by Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, WD 2, 
Box 533, April 1945. 
1538  PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 17 
January 1945; SANDFA, PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio 
Broadcasting Committee, 30 January 1945. 
1539  PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 6 
February 1944; PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting 
Committee, 30 January 1945. 
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The SABC also started to exploit the military radio facilities since September 1944 for direct 
relays to the Union.1540 The BBC, through the arrangements of the Middle East propaganda 
directorate, had also been broadcasting propaganda and news items to the South African 
forces since their deployment in the field. Its programmes included the “News from South 
Africa – African Transmission”, broadcast every week on Fridays, and the “Song Time in the 
Laager” – the BBC Forces Programme for the UDF troops in Middle East. It was, however, 
criticised for ‘giving undue prominence to the OB and the disloyal elements in the Union’.1541 
The comments from the troops of the 1st and 2nd divisions were negative towards the BBC in 
terms of the quality of its programmes to South African soldiers. The Afrikaans- speaking 
troops were unimpressed with the poor Afrikaans language pronunciations and the selection 
and quality of the songs such as Sarie Marais or Suikerbossie which were assumed to have 
‘mystic symbolic appeal’. The troops also felt ‘embarrassed’ by flattering language about 
their ‘glorious exploits’. They were also bored by ‘interminable talks’ and some “bed-time 
stories” which even influenced some troops ‘to tune into Zeesen’, though they discounted its 
apparent propaganda.1542 It was important to have quality Afrikaans broadcasting service as 
the Afrikaans-speakers were in the majority of the UDF. As result, the BBC welcomed the 
supply of Afrikaans material for broadcasting purposes from the experienced Krige and 
Malan.1543 Nonetheless, a variety of radio programmes such as popular music, news 
broadcast, “melodious moments”, “break for music”, “when the day is done” and also 
hospital requests, offered additional forms of entertainment for the troops on active 
service.1544 
 
As far as the SA Forces radio was concerned, the reaction of the troops was satisfactory. 
Between January and February 1945, letters from the audience expressing satisfaction at the 
transmissions, request programmes and news services were received.1545 To verify such 
reports, the Public Opinion Committee for SA Forces Radio was established on 30 March 
                                                 
1540  UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, Cursory Survey of the South African Public Relations, 30 November 
1944, by Maj J. Strydom, pp. 35, 41; SABC, Annual Reports, 1944, p.5. 
1541  CGS (War), Box 198, 42/5, Theron to Van Ryneveld, 9 April 1942. 
1542  CGS (War), Box 198, 42/5, Theron to Van Ryneveld, 9 April 1942. 
1543  Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (553), Malherbe to Esselen, 16 October 1944; Malherbe 
Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (557), Malherbe to Wakefield, 17 October 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 
438/1, KCM 56974 (552), Malherbe to J. Grenfell Williams (Acting Assistant Controller, Overseas 
Service, BBC), 28 December 1944. 
1544  Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 107. 
1545  PP, Box 41, General Comments on the UDF Forces Radio Station based on Letters Received from 
Personnel in Central Mediterranean Forces, 12 March 1945. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
269 
 
1945 to ‘measure the opinion of our [UDF] Forces concerning the Station’.1546 Major A.E. 
Ferning, senior IO within the AES was in charge and a survey questionnaire with two parts 
was developed: part A for collecting data on listening habits (e.g, how many people/radio 
sets); and part B for expression of opinion and preferences.1547 The survey consisting of 220 
questionnaires was conducted from 6-13 April within the UDF-SAAF units and the outcome 
was appalling. Only twenty-one questionnaires were returned, and it was attributed to bad 
timing as troops were busy with military preparations.1548 The feedback contained in the 
returned questionnaires was that only a few men listened due to the weak signal and that 
programmes were poor.1549 The estimated numbers of radio sets possessed by thirteen units 
were 120 and the estimated listeners were twenty-six. Given the limited number of 
respondents, the results could hardly be generalised to represent the cross section of opinions 
of the UDF troops. There was also a large listening public in hospitals and convalescent 
depots in Rome and their opinions were not surveyed, only informal reports.1550 It was then 
concluded that the SA Forces radio station needed to improve technically for better quality 
transmission, to secure more sets for the troops and to improve programmes so as to compare 
favourably with other stations such as the 8th Army Mobile, BBC Direct, British Forces 
Radio, American Expeditionary Station and even the German station (unspecified, probably 
Zeesen), which ranked higher in terms of quality.1551 
 
In South Africa, transmissions were facilitated through the SABC. Black soldiers, in 
particular, also benefitted from the expanded wireless transmissions from September 
1942.1552 The DNEAS offered its support to NAD regarding the NMC and military matters, 
and even provided talks by some AES members such as Selope Thema for broadcasting.1553 
                                                 
1546  PP, Box 41, Public Opinion Committee for SA Forces Radio, Staff Officer, Signals to ADPR, 31 
March 1945. 
1547  PP, Box 41, Forces Radio Survey: AES Questionnaire, 31 March 1945. 
1548  PP, Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, by Public Opinion Committee, 14 May 1945; PP, 
Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, Lindsay to Wilson, 22 May 1945. 
1549  PP, Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, by Public Opinion Committee, 14 May 1945; PP, 
Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, Lindsay to Wilson, 22 May 1945. 
1550  PP, Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, Lindsay to Wilson, 22 May 1945. 
1551  PP, Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, by Public Opinion Committee, 14 May 1945; PP, 
Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 15 May 
1945. 
1552  NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, Propaganda and Publicity: Broadcast to Natives, DNEAS to DDMI, 2 
September 1942; NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, Broadcast to Natives in Vernacular, Malherbe to Smit, 23 
September 1942; NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, News Bulletin by Department of Native Affairs, Sesotho 
Translation, 2 October 1942. 
1553  NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, Broadcast to Natives, DNEAS to Secretary for Native Affairs, 19 October 
1942; NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, Broadcast: Taking Cover, n.d.; NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, 
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But, as with the problems with the rest of the black South African audience, many NMC 
members could not listen to the daily programmes because of the unsuitable broadcast 
timings during training schedules.1554 The OC of 1st Battalion NMC, Dynamite Factory in the 
Cape Town, even argued that ‘no civilian employer could allow his labour force to stand idle 
for 30 minutes thrice weekly’.1555 Serving soldiers needed training time “badly” that 
listenership by the NMC would not have been high throughout the war. Nevertheless, those 
who could listen, enjoyed the programmes presented in vernacular. 
 
Sport was another form of entertainment. The UDF authorities in the western desert, the 
Middle-East and in Italy, organised various sporting activities for recreational purposes. As 
sports was regarded as one of the priority activities, sporting equipment such as rugby balls, 
soccer balls as well as cricket bats and hockey sticks were acquired an distributed to the 
troops.1556 For the troops, including NEAS members, every Wednesday afternoon was set 
aside for boxing1557, soccer1558, athletics1559 as well as rugby games1560,and weekends were 
especially used for sporting competitions between units or between services.1561 
 
For NEAS members, interest was more into soccer. There were leagues formed in military 
Commands and various floating trophies such as ‘NEAS Directors’ Trophy’ and ‘Directors’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
Broadcast to Natives and Indians: Japanese Fire-Bombs, n.d.; NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, Broadcast: 
Hitler’s Rule, by Thema, n.d. 
1554  NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, Broadcasting News to Natives, OC, 2nd Battalion NMC, Pietermaritzburg 
to DNEAS, 9 October 1942; NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, Native Broadcast, OC, 1st Battalion NMC, 
Dynamite Factory, Cape, 11 December 1942. 
1555  NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, Native Broadcast, OC, 1st Battalion NMC, Dynamite Factory, Cape, 11 
December 1942. 
1556  UWH, Box 267, B.I. 21, South African Gifts and Comforts Committee, Summary of Articles, 15 April 
1942; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 290-291; ‘Gifts and Comforts for Union 
Troops’, Rand Daily Mail, 28 August 1940; Roos, Ordinary Spingboks, p. 58. 
1557  NMC, Box 14, NAS 3/21, Boxing Champions of the NMC, Results of Contest at Voortrekkerhoogte, 6 
July 1944; Roos, Ordinary Spingboks, p. 58; Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, 
pp. 144-145. 
1558  NMC, Box 51, NAS 3/22/7, Control of Organised Sports and Recreational Training, NMC Soccer Day, 
7 August 1945; Roos, Ordinary Spingboks, p. 58; Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African 
Blacks’, pp. 144-145. 
1559  NMC, Box 13, NAS 3/21, NEAS Sports Meeting at Du Toitspan, 28 October 1943; NMC, Box 13, 
NAS 3/21, Report on NEAS Sports Meeting, East London Fortress Commander to DNEAS, 20 
October 1943; CGS (War), Box 131, 32/21, NEAS Entertainment and Sports: NEAS Military Athletic 
Tournament, Programme Schedule, 4 March 1944; NMC, Box 51, NAS 3/22/7, NMC Training Area 
Athletic Championship, Welgedacht, Area Commandant, NMC Welgedacht to DNEAS, 25 July 1944; 
‘Spectacular Non-European Athletic Tournament’, Rand Daily Mail, 4 March 1944. 
1560  Malherbe Papers, File 442/1, KCM 56974 (988), Sport Report for El Bullsheet, October 1943; ‘Div. At 
Play’, The Sable, August 1943; NMC, Box 51, NAS 3/22/7, NEAS Recreation, Fortress Sports Office, 
Cape Town to DNEAS, 4 May 1945. 
1561  ‘Div. At Play’, The Sable, August 1943; Roos, Ordinary Spingboks, p. 58; Grundlingh, ‘The 
Participation of South African Blacks’, pp. 144-145. 
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Floating Trophy’ were played for.1562 Rugby and cricket were most popular among white 
troops, and tournaments were organised between the services and even between countries, for 
example, South Africa against New Zealand.1563 The South African Gifts and Comforts 
Committee as well as the YMCA South African War Work Council were particularly 
instrumental in securing donations for sporting equipment for the UDF troops.1564 
 
As indicated in the previous section, an important enterprise for sustaining the morale and 
spiritual well-being of the troops was the development of the field force canteen services by 
the UDFI under Lieutenant Colonel T.R. Pornsford as the OC.1565 Pornsford was the national 
secretary for the YMCA who was requested, together with Captain L.C. Campling of the Toc 
H, to assist the DOD in organising canteen services for the troops.1566 The operations of the 
UDFI originated in July 1940 in East Africa, at the request of the CGS. The UDFI, which 
operated as a volunteer unit of the ACF from November 19411567, worked closely with the 
YMCA and the Toc H in East Africa for the provision of the canteen and recreational 
facilities, moral and spiritual support services for the soldiers.1568 
                                                 
1562  NMC, Box 51, NAS 3/22/7, Cape Fortress Sports League: NEAS Soccer Fixtures, 11 April- 6 June 
1945; CGS (War), Box 131, 32/21, Disposal of Non-European Army Services Trophies, Director of 
Land Forces to CGS, 7 December 1949; Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, p. 
144. 
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1942; NMC, Box 52, NAS 3/22, NMC: Gifts, Comforts and Donations: 6 April 1943; NMC, Box 52, 
NAS 3/22, Gifts and Comforts, OC, No.1 A.T. Depot, Premier Mine (Pretoria) to DNEAS, 19 
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Comforts Committee, Report, 17 December 1941; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 
290-291; ‘Gifts and Comforts for Union Troops’, Rand Daily Mail, 28 August 1940; Roos, Ordinary 
Spingboks, p. 58; Grundlingh, The Participation of South African Blacks, p. 145. 
1565  CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Memorandum of Interview with Sir Pierre 
van Ryneveld, Chief of the General Staff and Brigadier General J. Mitchel-Baker at Defence 
Headquarters, Pretoria, 23 July 1940; AG (3), Box 207, 154/51/50/9, Report on Meeting held Between 
YMCA and Toc H Representatives and Members of the DOD at Defence Headquarters, 12 October 
1940; Van der Waag, History of the South African Defence Force Institute, Introduction, p. vi. 
1566  CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, Correspondence, wrt Canteen Services, Dechief to Unidef, 23 July 1940; 
CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, Maintenance of Wet Canteens, J. Mallet, National War Services 
Secretary to Van Ryneveld, 26 July 1940; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, Memorandum for “Authorities 
Committee”, by Van Ryneveld, 27 September 1940; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and 
Toc H), Memorandum of Interview with Van Ryneveld and Mitchel-Baker, 23 July 1940; AG (3), Box 
207, 154/51/50/9, Report on Meeting held Between YMCA and Toc H Representatives and Members 
of the DOD at Defence Headquarters, 12 October 1940; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, Canteen and 
Social Amenities, E.A., CGS to Minister of Defence, 3 October 1940. 
1567  AG (3), Box 207, 154/51/50/9, Report on Meeting held Between YMCA and Toc H Representatives 
and Members of the DOD at Defence Headquarters, 12 October 1940; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, 
Circular, Union Defence Force Institutes, AG to QMG and All Heads of Sections, 11 November 1940. 
1568  AG (3), Box 207, 154/51/50/9, Report on Meeting held Between YMCA and Toc H Representatives 
and Members of the DOD at Defence Headquarters, 12 October 1940; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, 
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Within the Union, the UDFI’s civilian version was called South African War Work Council 
and provided similar services to the soldiers.1569 From 1941, the UDFI became the chief 
orchestrator of the comprehensive entertainment and recreation efforts for the troops in the 
different theatres of military operations.1570 It arranged for the reading and writing amenities, 
expedited the procurement, production and distribution of news sheets, magazines, 
periodicals, reference books, bulletins and pamphlets.1571 Operated by the members of the 
YMCA and Toc H, the UDFI provided the triangle huts, marquees, dug-outs and cinemas 
from home bases to the forward areas.1572 In addition, it operated the mobile canteen facilities 
which offered refreshments such as tea, coffee, cigarettes, beans, bacon, biscuits, toiletries 
and a water trailer as well as services such as lectures, religious services, art classes, concerts, 
libraries, note-paper games and mobile cinema shows for troops on active service.1573 
 
The YMCA operated the huts in the base camps and mobile canteens in the field, and the Toc 
H, which dealt mainly with the wet canteens (offering beer), operated in towns and villages 
                                                                                                                                                        
Circular, Union Defence Force Institutes, AG to QMG and All Heads of Sections, 11 November 1940; 
Van der Waag, History of SADFI, p. 39. 
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1941; ‘A Call from the Men of the Hour’, Y.M.C.A and Toc H War Fund Appeal, YMCH South 
African War Work Fund, Johannesburg, March 1940. See also Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, 
vol. 7, pp. 289-295; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, p. 37. 
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Toc H), Progress Reports, 1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, 
Monthly Progress Reports, 1944-1945; For publicity efforts see ‘Running a Mobile Cinema’, The 
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Training and Build Morale’, The Nongqai, November 1943, p. 1131. 
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Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 
1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 
1944-1945; Y.M.C.A and Toc H War Fund Appeal, YMCA South African War Work Fund, 
Johannesburg, March 1940; Y.M.C.A and Toc H War Fund Appeal, Toc H, Southern Africa, 
Johannesburg, March 1940. 
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1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 
1944-1945; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, chapters 5, 6 and 7; ‘Under the Red Triangle’, The 
Nongqai, January 1942, p. 3. 
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where they believed there was ‘greater control’ and a minimum risk of drunkenness.1574 The 
YMCA did not operate the wet canteens as an established tradition throughout its 
existence.1575 The UDFI also established the soldiers’ recreational clubs such as the 
Springbok Club, Voortrekker Club, Sable Club, Red Tabs Centre, Eagle’s Nest, the Non-
European Leave Centre and many others in North Africa and Europe.1576 These clubs, both in 
South Africa and in the North, including Europe, were important social centres for troops on 
leave, and provided various services such as accommodation, tourism, meals, tea, showering 
facilities or getting hair-cuts.1577 
 
The Gifts and Comforts organisation also supported the efforts of the UDF authorities to 
strengthen the physical and mental well-being of the soldiers in the Union, North Africa, the 
Middle-East and Italy.1578 Thousands of products such as shaving equipment, cigarettes, 
matches, combs, towels, razors, warm socks, sporting and musical equipment were contained 
in ‘glory bags’ and sent to the troops.1579 Until the end of the war, the Gifts and Comforts 
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October 1941; ‘Clubs for Union Troops’, The Star, 3 November 1941; ‘More Clubs for South Africa in 
Egypt’, The Star, 11 November 1941; ‘Springbok Club in Tripoli’, The Star, 10 May 1943; ‘Fine 
British Gift Volumes for Springbok Club’, The Star, 11 arch 1944; ‘Big Hotel in Florence for Troops’, 
The Star, 20 October 1944; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, p. 47; Roos, Ordinary Spingboks, p. 58. 
1578  UWH, Box 268, B.I. 22, YMCA and Toc H, Broadcast Talk by Reverend P.H.S. Sitters, 20 November 
1941; UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly 
Progress Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress 
Reports, 1941-1945; UWH, Box 267, B.I. 21, South African Gifts and Comforts Committee, 
Appreciation Extracts, 15 April 1942; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 290-292; 
‘New Drive for Gifts and Comforts’, Rand Daily Mail, 17 August 1940; ‘Gifts and Comforts for Union 
Troops’, The Star, 28 August 1940; ‘Gifts and Comforts need Money’, Cape Times, 21 April 1941; 
‘Gifts and Comforts for Union Troops’, The Star, 28 August 1940; ‘Comforts for our Boys up North’, 
Cape Times, 25 March 1941; ‘Comforts for Springboks’, The Star, 26 May 1942; ‘Gifts Fund Appeal’, 
The Star, 10 August 1944; ‘Pool Thanks Gifts and Comforts’, Rand Daily Mail, 26 February 1945; 
‘War Fund’s First Million’, The Star, 26 February 1945. 
1579  UWH, Box 268, B.I. 22, YMCA and Toc H, Broadcast Talk by Reverend P.H.S. Sitters, 20 November 
1941; UWH, Box 267, B.I. 21, South African Gifts and Comforts Committee, Summary of Articles, 15 
April 1942; UWH, Box 267, B.I. 21, South African Gifts and Comforts Committee, Progressive 
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organisation had raised thousands of pounds to finance their supply of gifts to the troops and 
also organised thousands of women to assist with war work for the troops, though funding 
appeals were still being made due to the high demand for goods.1580 
 
The provision of recreational and entertainment facilities were attempts by the UDF 
authorities to ensure that the troops enjoyed the social care services, their morale was 
sustained and they were kept gratified. For the NEAS members, much as the services were 
for building morale, they were also aimed at preventing them from “drinking, loitering 
aimlessly and consorting with loose women”.1581 Similarly, this was the case with the white 
troops as the authorities also controlled their leisure activities, for example, by ‘taking over 
the restaurants and hotels’ as well as the local staff soon after the 6th SA Armoured Division 
moved into Italy in 1944, for their exclusive utilisation by the South Africans.1582 The 
important factor for the UDF authorities was that the troops utilised those social welfare 
facilities and services in a regulated manner and in a controlled environment so as to keep 
them safe, healthy, content and focussed on their military obligations.1583 
                                                                                                                                                        
Statement of Articles Issued for Distribution to Fighting Forces “Up North”, September - October 
1942. 
1580  UWH, Box 267, B.I. 21, South African Gifts and Comforts Committee, Summary of Articles, 15 April 
1942; UWH, Box 267, B.I. 21, South African Gifts and Comforts Committee, Progressive Statement of 
Articles, September - October 1942; UWH, Box 267, B.I. 21, South African Gifts and Comforts 
Committee, Progressive Statement of Articles, May- June 1944; ‘£5, 000 Needed to Buy Christmas 
Gifts for Troops’, Rand Daily Mail, 9 October 1940; ‘Thousands Knitting for Troops’, The Star, 17 
August 1940; ‘Gifts and Comforts for Union Troops’, The Star, 28 August 1940; ‘Women War 
Workers Rally’, Cape Argus, 26 March 1941; ‘Comforts for our Boys up North’, Cape Times, 25 
March 1941; ‘Gifts Fund Appeal’, The Star, 10 August 1944; ‘Pool Thanks Gifts and Comforts’, Rand 
Daily Mail’, 26 February 1945; ‘War Fund’s First Million’, The Star, 26 February 1945. 
1581  Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, pp. 143-144. 
1582  ‘Big Hotel in Florence for Troops’, The Star, 20 October 1944; Roos, Ordinary Spingboks, p. 60. 
1583  UWH, Box 268, B.I. 22, YMCA and Toc H, Broadcast Talk by Reverend P.H.S. Sitters, 20 November 
1941; UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly 
Progress Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress 
Reports, 1941-1945; UWH, Box 267, B.I. 21, South African Gifts and Comforts Committee, 
Appreciation Extracts, 15 April 1942. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
275 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In terms of social welfare and entertainment services, the UDF authorities attempted to 
ensure the improvement of the physical and psychological well-being of the soldiers. The 
entertainment units and the UDFI provided the necessary mental diversions and the morale-
strengthening facilities and services which the soldiers enjoyed. For the authorities, these 
measures also served the strategic imperative of maintaining social control over the UDF 
troops in terms of their behaviour and discipline. Keeping the troops in the military base 
camps or at the UDF-controlled establishments outside South Africa, also reduced the risks to 
the soldiers’ health and also served to prevent them from the external influences that could be 
inconsistent with the existing socio-political conditions in South Africa or could also create 
unsustainable expectations among troops regarding the post-war social, political and 
economic order. The social welfare efforts of the authorities, however, were severely 
impacted by the military policies - pay, leave, allowances, pensions, promotions, transfers 
and movements – which, at times led to the decline of morale among the troops.1584 
Consequently, it became increasingly difficult for those involved in propaganda efforts to 
sustain the motivation and commitment of the troops, while at the same time having to 
contend with the policies that continued to impact on their morale. It remained a distressing 
situation for Dr Malherbe and even Brink, to whom the soldiers expressed their 
dissatisfactions as a result of the paradoxes and inconsistencies that plagued the UDF 
throughout the war.1585 
                                                 
1584  See reports on morale, UKZN, Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors 
Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; SANDFA, 
QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; SANDFA, DNEAS Group 
2, Box 20, NAS 3/42, Treatment and General Welfare of Members of None-Europeans of NMC 
Battalions and Units, 3 July 1940 – 28 August 1944. 
1585  See QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; Bantjés, ‘Die 
Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, pp. 11-14; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 223-229. 
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Illustration 42: Springbok, 23 Oct 1941  Illustration 43: iNdlovu-Tlou, 2 Sep 1944 
 
Fig. 12: NMC Reading iNdlovu-Tlou, NEAS Photographic Records, Ditsong Museum of Military History 
 
  
Illustration 44:UDF Honour and Good Name, Military Archives, War Diaries vol. 533 
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Illustration 47: UDF Entertainment Advertisements, Military Archives, War Diaries, vol. 534 
 
  
Illustration 48: UDF Forces Radio Advertisement, Military Archives, War Diaries, vol. 533 
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Fig. 13: The Nongqai, Apr 1945   Fig. 14: The Nongqai, Apr 1945 
 
  
Fig. 15: The Nongqai, Apr 1945   Fig. 16: The Nongqai, Dec 1945 
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Fig. 17: NMC Choir     Fig. 18: NMC Brass Band 
 
  
 
Fig. 19: NMC Drill Display    Fig.: 20: NMC Tug of War 
 
 
  
Fig. 21: IMC Boxing     Fig. 22: IMC Boxing 
 
Figures 12, 17-22: NEAS Photographic Records, Ditsong Museum of Military History, Johannesburg 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUDING PESRPECTIVES 
 
Before assessing the strengths, weaknesses and impact of South African propaganda during 
the Second World War, it would be useful to identify the important elements to be 
considered, especially those highlighted in the previous propaganda studies. Writing in 1927, 
Lasswell stressed that ‘no propaganda fits tightly into its category of major emphasis’.1586 
Thus, it is more useful to analyse propaganda according to the nature and extent of its 
purpose, the range of its objectives and the degree of its appraisal as an institutional 
imperative. In wartime, propaganda generally attempts to mobilise public opinion favourable 
to the state’s policy towards the war, either for intervention or for neutrality, also to counter 
resistance against the policy and to ‘attract the indifferent or to prevent them from assuming a 
hostile bent’.1587 When the policy of intervention in the war is adopted, the priority of 
propaganda mobilisation would thus be to secure population support and loyalty, to entice the 
neutrals and to denigrate the adversary.1588 
 
With regard to ascertaining whether propaganda has attained the desired effect, Jowett and 
O’Donnell emphasise that ‘propaganda must be evaluated according to its ends’.1589 It is 
imperative to consider whether the purpose and, in essence, whether ‘some specific goals 
have been achieved’.1590 The goals would vary according to the peculiar circumstances facing 
the nation state at that time. Therefore, in assessing the question of propaganda 
accomplishments in South Africa, the noteworthy issues should be in connection with the 
achievement of the intended purposes and goals. It is also imperative to appraise the 
apparatuses which were exploited for the propaganda effort in order to give an indication of 
whether they were adequate in expediting the achievement of those goals. This chapter, 
therefore, explores the above elements to determine the success of South Africa’s propaganda 
                                                 
1586  Lasswell, The Theory of Political Propaganda, p. 629. 
1587  Ibid. 
1588  See Lasswell, Propaganda in the World War, pp. 9-12; Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War, pp. 1-
11; Rhodes, Propaganda, pp. 107-131, 283-284; Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, pp. 
112-120; M. Balfour, Propaganda in War: 1939-1945, Organisations, Polices and Publics in Britain 
and Germany (Routledge and Keegan Paul, London and Boston, 1979), pp. 422-425, 434-437; R.S. 
Zahara, From Propaganda to Public Diplomacy in the Information Age, in Y.R. Kamalipour and N. 
Snow (eds.), War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective (Rownan and Littlefield, Lanham, 
Maryland, 2004), pp. 219-220; Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, chapters 5 and 6. 
1589  Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 279. 
1590  Ibid., p. 286. 
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efforts during the war. The discussion will commence with a brief review of the South 
African situation early in the war period in order to highlight some of the challenges which 
confronted the country at the time. During the review, the purpose and goals of propaganda 
efforts would also be exposed. Then the discussion will address those goals in order to 
ascertain whether they were accomplished. Since the war was fought over six years, it is also 
necessary to examine those goals in the context of the permutations of the war. The intention 
is to ascertain the concomitant adaptations of propaganda efforts in relation to the changing 
war circumstances. As a point of departure, this evaluation of propaganda is mainly 
concerned with the South African context. Specifically, it is concerned with South Africa’s 
attempts, at least for the ruling UP at the time, to sustain her socio-political values and 
institutional structures, while also attempting to re-envision her political future in the context 
of the prevailing political conditions and ideological currents. 
 
UNION POLITICS AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 
 
When war broke out, the South African political situation was unstable. Through most of the 
1930s, the country was subjected to Nazi propaganda which encouraged exclusive ethnic-
nationalism among white Afrikaans speakers and promoted anti-British and anti-Jewish 
sentiment.1591 Nazi Germany, in an attempt to limit the war potential of Britain, her main 
European rival, mounted an extensive propaganda effort to create schisms within the Empire 
and possibly to cultivate the neutrality of many countries, including South Africa.1592 As a 
result, the Union experienced bitter political divisions on the question of neutrality or 
intervention. By the outbreak of the war in September 1939, the country was confronted with 
a range of challenges. 
 
In the main, there was hostility and organised opposition towards the Union’s war policy by 
pro-republican Afrikaner nationalists, particularly the violence that was perpetuated by the 
OB.1593 The prevailing political tensions were exacerbated by Nazi propaganda, especially 
through the Zeesen broadcast, which condemned the Smuts administration for the war policy 
                                                 
1591  Discussed in chapter 1 of this study. 
1592  See Lawrence Papers, BC640, E.5, Official White Book on Nazi and Nazi Propaganda in South Africa, 
vols. 1-5, 1945; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1945; Strahl, Seven Years 
1942) 1942; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence’, pp. 209-230; Furlong, 
‘Allies at War?’, pp. 16-29; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika (1991); Citino, Germany and the 
Union of South Africa (1991). 
1593  Details in chapter 1. 
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and encouraged the anti-war elements to resist all efforts relating to the Union’s participation 
in the war. Furthermore, the previous Hertzog administration had pursued a passive defence 
policy and neglected the Union’s military preparations. As discussed in previous chapters, the 
military problems were also compounded by some members of the UDF commandos who did 
not support the war and were opposed to the deployment of the forces outside South Africa. 
This created anxieties with regard to the troop loyalty and their commitment to the 
government’s war policy. 
 
Therefore, at the beginning of the war, South Africa was severely constrained. There was an 
absence of national consensus on the war policy, a limited military capacity, a limited support 
from some members of the UDF and then, a low population morale due to the wave of the 
anti-war activism unleashed soon after the country entered the war.1594 Another point is that 
South Africa was divided on racial basis, with many blacks relegated to the political 
periphery, especially after the way they were cast aside despite their participation the First 
World War.1595 Their reaction to the government’s war policy ranged from half-hearted 
support, indifference and to an outright rejection. Thus, it is on the basis of such constraints 
that South Africa’s propaganda goals would derive, and against which to determine whether 
propaganda efforts during the Second World War were successful. 
 
Smuts obtained a narrow parliamentary majority for the country to participate in the war 
against Germany. The parliamentary triumph was a victory for the pro-war argument. 
However, opponents of Smuts’s war policy later accused him of betraying Hertzog1596 and 
the latent tensions were thus re-invoked. Anti-government sentiments were cultivated in 
many parts of the country, mainly due to the Nazi propaganda which exploited the country’s 
political conditions and encouraged discontent among Afrikaners and also rumours-
mongering among blacks. There was a concerted propaganda offensive against the 
government’s war policy which was conducted through political speeches, peace meetings, 
attacks on Smuts and through various other subversive operations. The aim was to ignite anti-
government agitation and to deprive it of popular support for the war. Therefore, due to the 
                                                 
1594  See Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/16, Censorship Summary, 3 December 1940; Army Intelligence, 
Box 46, I. 40.H, CE 2/15, Low Level of Moral on the Home Front, Ic to DDMI, 24 February 1942. 
1595  For detailed discussion see A. Grundlingh, Fighting their Own War: South African Blacks and the First 
World War (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1987). 
1596  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 16 December 1939; CGS (War), 
Box 197, 42/2., Extracts and Intercepts. Foreign Papers and Broadcast, 27 September 1940. See the 
details in chapter 1. 
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prevailing internal political disagreements, Union authorities were compelled to devise 
strategies to counter-act the anti-war sentiments and to facilitate the prosecution of the war 
effort. To this end, a massive publicity and propaganda effort was mounted to give effect to 
the realisation of the war policy’s objectives. 
 
Mindful of the prevailing internal politics, Smuts discarded any thought of a conscription 
policy and adopted a volunteer system for military service. Therefore, the first goal was to 
stimulate public interest and to foster patriotism in order to secure volunteers. Secondly, due 
to the escalation of the anti-war activism, it was imperaticve to preserve internal security and 
public order. This goal was also pursued among blacks, whose agitation for improvement of 
their political, social and economic circumstances, was interpreted by the authorities as 
subversive because they challenged what Roos calls the ‘colonial order’.1597 In the third 
place, there was a necessity to sustain public morale on the home-front and also within the 
UDF in order to effectively focus the efforts on prosecuting the war. These goals emerged out 
of the public appeals made by the government and military officials in the context of the 
prevailing political circumstances relating to the country’s war policy.1598 
 
However, those goals did not imply that they were mutually exclusive or were in sequential 
order for the employment of propaganda initiatives. There were overlaps, with varying 
degrees of emphasis, depending on the specific needs or purpose of propaganda at the time. 
For example, to obtain recruits, it was necessary to create a stable environment, to inspire the 
public and stimulate interest as well as to foster patriotism. It therefore, implied that 
propaganda efforts would be multifaceted. In broad terms, all propaganda initiatives were 
aimed at ensuring a positive outcome in all spheres of South Africa’s war effort. The above 
goals served as indicators to aid in the evaluation of the effectiveness of the propaganda 
efforts during the war. However, it is equally appropriate to review the various platforms and 
methods which were exploited for the implementation of propaganda programmes. The 
rationale is to ascertain their strengths and weaknesses as delivery mechanisms, in order to 
determine how they impacted on the realisation of propaganda goals. Such evaluation would 
                                                 
1597  For details on the argument see Roos, Ordinary Springboks, chapter 4. 
1598  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, Generals Smuts’s Appeals to the Public for Funds for Propaganda, 28 
September 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939; Smuts Papers, 
A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939; Lawrence 
Papers, BC640, E3.4, Notes of the Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Publicity, 5 October 
1939. 
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provide indications for drawing conclusions on the success or failure of the Union’s 
propaganda efforts. 
 
PROPAGANDA PLATFORMS AND METHODS 
 
The delivery of propaganda to the South African public was facilitated via the exploitation of 
key media platforms: radio, the press and the films. Radio, which had been heavily exploited 
by the Germans and the British, was considered the main instrument of propaganda.1599 South 
African authorities requested Wilson to conduct counter-propaganda through the SABC radio 
broadcast. The strategy was for the government officials to make direct appeals to the public 
and, in the case of public criticism, to provide explanatory statements to alleviate the public’s 
anxiety regarding the actions of the government.1600 
 
The government’s initial propaganda approach was, however, passive and defensive. Zeesen 
had been broadcasting for long periods during the inter-war years. There was also no policy 
nor system on how to implement propaganda. Hence the initial approach of merely issuing 
counter-statements. That strategy, however, was modified in 1940 when the Union’s experts 
in their various fields were utilised in the SABC’s radio broadcast to rationalize to the 
listeners why the country was at war against Germany and, generally, to promote the 
government’s war policy. Broadcast services were also extended to the black population, 
mainly to counter subversive activities, to inform them about the war and to appeal for their 
support when recruiting officials came to their areas. 
 
The value of radio was that, it had the potential to reach a larger audience at one time and 
also over long distances (e.g. Zeesen in Germany to South Africa). Another advantage was 
that broadcast could be transmitted in different languages, therefore facilitating an 
understanding by multiple populations, especially in a plural society like South Africa. The 
predominant languages used for broadcasting were English and Afrikaans for the white 
audience, and then Sesotho, Setswana, isiXhosa and isiZulu for the relevant black audience in 
their specific areas. Radio was also a useful tool for communicating information to non-
literate people who would otherwise not be reached by the press. 
                                                 
1599  See Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 
September 1939; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present 
Activities, 23 August 1940. 
1600  See chapter 3. 
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One major advantage of radio was that, because of the intensive technical requirements, the 
government could enjoy a far greater monopoly as the main audio communication asset, 
which was not readily available to the opposition movements.1601 In South Africa, the SABC 
fell under the political authority of the minister of post and telegraphs (Clarkson) – then in 
Smuts’s war cabinet. However, there were several limitations. Transmissions by other 
clandestine radio stations, particularly anti-government ones, generated confusion because 
they naturally presented a different picture to the official version of news. The white 
Afrikaans-speaking section of the population was targeted by the Zeesen radio as well as the 
Mystery Radio in order to arouse their hostility against Britain by emphasising the historical 
oppression and military humiliations of the Afrikaners at the hands of the British. Those 
negative messages exacerbated social tensions and intensified anti-war activism against the 
Union government.1602 Therefore, government monopoly and dominance of the radio as a 
platform of propaganda was challenged by broadcast from other radio stations. However, the 
counter-statements and talks presented by government loyalists countered their perspectives 
with patriotic constructions, especially with regard to refuting adverse depictions of war 
events. 
 
Secondly, there was a social problem related to radio. South Africa’s population was diverse 
in terms of language and culture. It was difficult to satisfy the needs of every language group. 
The white population was predominantly Afrikaans-speaking, but English was widely spoken 
and understood by Anglo-Afrikaners. Still, the dominance of the English language in the 
SABC’s propaganda broadcast drew sharp criticisms from the public and even from some of 
the authorities.1603 The under-exploitation of the Afrikaans language for propaganda was a 
major shortcoming as Afrikaans speakers, including soldiers, often tuned into Zeesen for 
news about the war and for entertainment.1604 Even members of the black population, who 
                                                 
1601  See the position of the SABC with regard to the war, Report of Commission of Enquiry, SABC, pp. 1-
35. 
1602  See UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1943; UP Archives, Intelligence Reports, 
vol. 2, Mystery Radio Transmissions, July to August 1942. 
1603  Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 200, Inter-departmental Committee on Security, Report on the SA 
Broadcasting Corporation, n.d; Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (544), Recognition of the 
Afrikaans Element in Propaganda, Malherbe to Wilson, 14 February 1941; Report of Commission of 
Enquiry, SABC, pp. 1-35; Marx, ‘Dear Listeners of South Africa’, pp. 150-153. 
1604  Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (544), Recognition of the Afrikaans Element in Propaganda, 
Malherbe to Wilson, 14 February 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (534), Hoernle to 
J.A. Davenport (British Broadcasting Corporation), 6 May 1941; SANDFA, CGS (War), Box 198, 
42/5, Theron to Van Ryneveld, 9 April 1942. 
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had access to radio, were negatively influenced by Zeesen broadcast.1605 For blacks, the 
language question was even worse in terms of addressing cultural dispositions. 
 
The third problem was the radio time utilised for war propaganda. The fact that only fifteen 
(and later thirty) minutes were allocated by the SABC for the government, also limited the 
impact radio could have had on the public. Despite the increase in radio licences, the 
programmes of the SABC were not dominated by the war.1606 According to Werdmuller, the 
Americans had 800 radio transmitters, the BBC radiated 400 hours per day in various 
languages and the Australians had up to 27 national and 99 commercial stations, all ‘pumping 
[propaganda] material which does not allow their respective nations to forget that, priority 
No.1, is to “Finish The Fight”’.1607 In contrast, South Africa had the SABC, the BBC radio 
service, and SAPA news and thus, ‘the propaganda value of the South African Broadcasting 
in the interest of the war [was] very close to zero’.1608 The consequence was a diminished 
listenership interest in the war because of an ineffectual broadcasting policy. 
 
Other shortcomings related to equipment deficiencies, shortage of military radio observers in 
the war areas, delayed recordings from the war zone, lack of instantaneous transmissions, and 
the turf wars between the BOI, the defence authorities and the SABC personnel, which 
impacted on publicity and propaganda effectiveness.1609 In terms of the speed of 
transmissions ‘to bring the South African public nearer the front line in imagination’, the 
South African authorities were failing in that regard.1610 Improvements in radio transmission 
came in late 1944, with the establishment of the UDF’s Radio Observer sub-unit attached to 
the SAPR. This service aimed at ‘bridging the gap’ in radio broadcasting, between the war in 
the north and back in the Union, where ‘war was receding in the consciousness of South 
                                                 
1605  NMC, Box 15, NAS 3/21 B, Discussion by the Sub-Committee on Non-European Propaganda, 6 July 
1942. 
1606  See SABC Annual Reports, Programmes, 1939 – 1945. 
1607  CGS (W), Box 197, 42/1, Radio in Relation to Military Propaganda, Werdmuller to Wakefield, 21 
April 1944. 
1608  CGS (W), Box 197, 42/1, Radio in Relation to Military Propaganda, Werdmuller to Wakefield, 21 
April 1944. 
1609  Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (104), Lindsay to Malherbe, 24 June 1944; Malherbe Papers, 
File 432/7, KCM 56974 (553), Malherbe to Esselen, 16 October 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, 
KCM 56974 (134), A.R. Delius to Malherbe, 28 November 1944. 
1610  CGS (War), Box 197, 42/1, DDMI Memorandum, Radio and Military Cooperation, Deputy Chief of 
Staff (DCS) (Brig Gen Wakefield in 1944) to Adjutant General (AG) (Maj Gen Len Beyers), 21 April 
1944. 
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Africans at home’.1611 However, the main difference was that the Radio Observer Unit was 
recording the “UDF in action at the frontlines”, and then passed the material on to the SABC, 
which did not use that material as the military authorities would have liked. The military 
authorities, therefore, circumvented the SABC by supplying their recorded material to the 
BBC, which then broadcast to South Africa. Given the above difficulties, therefore, the 
effectiveness of radio for delivering propaganda to the masses of South Africa was severely 
constrained. The situation was no better with regard to radio services to the UDF members 
abroad. 
 
For about five years, UDF members could mainly obtain news about war events elsewhere 
and about South Africa by listening to foreign radio stations as the military authorities did not 
have such a facility.1612 The BBC was criticised for irrelevant and poor quality programmes, 
not its technical efficiency. The establishment of the South African Forces Radio station in 
December 1944, in Rome, brought some relief in the entertainment sphere. However, the 
survey of the Public Opinion Committee for SA Forces Radio in April 1945 revealed some 
shortcomings. There was general lack of radio sets, poor signals and the musical items were 
predominantly American.1613 Soldiers even rated other radio stations above South African 
ones.1614 
 
Radio broadcast to blacks in South Africa also had various shortcomings. According to the 
SAIRR report of 1943, there were concerns regarding the minimum number of vernaculars to 
cater for the various cultural groups, for which language group were the broadcast designed 
to influence, and what the relevant content should be. The government opted for the dominant 
languages of isiZulu, Sesotho, Setswana and isiXhosa, not, for example, Xitsonga and 
Tshivenda. The cultural interests of all these groups differed. The timings of the broadcast 
were also problematic. With reference to the mid-week wireless broadcast, some of the 
respondents to the SAIRR investigators indicated that they had never even heard of the 
broadcast as they were always working. They complained that they went to work early and 
                                                 
1611  PP, Box 39, 1/19/5, Radio Observers Sub-Unit, DCS to DMI, 10 May 1944; UWH, Box 162, Narep 
Unfo 16, Cursory Survey of the South African Public Relations, 30 November 1944, by Maj J. 
Strydom, p. 41; PP, Box 41, Memorandum on Possible Radio Transmission to Union, Capt D. Erwin to 
DMI (Ic), 6 June 1944; SABC, Annual Report, 1944, p. 5. 
1612  See chapter 6. 
1613  See chapter 6. 
1614  PP, Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, by Public Opinion Committee, 14 May 1945; PP, 
Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 15 May 
1945. 
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returned too late. After work, they all wanted ‘to relax in the evening over a family meal’.1615 
Many expressed the same sentiment about the unsuitable times during the day. The broadcast 
were also limited as the transmissions could not reach the rural population, especially blacks, 
as many of them did not have access to the wireless sets or were too far from the broadcast 
centres.1616 
 
Furthermore, blacks generally lost interest. The native commissioners, who monitored 
attendance of broadcast services reported disappointing results.1617 Very few blacks, in 
proportion to the expected numbers, attended the broadcast services, especially those 
conducted through the telephone connected to loudspeakers (e.g. 100-150 out of the expected 
3000 hostel dwellers). Blacks were also critical of the technical quality of the broadcast 
through loudspeakers and were suspicious of government intentions. The news broadcast 
without providing background information failed to facilitate understanding among blacks 
about the war issues. They were also unhappy about the content of the programmes which did 
not feature any political or labour issues, and those programmes were regarded as 
“ridiculous”, “condescending” and “childish” at times because they were out of touch with 
the black interests.1618 
 
Instead of the radio broadcast, blacks preferred personal contacts for direct interaction. Radio 
was ineffective in that regard. But, it must be acknowledged that the objective of the 
government with regard to radio service to blacks was to combat subversive rumours, not 
mainly for recruitment. Hence, DNEAS, in addition to the appeals by the officials, the local 
chiefs and native commissioners, also opted to utilize returning NMC members to enhance 
recruitment efforts. This endeavor also backfired as some of those members who experienced 
the harsh treatment in the UDF, discouraged other potential recruits from enlisting.1619 
Regular meetings to secure black recruits were also ineffective. The main reason was the 
suspicion blacks had towards government overtures as a result of the country’s political 
policies. The NAD concluded that the poor responses of blacks to propaganda efforts were 
                                                 
1615  NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 
March 1943, pp. 1-5. 
1616  See chapter 3. 
1617  See chapter 3. 
1618  See the listeners reactions reports, chapter 3. Specifically NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on 
Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. 
Richards, 17 August 1940, pp. 1-7; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Preliminary Report on Broadcasting 
for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 March 1943, pp. 1-5. 
1619  See Grundlingh, ‘The participation of the South African Blacks in the Second World War’, p. 58. 
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largely a result of the general apathy among blacks in the ongoing war.1620 Therefore, there 
was little they could do to change the situation. The Secretary for Native Affairs, Smit, failed 
to acknowledge that it was mainly due to the marginalisation of blacks from the political 
processes, their neglect after serving in the First World War, the racialised military service 
conditions and the accelerated black nationalism and agitations for equality, which rendered 
government propaganda efforts towards blacks ineffective. Therefore, irrespective of the 
kinds of platforms and methods utilised, government propaganda towards blacks had limited 
effect. 
 
Another war propaganda platform exploited was the printed media. The advantages of the 
printed media lay in diversity, range and visual impact. Authorities used a variety of printed 
media to generate public interest and to promote the country’s war effort, both in South 
Africa and abroad. In terms of preference, the printed media came second to radio because 
there was a degree of government control over the SABC due to its political oversight, but 
not over the press. The government and military authorities actually negotiated with 
newspaper editors to assist in publicity and propaganda campaigns regarding the Union’s war 
effort. Through the BOI and SAPA, the authorities would supply the news and photographs 
for publication in the press and would also place advertisements for recruitment. Yet, the 
agreement with the newspapers was voluntary and some of the papers, especially from the 
opposition, published articles which placed the country’s military forces or the war effort in a 
negative light. The government derived a limited advantage from the press and the control 
measures were inadequate to prevent the negative publicity. For example, although the 
material could be censored before the BOI submitted them to the newspapers, some papers 
could obtain information from interviewing soldiers on leave or from those who have been 
discharged. The anti-war press used such information to criticize the war policy and to 
inflame public opinion against the government. Still, the authorities derived some advantages 
because none of the papers had independent war correspondents with the UDF in the field, 
only the BOI and SAPA representatives were authorised to provide war news and 
photographic pictures.1621 
                                                 
1620  See chapter 3, NAD officials’s comments to reports about black reactions to war news service, NTS, 
9653, 520/400/9, War News for Natives, Smit to Richards, 21 August 1940; NTS, Box 9655, 
520/400/13, Concerning Native Broadcast, R. Erasmus to Smit, 23 September 1943. 
1621  See CGS (War), Box 197, 42/3, Director of Information’s Reply to General Theron, Wilson to Theron, 
11 May 1943; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Report on Military Publicity and Propaganda by Assistant 
Director of Public Relations, General Officer Administration, UDF Middle East Force, 22 February 
1944. 
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To counter the effect of the anti-war press, the BOI, the DMI (Ic) and even the UUTS, 
produced press summaries on daily basis to enable the authorities to manufacture counter-
statements against the public criticisms and allegations. The military authorities also applied 
censorship measures to prevent the anti-government papers from reaching the troops in the 
field and organised with the pro-war papers to supply their publications to the troops. This 
was in addition to the newspapers specifically produced and dedicated to the troops, for both 
whites and blacks. Newspapers were supplemented with dedicated military magazines, 
service journals and, for visual imagery, posters and war art. These press efforts, though, 
were constrained by the general lack of ‘action pictures’ which the authorities complained 
about frequently.1622 The main shortcomings with regard to the utilisation of the press for war 
propaganda had more to do with the BOI’s monopoly of news supply and pictures which 
drew criticisms from the defence authorities. The BOI was mostly criticised for having few 
war correspondents, for poor quality and selection of photographs, and for administrative 
inefficiency which resulted in delays regarding news supply to newspapers, especially to 
those in the countryside.1623  
 
Nonetheless, the press remained the most significant medium of war propaganda because of 
its variety, range and scope, and that one paper could be exchanged between several readers, 
thus making it a cheaper option. The newspapers, in particular, offered the government and 
military authorities the opportunity to conduct counter-propaganda against the negative 
publicity through elaborate press statements or by availing themselves for press interviews. 
On the other hand, the opposition movements produced their own publications which 
contested the terrain of wartime propaganda. But, those opposition papers were mainly in 
Afrikaans, and about half of them were pro-Union government and the war policy.1624 In 
terms of reach, authorities could therefore count on pro-government Afrikaans papers as well 
as English papers, which had the largest circulation, to facilitate the Union’s propaganda 
effort. 
 
                                                 
1622  See PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/7/5, DCS to ADPR, UDF Admin HQ, 16 December 1944; PP, Box 40, 
UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944;Malherbe Papers, 
File 438/1, KCM 56974 (553), Malherbe to Esselen, 16 October 1944. 
1623  See comments of the defence authorities in various reports and correspondences in chapter s 3 and 6. 
1624  See the categories and the circulation of the pro-war newspapers in the Union discussed in chapter 3. 
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In addition to the independent newspapers, there were a several pro-government publications 
such as Libertas and The Nongqai, which were dedicated to providing publicity for armed 
forces. These journals carried stories about the activities of the UDF, as units or profiled 
individuals, thus giving maximum exposure of the troops. Therefore these journals, heavily-
laden with the pro-war content, supplemented pro-war newspapers. The government also 
produced news sheets such as the EAForce/Springbok, and for blacks, the Ndlovu-Tlou as 
well as the Weekly News Bulletin and News of the War. These news sheets were dedicated to 
the war effort and played an important role in the mental stimulation of the troops. However, 
black soldiers did not really like Ndlovu-Tlou because the content was a reproduction of the 
Weekly News Bulletin, rendering the news stale to readers. The advantage of dedicated UDF 
papers was that the content was determined by government agencies: the BOI and the NAD 
for blacks. In the final analysis, the press, therefore, provided a larger coverage of South 
Africa’s propaganda effort and was also the strongest of the platforms that the government 
exploited. It could therefore be regarded as the most effective in terms flooding the public 
with war-related news. However, the lack of government-owned mainstream newspapers 
became a source of weakness, especially during the 1943 elections where it had to negotiate 
for space and pay for advertisements.1625 The opposition movements, especially the HNP, had 
their own newspapers dedicated to publicity and propaganda.1626 
 
Union authorities also utilised films for war propaganda. By the outbreak of the war in 1939, 
the film industry in South Africa had been developing for over four decades. At the time of 
crisis, as Thelma Gutsche noted, it was surprising that the government ‘did not see the 
necessity for films for politics’, but the opposition movements did.1627 For, as war ignited 
domestic tensions, extreme nationalists such as Dr Rompel, orchestrated the production of 
amateur films to promote Afrikaner culture. Opposition movements such as the 
Reddingsdaabond (Salvation Bond) facilitated the establishment of the VOBI and RARO 
film companies to promote Afrikaner culture amongst the white Afrikaans-speaking public in 
the Union.1628 Despite this, the Union government made no provision for exploiting films for 
propaganda purposes. It was left to the African Mirror, the weekly newsreel which presented 
                                                 
1625  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 262, Senator Conroy to J.W. Higgerty (MP), 19 January 1944; Smuts Papers, 
A1, vol. 262, Senator Conroy to Hofmeyr, 16 May 1944. 
1626  Die Vaderland (Transvaal), Die Transvaler (Transvaal), Die Burger (Western Cape), Die Oosterlig 
(Eastern Cape) and Die Volksblad (OFS). 
1627  Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, pp. 352, 370. 
1628  Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, pp. 264, 345; Keyan 
Tomaselli, Encountering Modernity, pp-8-9. 
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commercial advertisements, to produce ‘patriotic items and inspiring commentary’ in order to 
stimulate interest in the war. 
 
It took about nine months after the outbreak of the war, before the BOI could commission the 
African Films company to produce a short military film, Fighters in the Veld, to depict the 
country’s contribution in the war effort. According to Gutsche, the film was an edited series 
of documentaries by the African Mirror and made little impression in the country.1629 Many 
other war propaganda films were produced and exhibited thereafter, including the special 
instructional films produced by the UDF’s Film Unit which operated from December 
1940.1630 One weakness of the film propaganda, though, was the preponderance of the 
English language films produced, imported and circulated in the Union. After two years of 
the war, Dr Malherbe highlighted the disadvantages stemming from there, especially the 
point that white Afrikaans speakers were “marginalized” through those films.1631 According 
to Gutsche, there was “irritation” and “resentment” by the nationalist Afrikaners who derided 
the films. The situation was improved when the UUTS facilitated the production of Afrikaans 
propaganda films such as Noordwaarts, and exhibited them through their mobile cinemas 
across the Union.1632 The BOI thus followed suit from 1942, by re-editing the English 
material to the Afrikaans language and by using mobile cinemas for Afrikaans film 
exhibitions to rural communities.1633 
 
However, as it would be acknowledged by the authorities later, the film section of the 
Union’s war propaganda effort was the weakest. Part of the reason was that the authorities 
relied on the private film companies to produce films and they, in turn, were more concerned 
with the commercial productions for revenue purposes. The government did not have the film 
producing capacity – skilled manpower and technical equipment - to maximize the 
exploitation of films for war propaganda. Until April 1944, the film material intended for 
propaganda was handled by the BOI, with a limited number of cinematographers (two at the 
                                                 
1629  Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, p. 270. 
1630  AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/4, DCS to DMI, 5 October 1942; PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, 
Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 1942; AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, 
Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 1943. 
1631  Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (544), Recognition of the Afrikaans Element in Propaganda, 
Malherbe to Wilson, 14 February 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), 
Memorandum on Films for Publicity and Propaganda, 1941. 
1632  See UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942-30 June 1943; Gutsche, 
The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures, p. 371; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, 32. 
1633  See Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942. 
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most). The UDF’s Film and Photographic Unit under Clayton was also constrained as it had 
two cine operators, who also doubled-up to take still photographs with obsolete equipment, 
thus creating an inadequate coverage of the UDF outside South Africa. Hence the DMI (Ic)’s 
press liaison staff as well as Lindsay, the ADPR in the North, described the film dimension of 
the Union’s publicity and propaganda effort as “inadequate”, “weak” and “poor”.1634 
 
For blacks, films played an important amusement value, but failed to mobilise support for the 
war. The content was outdated and, as with radio broadcast, the messages were out of tune 
with black interests.1635 It was, however, black troops who benefited and enjoyed film 
exhibitions for entertainment purposes. The UDFI (YMCA and Toc House) played a major 
role in this regard, with the provision of film services to the troops in the Union and in east 
and north Africa. The Union troops, including NEAS members as well as members of the 
other Allied forces enjoyed free film shows provided by the mobile cinema vans. Films 
provided valuable psychological relief for troops in various military camps and in isolated 
areas and complemented the weaknesses of radio broadcast. 
 
With regard to UDF’s internal propaganda, authorities introduced the AES in February 
1941.1636 The need for implementing propaganda initiatives inside the military forces was 
contemplated in mid-1940, to improve the morale of the troops and for political education. In 
particular, the educational intervention was considered imperative to combat the reported 
restlessness among the troops and to create awareness among them regarding the Union’s 
cultural, political and economic assets that needed to be preserved. In addition to sustaining 
troop morale, the AES was also intended to prepare the troops for post-war tasks of educating 
other members of the public about the value of democratic citizenship.1637 The AES training 
programme, conducted at the Military College in Pretoria became a deliberate government 
effort to shape the mental outlook of the soldiers.  
 
However, the AES project encountered a number of problems once the scheme was 
established. Military operational requirements led to the sporadic attendance of lectures 
conducted by the IOs. The OCs also doubted the value of education within the military and 
                                                 
1634  See chapter 4, films and newsreels section. 
1635  See details in terms of film productions and scenarios in chapter 4. 
1636  See chapter 5. 
1637  See Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 3; 
See also details in the AES Bulletin, UHW, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the 
UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4. 
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were anxious about the potential disruptive effects on military discipline. But, as a result of 
the official support of the AES from Smuts and Van Ryneveld, the OCs cooperated. Though 
the IOs, who were also trained intelligence officers, could also assess the morale among the 
troops and intervene where possible, they could do nothing when it came to the policy-
induced troop frustrations. Their advice landed them in trouble with the senior authorities.1638  
 
In 1942, the AES was expanded to include the training of WAAF and WAAS. The graduate, 
called welfare- information officers (WIOs) combined both the social welfare services with 
education for citizenship to dedicated to the women due to their unique problems.1639 To 
NEAS members, the AES was never officially extended to them. Instead, the propaganda 
courses for black soldiers were organised by DNEAS in 1942, with the aim of countering 
subversive activities among them. The programme mainly emphasised the reasons for war 
and, more specifically, the negative implications of a Nazi victory. Political topics, just like 
with the radio broadcast service, were avoided.1640 
 
The AES represented a concerted propaganda effort by military officials to rationalise the 
Allied war effort, to develop consciousness about the political, economic and social 
challenges in South Africa. However, it had its weaknesses. Due to the large number of the 
troops, its reach was limited. Its liberal orientation failed to materialise beyond the war in 
South Africa.1641 The AES was a war measure of a short duration and its long term vision 
ended in 1948 when the National Party came to power. The avenue for liberal politics was 
closed with the NP’s implementation of the policy of apartheid. Dr Malherbe would concede 
later that the AES had minor influence on the consciousness of the army during the war.1642 
 
                                                 
1638  See Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the 
Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, 
Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education 
Services, 30 September 1945, p. 10-11. 
1639  See UWH, Box 162, Narep, Unfo 16, Units and Formations: History of WAAS Welfare (Information 
Service), 1940-1946, pp. 1-8; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare Information – 
WAAS, p. 1. 
1640  See DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. Antel, 26 
September 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Programme of Propaganda Courses Given to 
Native Military Corps, n.d. 
1641  See Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 174. 
1642  See Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (11), Malherbe to J. Rousseau, 3 January 1974. Italics 
indicate that Malherbe emphasised that point in the letter to Prof Rousseau. On the achievements and 
careers of the IOs, see Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 217-219. 
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As indicated, therefore, there were several weaknesses with regard to the main platforms, 
radio, press and films, which were utilised by the Union government for war propaganda. The 
government did not enjoy the monopoly over these platforms, especially the radio and the 
films. However, the agencies concerned with publicity and propaganda efforts continued with 
their general support for the government’s war policy and also provided assistance with 
regard to facilities and technical support. Hence, there were few disruptions and no collapse 
of the system for the duration of the war. There were, however, problems with regard to the 
actual responses from the public with regard to volunteering for military service. Indeed, 
irrespective of employing multiple propaganda platforms – radio, the press, films, rallies and 
military demonstrations – to persuade the public to enlist for military service or for war 
production, this goal of war propaganda could not be fully realised. 
 
RECRUITMENT PROPAGANDA 
 
As shown in the previous sections, the Union’s mobilisation efforts basically started from the 
lowest base and the need for manpower was urgent. As Martin and Orpen emphasise, ‘unlike 
machines, men could not be rapidly produced, ready for action, nor could they be 
imported’.1643 Many UDF units were understrength. Out of the estimated total population of 
ten million, the defence authorities were concerned about the potential number of military age 
recruits they could obtain. From the total population, about 500, 000 eligible white males, at 
least 143 000 was required.1644 Shortfalls were expected as a result of the impact of the anti-
war propaganda and due to penultimate line at the bottom, “medial unfitness” or involvement 
in key civil occupations or industries. 
 
In September 1939, according to the figures provided by the defence authorities, the UDF 
found itself with some 20, 000 odd regular force and some 100, 000 odd reserve force 
members.1645 It was way below the required establishment. With Hitler’s commencement of 
the German blitzkrieg, events in Europe turning worse for the Allies, South Africa had no 
                                                 
1643  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 63. 
1644  See chapter 3, specifically the manpower estimates, SANDFA, UWH, Box 88, MS 22, CGS to 
Chairman of Defence Advisory Committee and Chairman of Defence Authorities Committee, 2 
October 1940; CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 
1940. 
1645  See UWH, Box 88, MS 22, Organisation of UDF for War, 2 October 1940; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, 
Statement of Local Military Position of 7th September 1939, pp.1- 13; CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The 
Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940, pp. 1-2. 
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single division ready to be deployed for active service. There were teething problems. These 
included military forces having to be built from the ground, the impact of anti-war hostility 
from Afrikaner nationalists, refusal by some UDF members to serve ‘anywhere in Africa’ and 
the impact of German propaganda on the progress of recruitment.1646 
 
Until then, South Africa had neither organised publicity and propaganda system nor policy. 
Government supporters, individually or through their organisations, encouraged the 
authorities to take propaganda seriously in order to expedite recruitment. The DMI also 
implored the senior officials to add propaganda as an imperative in the list of factors required 
in the appreciation of the war.1647 Until December 1940, with Lawrence’s establishment of 
the National Advisory Committee on Government Publicity1648, three organisations, the BOI, 
DMI (Ic), UUTS, had been engaged in propaganda efforts, but mostly in an independent 
manner.Hence, there was no concerted and general propaganda framework to guide their 
activities and coordination of their efforts.1649 This resulted in overlaps and clashes over 
jurisdiction and authority in delivering propaganda. By 1941, the DMI (Ic) was still 
complaining about the ‘confused propaganda arising out of the absence of policy’ and the 
seemingly “official policy” of ‘soft pedal recruiting to protect labour’.1650 It was confirmation 
that the South African publicity and propaganda efforts, as far as recruiting was concerned, 
had not been going well. 
 
Smuts and other senior government and military officials made patriotic appeals to the public 
to support the government to fight for the preservation of the rights, freedoms and justice in a 
righteous war against ‘the rule of force’.1651 Various forms of mass media were exploited to 
evoke emotions, calling for sacrifice, honour and duty, to safeguard the liberties and heritage 
threatened by Nazism. However, the enthusiasm and rush of recruits did not materialise as it 
                                                 
1646  See UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1940. 
1647  See SANDFA, UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1940. 
1648  Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 58, National Advisory Committee on Publicity, 6 January 1941; CGS 
(War), Box 43, 10/7, Deputy Director of Recruiting to the Defence Authorities Committee, 3 January 
1941. 
1649  See the criticisms from military intelligence, specifically PP, Box 57, PR 3/4, Memorandum on the 
Scope and Work of (DMI) I.C.(iii), by Lt J.E. Sacks, 6 August 1940; PP, Box 59, PR 7/2/1, Military 
Counter-Propaganda on the Home-Front, Ic to DDMI, n.d; PP, Box 59, PR 7/2/1, Suggested Measures 
for Countering Subversive Propaganda in South Africa, by Lt J.E. Sacks (Ic), 17 September 1940. 
1650  See PP, Box 57, PR 3/1, Points to be Considered in any Reorganisation of Propaganda, Ic to DDMI, 4 
August 1941. 
1651  See Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 303/1, Speeches and Broadcast by J.C. Smuts, Nos. 127 - 134, November 
1939 - December 1941; UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, 
Broadcast by a General Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft 
Artillery, 5 June 1941. 
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was hoped. In contrast, the UDF had been losing men due to the introduction of the Africa 
Oath and later the General Service Oath.1652 Because recruitment was not improving and 
there was constant shortage of manpower, in September 1940, the director of recruiting 
Werdmuller, arranged for the optimisation of the publicity and propaganda avenues – the 
press, radio, visiting churches, attending community gatherings and social events, and 
undertaking recruiting marches and loudspeaker vans to enhance recruitment efforts.1653 
Between November 1940 and October 1941, the well-publicised military mobile recruiting 
columns traversed the Union and the neighbouring countries to exhibit military hardware, to 
inspire the public and to appeal for recruits. The tours were often well attended by crowds 
and also facilitated interaction between the military and the public. These secured more 
recruits at the time.1654 However, the general manpower shortage continued to plague the 
authorities. Martin and Orpen indicate that ‘manpower shortage’ was a ‘perennial problem’, 
and the CGS had to inform the war committee that ‘it should seldom be necessary to 
discharge anybody as medically unfit … men were therefore to be retained in the service up 
to the limit of their capacity to serve’.1655 
 
The problem of persistent manpower shortage was attributed to the population “with a 
peculiar split of loyalties” – mainly between the pro-war and the anti-war factions.1656 In 
particular, it was the impact of the anti-war resistance which kept many white men out of 
military service. It was a similar situation with the recruitment results of women – mostly 
disappointing.1657 As far as the recruitment propaganda employed towards blacks, success 
was also limited. Authorities exploited various mechanisms for recruitment propaganda such 
as appeals by chiefs, native commissioners, returning NMC members, poster displays, 
newspaper advertisements, mobile film vans and military demonstrations. However, in terms 
of the goal of obtaining as many recruits as possible, there was limited responsiveness from 
blacks. A recurring concern was the prohibition to carry firearms and differentiated service 
                                                 
1652  See the controversies around the Africa Oath and the Orange Flash in chapters 2, 3 and 6. 
1653  See CGS (War), Box 207, VI, 45/4, Military Recruiting Tours, Werdmuller to the AG, October 1940. 
1654  See recruiting figures, specifically, CGS (War), Box 210, VIII, 45/8, Analysis of Recruiting Figures, 
Diagrams and Graphs, 1941-1945. 
1655  See Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 104-106. 
1656  See Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 104-106. 
1657  See chapter 3 for details, specifically, Malherbe Papers, File 143/2, KCM 56992 (16), General Report: 
Recruiting Tour undertaken through Northern and Eastern Transvaal by Lt J. Malherbe, 18 December 
1941; ‘Disappointing Response by Women in Pretoria’, Rand Daily Mail, 30 August 1940. ‘Recruiting 
of Women Disappointing’, Rand Daily Mail, 30 March 1942. 
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conditions. In view of the prevailing government policies, propaganda efforts towards blacks 
could not be useful.1658 
 
1942 was a disaster in the country’s history. Allied forces under Major General Klopper 
surrendered Tobruk to Major General Rommel in June, with South Africa losing the whole 
Division (over 10 000 troops). All sorts of criticism against the government emerged.1659 In 
reaction to that disaster, the Union authorities launched an intensive recruitment campaign to 
replace the losses incurred at Tobruk. Funds were made available for recruitment efforts 
(£22, 000) and the ‘Avenge Tobruk’ campaign was waged five days later after the surrender 
of the garrison.1660 Smuts took the lead and appealed for 7 000 men to replace the losses. A 
massive publicity campaign followed, inducing the public to enlist in various military units 
required in war service: field artillery, corps of signals, tank corps and infantry.1661 In 
addition, meetings were organised, interactions with wives, mothers and the relatives of 
serving men were arranged, and stories of sacrifices and achievements of soldiers were told 
in order to try to generate a combative spirit within the public. In a very recent article, S. 
Chetty provides an interesting examination of the recruitment films which were produced 
after the Tobruk disaster to enhance the propaganda efforts. 
 
One film in particular, Fall In, produced by Union Films, appealed to the South African 
public to increase their support for the country’s participation in the war. The main emphasis 
was to denigrate the Italo-German forces as the ‘gangsters and criminals’ who did not respect 
war conventions and devastated “innocent” nations with bombs.1662 According to Chetty, the 
war was localised by presenting the UDF as the “police” and their Axis enemies as 
“criminals” who needed to be stopped far away from the Union borders.1663 As in all other 
                                                 
1658  See the criticisms from Dr Audrey Richards, Hugh Tracy and the SAIRR trio of Dr Kuper, B. Vilakazi 
and E. Westphal discussed in the chapter 3 – Radio Broadcast to Natives. 
1659  See censorship reports, CGS (War), Box 207, VI 45/5, Tobruk, 27 June 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 
50, I. 44.(E), Memorandum Regarding Public Reaction to the Fall of Tobruk and Mersa Mantruh, 7 
July 1942. 
1660  HEN 2191, 432/1/13, vol. 2, Memorandum on Government Publicity and Propaganda, 27 November 
1943; CGS (War), Box 207, VI 45/5, ‘Avenge Tobruk’ Recruiting Drive, Director of Recruiting to all 
Recruiting Officers, 29 June 1942; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 158-160. 
1661  See SANDFA, Army Intelligence, Box 20, I.20. (A), Recruiting Publicity Campaign, Deputy Chief of 
Staff to General Officer Administration, UDF, Middle East, 17 October 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 
20, I.20. (A), Broadcast by Major-General Dan Pienaar, 20 November 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 
20, I.20. (A), Training for the Guns, Broadcast by 2nd Lt H.T Hoernle of South African Artillery, 10 
December 1942. 
1662  S. Chetty, ‘Imagining National Unity: South African Propaganda Efforts during the Second World 
War’, Kronos, vol. 38, no. 1, 2012, pp. 106-130. 
1663  Chetty, ‘Imagining National Unity’, p. 118. 
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appeals, the emphasis in the message of Fall In was on the threat posed by the Axis to South 
Africa’s safety and the risk to her freedom. If the Union did not provide the required recruits, 
the disaster of Tobruk could befall the country, and the sacrifices of those captured would 
have been in vain. Thus, more men were requested to enlist for military service in order to 
ensure the speedy conclusion of the war and the safe return of the Tobruk prisoners of 
war.1664 Until the end of 1942, the constant message of avenging Tobruk campaign was the 
appeal to the sympathy and national patriotism or using “guilt” to instigate public support.  
 
In this respect, the post-Tobruk campaign proved successful. From June to September 1942, 
the monthly intake was about 2, 030 recruits.1665 The number of recruits was considerably 
higher than expected. Early in 1943, instead of the 7000 troops required, about 12 000 
recruits had reportedly enlisted.1666 The rush of recruits was not expected to be sustained 
during 1943. In the comments about recruiting, it was projected that, following the trends of 
1941 to 1942, excluding the effects of the Tobruk Drive, the intake in 1943 was likely to be 
considerably lower.1667 Indeed, the estimations were proven to be correct. During the period 
from February to November 1943, the average weekly intake declined from 325 in 1942 to 
113.1668 In assessing the reasons for the general lack of recruits, Werdmuller visited about 
thirteen centres in the Union and found that there was too much complacency: sporting 
games, racing competitions and general entertainment was taking place normally while the 
country was at war.1669 Upon further investigation, there was also what was called a 
‘misapplication of ability’, artisans being used as barmen, ship repair specialists used as 
switchboard attendants and machine-tool operators doing paint work.1670 These problems 
resulted in limited public enthusiasm and indifferent morale among serving troops. 
 
In spite of the changed propaganda strategy which appealed more to personal motivations 
such as better pay or economic opportunities, by 1943, there was a definite decline in 
                                                 
1664  Chetty, Imagining National Unity, p. 121. 
1665  See CGS (War), Box 210, 45/8, Recruiting and Wastage Figures, Tobruk Recruiting Drive, 17 
November 1942. 
1666  See AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2, Proposed Establishment, Sub-Section Director of Military 
Intelligence, 14 January 1943. 
1667  See CGS (War), Box 210, 45/8, Comments on Tobruk Recruiting Drive, 17 November 1942. 
1668  See CGS (War), Box 210, 45/8, Recruiting Figures, 6 November 1943. 
1669  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 159. 
1670  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 160. 
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recruitment numbers and morale was also low.1671 The recruitment of blacks, which had been 
‘going very badly’ for the government, was stopped in March 1943, probably due to the 
prevailing view in certain government quarters that ‘the war would soon be over’.1672 The 
situation of low recruitment numbers continued during 1944 and 1945, despite the 
introduction of direct radio transmissions to the Union to keep the public closer to the war. 
The goal of securing volunteers for military service was partly successful, mainly in terms of 
sustaining the country’s continued participation in the war - then later through the exploits of 
the 6th SA Armored Division (which also experienced chronic manpower shortage). 
 
Thus, in terms of numbers at the outbreak of the war, the original military strength was about 
20, 000 men, but by August 1941, the strength had increased to 130, 000 trained men. In June 
1943, the figure stood at 169, 000 white men and women and 102, 000 NEAS members. By 
1945, the total number of the UDF members was about 330, 000 volunteers, with 190, 000 
being white males.1673 The NEAS volunteers were about 123, 000 in total, with 76, 000 being 
members of the NMC.1674 The deduction can be made that, from where South Africa had 
started in 1939, there was marked improvement in the strength of the UDF by the middle of 
the war. It was estimated that one in every three males had enlisted.1675 The authorities were 
satisfied on one hand, and complained about manpower shortage in the various military units 
on the other. 
 
Although the numbers appeared to be almost half of eligible white males, many of them 
remained in the Union to contain the anti-war elements. But, the shortage of manpower 
remained a persistent problem throughout the war. Therefore, if one takes into account that 
there was an estimated total 1.2 million males of military age, and only about 300, 000 
volunteers were obtained, it was a low return. However, the fact that there was “no military 
                                                 
1671  UKZN, Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in 
the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; SANDFA, Archives of the 
Quartermaster General (QMG), Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; 
‘Opportunities for Women: What the Army has to Offer’, The Star, 8 July 1942; Chetty, Imagining 
National Unity, p. 125. 
1672  Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, pp. 85-87; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at 
War, vol. 7, p. 160. 
1673  See UWH, Box 240, B.I. 2, The South African Armed Forces at War, pp. 1-6, 20 January 1944; A. 
Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War, pp. 241-242; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 
1; Gleeson, The Unknown Force, p. 148; Spies and Liebenberg, South Africa in the 20th Century, p. 
277. 
1674  Gleeson, The Unknown Force, p. 148; Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, pp. 85-
87. 
1675  See UWH, Box 240, B.I. 2, The South African Armed Forces at War, pp. 1-6, 20 January 1944; 
Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War, pp. 241-242. 
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force” at the beginning of the war, success was therefore modest. And also, the increase in 
the strength of the UDF was attributed mostly to the “robust” propaganda drive, especially 
the mobile tours, and others.1676 Thus, one of the propaganda goals achieved some limited 
success, especially given that the recruitment records corresponded with the number of 
recruits obtained after a recruitment drive.1677 But for blacks, out of the estimated 600, 000, 
and only 76, 000 enlisting, it was worse as a proportion, and propaganda in this regard can be 
viewed as having failed to provide much of a service inducement.1678 In all categories, in any 
event, volunteering for military service was equally motivated by factors such as economic 
necessity, peer pressure, adventure and patriotic fervor, and not necessarily due to war 
propaganda.1679 
 
PUBLIC AND MILITARY MORALE 
 
On the basis of the available records, it would not be possible to construct a complete picture 
regarding the impact of propaganda on the state of national morale during wartime South 
Africa. It should noted that, there was no concerted effort during the war to ascertain the level 
of morale, but merely a survey conducted by intelligence officials who were trying to 
determine the level and extent of the threat to national security. Of more value, though, were 
the censorship summaries gleaned from correspondences which gave some insights into the 
feelings and opinions of the public. However, those summaries focused more on reporting 
about the outgoing letters to the troops, either in the Union or in the field, and the likely 
impact of the contents on troop morale. In 1943, an attempt at producing a consolidated 
report on morale was done, but it was only concerned with feelings and opinions of troops. 
That notwithstanding, it would still be useful to examine these surveys and reports which 
were generated during the war in order to gain some perspective on the mood of the nation at 
that time. 
 
                                                 
1676  Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War, pp. 241-242; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 
30-31. 
1677  See CGS (War), Box 210, 45/8, Recruiting and Wastage Figures, Tobruk Recruiting Drive, 17 
November 1942; Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War, pp. 241-242; Roos, 
Ordinary Springboks, pp. 30-31. 
1678  Gleeson, The Unknown Force, p. 148; Grundlingh, The Participation of South African Blacks, pp. 85-
87. 
1679  Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 30-31; Gleeson, The Unknown Force, p. 148; Grundlingh, The 
Participation of South African Blacks, pp. 85-87; Spies and Liebenberg, South Africa in the 20th 
Century, p. 277. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
305 
 
The question of morale had been the most problematic for South Africa. As discussed in 
chapter 1, the internal security and stability of the country was threatened by intensified 
subversive activities perpetuated by the ethno-nationalistic Afrikaner section of the 
population, which was hostile to Smuts’s war policy. At the time, Nazi propaganda had 
penetrated the country and was persistently undermining national confidence and morale 
through the Zeesen broadcast. In response, the government devised a propaganda strategy 
which was intended to facilitate the conversion of the white Afrikaans-speakers from their 
pro-Nazi bias to a positive attitude towards the government’s war policy and to instil a belief 
in them about the morality of the cause pursued by South Africa and the Allied powers.1680 
Consequently, as the effects of Nazi propaganda were felt in the various sectors of the 
country’s population1681, the authorities employed a counter-propaganda strategy, of 
refutation against Zeesen statements, and the justification of the government policies. This 
strategy also entailed the pursuit of the philosophy of “truthful propaganda”, which required 
accurate factual information (political, social and economic), to counter the inaccuracies and 
distortions of the facts by the opponents. It was considered necessary at the time to create a 
platform from which to build national goodwill and to facilitate the mobilisation of public 
opinion favourable to the Union government’s policies. 
 
However, this strategy was not effective as the reports continued to reflect the decline of 
national morale due to the escalation of the anti-war activism.1682 Thwaites, then the DMI, 
indicated that ‘much has been accomplished since the Union made up its mind to reply to 
Zeesen, but there is a tremendous leeway to be made up … the enemies of the Government’s 
war policy had a flying start and it [was] difficult to make up the leeway’.1683 The military 
also considered the refutation strategy as ineffective. It was indicated that radio, the most 
powerful propaganda instrument then, was weakened by ‘the defence and justification’ 
approach for short duration, instead of a continuous commentary and emphasis on favourable 
news regarding the ‘inevitably victorious end of the war’.1684 Government loyalists were also 
not satisfied with the initial radio broadcast and wrote to the authorities requesting an 
                                                 
1680  See Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 
September 1939; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.4, Notes of the Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee 
on Publicity, 5 October 1939; Smuts Papers, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on 
Publicity, 8 November 1939. 
1681  For details of Nazi propaganda and its effects, see chapter 1. 
1682  See Union’s intelligence reports and security assessments in chapter 1. 
1683  See UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 25 November 1939. 
1684  See Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (J), Memorandum on the Stimulation of Recruiting in South 
Africa, R. Jordaan to DMI, 11 May 1941. 
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intensification and diversification of the propaganda efforts in view of the growing anti-war 
resistance.1685 Changes were implemented in December 1940, when the broadcast programme 
of the BOI was expanded to include talks by the Union’s panel of experts in the various fields 
to educate the public about the country’s social, cultural, religious, political (civil liberties 
and democratic freedoms) and economic assets which needed to be protected and 
preserved.1686 This was regarded as positive propaganda and it was deemed necessary to 
improve on that service. Also, the Union government’s principle of voluntary military service 
also contributed towards breaking the opposition’s influence as no one was forced to serve in 
the war, but merely appealed to the population’s sense of patriotism to defend the country’s 
interests. This approach reduced the risk of negative publicity and the potential repercussions 
on the public and military morale. There are other factors to consider, which also had a 
bearing on national morale. These were captured by the American sociologist, Lasswell, 
when he wrote in 1938 that, ‘during war, much reliance must be placed on propaganda to 
promote the economy of food, textiles, fuel and other commodities’.1687 Thus, as much as it 
was necessary to obtain recruits, it was equally important to assure the public about the 
economic power of the country to sustain the population and still be able to contribute to the 
war effort. To this end, authorities employed economic propaganda.1688 But the actual 
economic realities in the country contradicted such efforts. 
 
Like all the other belligerents in the war, South Africa also employed the rationing of 
resources such as paper, fuel and foodstuffs, and the public complained about the 
shortages.1689 Through the use of economic intelligence summaries, the government made 
pronouncements in the print media, radio and via films, exalting the productive capacity, the 
economic strength and the abundance of resources of the country and her allies (British 
                                                 
1685  ‘A Call for Union Unity for Freedom, Truth and Democracy’, Rand Daily Mail, 14 October 1939; PP, 
Box 57, PR 3/5, Suggestions for Propaganda Department under Military Control, by Mr John B. Bruce 
of Johannesburg to DDMI, 13 September 1940; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 247, Thawkery? To Smuts, 27 
June 1940. 
1686  See UWH, Box 273, B.I. 25, Broadcast by ‘Panel Speakers’, 21 June 1941. 
1687  Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War, p. 9. 
1688  See specifically PP, Box 58, EC 17, Economic Propaganda: Subversive Activities, 1941-1945; PP, Box 
57, EC 38, Economic Propaganda: Intelligence Summaries, 1941-1945; PP, Box 57, EC 6; Economic 
Comparison: Germany, Italy, Britain, USA, April 1941; PP, Box 57, EC 28, South Africa’s War Effort: 
Economic Material by DMI (Ic), 9 January 1942; ‘The Economic War’, Current Affairs, vol. 6, 
February 1942, issued by the Middle East Branch of Army Bureau Current Affairs (ABCA), GHQ, 
Middle East Force, pp. 4-12; PP, Box 57, EC 6, Reuters: Economic Service, Commercial Bulletin, 7 
January to 4 March 1942. 
1689  See Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 152, On The South African Food and Agricultural Situation, 1942; HEN, 
Box 2190, 432/1/12, Weekly Newsletter: Cost of Living, Report, 19 March 1944. 
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Commonwealth and the USA), whilst down-playing those of the Axis.1690 The military 
mobile recruiting tours also served the economic propaganda value through the display of 
war materials produced in the Union’s industries. Thus, for the purposes of the war, the 
government’s propaganda presented an optimistic perspective, particularly since the country 
was geographically removed from the war zone. But, in terms of satisfying the daily needs of 
the population, propaganda could not help. The effects of rationing and shortages of regular 
supplies such as milk, butter, eggs, meat, maize, bread, vegetables as well as cloth and the 
housing shortages, soon elicited criticisms against the government as being unable to 
adequately provide for its population.1691 This aspect was however not too high on the 
authorities’ agenda, which proved to be their undoing after the war. The concern of the 
authorities was more about political warfare. (This point is highlighted below, in the section 
on the 1943 elections, where the war policy was a decisive factor). 
 
From 1940, with the seemingly successful German military operations against the Allies in 
Europe, anti-government agitations escalated in anticipation of obtaining favourable peace 
terms after the defeat of Britain (Union’s ally), of which the prize was the Afrikaner republic. 
The public expressed outrage at the government’s “tolerance” of the anti-war elements and 
their activities.1692 In 1941, an intelligence officer motivated for the intensification of 
propaganda effort in this manner: 
 
An attempt should be made to switch hostile districts into friendly areas, and to turn the 
scales against Nationalist and pro-Nazi agents who [were] poisoning the public mind without 
anyone checking their progress. Government supporters [were] not kept sufficiently informed 
with daily happenings and developments to counteract or contradict the campaign of calumny 
which [was] freely indulged in by the outspoken supporters of Nazi-ism. What [was] needed 
was propaganda, more propaganda and still more propaganda…1693 
 
                                                 
1690  See PP, Box 57, EC 1, Report on the Interview with Professor S.H. Frankel in Connection with Co-
operation in Collecting Economic Information for Propaganda Purposes, by Lt Sacks, 16 August 1940; 
PP, Box 57, EC 1, Economic Warfare and Propaganda, 27 January 1941; UWH, Box 91, MS 71, Radio 
Broadcasting, Wilson to Collyer, 11 January 1941; UWH, Box 239, B.I. 2, South Africa at War, 14 
October 1941; UWH, Box 240, B.I. 2, The South African Armed Forces at War, 20 January 1944. 
1691  See Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 304/2, General Smuts’s Speech at the Union Congress of the United Party, 
Bloemfontein, 6 December 1944, pp. 3-6. See particularly Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, p. 139. 
1692  See chapter 1. 
1693  CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 26 February 1941. 
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It was one of the many reports which expressed frustration with the apparent manner in 
which anti-war elements were carrying on with their subversive activities without any 
meaningful response on the side of the government. It also implied that the existing 
government propaganda actions were not reaching the public as much as they should have 
been. On 24 February 1942, another intelligence official produced a disconcerting censorship 
report about the low level of civilian morale. It indicated that there was growing 
‘despondency, disappointment, nerviness and discouragement’ which was expressed in the 
letters of the relatives of the serving men, thus, in turn affecting the morale of the troops. 
These ‘demoralising and disheartening’ statements, noted the report, were attributed to the 
impact of the OB activism, and there were also doubts about the ‘veracity of the Press and 
radio’ as well as about the country’s ability to win the war.1694 The report summed up the 
deterioration of civilian morale, despondency and a sense of defeatism in three words: 
‘bewilderment, distrust and fear’.1695 
 
The confusion was created by the optimistic use of propaganda in exaggerating the military 
exploits of the Allies, for example, the press and radio reports about the ‘inevitable 
destruction of General Rommel’s army … enclosed in a ring of steel’, then suddenly, 
‘Rommel’s remarkable recovery’, or the ‘invincibility of Singapore … fighting to the last 
men’, then, her surrender to Japan.1696 It produced doubt, confusion and also the fear within 
the public of the threat from Japan to the Union via the Indian Ocean. The implication of this 
report was that propaganda was “untrue” because it was contradicted by the events. It also 
meant that it would be increasingly difficult to counter the opposition propaganda if 
government information was exaggerated. It was therefore suggested that, ‘all publicity 
reports should refrain from over-optimism, that news should be swift, truthful and 
unambiguous so that shocks can be anticipated’, not the “rosy pictures” about the imminent 
obliteration of the enemy. This report shows that public morale was affected negatively by 
the internal security threats and the military setbacks encountered by the Allied forces. It was 
therefore difficult for propaganda to refute the facts about the military setbacks. Hence, after 
the disaster of Tobruk in June 1942, the morale was very low1697, and the propaganda 
campaign focused on gaining public sympathy in order to obtain recruits. Even though public 
                                                 
1694  Army Intelligence, Box 46, CE 2/15, Low Level of Morale on the Home Front, 24 February 1942. 
1695  Army Intelligence, Box 46, CE 2/15, Low Level of Morale on the Home Front, 24 February 1942. 
1696  Army Intelligence, Box 46, CE 2/15, Low Level of Morale on the Home Front, 24 February 1942. 
1697  See CGS (War), Box 207, VI 45/5, Tobruk, 27 June 1942; SANDFA, Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 
44.(E), Memorandum Regarding Public Reaction to the Fall of Tobruk and Mersa Mantruh, 7 and 11 
July 1942. 
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morale was low, the response to the recruitment campaign exceeded expectations. This could 
be attributed to the public anger and fear of the implications of the ultimate German victory. 
The government had been doing its utmost to play up the Nazi threat to the country’s 
independence and liberties, through films and newsreels which showed the devastations 
caused by bombings.1698 
 
By 1943, public moral had slackened. This was attributed to complacency and war weariness, 
and not by military setbacks.1699 Ironically, the Allied forces were enjoying military successes 
and the Axis forces were driven out of Africa by May 1943.1700 As discussed above, by 1944-
1945, government propaganda efforts, by means of direct radio transmissions from Rome, 
were still attempting to invigorate enthusiasm about the war, particularly in praising the role 
of the 6th SA Armoured Division in contributing towards the military victories of the Allied 
forces in Italy.1701 As Dr Malherbe pointed out, the main reason for propaganda by then was 
to build up the image of a ‘common soldier as a hero in the minds of the South African 
public’.1702 The focus, therefore, was on the post-war situation and the need to ‘minimise 
disruptions’ brought about by the six years of war.1703 At the time, especially from 1943 
onwards, the public was more concerned about the social and economic reconstruction and 
wondering how the government was going to respond to the situation after the war.1704 
 
Apart from the impact of the despondent letters from the relatives at home or the subversive 
rumours spread through the anonymous letters1705, there was a decline in the morale among 
                                                 
1698  See chapter 4. 
1699  See Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the 
Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, 
Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; See also Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 159-
160; Chetty,‘Imagining National Unity’, pp. 121-125. 
1700  See Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, Smuts to Gillett, 21 June 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, Smuts to 
Gillett, 4 July 1943; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, chapters 15 and 16; Roos, 
Ordinary Springboks, chapter 6. 
1701  See J. Bourhill, Come Back to Portofino: Through Italy with the 6th South African Armoured Division 
(30 Degrees South, Johannesburg, 2011); E. Kleynhans, The First South African Amoured Battle in 
Italy during the Second World War: The Battle of Celleno – 10 June 1944, Scientia Militaria, vol. 40, 
no. 3, 2012, pp. 250-279; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, chapters 15 and 23. 
1702  UKZN, Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (553), Malherbe to Esselen, 16 October 1944. 
1703  See Chetty, ‘Imagining National Unity’, pp. 128-129.  
1704  See Smuts Paper, A1, vol. 261, Private Letters, Smuts to Gillett, 11 and 31 July 1943; QMG, Group 1, 
Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 304/2, General 
Smuts’s Speech at the Union Congress of the United Party, Bloemfontein, 6 December 1944, published 
by United Party, Pretoria, 1944, pp. 3-8. 
1705  War Diaries (WD) vol. 1, Box 296, Military Censorship Summary, East Africa Force Headquarters, 20 
February 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (861), Anonymous Letters to Soldiers and 
their Relatives, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to Director of Information (Bureau), 
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the troops due to the military and administrative policies. In a memorandum compiled by 
Captain Janie Malherbe in August 1942, a number of military policy-related factors 
impacting on morale were exposed. Dissatisfactions within the UDF arose as a result of the 
stagnation in camps, lack of troops movements, inappropriate utilisation of troops, denial or 
delays of leave applications, delays in pay allowances or approval of requests, monotonous 
military life, discriminatory service conditions (mainly for blacks) and concerns about the 
post-war situation.1706 A more elaborate report on military morale, titled ‘Memorandum on 
Apathy in the U.D.F. Towards the War’, was produced twelve months later, on 25 August 
1943, by the DMI.1707 
 
That report revealed that, widespread apathy towards the war, both in the UDF and in the 
civilian population, was a result of war ‘weariness, irritation and boredom’ about the war 
which, by then, was in the fourth year. People were interested in personal difficulties such as 
housing problems, cost of living, lack of supplies, inflation, plight of the poor, food shortage 
and general economic insecurity. Furthermore, the memorandum also stated that ‘the 
remoteness of the war from South Africa, and the removal of any direct threat to the country’ 
were reasons for the apparent state of national apathy. These factors were of a general nature 
and applied mainly to the civilian population. The UDF members were unhappy about the 
dull and unrealistic training routines, the defence policy whereby promotions were frozen and 
the uncertainty about the future of the UDF.1708 
 
Another policy matter that created dissatisfaction within the UDF, was the introduction of the 
General Service Oath (Blue Oath – service anywhere in the war) in 1943. Just as the Africa 
Oath of 1940, it generated hostilities between those who took in and those who did not.1709 
The distinction between men who served in the North and those who did not, also generated 
ill-feeling among the troops.1710 Other factors which militated against troop morale were 
issues related to service conditions, salaries and allowances, leave, promotions, transfers and 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 March 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (860), False Reports Spread Among 
Soldiers and their Relatives, DMO and I to CGS, 31 March 1941. 
1706  Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army 
at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942. 
1707  SANDFA, QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943. 
1708  SANDFA, QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943. 
1709  SANDFA, QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943. 
1710  See QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; Martin and Orpen, 
South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 223-229. 
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movements.1711 These problems were acutely felt by the NMC members, some of whom 
reacted by committing various offenses such as absent without leave, drunkenness, “losing” 
military articles and clothing (trousers, vests, boots, helmets, shirts, belts, Haversack, towels, 
spoons, coats and water bottles), in a deliberate contravention of the military disciplinary 
code.1712 
 
As a result of the above factors, it was difficult for the IOs to lift the morale of the troops 
when the problems lay with the government policies and the administrative inefficiencies. 
The sensitivity and seriousness of the matter forced Dr Malherbe to issue instructions that the 
report on the low troop morale was highly classified and should be ‘kept under lock and key, 
in suitable custody or destroyed by fire if not required for records’.1713 In fact, the 
manifestation of dissatisfactions within the UDF became explosive in August 1945, when 
disillusioned troops rioted at Helwan camp in Egypt, hurling an assortment of objects and 
breaking windows, due to their frustrations at the ‘maladministration of the repatriation 
issue’, overcrowding and the failure to expedite the demobilisation process.1714 Authorities 
acknowledged their inadequacies and more facilities as well as sports equipment were 
provided to the camp. There was also an improvement in the repatriation efforts by the 
authorities, though on a limited scale due to shortage of transport, to ‘bring the boys 
home’.1715 The riots at Helwan were a demonstration of the level of disillusionment that had 
been setting in among the troops, and also within the civilian population, with regard to the 
Smuts administration. Before then, the government had been convinced that the policies they 
pursued were supported by the population. This view was produced by the results of the 
general elections of 1943, where the UP, in an apparent endorsement of its war policy, 
                                                 
1711  See reports on morale, UKZN, Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors 
Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; QMG, 
Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; DNEAS Group 2, Box 20, NAS 
3/42, Treatment and General Welfare of Members of None-Europeans of NMC Battalions and Units, 3 
July 1940 – 28 August 1944. 
1712  See World War 2 Diaries, vol. 1, Box 101, D1-4 (88), Offenses and Punishment Report, Lt Col G.K. 
Mackensie, 2nd Battallion NMC, Oribi Camp, November to December 1942; DNEAS Group 2, Box 20, 
NAS 3/42, Treatment and General Welfare of Members of None-Europeans of NMC Battalions and 
Units, 3 July 1940 – 28 August 1944. 
1713  QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, Summary, Malherbe to Mitchel-Baker, 16 
September 1943. 
1714  ‘Pool Appalled by Helwan Riots;, Rand Daily Mail, 29 August 1945; ‘Court Reports on Main Causes 
of Helwan Riots’, Rand Daily Mail, 25 October 1945; ‘Court’s Findings on Disturbances at Helwan’, 
The Star, 24 October 1945; ‘Riot Warning at Helwan’, The Star, 7 November 1945. See also Roos, 
Ordinary Springboks, chapter 6. 
1715  Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 101-102. 
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defeated the opposition movements. This perspective requires further examination, especially 
in the context of the mistaken belief that the population was “happy” with the government. 
 
Towards the end of 1942, the UP-led government contemplated the holding of general 
elections. Within the government’s publicity and propaganda structures, it was felt that if the 
elections were to be held, ‘there should be no suggestion of hesitancy on the part of the 
government of the outcome of the General Elections’.1716 The general thought was that, the 
government must display confidence and not be afraid to ‘go to the people [for support] so 
that it proceeds with its great task of winning the war’.1717 According to legislation, the 
period of the Union parliament’s House of Assembly was coming to end after five years. 
Since it was elected in May 1938, the first meeting of the House was on 22 July, and thus its 
term of office was about to expire on 21 July 1943.1718 But, there was doubt about the 
advisability of holding the general elections in wartime, especially given South Africa’s 
controversies surrounding her participation in the war. 
 
This view was expressed by Reitz in September 1942, during the opening of the war market 
in aid of the Governor General’ Fund and the Red Cross. He stated that ‘the government was 
not going to hand over the country to the people who would make peace with Germany and 
the people did not want “racialists bawling at one another”’.1719 The conditions in the country 
were not considered favourable for elections. If the elections were to be held, argued Reitz, 
‘there might be a “miniature civil war” and a lot of “bad blood” would be aroused’.1720 Reitz 
was cautious about the prospect of winning the elections. It was less than three months after 
the Tobruk disaster and the intelligence surveys on the mood of the nation had not been 
encouraging. The first shocks of the Tobruk events were wearing down, but there was an 
increase in the number of censored letters which expressed pessimism and doubted the 
country’s prospects in prosecuting the war.1721 Thus, Reitz, while he claimed not ‘to fear the 
results of the election’, he realised that since the opposition organisations depended on a 
                                                 
1716  UWH, Box 273, Meeting of Propaganda Co-ordinating Committee, General Election, Pretoria, 17 
September 1942. 
1717  UWH, Box 273, Meeting of Propaganda Co-ordinating Committee, General Election, Pretoria, 17 
September 1942. 
1718  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 258, Memorandum on General Elections, unsigned, but had written note by 
Louis Esselen attached to it, dated 12 March 1943. 
1719  ‘Inadvisable to Hold Elections – Says Col. Reitz’, Rand Daily Mail, 7 September 1942. 
1720  ‘Inadvisable to Hold Elections – Says Col. Reitz’, Rand Daily Mail, 7 September 1942. 
1721  Army Intelligence, Box 27, CE 4/1, Memorandum Regarding Public Reactions to the Fall of Tobruk 
and Rommel’s Advance into Egypt, 11 July 1942. 
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German victory, ‘if they attained power by a “snap” majority, what would happen to the men 
“up North”’.1722 His views were also supported by one UP official and member of parliament, 
Colonel K. Rood, who explained that ‘he was opposed to the general election because 
thousands of young men, who had joined the Army to destroy Hitlerism, would not be able to 
exercise the very democratic rights which they were fighting to retain’.1723 He was concerned 
that due to the ‘absence of thousands of United Party supporters’ who were in military 
service, the opposition could exploit the war conditions to bring about the ‘downfall of the 
government’.1724 
 
Therefore, because of the war conditions and the prevailing public mood, government 
officials were not convinced that it was the right time to hold the elections. However, the UP 
intelligence reports presented a different picture about the feelings within the white 
electorate. According to the survey by Captain G.H. Ribbink, the UP intelligence officer, 
most members of the public have been mellowing towards Smuts and his war policy since 
1941. The reasons, according to the reports, were the entry of Japan into the war (against the 
Allies), the internecine strife within the opposition movements, especially the clashes 
between Malan (HNP) and Van Rensburg (OB) on the question of how to achieve the 
Afrikaner republic. The report also indicated that, although there were “pockets” of people in 
the Cape and the OFS, “who refused to change” or who still “lived in the past and could 
never get away from the Boer War”, there were general signs of the “softening of attitude” 
towards Smuts’s war policy.1725 Some, who were ‘virulent anti-warites’, had turned around 
and condemned the bomb outrages and Malan’s ‘dictum’ that, ‘even if the country was 
invaded by the enemy, the Nationalists would not take up arms’.1726 They, in turn, expressed 
an ‘anti-Hitler and anti-Nazi’ sentiment, and also went on to declare to Ribbink that, 
‘Generaal Smuts het die regte ding gedoen toe hy oorlog verklaar het teen Duitsland’ (General 
Smuts did the right thing when he declared war against Germany).1727 Ribbink, still, lamented 
the lack of propaganda activity, especially in the country-side, to capitalise on the changing 
sentiment towards the government’s war policy. This ‘lack of propaganda activity’ was a 
regular feature in the intelligence reports, particularly with regard to the critical need to 
                                                 
1722  ‘Inadvisable to Hold Elections – Says Col. Reitz’, Rand Daily Mail, 7 September 1942. 
1723  ‘Elections Now, An Injustice to Springboks’, Rand Daily Mail, 10 September 1942. 
1724  ‘Elections Now, An Injustice to Springboks’, Rand Daily Mail, 10 September 1942. 
1725  UP Archives, Intelligence Service Reports, Capt G.H. Ribbink to O.A. Oosthuizen, 28 December 1941. 
1726  UP Archives, Intelligence Service Reports, by Capt G.H. Ribbink, 17 June 1942. 
1727  UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Service Reports, by Capt G.H. Ribbink, 17 June 1942. 
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convert the Afrikaans-speaking section of the population living in the rural areas.1728 Hence, 
in order to make sure of election victory, propaganda efforts were intensified. 
 
The focus of the government was on discrediting Malan and his HNP, by producing 
publications with a selection of quotations about the racialistic tendencies during his past 
declarations against the English speakers, the negative attitude of the opposition leaders 
towards the soldiers, as well as by exposing “an unwritten alliance of Malan with Hitler” 
regarding the German assurances not to dominate South Africa or to interfere in her internal 
politics.1729 These propaganda efforts were undertaken before even a decision was made 
about whether there would be elections.1730 A stable atmosphere in the country was 
paramount to ensure the election victory for the UP. 
 
In January 1943, Smuts had not yet decided on what to do. He noted privately that he was 
waiting to ‘see how the war goes’ before making a decision – either to prolong the life of the 
parliament or to dissolve it and hold a general election. Although the atmosphere seemed 
favourable then, he did not want to take a risk on the elections which he regarded as ‘the most 
important ever held’ in the Union.1731 Because of some undercurrents of agitation, Smuts 
wanted to keep the decision about the elections in abeyance, leaving the opposition ‘guessing 
and cursing’ until there was visible success of the Allied forces on all fronts, and he was sure 
of ‘winning the elections’.1732 By April 1943, the situation in the Union appeared to be 
calmer, and Smuts had concluded an electoral pact with the Dominion and the Labour parties 
to support one another and not to put up candidates against each other in the parliamentary 
seats held by any of them.1733 Thereafter, on 15 May 1943, it was announced that the general 
elections would be held on 7 July of that year, providing a seven weeks window for election 
                                                 
1728  See UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1945; UP Archives, Intelligence Service 
Reports, by Capt G.H. Ribbink, 17 June 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44, 22-23 June 1942; 
Army Intelligence, Box 24, I 22, Intelligence Records Bureau Summary, 7 February 1942.  
1729  UWH, Box 273, Meeting of Propaganda Co-ordinating Committee, General Election, Pretoria, 17 
September 1942; UWH, Box 273, Lawrence’s Speech, 28 August 1942; UP Archives,  ‘National Party 
Policy: A Series of Extracts from Speeches by its Leader’, by OA Oosthuizen, 1942. 
1730  ‘Inadvisable to Hold Elections – Says Col. Reitz’, Rand Daily Mail, 7 September 1942. 
1731  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, Private Letters, Smuts to Gillett, 13 January 1943. 
1732  Smuts Paper, A1, vol. 261, Private Letters, Smuts to Gillett, 13 January 1943. 
1733  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, Private Letters, Smuts to Gillett, 22 April 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 
307, United Party Agreement with the Dominion Party and the Labour Party, 21 April 1943; ‘Election 
in South Africa’, The Times, 7 May 1943. 
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campaigns.1734 By that time of the election date announcement, the opposition movements 
had already begun with their anti- war campaign.1735 
 
In April 1943, Malan declared that ‘if we come to power, we will terminate our active 
participation in the war. We will withdraw from the war. We shall bring back within our 
borders our troops who have been sent far beyond our borders’.1736 This view, together with 
the Black Manifesto view - the influence of communists on the black society as a result of the 
Union’s association with Russia due to war, became a central election themes for the 
Nationalists.1737 The elections were regarded as the ‘khakhi elections’ or the ‘Soldiers’ 
Vote’,1738 because the Union’s war policy was at the centre of the debates.1739 To optimise the 
chances of electoral success, the government also amended the electoral laws in 1943 to 
allow the soldiers on active service, even those outside the country, to participate in the 
elections.1740 To allow more opportunities for the soldiers to cast their votes and to allow time 
for the ballot papers to be returned to the Union in time, the voting process for them took 
place over the period 28-30 June 1943.1741 The opposition movements urged their supporters 
to vote against Smuts, while the UP played up the national security threats and encouraged 
their supporters to unite behind the war policy in order to ensure the future safety of the 
country.1742 As the SABC policy did not approve of utilising radio for political parties1743, the 
                                                 
1734  ‘Elections in July’, The Star, 15 May 1943; UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Memorandum for PM: Opposition 
Statements Regarding the War Issue and the Election, April to July 1943. 
1735  ‘Elections in July’, The Star, 15 May 1943; UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Memorandum for PM: Opposition 
Statements Regarding the War Issue and the Election, April to July 1943. 
1736  As quoted from Die Transvaler’, 30 April 1943, UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Statements 
Regarding the War Issue and the Election, April to July 1943. 
1737  UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Newspaper Extracts: Memorandum on Opposition Statements Regarding the 
War Issue and the Election, April to July 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, Private Letters, Smuts to 
Gillett, 22 April 1943; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44 (B), Counter-Election Propaganda, 21 June 
1943; See also Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, pp. 222-248. 
1738  UP Archives, General Elections and Provincial Elections, Military Election Matters, 1943; ‘South 
Africa’s Most Momentous General Elections: Duty to Army and Nation’, The Star, 3 July 1943; 
‘Smuts Prepares S.A. for Swift Election Campaign’, Rand Daily Mail, 17 May 1943; ‘Climax of 
Elections Campaign: “War to the End” Will be Smuts’s Call’, Rand Daily Mail, 5 July 1943. 
1739  UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Newspaper Extracts: Memorandum on Opposition Statements Regarding the 
War Issue and the Election, April to July 1943; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44 (B), Counter-Election 
Propaganda, 21 June 1943; UP Archives, General Elections and Provincial Elections, Military Election 
Matters, 22 June 1943 
1740  Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, pp. 225, 275;UP Archives, Pamphlet to Troops: What You Should Know 
about the Election, issue by the UP, 1943. 
1741  UP Archives, Pamphlet to Troops: What You Should Know about the Election, issue by the UP, 1943. 
1742  UP Archives, Smuts on Nationalism, Speech Delivered at the Salvation Army Diamond Jubilee, 12 
April 1943; UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Newspaper Extracts: Memorandum on Opposition Statements 
Regarding the War Issue and the Election, April to July 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, An Appeal 
by the Prime Minister, n.d; UP Archives, General Elections and Provincial Elections, Military Election 
Matters, June 1943; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44 (B), Counter-Election Propaganda, 28 June 1943; 
‘South Africa’s Most Momentous General Elections: Duty to Army and Nation’, The Star, 3 July 1943; 
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election campaigns were waged through the alternative media platforms. The government, 
though, was at a disadvantage because the Zeesen radio campaigned against the war policy in 
support of the opposition movements.1744 The HNP had Die Transvaler, Die Burger and Die 
Vaderland, as its newspaper organs which played a vital role in the campaigns, while the UP 
had none, and had to pay for its advertisements.1745 
 
However, the UP’s campaigning proved successful, especially with the involvement of the 
UUTS which produced posters, stamps, stickers, cartoons, photographs of leaders, pamphlets 
and leaflets, booklets and brochures, mobile cinema vans, loudspeaker announcements, 
military demonstrations, and newspapers advertisements.1746 Smuts was used as a brand in 
the campaigns and, at the same time, the opposition movements were disparaged by 
publishing their negative statements about the Jews, the English, the soldiers and also their 
views about the black society in the Union.1747 The elections went well and the UP won by 
110 to 43, giving them a 67 majority over the HNP.1748 Although it was difficult to determine 
the impact of propaganda on the outcome of the elections, it could be deduced that, what 
worked for the UP were the internal struggles within the opposition movements which failed 
to form a united front to fight the against the government as well as the votes from 
servicemen and their relatives back in the Union.1749 The UP had an electoral pact with the 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Smuts Prepares S.A. for Swift Election Campaign’, Rand Daily Mail, 17 May 1943; ‘Climax of 
Elections Campaign: “War to the End” Will be Smuts’s Call’, Rand Daily Mail, 5 July 1943. 
1743  SABC, Annual Report, Board’s War Policy, 1940, pp. 4-6. 
1744  ZB, Box 8, WR 65/9/43, Broadcast from Enemy Radio Station, July 1943; PP, Box 18, Zeesen 
Broadcast, July 1943; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44 (B), Counter-Election Propaganda, United Party 
Election Circular No. 4, 28 June 1943. 
1745  UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Newspaper Extracts: Memorandum on Opposition Statements Regarding the 
War Issue and the Election, April to July 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 262, Senator Conroy to J.W. 
Higgerty (MP), 19 January 1944; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 262, Senator Conroy to Hofmeyr, 16 May 
1944; Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, pp. 241-245. 
1746  UP Archives, Elections 1943, Correspondence and Propaganda, May-July 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, 
vol. 261, Smuts to Gillett, 21 June 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, Smuts to Gillett, 4 July 1943; UP 
Archives, Intelligence Reports, Ribbink to Oosthuizen, 12 June 1943; Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, pp. 
239-245. 
1747  UP Archives, UP Pamphlets: ‘National Party Policy: A Series of Extracts from Speeches by its 
Leader’, by OA Oosthuizen, 1942; UP Archives, UP Election Talk No. 5, 25 May 1943; Army 
Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44 (B), Counter-Election Propaganda, United Party Election Circular No. 4, 28 
June 1943; Tothill, The 1943 Elections, pp. 239-245. 
1748  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, 11 July 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, 31 July 1943; CGS, Group 2, 
Fortnightly Intelligence Reports, 11 August 1943; Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, p. 332. 
1749  See Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, 31 July 1943; UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Newspaper Extracts: 
Memorandum on Opposition Statements Regarding the War Issue and the Election, April to July 1943; 
CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Reports, 11 August 1943; UWH, Box 162, 
Narep, Unfo 16, Units and Formations: History of WAAS Welfare (Information Service), 1940-1946, 
pp. 1-8; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Annexure B, Welfare Information – WAAS, p. 2; Marquard 
Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 10; Cardo, 
‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 164; Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, p. 397. 
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Dominion and Labour parties, whereas the main opposition, the HNP, failed to secure the 
same support from the other anti-war movements, mainly because of Pirow (New Order) and 
Van Rensburg (OB)’s rejection of the constitutional politics – thus refraining from voting.1750  
 
Tothill also contends that the victory of the UP in the 1943 elections was a product of ‘the 
most carefully prepared for country’s history’ and also due to the fact that the war was going 
well for the Allies.1751 Nonetheless, given the country’s unstable political climate going into 
the war and the fact that the elections were held in the middle of the war without disruptions, 
culminating in the UP victory, was indicative of the extent to which the public had 
“mellowed” towards Smuts’s war policy. Hence, in 1944, Smuts could speak with a measure 
of satisfaction at how the country had progressed since September 1939: 
 
In spite of difficulties, a divided public, a political situation that had always to be carefully 
watched, subversive movements, sabotage and the absence of transport and supplies, we 
could preserve our social and industrial peace … we were more free from strikes and other 
disturbances than ever before.1752 
 
However, as Tothill maintains, the UP’s victory was an illusion because the socio-economic 
aspects were not really addressed.1753 These were conceded by Smuts on 6 December 1944, at 
the fourth UP congress in Bloemfontein (the first after the general elections), while 
addressing the gathering on the Social, Economic and Political Review of the Union. He 
acknowledged that, while the election victory had ratified his war policy and ‘repudiated the 
Opposition’, the job at home in terms of looking after the country was ‘less successful’.1754 
Because of war requirements, there was shortage of food and other civilian supplies as well 
as the introduction of controls to facilitate rationing and to regulate consumption, which drew 
public criticism.1755 The other point was the demobilisation process which was wrecked by 
administrative problems and the returning troops who then faced an acute housing shortage 
                                                 
1750  CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Reports, 11 August 1943. 
1751  Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, pp. 222, 397-398. 
1752  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 304/2, Speeches and Broadcast: United Party Congress, 11 October 1944. 
1753  Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, p. 1; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 262, Conroy to Hofmeyr, 16 May 1944. 
1754  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 304/2, General Smuts’s Speech at the Union Congress of the United Party, 
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problem.1756 These socio-economic issues were to play an important role in the future course 
of South African politics after the war, when the UP lost the elections to the HNP under 
Malan in 1948.1757 While the UDF members were disillusioned with the UP’s inability to 
improve their socio-economic conditions after the war, there were other factors such as 
increased black urbanisation, which produced growing self-awareness and accelerated black 
nationalism.1758 This, in turn, led to political agitation and labour strikes, which also ‘aroused 
fears in many white people’, who then flocked to the NP, to ensure the preservation of a 
harder segregationist order and a return to an uncompromising conservatism.1759 
 
Therefore, the UP’s liberal ideology perpetuated through the AES could not counter the 
“threat” of black nationalism in the eyes of many Afrikaans-speaking whites. Afrikaner 
nationalism, which was accelerated throughout the war by the NP, was consolidated after the 
war, mainly due to fear of the socio-economic competition from blacks, as a result of the 
increase of urban employment and their increased politicisation. This aspect helped to clinch 
the electoral contest for Malan, who, unlike the UP, did not vacillate about the “native 
policy”, but clearly emphasised racial segregation to eliminate any “threat” to white socio-
economic privileges.1760 
 
On any broad measurement of scale, the Union’s publicity and propaganda efforts had a 
limited effect because they could not satisfy the requirements and aspirations of the diverse 
population. For blacks in South Africa and across the African continent, the content of the 
propaganda messages for the Allies stood at variance with the reality of their social, 
economic and political conditions. The democratic values which the war was fought for, were 
contradicted by the discriminatory policies and practices in the Union. Hence, as in many 
colonies around the African continent, there was an increase of black nationalism and 
political activism for decolonisation, equal rights and freedom. Black political action 
increased immediately after the war with a number of labour strikes taking place in the 
industrial sector. 
                                                 
1756  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 304/2, General Smuts’s Speech at the Union Congress of the United Party, 
Bloemfontein, 6 December 1944, pp. 6-7. 
1757  See Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, p. 3; Marx, Oxwagon Sentinel, pp. 484-487; Deegan, The Politics of 
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Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
319 
 
 
In turn, rising African nationalism, with Smuts’s political weakness and the alienation of a 
large portion of the white electorate, combined with difficult socio economic conditions, 
provided Malan’s NP with ammunition which was exploited through the apartheid platform 
to attain victory in the 1948 general elections. This defined the post-war South African 
politics, with the NP’s persistent effort to maintain power, and also to gain global acceptance 
of its policies throughout the second half of the twentieth century. As minority white rule 
would go on to find itself fighting a new and different kind of “apartheid war” in the decades 
after 1945, the propaganda of government and of its opposition found new forms and new 
fields of operation. 
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